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Published online: 10 Apr 2025.

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Peacemaking as Statebuilding: Colombia's 2016 Agreement in a Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT

This article shows that Charles Tilly's argument that war makes the state can be augmented by the notion that peace makes the state too. We develop a four-part analytical framework to analyse contemporary civil war peace agreements and identify the extent to which they include provisions specific to security, institutions, governance, and external actors. Using the framework and data, we are able to demonstrate how statebuilding has played a role in peacemaking in the post-1989 period before focusing on Colombia. The article finds that statebuilding has played a significant role in peacemaking in the contemporary era and has accelerated in the post-Cold War period. In the Colombian case, unlike the 2016 peace agreement with FARC, historically peace accords between the Government of Colombia and rebel groups have not been particularly concerned with statebuilding. We are able to conclude, on the basis of comparative empirical evidence, that statebuilding is a core part of contemporary peacemaking.

Introduction

In most statebuilding discourse, interstate war is an important driver of statebuilding. According to Huntington (1968, 123), 'war was the great stimulus to state building'. For Charles Tilly (1975, 42), European history showed that it was the war that made the state, and it was the state that made war. The underlying argument suggests that war caused states to both collect more revenue and collect revenue more efficiently, therefore building their administrative capacity and ability to marshal resources – sometimes in order to wage war. The state, according to this line of thinking, was able to offer protection against external threats, as well as act as a unifying actor for diverse populations. In short, there was a symbiotic relationship between the state and war, with the former able to mobilise material and immaterial resources, and the latter providing a rationale for that mobilisation. Literature away from the war and statebuilding relationship notes that successful statebuilding is related to policy choices, where deliberate decisions were made to invest in state capacity (Besley and Persson 2009; Gennaioli and Voth 2015). Of course, the

European experience did not map onto other parts of the world and narratives of the European historical trajectory of state development were criticised as ethnocentric, path dependent, and contextually unique (Herbst 1990, 118). According to Herbst (Herbst 1990, 125), for example, the African statebuilding trajectory was not driven by external threats, and instead has been marked by weak states facing 'fragmented' societies and 'little orientation to the state as a whole'. Similarly, Latin American countries have had different historical contexts than those of Europe, and states have been historically weak (Centeno 2002). The absence of external threats left most Latin American countries with less professional militaries, contributing to coups and revolts. While coups have declined, there has been other violence as states attempt to assert a monopoly on violence and control of resources (Madrid and Schenoni 2024). In its latest iteration, story of the statebuilding in Latin America involves populist authoritarianism as a means of extending state authority (Meléndez-Sánchez 2021).

State capacity and policy choices also has a significant bearing on understandings of the causes of civil wars. Extant civil war literature, mainly focused on greed or grievance, suggests that state capacity and poor governance are the primary causes of civil war in most developing countries (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Keen 2012; Murshed 2010). While the policy objective of fighting a civil war for a state is to eliminate challenges to the state and maintain its monopoly on the use of force (Tilly 1978), countries have fallen into a 'conflict trap' whereby war further perpetuates weak state institutions and poor governance (Collier 2003). The only way to break the 'conflict trap' is by ending wars and building states (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). In this article, we argue that comprehensive peace agreements negotiated to end armed conflict are also often vehicles for statebuilding. Potentially this can deliver benefits (including peace) for civilians, although sometimes statebuilding and peace can be in conflict. Much depends, of course, on what kind of state is built and maintained.

The ways civil wars end can define the post-war statebuilding process. The victors, either government or rebels, can adopt and implement reforms that safeguard their interests, which may perpetuate state weakness and poor governance. This is particularly because the government victor has incentives to reward the coalition that secured the victory, as was the case in Sri Lanka in 2009 (Ruwanpura et al. 2020). In cases of rebel victory, the victors have to rebuild the state, its institutions and governance systems, in order to consolidate their authority (Sharif and Joshi 2023; Toft 2010). Although statebuilding following any termination type is a significant topic for research and policy, our interest is specific to civil war peace agreements. Such peace accords are likely to be made by actors who previously had incompatible visions of the optimal state and contain provisions that seek to reconcile those incompatibilities.

The key aim of the article is to contribute to our understanding of contemporary peacemaking by empirically demonstrating the extent to which comprehensive peace accords can be regarded as vehicles for statebuilding. This raises important questions about the relationship between peacemaking and statebuilding, and the extent to which the state rather than people may be the primary beneficiary of a comprehensive peace accord. The article focuses on how provisions in peace accords enable statebuilding. In order to do so, the article develops a four-part analytical framework that acts as a guide as to whether or not a peace accord enables statebuilding. The four-part framework

examines the extent to which the peace accord centralizes security around the state, institution-building provisions, good governance provisions, and the extent to which the comprehensive peace accord calls upon international actors to support post-accord statebuilding.

In terms of structure, the article further discusses the statebuilding literature in order to construct and justify the already mentioned four-part analytical framework. In order to assess the extent to which statebuilding plays a role in peacemaking, the article draws on data from the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) to examine comprehensive peace accords in the post-1989 period. Following this comparative analysis, the next section examines the extent to which statebuilding was a feature of peace accords in Colombia in the 1984–2016 period. The last substantive section contains a more detailed examination of the statebuilding aspects of the 2016 Final Agreement. It should be noted that the article examines the frequency of statebuilding provisions in peace accords rather than implementation. The concluding discussion examines the extent to which the 2016 peace agreement can be considered a major strategic accomplishment for the Colombian state as it involved very considerable statebuilding provisions.

In terms of case selection, three factors are worth noting. The first is that PAM data allows the comparative study of comprehensive peace accords thus facilitating placing the Colombian case in a wider peacemaking context. The second case selection point is that Colombia has had multiple armed conflicts and peace accords over an extended period of time, thus facilitating a longitudinal perspective. The third point relates to the 2016 peace accord which was one of the last major civil war peace accords agreed to end one of the longest armed conflicts in the Western hemisphere. In many ways, conflict in Colombia over many decades has revolved around statebuilding, with the state seeking to extend its sovereignty and capacity, and rebel groups opposing this. The 2016 comprehensive peace accord provides an opportunity for a 'stock-take' of the contested Colombian statebuilding project with the state attempting to consolidate its own power and non-state bodies posing a challenge to that.

