After War Ends: Aid Paradigms and Post-conflict Preferences

Pamina Firchow
Julianne Funk
Roger Mac Ginty

Abstract

This article is interested in aid preferences, or what people desire in terms of aid, in a post-conflict and post peace accord context (namely, Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina). When examining post-conflict preferences around peace thirty years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can observe less of an emphasis on justice and security-related needs and more concrete demands for traditional development-related needs such as infrastructure, jobs, improvement of public spaces and business. Using extensive and original community-sourced data, we show a widespread diversity of needs and priorities related to peace depending on people's gender, age, ethnicity or nationality and location. This points to the need for peace programming that is multi-modal, flexible, and able to recognize different timelines. This is significant in that Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced very substantial international peace support and reconciliation assistance over the past three decades, but citizens are anxious to move on and return to 'normal.' The research suggests a fatigue with post-conflict contexts being perennially linked to a 'post-war' or 'post-conflict' status and thus serves as a guide for future international support decades after war has ended.

Introduction

After wars end, many interests compete over funds provided by international actors. These interests represent a myriad of different issues that can and should be addressed after armed conflict, such as humanitarian, security, justice, development, governance or reconciliation related needs. As localization is integrated into international aid frameworks, a key issue revolves around who makes these aid decisions (international, national or local actors) and whose issues are prioritized. There is limited understanding around whether international donor decisions align with the preferences of everyday people living in contexts where violent conflict took place.[1] Few empirical studies have examined whether or how local post-

---

[1] We use the term 'post-conflict' in this paper because it engages an existing body of literature. However, we acknowledge the complexity of this term regarding many conflict contexts. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, this paper's case, the direct violence of armed conflict ended in 1995 but political conflict has continued for decades,

conflict preferences influence aid paradigms and what consequences paying attention to preferences may have for the effectiveness of international aid in these contexts. Indeed, as Hennessy and colleagues note, 'The dearth of studies conducted from the recipient perspective is perplexing after more than 30 years of "alignment with recipient preferences", "local ownership of aid", "locally-led development" and "decolonisation of aid"' (Hennessey et al. 2023, 1).

This study attempts to fill this gap by using a dataset of 1109 community-generated peace indicators generated by 323 residents in seven neighborhoods of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Blagaj, Podhum, Cernica, Zalik, Potoci, Bijeli Brijeg and Cim) from December 2021 to February 2022 in order to better understand the dynamics between post-conflict preferences and aid paradigms three decades after the armed conflict there ended.[2] We find that nearly thirty years after the war ended, the people of Mostar have tired of the international focus on peace and justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When identifying indicators of peace, they do not express much concern for traditional transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials, truth commissions or reparations that address ethnic and religious divides, and instead place much more emphasis on development-related activities associated with alleviating hardship and improving everyday quality of life, such as business opportunities, better governance, improved infrastructure, access to medical care and the ability to play sports. However, we also found that people did prioritize indicators related to the legacies of the war, and integration and acceptance, which were focused on social acceptance, inclusion, dialogue, memorialization and reconciliation related activities, although these factors were less important than the development-focused priorities. Therefore, our evidence from Mostar suggests that thirty years after the war everyday people prioritize development assistance with some integration of dialogue or conflict resolution rather than assistance that is explicitly linked to retributive or restorative justice mechanisms.

However, we also find that there is a large level of variability from one neighborhood to another within Mostar, meaning that various factors such as ethnicity, religion, location and war and post-war experiences can influence conflict preferences. Our data points to a dynamic non-linearity in preferences after conflict rather than a simple linear arc that moves from peace to development. This reinforces the claims made by peace researchers that

---

including structural (e.g. legally instituted discrimination) and cultural violence (e.g. the perpetuation of nationalist prejudice and exclusion).

[2] The focus group facilitators prompted participants to reflect on two concepts: peace and 'life together' (which is related to 'coexistence' but slightly less loaded with assumptions). The seven communities generated 1109 peace indicators and 1162 life together indicators. This paper includes analysis exclusively of the peace indicators because the main research question we are investigating is about aid preferences, or what people desire in terms of aid, in a post-peace-accord context. Therefore, we are interested in people's indicators of peace and how these align with peacebuilding activities.

making broad-stroke conclusions about post-conflict preferences is problematic, since these should always be contextualized, taking into consideration the many different variables that may affect preference (Chandler 2000; Décobert 2020; Lederach 2005; Mac Ginty 2021; Richmond 2018). In other words, preferences do not necessarily follow a conflict curve or a set of logical steps of interventions typically implemented after war (Lund 1996).

