The Other Side of Agency
In our philosophical tradition and our wider culture, we tend to think of persons as agents. This agential conception is flattering, but in this paper I will argue that it conceals a more complex truth about what persons are. In 1. I set the issues in context. In 2. I critically explore four features commonly presented as fundamental to personhood in versions of the agential conception: action, capability, choice and independence. In 3. I argue that each of these agential features presupposes a non-agential feature: agency presupposes patiency, capability presupposes incapability, choice presupposes necessity and independence presupposes dependency. In 4. I argue that such non-agential features, as well as being implicit within the agential conception, are as apt to be constitutive of personhood as agential features, and in 5. I conclude.
Reader, S. (2007). The Other Side of Agency. Philosophy, 82(4), 579-604. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819107000162
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||Oct 1, 2007|
|Deposit Date||May 23, 2008|
|Publicly Available Date||Feb 11, 2010|
|Publisher||Cambridge University Press|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
Published Journal Article
This paper has been published by Cambridge University Press in "Philosophy" (82:4 (2007) 579-604). http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1447396<br /> Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2007.