Building an analytical framework

This section notes how four inter-related factors in peace accords can indicate the role of statebuilding in peacemaking. Security reforms (and especially establishing the state as sovereign in relation to security), institution-building reforms, good governance reforms, and the extent to which implementation involves the state, sub-national or international actors, all point to the extent to which statebuilding is part of peacemaking. The analytical framework seeks to engage with literature in these areas, contributing to the discussion on how peacemaking also involves statebuilding. All four factors provide potential avenues whereby the state can enhance its capacity and claims to legitimacy. We adopted these four categories based on an extensive engagement with the literature and drawing on how provisions in peace agreements are intuitively categorised in Joshi and Darby (2013). The categories (and for this reason provisions in each category) used in the four-part analytical framework are not ranked based on their importance from a statebuilding perspective, as the extent of reform needed differs from one peacemaking context to the other. Still, it is important to recognise that the provisions negotiated in peace agreements during the Cold War primarily focused on security-related issues –

mainly concerning the demobilisation of rebel combatants and had limited focus on political reforms (Quinn and Joshi 2016, 94). However, this pattern has significantly changed in the peace agreements negotiated after the Cold War. While security-related provisions are more frequent in civil war peace agreements (Lee, Mac Ginty, and Joshi 2016), the analytical framework reflects the broader reforms negotiated in the context of post-Cold War change. In aggregate these four factors constitute our analytical framework and allow us to determine the degree to which statebuilding provisions feature in comprehensive peace accords.

Statebuilding as a research and policy topic has attracted the attention of scholars in political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, security studies, and peace and conflict studies (Chandler 2010; Herbst 2014, 1990; Lake 2010; Paris and Sisk 2009; Richmond 2013, 2009; Thies 2005, 2006, 2007; Tilly 1975; Tilly 1978; Tilly 1985; Waldner 1999). Roland Paris' 'institutionalization before liberalization' formulation, for example, argued that states coming out of war should concentrate on building strong institutions before extending representation (Paris 2004). The title of Call and Wyeth's 2008 book reinforces the point that for many, statebuilding was a route to peace: *Building States to Build Peace* (Call and Wyeth 2008). Others, for example David Chandler, warned of the risks of hollow post-war states in which power lay with external actors (Chandler 2010). While these rich interdisciplinary discussions have focused on statebuilding as a process and outcome of the interplay between war, economic reforms, and international interventions, our specific interest is on how peace agreements can shape the post-civil war statebuilding process. In this article we conceptualise statebuilding as a process of expanding state presence and capacity, during which the state exercises coercive and non-coercive approaches to gain civilian compliance to its authority.

In Tilly's (1975) account of European state formation or justifications for modern liberal international peacebuilding (Bakonyi 2022; Gazeley 2022; Paris and Sisk 2009), the state is discussed as a unified mechanism to provide security (the first part of our analytical framework). For Tilly, questions on security can be resolved by eliminating or pacifying those political or militant rivals who pose a threat to the state and its exercise of coercive authority (Tilly 1978, 191). Although Tilly was writing about a particular historical context with a focus on external threats and wars, it is important to note that his notions of the Westphalian state have been a constant trope in modern liberal internationalism and interventions. The civil war rebel governance literature points to how rebel groups challenge the state by offering alternative institutions and governance, producing conditions of dual sovereignty and governance (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Huang 2012; Joshi 2024a; Loyle et al. 2021; Mampilly 2012). Peace agreements offer a non-violent way of dismantling dual sovereignty and governance structures by providing agreed-upon mechanisms to extend the state's reach over the territory by reforming security, institution-building, and governance.

In cases of international military intervention, foreign countries often step-in to enhance security, developing security institutions and rebuilding the armed forces (Bakonyi 2022; Dodge 2013; Gazeley 2022; Jahn 2007; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009; Richmond 2009). The post-Cold War civil war comprehensive peace agreements analysed herein include various security-related provisions that aim to achieve internal security by demobilising rival armed forces and reforming state armed forces, including – in

some cases – recruiting from rival rebel groups. For example, in South Africa, combatants belonging to the African National Congress (ANC) were demobilised and some were integrated into a reformed South African Defense Force (SADF) (Kynoch 1996). In Northern Ireland, a key part of the 1998 Belfast Agreement involved reforming the police force, a development that included recruiting members from the Catholic population, and implementing greater oversight and accountability in policing (Ellison 2007). In many other cases, comprehensive peace agreements have involved extensive security sector reforms (Muggah 2019).

The second part of the analytical framework is building and strengthening institutions. Literature on civil war causation has emphasised the importance of institutional quality and trust in state institutions. Therefore, strengthening and building institutions has become a staple of peacemaking, with the notion that peace can be sustained by building institutional capacity hardwired into much international thinking. In this view, a functioning state is an enabler for other key parts of the liberal peace such as rule of law, liberal democracy and a market-based economy (Bakonyi 2022; Barnett 2006; Lake 2016; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). The 1992 *Agenda for Peace* document, often seen as seminal for post-Cold War international approaches to peace, was clear about the need for 'technical assistance' to enhance 'deficient national structures and capabilities'(Boutros-Ghali 1992, 33). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are dependent on functioning states to deliver many of the goals, with the peace-related SDG 16 specifically mentioning 'strong institutions'(United Nations 2015). In most instances, the post-Cold War comprehensive peace agreements that ended civil wars contained provisions that aimed to build state institutions. This involved reforming constitutions, the way the three branches of government were constituted, and the devolution of state power to subnational units, including electoral and political reforms that enabled armed rebel groups to participate in the democratic process and legitimately claim access to political power and resources. For example, an elected constituent assembly was negotiated to write a new constitution in Nepal. The 2006 CPA also included provisions that established a federal system, reformed the way the executive, legislature, and judiciary were composed, and reformed the electoral system, allowing the Maoist party to contest elections and secure electoral representation in national and local representative bodies for women and marginalised segments of the population. Similar reforms were negotiated in Burundi's 2003 Arusha Accord, the comprehensive peace agreement negotiated with Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Sudan (2005), the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, and the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.

The third part of the analytical framework relates to good governance reforms. Substantial literature connects conflict onset and recurrence with social, political, and economic marginalisation (Clapham 1998; Justino 2009; Walter 2015; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), bad governance, or poor policy choices that stifle growth, promote corruption, exclude the poor and minorities, and, therefore, perpetuate armed conflict (Collier 2008, 2003). Comprehensive civil war peace agreements have sought to significantly reform public sectors and improve governance practices by reconciling policy differences with the political opponents who took up arms. By negotiating governance-related issues, civil war peace agreements can provide instruments to peacefully govern populations and territories that previously were excluded, ungoverned, or hostile to the state.