Although our data only relates to one case, and therefore we must be careful about generalizability, the issues raised in this article connect with a number of policy debates and initiatives that have wider applicability. For example, the lack of linearity that we identify in our research resonates with the adoption of an integrated approach termed the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. This triple nexus emerged from earlier efforts to link sectors, such as the disaster-development continuum (Audet 2015) and the conflict-development nexus (Korf 2006). For the purposes of this article, then, an important question is the extent to which these outsider and elite-level preferences and nexuses match local preferences. In other words, is the link between peace, humanitarianism and development that has been internalized by international actors also shared in the same ways by local actors? This question is crucial as elite-level actors have access to material resources, in the form of aid or tax revenues, that local actors may not. A misreading of post-conflict preferences carries the risk of waste and ineffectiveness as well as a souring of donor-recipient relations and the wider post-conflict environment.

In terms of this article's structure, the first substantive section helps contextualize the article by examining the literature on post-conflict preferences and resulting tensions between internal and external actors. The section also adds to the context by outlining the development of the triple nexus, or the attempt by international organizations to coordinate and make responsive their approaches to humanitarian, development, and conflict challenges. In its second section the article briefly describes the history of post-war international intervention in Mostar and particularly makes the point that many of these interventions were top-down and conformed to external imaginaries of what would be in the best interests of local actors. The third section then outlines the research design, and the methodology involved in the indicator collection and analysis processes. The fourth section deals with findings and reports the preferences of local communities as measured by the indicators. The conclusion discusses the findings and in particular clear local preferences for development related priorities rather than issues directly linked to justice. This points to a fatigue with interventions linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war status.

Post-conflict preferences and the Triple Nexus

There is disagreement among scholars from various disciplines interested in what kind of conflict responses are preferred after war (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla-Boado 2011; Aloyo,

Dancy, and Dutton 2022; Firchow 2018; Pham et al. 2016; Samii 2013; Tellez 2019). Post-conflict preferences refer to the preferences or behaviors that individuals or institutions exhibit following war or a traumatic event. Preferences can vary depending on the nature of the event, the individual or community's experience during the war, and cultural, social, and environmental factors. Studies in the area of post-conflict preferences reflect debates around what kinds of interventions everyday people want after war, although there remains little consensus on findings. For example, political scientists studying justice preferences after war have found that people affected by armed conflict prefer trials over other forms of transitional justice such as reparations (Aloyo, Dancy, and Dutton 2022; Meernik and King 2014). Aloyo, Dancy and Dutton argue that victims and witnesses of mass atrocities prefer retributive over reparative justice when called upon to choose between the two (Aloyo, Dancy, and Dutton 2022, 12). Whereas others have shown that civilians exposed to violence in conflict zones are more inclined to grant concessions to armed actors (Tellez 2019), forgive and forget (Samii 2013) or, in contrast, that civilians are more interested to learn the truth about what happened to their loved ones (Firchow 2018) or ensure their physical security (Carey, González, and Gläßel 2022). Overall, post-conflict preferences may provide a significant roadmap to the process of recovery and healing following violent conflict or a traumatic event. Understanding and addressing these preferences and how they emerge may help to promote a more positive and effective response to such events. They also connect with the trend among international organizations towards more participatory agendas that involve (potential) local beneficiaries (Benites-Lazaro and Mello-Théry 2019; Firchow and Selim 2022).

At the heart of post-conflict preferences is the question of who decides what is to be prioritised after war. Local, national, international and transnational actors may have different post-conflict preferences reflecting their needs and aspirations. Important here is the ability of donors to assess needs in accurate ways, and for (potential) recipients to express needs and feedback. The relationship between aid providers and beneficiaries is a complex one with multiple dynamics at play. Local organisations may mirror donor priorities in the hope of gaining funding (Morfit 2011). Citizens in countries regarded as corrupt or clientelistic may favour projects funded by overseas aid rather than their own government (Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016). Political elites and militants may profit from aid (Andersen, Johannesen, and Rijkers 2022), and public opinion in donor countries can sway donor decisions. Crucial in all of this is the opportunity for multiple aid preferences to map onto one another. A UK diplomat posted to Bosnia and Herzegovina summed up the issue in noting that his Embassy would, 'try to make sure that our priorities and assistance programmes properly match with the change people in this country want to see. The citizens of BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] are the best judges of how to improve life here' (Field 2019).

