Second best efficiency and the English auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

Abstract

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2011). Second best efficiency and the English auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 496-506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Apr 21, 2011
• Publication Date: Nov 1, 2011
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 28, 2018
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 73
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 496-506
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1324087