These instruments address various governance issues ranging from economic development and education reform to citizenship rights and issues of displaced populations, conflict victims, and prisoners. In theory, reformed or newly instituted governance instruments bring the state closer to the people and increase people's trust in state institutions (Börzel and Risse 2016; Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012; Risse 2012).

The final element of our analytical framework relates to which stakeholders (the central state, subnational actors, or international actors) are called upon for the implementation of peace accord provisions. In many cases it is the central state that is charged with the implementation of a peace accord, although in some cases, the implementation mandate is devolved to sub-national bodies, perhaps to take account of minority group concerns in some territories. This devolution of the implementation mandate is also in keeping with the 'local turn' in peacemaking and the realisation that meaningful involvement of local populations may enhance the sustainability of a peace accord (Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty 2014; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). In addition to the central state and subnational bodies, peace accords have also been the site of significant international involvement. Unlike military interventions by Western countries that attempted to build post-war states (Angstrom 2008; Bakonyi 2022; Dobbins 2003; Gazeley 2022; Jahn 2007), peace agreements offer opportunities for external actors to aid the post-war statebuilding efforts in partnership with national actors. These external actors frequently include the United Nations, regional organisations, specialised intergovernmental organisations, and individual countries that provide supportive roles in the transition from war to a functioning state.[1] This often involves technical assistance related to the implementation of the peace accord, such as short-term security assistance or monitoring the implementation of particular peace accord provisions. How responsibility for peace agreement provisions are shared out between national, subnational and international actors can signal the extent to which the comprehensive peace accord is also a statebuilding exercise. External actors may bring technical expertise and support for national and local actors, something that may benefit them.

The analytical framework is a categorisation device (the peaceful dismantling of dual security, institution-building, governance, and the role of external actors) intended to capture the extent to which statebuilding is involved in peacemaking. While the issue has received coverage in the literature, PAM data allows us to empirically test the statebuilding-peacemaking relationship. There has been an extensive literature on state formation with much of the literature concentrating on the Euro-Atlanticist story. Some of the more specialised literature has examined contemporary post-conflict contexts. For Paris (2004), Rotberg (2009), and others, the process of securing peace involves institution-building. Barnett (2006) focuses on the process of stabilising the war-torn state through constitutionalism and putting in place representative mechanisms that can help generate state legitimacy. Christine Bell's work underlines the centrality of the state in peace accords, and how accords allow the state's 'nature and purpose' to be redefined (Bell 2008, 106). Critical Peace and Conflict Studies literature has been alert to how liberal internationalism has been involved in the construction of hollow states (Chandler 2010) and how hybrid institutions have been the site of contestation between local, national and international actors (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Mac Ginty 2010). Zollman, for example, notes how the post-Saddam Hussein 'statebuilding project' in Iraq was advertised as having 'the benevolent tenets of liberal peacebuilding'

but actually 'constituted a neo-colonial state intervention geared towards securing lucrative investor rights and market access for transnational corporations'(Zollmann 2020, 146). Visoka observes how post-conflict states are often overly dependent on external actors and resources and so lack internal legitimacy (Visoka 2020, 57).

In the next section we apply the analytical framework as discussed above to comparative data from the Peace Accords Matrix to illustrate the extent to which statebuilding is a feature of comprehensive peace accords before going on, in the subsequent section, to examine the situation in relation to Colombia.

Comparative data on statebuilding in comprehensive peace accords

We use data from the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) to understand the extent to which provisions in comprehensive peace accords are concerned with statebuilding. The data has, in the past, been used to examine the extent to which peace accords conform to the principles of the liberal peace, and the extent to which accords prioritise security over other issues (Joshi and Darby 2013; Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty 2014; Lee, Mac Ginty, and Joshi 2016). It complements other studies of the content and implementation of peace accords that show an increasing orientation towards building and reforming institutions such as structural change of a state's security forces through downsizing, training and greater civilian control (Bell and Badanjak 2019; Joshi and Darby 2013; Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). For the purposes of this study and its focus on statebuilding as part of peacemaking, we organise the PAM dataset according to the four categories of the analytical framework: a unitary security force, institution-building, governance, and the extent to which external and substate actors have been called upon for peace accord implementation. The focus is on the number of peace accord provisions that fall into each category. Appendix Table A1 illustrates how there are nine security-related provisions, 12 provisions specific to building or reforming institutions, 22 to governance, and six to external actors. These categorizations are mutually exclusive.

To explain further about these provisions, security-related provisions emphasise the dismantling of rival security forces as well as structural reforms that address the inclusion of minorities, human rights training, and establishing civilian control of armed forces. Institutional reform provisions include elements that extend or enhance the central government's reach to the regional or local levels. This is done by sharing power in the executive and legislative branches or allowing rival forces to temporarily control ungoverned territories, maintaining their authority in those territories. Institutional reforms and new institutional mechanisms in peace agreements intend to bring the state closer to the regional and local levels. The governance category includes provisions specific to rights as well as education reform and economic development. The external actor category identifies provisions in CPAs with an implementation or oversight role held by external actors. External actors may provide security in the form of peacekeeping, financial support as outlined by donor support provisions, and technical support for verifying the implementation of the peace agreement. Civil war peace agreements often envisage external actors as having facilitative and supportive roles in the post-war statebuilding process. It is worth noting that many international organisations and states only, or primarily, interact with states, thus reinforcing statehood. Kappler makes the point that peace-support operations often constitute a 'self-legitimizing system' in that legitimacy

is often assessed by the same networks that design the peace support system and its activities (Kappler 2020, 117).

Table 1 shows the frequency of provisions falling into each category for all 34 comprehensive civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War years. Three patterns are discernible. First, there is variance in the focus of individual peace agreements with some placing a greater emphasis on institution-building and governance (e.g. South Africa, Burundi, and Rwanda), and others emphasising security as the top priority (e.g. Mali, Congo, Cambodia). Second, in terms of the frequency of provisions, all four categories in the analytical framework are represented, with governance, security, institutions, and external actors having 258, 192, 180, and 68 provisions, respectively. Third and finally, statebuilding elements predominantly focus on security, with 63% of agreements including all possible security-related provisions, followed by institutions with 44% of provisions, governance with 35% of provisions, and external actors having implementation responsibility with 33%. An analysis of the frequency with which peace accord provisions were directed at statebuilding shows a strong tendency of peace accords to build states, especially through security provisions. At the same time, our analysis shows the prevalence of a statebuilding approach in contemporary civil war peace agreements with the agreements significantly focusing on institutional reforms, governance, and awarding mandates to external actors.