Studies around shifting aid paradigms look at how the aid sector addresses post-conflict needs and how different sectors compete for funding and a seat at the table in contexts where violence has occurred. Scholars interested in aid paradigms recognize the fluidity between sectors and ask questions around decision-making regarding what actors engage when, and how aid decisions are made by the international community (M. Barnett 2018; M. N. Barnett 2020). In particular, scholars have argued that there is a need for more integrated approaches to the provision of international aid (Décobert 2020). These scholars seek to understand the logics of different underlying aid paradigms and approaches, as well as who decides which type of aid is appropriate in a specific time and place; and how aid paradigms and programs are interpreted, experienced, and (re)negotiated by different actors (Décobert 2020).

Efforts to bring sectors together or what is called the 'linkage debate' have been discussed in terms of the disaster-development continuum (Audet 2015) and the conflict-development nexus (Korf 2006) and, more recently, the humanitarian, development and peace nexus (HDP) (McCandless 2021). According to Erin McCandless, 'The HDP nexus, represent[s] a culmination and synergy of lessons and movements in analysis, policy, and practise over decades, is offering fundamentally critical insights for diagnosis and practise' (McCandless 2021, 143). Crucially, in terms of diagnosis and practice, the HDP nexus has implications for planning and funding. The UN system emphasized the need for a 'New Way of Working' or NWOW that would integrate analysis, planning and programming, leadership and capacity-building, and financing (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 2021, 12). In recent decades the nexus and the integrated working it requires has been mainstreamed into programming and has been institutionalised by the UN, EU and others (Mena et al. 2022, 326). Thus, for example, a UN-World Bank Group Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations was signed in 2017, with a UN-financed instrument, the Humanitarian Development Peace and Partnership Facility (HDPP), created to further support UN-WBG cooperation (Baroncelli 2023, 25).

The recognition of peace as a Sustainable Development Goal has been important in solidifying the link between peace and development (Mabera 2016, 79). Certainly an emphasis on coherence has been noticeable in the messaging around the UN's Sustaining Peace agenda with Secretary General António Guterres exhorting a 'UN system-wide approach', and institutionally the Peacebuilding Support Office was mandated to 'enhance system-wide coherence' (Guterres 2018; Peacebuilding Support Office 2023). The triple nexus was adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2019 with the aim of providing 'a comprehensive framework that can incentivise and implement more collaborative and complementary humanitarian, development and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations' (OECD-DAC 2023, 3). The triple nexus has also been adopted by the European Union, with a 2022 study finding that understanding

of the triple nexus was strong at headquarters and country level (Land and Hauck 2022, 24). The key point is that the notion and associated practices of the triple nexus have widespread buy-in at the level of elite international donors. It is therefore reasonable to expect that international assistance efforts aimed at Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized interlinkages between sectors, especially in recent years as the triple nexus took root.

International intervention in Mostar

While Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has received billions of dollars of aid and substantial international intervention since the war ended in 1995, Mostar, the most devastated wartime city in the country according to the UNDP, 'has been subject to a special degree of international attention, supervision and engagement' (Bose 2003, 69) mainly because Mostar holds symbolic value for different actors. Mostar is considered the capital of Herzegovina for nationalist, separatist Bosnian Croats who announced Herceg Bosna as a separate entity during the war. For the international community, the city represents a first step towards a common, shared state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and can act as a role model for the country (Cateaux 2021, 76). Mostar continues to be home to two large national groups, the Bosniaks and the Croats, even after the war and ethnic cleansing.[3]

The wartime displacement around Mostar was significant. The vast majority of the city's 20,000 Serbs fled or were driven out of the city in 1992 when the Yugoslav National Army was repelled from Mostar. Thereafter, during the second (more significant) part of the war in the city between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian state (primarily Bosniaks), the city was ethnically cleansed, particularly non-Croats from the west side. As such, many referred to themselves as 'refugees in their own city' (Cateaux 2021, 80). Additionally, the city's demographics changed dramatically; 50% arrived from other 'cleansed' areas and, as newcomers, changed the sense of attachment to the city's culture and history. Before this displacement, Mostar was considered one of the most ethno-nationally heterogeneous and 'mixed' locations in all of Yugoslavia (Hromadžic 2011). Given these realities, significant aid and intervention in the last 30 years has been dedicated to (re)uniting the city, such as rebuilding the bridges or facilitating 'minority returns' – returns to areas that now have another ethnic majority than the returnee.

