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On Trade in Bilateral Oligopolies with Altruistic and Spiteful Agents

Lombardi, M; Tonin, S

On Trade in Bilateral Oligopolies with Altruistic and Spiteful Agents Thumbnail


M Lombardi

S Tonin


This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley–Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the opposite side of the market, it shows that agents always find advantageous to trade. However, they prefer to stay out of the market and consume their endowments when there are altruistic agents who have concerns for the welfare of those on the same side of the market, or when there are spiteful agents. These non-trade situations occur either because the necessary first-order conditions for optimality are violated or because agents’ payoff functions are not concave.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Sep 4, 2019
Online Publication Date Sep 14, 2019
Publication Date 2020-10
Deposit Date Sep 6, 2019
Publicly Available Date Sep 19, 2019
Journal Economic Theory Bulletin
Electronic ISSN 2196-1093
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 8
Issue 2
Pages 203-218
Public URL


Published Journal Article (Advance online version) (361 Kb)

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Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2019.
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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