Peacemaking and statebuilding in contemporary Colombia

Having examined the frequency with which statebuilding features in civil war peace agreements we now turn our attention to the Colombian context. In many ways, the history of conflict in Colombia over the past two centuries has been a history of unfinished statebuilding, with the state seeking to extend its power over territory and populations. Rettberg has noted 'the historical weakness of the Colombian state in most regions, especially the rural areas'(Rettberg 2020, 85). Colombia has a history of elite settlement between the liberal and conservative parties that predominantly centered around access to state power and economic resources (Hartlyn 1988; Soifer 2015). By accommodating each other's ideological differences, the liberal and conservative parties secured political stability in Bogota until the first half of the twentieth century (Hartlyn 1988; Soifer 2015). The elite power-sharing at the center, however, deepened vertical economic inequality and left much of rural Colombia ungoverned by the state, a context that proved to be a fertile ground for both paramilitaries and leftist insurgent movements (Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Curtin 2007; Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Curtin 2008; Kingsley 2014; Ramírez and Joshi 2024). The *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army* (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, FARC – EP or FARC) emerged in 1964, followed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1966, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in 1968, the Workers' Self-Defenses (ADO) in 1974, and the Movement-19 (M-19) in 1978, the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), and the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL) in 1984. By 1984, there were at least seven active insurgencies in the Colombian countryside (Ramírez and Joshi 2024).

While the Colombian government mobilised its armed forces and received security assistance from the United States to rein in insurgent groups and the production of narcotics in rural Colombia (Avilés 2008; Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Curtin 2008), the

Table 1. Elements of Statebuilding in Contemporary CPAs since 1989.

Country	Accord Name and Date	Frequency of Provisions			
		Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
Guatemala	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec 29 1996	7	9	13	2
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Jan 16 1992	7	6	8	2
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, Apr 10 1998	6	7	13	1
Macedonia	Ohrid Agreement, Aug 13 2001	5	6	8	2
Croatia	Erdut Agreement, Nov 12 1995	2	1	4	3
Bosnia	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov 21 1995	3	8	9	3
Guinea-Bissau	Abuja Peace Agreement, Nov 01 1998	2	1	2	2
Mali	National Pact, Jan 06 1991	6	5	3	1
Senegal	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC, Dec 30 2004	4	0	5	0
Niger	Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, Apr 15 1995	5	2	8	1
Ivory Coast	Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), Mar 04 2007	7	4	4	2
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement, Aug 18 2003	7	7	8	4
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Peace Agreement, Nov 30 1996	8	5	8	2
Sierra Leone	Lomé Peace Agreement, Jul 07 1999	6	5	10	4
Congo-Brazzaville	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, Dec 29 1999	7	3	5	1
Burundi	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement / Pretoria Protocol, Nov 02 2003	8	8	14	4
Rwanda	Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993, Aug 04 1993	7	9	6	3
Djibouti	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale, Dec 26 1994	3	2	4	0
Djibouti	Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, May 12 2001	5	3	8	1
Angola	Lusaka Protocol, Nov 15 1994	6	4	5	2
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding, Apr 04 2002	8	5	4	1
Mozambique	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Oct 04 1992	8	5	7	3
South Africa	Interim Constitution Accord, Nov 17 1993	5	9	10	1
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Jan 09 2005	9	12	18	3
Lebanon	Taif Accord, Oct 22 1989	3	8	6	0
Tajikistan	General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, Jun 27 1997	7	7	4	3
India	Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), Feb 20 1993	5	3	9	0
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT), Dec 02 1997	5	2	7	1
Nepal	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nov 21 2006	5	9	12	2
Cambodia	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23 1991	8	4	5	4
Philippines	Mindanao Final Agreement, Sep 02 1996	4	8	9	2
Indonesia	MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Aug 15 2005	6	5	11	1
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on East Timor, May 05 1999	3	1	2	4
	Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug 30 2001	5	7	9	3

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

		Frequency of Provisions			
Country	Accord Name and Date	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
Papua New Guinea					
	Total provisions	192	180	258	68
	Expected possible provisions	306	408	748	204
	Percentage of possible provisions	63%	44%	35%	33%

government also engaged in peace processes with various insurgent groups. Between 1984 and 2016 Colombian governments negotiated 35 peace agreements (Ramírez and Joshi 2024). These agreements tended to be with specific organisations rather than being comprehensive and nationwide. Using the PAM methodology and organising peace accord provisions into four categories from the analytical framework (security, institutions, governance, and external actors) as discussed above, we evaluated these agreements to explore their statebuilding elements (see Table 2).

As can be seen in Table 2, the frequency of provisions falling into each category for earlier agreements was significantly low. Most of the earlier agreements were aimed at securing the Colombian countryside by demobilising insurgent groups with little to no focus on building institutions and governance. Further, none of the peace agreements prior to the 2016 agreement with the FARC-EP specified a role for external actors. The main external actor in this era was the United States through its security assistance program, although this was not mentioned in any of the peace accords.[2] While the agreements negotiated in Colombia contained statebuilding elements, they were not robust compared to other civil war comprehensive peace agreements. Figure 1 shows the percentage of provisions in security, institutional, governance, and external actors dimensions for both the CPAs and peace agreements negotiated in Colombia over the 1984–2016 period. In all possible security provisions, CPAs contained 63% of possible provisions compared to only 18% for the agreements negotiated in Colombia between 1984 and 2016. The percentage difference is 242%. The percentage difference in institution-building between the Colombian agreements and CPAs is 429%. For governance related provisions, this difference is 268%. With respect to the external actors, it is 240%. Given that peace agreements in Colombia were partial or specific agreements with individual armed groups, it is not entirely surprising that statebuilding provisions (impacting on the whole of Colombia) did not necessarily feature in a large way. The only peace agreement that stands out in the 35 agreements negotiated since 1984 is the 2016 Colombian Final Agreement (CFA) negotiated with the FARC – EP. Like other CPAs, the 2016 CFA with the FARC emphasises building and reforming institutions and governance along with promoting security and specific roles for external actors (see Table 2). The next section takes a closer look at the statebuilding aspects of the 2016 CPA.

Statebuilding in the 2016 Colombian final agreement

Data on peace accord provisions, and the frequency with which they reference statebuilding, can only go so far. In order to probe more deeply on this question of state consolidation through peace accords, we analysed the 2016 Colombian Final

Table 2. Elements of Statebuilding in peace agreements in Colombia, 1984–2016.