The March 1994 internationally-negotiated Washington Agreement brought an end to fighting between Bosniaks and Croats, before the country's final ceasefire (which included

---

[3] Though geographically separated to east and west sides of the city by the wartime violence, Bosniaks and Croats each make up around half of Mostar's population (the city's Serbs fled or were exiled during the war and only small numbers have returned). In the rest of the country, "the vast majority … live in areas solidly dominated by their own national group" (Bose 2003, 72). For example, Bosniaks predominate in Sarajevo and Tuzla and Serbs in Banja Luka and Bijeljina; Mostar and Brčko are significant exceptions.

Bosnian Serbs) was signed in November 1995.[4] The Washington Agreement also granted Mostar an exceptional situation whereby the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) governed for the first two years (July 1994 – January 1997) where agreed tasks included unifying the police, ensuring security and movement across the front line, improving conditions for refugee and displaced person returns, facilitating one, democratically elected city council, and reconstructing buildings, infrastructure and public services (Yarwood 1998, 7). Following this regime, a partnership of international organizations divided up responsibility for these tasks, led by the Office of the High Representative.[5] The EU aspirations – for stability, security, and development of a liberal market economy – played a role in the aims of the intervention and decisions carried out (Cateaux 2021).

The literature on the post-war period tells of a concerted international effort to unify and integrate Mostar, particularly in terms of physical reconstruction and city administration (Björkdahl 2012).[6] The international community, beginning with the EUAM, perceived reconciliation as essential to stability, which therefore framed how the reconstruction funding was spent (Cateaux 2021). '[F]ostering intergroup relations' was attempted through the rebuilding of common, public spaces where individuals could once again interact (Greiff and Greiff 2014, 115). The concentration of foreign aid was therefore especially directed to the so-called Central Zone of Mostar; this was the area around the former front line between the two ethnic communities, which was the 'only politically shared space in the city' (Makaš 2011, 2).[7] Infrastructure reconstruction and the highly symbolic rebuilding of bridges were

---

[4] The Washington Agreement, signed 1 March 1994, available on the USIP's digital collection of peace agreements:https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washag ree_03011994.pdf. See article VIII. The Dayton Agreement
The Dayton Agreement was negotiated in the USA and brought an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a constitution, the establishment of three 'constitutive people', ethnic quotas, and two 'entities': The Federation and Republika Srpska.

[5] A Stabilization Force (SFOR, led by NATO) was responsible for physical security; an International Police Task Force (supervised by the UN) monitored, trained and restructured the local police; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) worked on elections (law, actual elections, supporting democratization, etc.); the Office of the High Representative(-South) was responsible for general strategy and coordination of civil society agencies; and the UNHCR and a Reconstruction and Return Task Force promoted returns of displaced persons and refugees to Mostar (Bose 2003, 69).

[6] Interestingly, the international intervention in Mostar has not been as concerned with restoring some of the key characteristics that distinguished the city pre-war. Prewar, the city was known for its industry (aluminum, aircraft, tobacco, wine, grain) and a high number of mixed marriages. It was also a garrison town with an air base and railway link to Sarajevo, which made it a key war target. The international community has made little effort to rebuild Mostar's industry and most efforts in this sector have been local (especially those in political power during and after the war). Instead, the international community focused on tourism for economic revival focused on the Ottoman old town and bridge, which has primarily benefitted the Bosniaks who belong to this part of town. Some of the industry is functioning, but at much lower capacity than before and tends to employ and benefit one or the other group.

[7] The central zone was envisaged by the EUAM as a space where shared public facilities would be located (post office, ministries, train station, etc.; Yarwood 1999) but the actual land area was highly contested and finally

intended to create a 'shared, de-politicized public space' (Björkdahl 2012, 12). In particular, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge, Stari Most, was seen as a key sign of reconciliation, even though the bridge does not actually connect the east and west sides of the city.

