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Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge

Faraci, David

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Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contender. I previously argued that this is a dead end, that all moral perception is dependent on a priori moral knowledge. This suggests that perceptualism merely moves the bump in the rug where the reliability challenge is concerned. Preston Werner responds that my account rests on an overly intellectualized model of perception. In this paper, I argue that though Werner may well be correct, my arguments, properly extended, still suggest that perceptualism leaves realists in no better position than intuitionism when it comes to the reliability challenge.


Faraci, D. (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16(1), 63-73.

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Feb 27, 2019
Publication Date Feb 27, 2019
Deposit Date Sep 3, 2018
Publicly Available Date Feb 27, 2021
Journal Journal of Moral Philosophy
Print ISSN 1740-4681
Electronic ISSN 1745-5243
Publisher Brill Academic Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 16
Issue 1
Pages 63-73
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