Accord Name and Date	Frequency of Provisions			
	Security	Institution	Governance	External actor
Uribe Agreements, March 28, 1984	1	1	4	1
Corinto Accords, August 24, 1984	1	2	1	0
Accord Between the Commission of Peace, Dialogue, and Verification and the Detachments Simon Bolivar and Antonio Nariño of the National Liberation Army (ELN), December 9, 1985	1	0	1	0
Agreement on the Extension of the Truce, March 2, 1986	2	1	1	0
Political Pact for Peace and Democracy (Government, m-19, Liberal Party, Legislative Chambers, Catholic Church), November 2, 1989	1	2	2	1
Political Agreement Between the National Government, Political Parties, and the m-19, March 9, 1990	2	3	2	2
Final Agreement Between the National Government and the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), January 25, 1991	3	2	4	1
Agreement on EPL Camps – National Government, February 15, 1991	2	0	0	1
Final Agreement Between the National Government and the EPL, February 15, 1991	3	2	4	1
Agreement Between the National Government and MAQL, March 6, 1991	2	1	0	0
Cravo Norte Agreement, May 15, 1991	0	0	0	0
Final Agreement Between the National Government and the MAQL, May 27, 1991	2	0	4	1
General Agenda and Calendar of the Complete Negotiation Process, June 6, 1991	2	2	4	1
Agreement Between Commando Ernesto Rojas and National Government, March 20, 1992	2	0	1	1
Agreement Between the Government and the Popular Militias of the People and for the People and the Popular Independent Militias of the Valle De Aburrá of Medellín and Annex to the Initial Agreement Between the National Government, the Popular Militias of the People and for the People and the Popular Independent Militias of the Valle De Aburrá, February 15, 1994	3	0	2	0
Current of Socialist Renewal (Crs), April 9, 1994	2	1	5	1
Militia Agreements, May 26, 1994	1	0	2	1
Francisco Garnica Front, June 14, 1994	2	0	0	0
Final Agreement National Government Francisco Garnica Guerrilla Coordination Front, June 30, 1994	2	1	1	0
Agreement for the Liberation of the Oea Delegates, November 1, 1997	1	0	1	1
Declaration of Viana, February 9, 1998	2	2	2	0
Puerta Del Cielo Agreement, July 15, 1998	0	1	5	0
Final Agreement Independent Revolutionary Movement – Armed Commandos, July 29, 1998	3	0	2	1
Caquetania Agreement, May 2, 1999	0	0	0	1
Common Agenda for the Path to a New Colombia, May 6, 1999	1	5	5	0
Agreement Between the Government and the National Liberation Army (Eln), October 30, 2000	1	0	1	1
Los Pozos Agreement Between the Government of Colombia and Farc, February 9, 2001	1	0	2	0
San Francisco De La Sombra Agreement to Define and Consolidate the Peace Process, October 5, 2001	0	0	1	0
Accord for Colombia Between Colombian Government and ELN, November 24, 2001	1	0	0	0
Accord for a Timetable for the Future of the Peace Process, January 20, 2002	1	0	0	1
Agreement on the National and International Involvement at the Table of Dialogue and Negotiation, February 7, 2002	0	0	0	0
Santa Fe De Ralito Agreement to Contribute to the Peace of Colombia, July 15, 2003	1	0	0	0

Table 2. Continued.

	Frequency of Provisions			
Accord Name and Date	Security	Institution	Governance	External actor
Agreement Between the National Government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia for the Placement Zone in Tierralta, Córdoba (Fátima Agreement), May 13, 2004	1	0	0	1
Agreement with the Guevarista Revolutionary Army, August 2, 2008	3	0	0	0
Final Colombian Agreement, November 24, 2016	6	8	13	2
Total Provisions	56	34	70	20
Expected provisions	315	420	770	210
Percentage of possible provisions	18%	8%	9%	10%

Figure 1. Difference between Civil War CPAs and the peace agreements negotiated in Colombia.

Agreement (CFA) between the FARC and the Colombian government with data from the Peace Accords Matrix Barometer Initiative (Quinn et al. 2023). Unlike existing peace agreement data that provides information specific to provisions negotiated in the agreement (Bell and Badanjak 2019; Joshi and Darby 2013; Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019), the PAM-BI data analyses the content of the 2016 CFA with the objective of tracking implementation compliance for all commitments in the agreement that are actionable, observable and measurable. The PAM-BI data identifies 578 such commitments or stipulations that can be objectively measured and monitored for implementation compliance.

All 578 stipulations in PAM-BI data are coded to identify the location and/or actors implementing the given stipulation. Therefore, we are able to identify the involvement of international, national, and regional/local actors in the 2016 CFA.

To begin with, we code the international involvement variable as '1' when the stipulation explicitly calls for a role for foreign countries, intergovernmental organisations, or any other foreign entities (governmental organisations, humanitarian agencies, think

tanks, and academic institutions) to have a role in the implementation process. Otherwise, this variable is coded '0'. Peace agreements usually contain a series of reforms and policy priorities for the state to implement, addressing political, social, and economic issues (Bell and Badanjak 2019; Joshi and Darby 2013; Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect these priorities to be carried out at the national level, which involves processes, political actors, and institutions that operate at the national level. As such, we code a variable for national involvement as '1' for the responsibilities involving the Colombian government's legislative, executive, and judiciary branches and various agencies responsible for designing and implementing policies and programs at the national level as part of implementing the 2016 CFA. If a stipulation does not identify these actors or call for a role to be established for them, or the implementation does not transpire at the national level, this variable is coded '0'.

Similarly, we code a variable for regional and local involvement as '1' if a stipulation identifies the primary implementation mandate to lie with either subnational-level government entities working closely with civilians, indigenous or local communities, or civil society groups. In the 2016 CFA, these actors and entities are recognised to have significant influence, as they play roles in consultative and participatory processes in designing and implementing policies. They can also be the beneficiaries of the implementation outcome. Otherwise, this variable is coded '0'. Because a given stipulation can involve roles for multiple actors in multiple locations, the coding is mutually inclusive of the involvement of multiple actors and locations.

