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Corlett on Kant, Hegel and Retribution

Brooks, Thom

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The purpose of this essay is to critically appraise J. Angelo Corlett's recent interpretation of Kant's theory of punishment as well as his rejection of Hegel's penology. In taking Kant to be a retributivist at a primary level and a proponent of deterrence at a secondary level, I believe Corlett has inappropriately wed together Kant's distinction between moral and positive law. Moreover, his support of Kant on these grounds is misguided as it is instead Hegel who holds such a distinction. Finally, I attempt to refute the almost timeless retributivist rejection of deterrence-based theories of punishment on the grounds that the latter somehow would condone in some cases the punishment of innocent persons. These individuals almost always demand that no innocent person be punished as a rule of the highest order.


Brooks, T. (2001). Corlett on Kant, Hegel and Retribution. Philosophy, 76(4), 561-580.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Oct 1, 2001
Deposit Date Nov 16, 2012
Publicly Available Date Apr 26, 2013
Journal Philosophy
Print ISSN 0031-8191
Electronic ISSN 1469-817X
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 76
Issue 4
Pages 561-580
Keywords Kant, Hegel, Punishment, Retribution.


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