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Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

Faraci, David; Shoemaker, David

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David Shoemaker


Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.


Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 319-332.

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Mar 19, 2010
Publication Date Mar 19, 2010
Deposit Date Aug 31, 2018
Publicly Available Date Sep 4, 2018
Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Print ISSN 1878-5158
Electronic ISSN 1878-5166
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 1
Issue 3
Pages 319-332
Related Public URLs


Accepted Journal Article (252 Kb)

Copyright Statement
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of philosophy and psychology. The final authenticated version is available online at:

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