Implementation activity following the signing of the peace agreement is likely to have a significant statebuilding dimension as it involves developing or reforming institutions and delivering good governance (Barnett 2006; Chesterman 2014; Mac Ginty, Joshi, and Lee 2019; Paris 2008; Rotberg 2009; Urlacher 2021; Wesley 2008). Often the conflict is over the state, its orientation, its record of sharing resources, and conduct on security issues, and so attempts to deal with conflict often require a reform or reorientation of the state. The 2016 CFA is no exception. Therefore, after identifying the actors and location with primary mandate for all 578 stipulations, we coded each stipulation according to any statebuilding elements, which is defined in terms of (re)building institutions, programmes to be implemented for the delivery of governance, processes to be carried for the legitimacy of the programme, and the provision of resources to effectively rebuild the state. As such, we code four different variables with statebuilding elements. The variable institution is coded '1' if a stipulation creates or reforms entities such as the establishment of commissions, committees, or boards. If a stipulation calls for new laws or constitutional revisions, this is also coded as an institution. Otherwise, this variable is coded '0'. The variable programme is coded '1' if a stipulation identifies activities with defined goals and objectives in relation to governance, statebuilding, or security. Otherwise, this variable is coded '0'. The variable process is coded '1' if a stipulation calls for facilitative or consultative activities to be carried out in order to design and implement programmes. Otherwise, this variable is coded '0'. Finally, the variable resource is coded '1' if a stipulation calls for financial support or subsidies. A stipulation that calls for elements that intend to build capacities such as technical training or support is also coded as a resource variable, otherwise '0'.

Findings from the 2016 Colombian final agreement

Data generated from this process is used to evaluate the statebuilding dimensions in the 2016 CFA. Table 3 below provides an overview of the location (international, national, regional, local) and/or actors charged with implementing a stipulation. As the Table shows, the 2016 CFA had a very significant focus on statebuilding. Out of 578 stipulations, national-level actors or responsibilities are identified as having some mandate for 540 stipulations, or 93.42 percent of all stipulations in the agreement. Out of these 578, 250 stipulations, or 43.25 percent of all stipulations, fall under the sole competency of national-level actors. Similarly, 289 or 50 percent of all stipulations belong to the regional or local category, but only 22 (3.81 percent out of 578) are in the exclusive domain of regional and local level actors or processes. Further, out of all the stipulations in the 2016 CFA, 246 or 42.6 percent relate to both the national and local actors and locations. While national and sub-national actors may be involved in the implementation of the same peace accord provision, the power dynamic between the two is not the same. As such, it can be argued that the peace accord seeks to expand the state and its presence at the sub-state level. In other words, it is possible to argue that the 2016 CFA was an exercise in statebuilding as the agreement provides the state a passage to territories and communities. The agreement uses the language of peace to strengthen the state.

The 2016 CFA also had an international dimension and gave international actors a specific mandate for 60 out of 578 stipulations, or 10.22 percent. Of these stipulations, 32 (5.5 percent of total stipulations) relate to both international and national actors, whereas only nine stipulations specify roles for both international actors and regional and local actors. International actors have an exclusive mandate for seven stipulations. The international, national, regional, and local actors are listed together as having joint mandates for 12 stipulations out of 578. These 12 stipulations are specific to the ceasefire (3), demobilisation (1), disarmament (2), reintegration (1), children's rights (1), paramilitary groups (1), electoral/political party reform (1) and economic and social development (2). The data indicates that the 2016 CFA seeks to build or rebuild the Colombian state by bringing it to the peripheries – geographically and thematically. The statebuilding process includes international actors, whose role is especially to provide assistance for national level priorities and processes that aid the state in achieving security and strengthening the state presence in the territories. This finding is consistent with the hybrid peace argument that suggests relationships and activities involving actors who

Table 3. Implementation Role or Location in the 2016 Colombian Final Agreement.

|	
Total International	60 (10.22%)
Total National	540 (93.42%)
Total Regional/ Local	289 (50%)
International & National	32 (5.5%)
International & Regional/Local	9 (1.6%)
National & Regional/Local	246 (42.6%)
International, National & Regional/Local	12 (2.1%)
International only	7 (1.2%)
National only	250 (43.3%)
Regional/Local only	22 (3.8%)

Figure 2. Roles and inclusion of external, national and local actors in implementing the 2016 CFA.

align horizontally and vertically (Mac Ginty 2010). Figure 2 shows the expansive nature of statebuilding priorities and how the central state dominates the peace accord in terms of having an implementing mandate. The size of the circle is proportional to the total stipulations in the 2016 CFA.

In the analysis of the 578 stipulations, we find that 70 out of 578 stipulations (or 12.11 percent) relate to building institutions. The number of stipulations specific to programs is 85 or 14.70 percent. Out of all stipulations, 115 or 19.89 percent of the stipulations are related to providing resources. The most significant focus is on processes, with 383 stipulations (66.26 percent). Over two-thirds of stipulations within processes suggest participation and representation of communities, indigenous groups, women, and civil society actors. In one reading these can be seen as democratising and involving a degree of devolution and participation of sub-national actors. Yet, as illustrated above, given the involvement of the central state in so many stipulations, the peace accord can also be read as bringing populations into the ambit of the state. Given that resources are often involved, there is an incentive for substate actors to participate. These processes are instrumental for the peace implementation process to be inclusive and gain legitimacy. As such, the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia aims to build the Colombian state and reach the countryside by gaining and expanding the state's legitimacy.

Concluding discussion

We have demonstrated, through comparative empirical evidence of the provisions in peace accords, that statebuilding plays a major role in peacemaking in the modern era.

Moreover, by examining the case of Colombia, we have been able to demonstrate that historically peace accords between the Government of Colombia and various rebel groups have not been particularly focused on statebuilding. An examination of the provisions in the 2016 Colombian Final Agreement, however, shows a radical change. The 2016 Agreement contained multiple provisions that further empowered the state, extended its reach and awarded it oversight powers. By categorising provisions in the 2016 Agreement according to 578 stipulations, we are able to map the implementation process involving various actors. The data makes clear that the 2016 Peace Agreement marks a power grab on the part of the state. Caution is required, however. We are not able to rank the importance of particular provisions as different actors are likely to attach different importance to different provisions and this may change over time (Joshi 2024b). Moreover, the actual implementation may tell a different story. Once the detailed implementation data on the 2016 CFA is available from the Kroc Institute, future research could explore how the agreement's implementation would shape post-accord statebuilding.

