The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions

Ingthorsson, R.D.

Abstract

According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for ’ and ‘sufficient for ’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for ’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is in no sense a condition for P; it is a mere consequence of P.

Citation

Ingthorsson, R. (2008). The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions. Metaphysica, 9(2), 129-137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Oct 1, 2008
• Deposit Date: Oct 7, 2009
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 7, 2009
• Journal: Metaphysica
• Print ISSN: 1437-2053
• Electronic ISSN: 1874-6373
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 9
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 129-137
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x
• Keywords: Necessary and sufficient conditions, Conditionality, Ontology, Wertheimer, Causality, Truth-functional analysis.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1531283
• Publisher URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/6086