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Credit ratings and managerial voluntary disclosures

He, G.

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Abstract

This study investigates whether managers influence credit ratings via voluntary disclosures. I find that firms near a rating change have a higher incidence of a disclosure regarding product and business expansion (PBE) plans. This finding is more evident for firms that are subject to lower proprietary costs of disclosures, which implies that managers do trade off both the benefits and costs of the disclosures. I find no evidence that firms close to a rating change selectively release good news or suppress bad news on PBE. Overall, my results suggest that firms generally exhibit a credible commitment to maintaining disclosure transparency for a desired credit rating.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 2, 2017
Online Publication Date Apr 2, 2018
Publication Date May 1, 2018
Deposit Date Dec 5, 2017
Publicly Available Date Apr 2, 2020
Journal Financial Review
Print ISSN 0732-8516
Electronic ISSN 1540-6288
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 53
Issue 2
Pages 337-378
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12149
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1343366

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: He, G. (2018). Credit ratings and managerial voluntary disclosures. The Financial Review 53(2): 337-378, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12149. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.





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