It is clear that statebuilding comprises a major part of the 2016 Colombian Final Agreement. Given that the conflict (or more precisely conflicts) was to a significant degree a contest around unfinished statebuilding, then this can be regarded as an accomplishment by the central state. The CFA can be seen as a vehicle for the extension of state territorial and policy control in a way much more pronounced than previous peace accords in Colombia. Moreover, the comparative international data shows that compared to other peace accords, the 2016 CFA had an enhanced statebuilding aspect. These findings turn Tilly's observation that 'war makes the state' on its head and suggests that, in the case of Colombia and other contemporary cases at any rate, it is peace that makes the state. The peace accord provided the security space and legislative and institution-building opportunities to further state capability and territorial control. Yet these findings require two points of nuance. The first point revolves around the well-known observation that peace accords are only as good as their implementation (Joshi and Quinn 2017; Mac Ginty, Joshi, and Lee 2019). The latest available report (July – September 2023) on the implementation of the CFA suggests that implementation has stalled. While 31% of peace accord stipulations had been completed, and 20% were judged to be at an intermediate stage of completion, 38% had achieved only a minimum level of completion and 11% had not been initiated (Álvarez et al. 2024, 8).[3] In other words, it is worth being cautious about a conclusion of state expansion under the guise of the peace accord if that peace accord is only partially implemented. Indeed, a blunt illustration of the failure of the state to extend its reach in the aftermath of the peace accord can be seen through the high levels of political violence, especially that directed against social activists. The 2023 Human Rights Watch World Report noted that the 2016 peace accord in Colombia brought 'an initial decline in violence. But violence took new forms and abuses by armed groups increased' and that many human rights defenders, indigenous leaders and others 'face pervasive death threats and violence' (Human Rights Watch 2023).

The second note of caution refers to one aspect of the statebuilding dimension of the peace accord, namely its ambition to engage in statebuilding from below (Piccolino and Ruette-Orihuela 2021, 2398). While the CFA does include orthodox statebuilding aspects such as building institutions at the centre, a key element of the peace accord was Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus (PDETs). The PDETs seek 'to build state institutions capable of effectively regulating daily life in regional development. It is about building a government through the participation of state agents and society as a whole,

based on the recognition of the different actors inhabiting a territory' (Valencia, Castaño, and Silva-Ojeda 2024, 8–9). What makes the PDETs noteworthy is their participatory ambitions whereby the state is built from the local level. The Colombian state has been described as 'excessively centralized' (Rodríguez Iglesias and Rosen 2022, 91) with power based in Bogota and significant rural-urban disparities, and thus the PDETs offer – theoretically at any rate – an antidote. Yet while the PDETs create opportunities for participation in the planning of projects, they are also a vehicle through which rural areas can be brought into the ambit of the state. Indeed, one study was scathing of local-level and environmental peacebuilding, describing it as 'an extractive peace wherein peacebuilding policies pacify and forcibly integrate frontier communities' (Johnson, Rodríguez, and Hoyos 2024, 2). Another study starkly puts this as the 'necropolitics of peacebuilding' in which provisions in the peace agreement 'racialized and spatialised violence directed at indigenous leaders, organisations and communities' (Ruette-Orihuela et al. 2023, 2).

The classical literature on statebuilding points to a dialogic, indeed transactional, relationship between the state and its population. In this model, the state accumulates and centralises power, but affords security and resources to those under its protection. Theoretically, a virtuous political economy develops between citizen and state allowing the state to develop and the citizens to prosper. In reality, and as the Colombian case shows, the process is sclerotic negotiation with many episodes. The 2016 Colombian Final Peace Accord can be read as an important episode in the statebuilding process. Certainly the emphasis on statebuilding in a large number of provisions, and the appointment of the state as the principal implementation body, points to peacemaking as statebuilding.

Notes

1. In Cambodia, Croatia and East Timor the United Nations assumed extensive roles in the form of transitional authority, but most recent practice involves more facilitative roles accepted by the host state.
2. Except for the 2016 CFA, all other agreements negotiated in Colombia had the verification provision in the external actor category. This verification provision had roles involving only domestic actors.
3. The Kroc Institute's report suggests that the implementation is complete in 31% of stipulations. Most of this success belong to Point 3 (End of Conflict) of the agreement, with over 39% of 31% (or 181 out of 578) of complete implementation. The Point 3 of the agreement mostly focuses on security aspects (ceasefire, demobilization, laying down of weapons and reintegration of FARC combatants). This is followed by 27% of all completed stipulations in Point 6, which includes provisions for external actors and deals with provisions specific to the monitoring and verification process. Rural reform, political participation, the substitution of illicit crops, and victims related topics have 2 percent (4 out of 181), seven percent (13 out of 181), eight percent (15 out of 181), and 16 percent (29 out of 181) completed provisions respectively.

Disclosure statement

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Appendix

Table A1. Provisions in Peace Agreement and their categorisation.

S.N.	Provisions	Descriptions	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
1	Arms Embargo	This provision limits or prohibits the sale or transfer of weapons and targets both state and non-state armed actors.	✓			
2	Amnesty	The amnesty provision outlines processes for legal immunity or exemptions given to armed actors for political and criminal offenses committed during the conflict.			✓	
3	Boundary Demarcation	The boundary demarcation provision provides the basis for creating, dividing, or altering the boundaries of subnational or local government entities.			✓	
4	Ceasefire	The ceasefire provision provides the basis for the state and the rebel forces to stop fighting, as well as regulates the movement of troops.	✓			
5	Children's Rights	This provision promotes children's rights, access to education, and protection from abuse and exploitation both in general and by armed actors in particular.			✓	
6	Citizenship Reform	This provision revises the requirement or process of obtaining or revoking citizenship status. In general, attempts have been made to make it easy for dwellers in the country to get citizenship regardless of their ethnicity or religious background when they reside in the recognised boundary of the state.			✓	
7	Civil Administration Reform	With this provision, the signatory intends to reform the civil administration to address issues related to corruption, representation of diverse groups, and its efficiency at the local level.		✓		
8	Constitutional Reform	The constitutional reform provision deals with the content to be revised in the existing constitution or write a new constitution.		✓		
9	Cultural Protections	This provision recognises citizens of their right to practice their culture, their right to a heritage, and their right to a recognition of cultural diversities.			✓	
10	Decentralization / Federalism	This provision deals with establishing federal or decentralised governing units so that the state or municipality at the subnational level can make decisions pertinent to the defined territory and collect and manage resources independently from a central government.		✓		
11	Demobilisation	The demobilisation provision is a process involving the discharge of active	✓			

Table A1. Continued.

