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Knowledge and Power in Plato's Political Thought

Brooks, Thom

Authors



Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.

Citation

Brooks, T. (2006). Knowledge and Power in Plato's Political Thought. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14(1), 51-77. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550500445137

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2006
Deposit Date Nov 21, 2012
Journal International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Print ISSN 0967-2559
Electronic ISSN 1466-4542
Publisher Taylor and Francis Group
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 14
Issue 1
Pages 51-77
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550500445137
Keywords Plato; Socrates; Republic; idealism; constitution; democracy
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1471336
Publisher URL 10.1080/09672550500445137


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