S.N.	Provisions	Descriptions	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
		combatants belonging to either the rebel or state armed forces. This consists of regrouping in assembly areas or cantonment sites for a formal or official release from combat roles.				
12	Disarmament	The disarmament provision provides the process of disarming combatants and collecting, documenting, and destroying arms, ammunition, and weaponry used in the war.	✓			
13	Dispute Resolution Commission	This provision creates a dispute resolution commission, which is an institutional mechanism established to resolve implementation-related disagreements or disputes. The mechanism often has members representing all parties in the agreement.		✓		
14	Donor Support	The donor support provision calls on foreign entities (foreign governments or non-governmental organisations) for financial resources to implement the agreement.				✓
15	Development	The development provision identifies programmes or reform initiatives that intend to improve the economic and social conditions of the war-affected region, country, or both.			✓	
16	Education Reform	The education reform provision addresses issues related to curriculum, quality, and accessibility of education.			✓	
17	Electoral / Political Party Reform	This provision changes laws pertaining to the electoral system, the threshold requirement for winning seats or becoming a national party, and the opportunity for rebel groups gaining the status of legitimate political parties.		✓		
18	Executive Branch Reform	The executive branch reform provision contains conditions specific to the appointment, composition, tenure, and power of the head of the state, the head of government, and the cabinet members.		✓		
19	Human Rights	This provision calls for general adherence to human rights norms and practices for joining a human rights treaty and/or establishing a human rights commission as a body to work on human rights issues.			✓	
20	Independence Referendum	The independence referendum provision provides a legal foundation for an area of an existing state to have an election to decide the question of independence or autonomy within the state.			✓	
21	Indigenous Minority Rights	This provision calls for measures to be taken to recognise the historical ties between the group and their land, ownership, access to the land, and their political and social power affecting the decision.			✓	
22	Inter-Ethnic /State Council	This provision calls for an institutionalised mechanism for sustained interaction between ethnic groups or ethnoreligious groups and the state, so that the		✓		

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued.

S.N.	Provisions	Descriptions	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
		government has input from these groups on legal and political matters.				
23	Internally Displaced Persons	This provision provides policies and programmes targeted at individuals and groups of people displaced within the country because of war.			✓	
24	International Arbitration	This provision allows disputants to present their cases to an impartial third party to resolve the underlying disagreement.				✓
25	Judiciary Reform	The judiciary provision calls for reforms specific to the structure, appointment, qualification, or process of handling criminal or civil cases in the judiciary.		✓		
26	Legislative Branch Reform	The legislative branch provision calls for reforms specific to its composition, the qualification of its members, as well as the procedures and rules of the lawmaking process.		✓		
27	Media Reform	This provision calls for reforms that affect press freedom, media licensing, media ownership, protection of journalists from violence and intimidation, and access to information.			✓	
28	Military Reform	The military reform provision calls for changes in the structure of the military, the integration of opposition troops into the national army, civilian control over the military, gender and ethnic representation in the army, and reforms in training procedures.	✓			
29	Minority Rights	The minority rights provision calls for reforms specific to minority groups' linguistic rights, the use of language, and the role of minority groups in the political and policy-making process at the national and local levels.			✓	
30	Natural Resource Management	This provision governs the issues specific to the utilisation of natural resources, the sharing of revenue from the utilisation of natural resources, or the right to own, extract, and sell natural resources.			✓	
31	Official Languages and Symbols	This provision calls for changes to the language used for official purposes at the national and subnational levels, as well as national symbols and flags, in order to represent the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversities of the country.			✓	
32	Paramilitary Groups	This provision specifies a process of absorbing, disbanding, or dismantling paramilitary groups, irregular militias, or mercenaries.	✓			
33	Police Reform	The police reform provision calls for changes in the structure of the police force, the integration of opposition troops into the police force, civilian control over the military, gender and ethnic representation, and reforms in training procedures.	✓			
34	Prisoner Release	This provision calls for the release of political and war prisoners imprisoned by one or both sides.			✓	

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued.

S.N.	Provisions	Descriptions	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
35	Review of Agreement	This provision calls for a periodic review of the implementation status by the signatory themselves or domestic or international actors.			✓	
36	Ratification Mechanism	This provision involves a process or processes to confer legal status to the agreement. The process usually consists of a cabinet decision, a legislative process, or a referendum.			✓	
37	Refugees	This provision articulates the policies and programs targeted at individuals and groups of people displaced by war and living outside the country.			✓	
38	Regional Peacekeeping Force	This provision calls for the deployment of peacekeeping forces with troops from countries in a region under the command of a regional organisation.				✓
39	Reintegration	The reintegration provision delineates programs involving ex-combatants social, psychological, and economic well-being or compensation packages designed to facilitate their return to civilian life.	✓			
40	Reparations	This provision calls for compensation or reparations in the form of financial support to those who suffered harm from the conflict or for the creation of monuments commemorating conflict victims.			✓	
41	Self-Determination Process	This provision allows a guaranteed process for the people of a territorial unit to determine their desired future political status for the territory.			✓	
42	Territorial Powersharing	This provision institutionalises the rebel's authority in the territory which they hold for security reasons during the transition period.		✓		
43	Transitional Powersharing Government	This provision is an institutional arrangement that allows the government, opposing political parties, and signatory rebel groups to share positions in one or all three branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial).		✓		
44	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	This provision establishes an institutional body to investigate and report on patterns of human rights abuses within an agreed-upon period, usually for the entirety of the conflict with the objective of achieving reconciliations.		✓		
45	Verification	This provision is a mechanism which gives members representing domestic, regional, and international actors the mandate to verify the implementation of the peace agreement.				✓
46	UN Peacekeeping Force	This provision calls for the deployment of peacekeepers under the command of the United Nations to stabilise and assist the war to peace transition.				✓
47	UN Transitional Authority	This provision is an arrangement by which the parties give the sovereign executive authority to the United Nations for transitioning periods.				✓

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued.

S.N.	Provisions	Descriptions	Security	Institution	Governance	External Actors
48	Withdrawal of Troops	The withdrawal of troops provision calls for the removal of military or military bases from a certain area of the country or the removal of foreign armed forces.	✓			
49	Women's Rights	The women's rights provision provides for reforms to recognise and protect women's political, social, and economic rights, including gender equality.			✓	
	Total		9	12	22	6

Two provisions, Implementation Timeline and Commission to Address Damage/Loss are excluded. The timeline provision indicates specific deadlines for a given provision. The Commission to Address Damage/Loss provision allows victims of the conflict to adjudicate this body to determine the claim. Such practice is less common in an intrastate peace agreement.