Unification of the city's administration was an equally key point of the international effort in Mostar. With the signing of the Washington Agreement, the armies of the Bosnian government and the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna stopped armed conflict, but the city remained divided according to the wartime Croat west and Bosniak east sides. Expulsions of 'ethno-national others' continued until 1997. Each side of the city had (and still has) an administration dominated by one ethno-national party – the Croatian HDZ-BiH and the Bosniak SDA – and most aid has been subject to this power-sharing dynamic (Weber 2020). Despite these political parties' wishes, the international community sought to unite the city's administration, through a 1996 Interim Statute and then a 2004 Statute of the City of Mostar. However, a disagreement in 2010 around whether the electoral system was discriminatory resulted in a decade without local elections in Mostar and eight years without a city assembly, during which Mostar's public assets and services, environment, financial accountability, etc. suffered (Repovac Nikšić 2021, Weber 2020).[8] In 2020, the EU resolved the matter with further negotiations. The nearly three-decade long process has been a site of contestation between international attempts to unify and integrate the city and attempts by local political parties to prioritize their own identity group. This context is important when considering aid preferences and whose preferences are prioritized. There have long been criticisms of international intervenors acting without recourse to local preferences (Knaus and Martin 2003; Marten 2004), although more recent statements and stances from international actors seem to emphasize participation.

Efforts by the international community have been critiqued for failing to reintegrate the ethnic populations, administrative structures, and governance in Mostar (and in BiH) and, in the process, have enhanced partition and separation (Bose 2003, 71). Rather than asking what Mostarians see as a common denominator on which to build their city or listening to their feedback on the city statutes (Cateaux 2021, 83), interventions have stuck to the old symbol of 'bridging', which seems to conform more to outsiders' imaginaries of reconciliation rather than authentic and locally-held aspirations.[9] In an effort to avoid the politicization of aid, the perspectives and the needs of the population have been largely

---

shrunk during negotiations. Cateaux notes the Central Zone as functioning as both a glue and a buffer – aiming to connect two sides, but also to prevent clashes (2021).

[8] Florian Bieber (2006, 420) reflects that local governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been to post-war BiH: "the way municipalities were run determined the return of refugees and greatly impacted on the economic and social development of the locality." As we see here, Mostar is a case in point.

[9] Palmberger (2012) aptly points out that that internationals automatically equate 'crossing sides' as positive and not doing so as intolerant whereas asking *why* people do what they do is entirely neglected.

disregarded by international actors in Mostar, a pattern not dissimilar to international activities in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gilbert 2016).

The trajectory of international assistance to Mostar tells a story of immediate medical aid during the months at the end and immediately after the war (Black, de Giacomi, and Barreto 1996) and then a shift to dealing with more complex accommodation and infrastructure needs in the years after the conflict (Seebacher 1999). To some extent, Mostar became a darling of the international community with high-profile interventions such as the establishment of the Pavarotti Music Centre and the Mostar Rock School (Dohrn 2018; Lang and McInerney 1999). Less glamorously, international actors sought to integrate the municipality and services such as public transport and trash collection. As Gusic noted, 'The initial strategy to end wartime division and unite the city was met with fierce resistance and ultimately proved unenforceable' (Gusic 2019, 104). Nevertheless, substantial aid was directed at Mostar, amounting to €150 million in the period of EU administration up to 1999 (Bieber 2005, 424).

High levels of aid were not sustainable. In 1997, just a few years after the war had ended, the Croatian Mayor of west Mostar opined that, 'We have been abandoned. The European Union rebuilt the infrastructure but didn't give us the money to maintain it. International aid has virtually ceased' (cited in Hedges 1997). Since then, there has been clear evidence of donor fatigue. In 1999 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted 'donor fatigue and huge demands generated by the Kosovo emergency' for obligating it to reduce and modify its assistance programme for returnees and IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons]' (UNHCR 1999, 327). The following year, the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina reported to the UN Security Council that 'Donor fatigue has set in' (United Nations Security Council 2000). This point was repeated to the 2001 Security Council briefing to the extent that 'Donor fatigue had already led a strategic reduction in actual and projected aid' (United Nations Security Council 2001).

Much commentary on international assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the power of international actors (most notably the Office of the High Representative) and the consequent impact on the legitimacy of the state (Gilbert 2020). While in some contexts the issue of international aid raises the spectre of tension between international donors and a national government (Findley et al. 2017), the federal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina complicates matters. Rather than a unified government (Pickering 2012), the federal structure means multiple – but relatively weak – layers of government, with strong tendencies in the Republika Srpska to break away. The key issue is that there is not a strong national counterpoint to (perceived) aid imperialism by external actors. It should be added that not all assistance is western and so fits within a 'west' versus 'non-west' paradigm (Li 2021).

Despite a national transitional justice strategy that was drafted in 2010, transitional justice (TJ) attempts became casualties of the very divisions they sought to overcome (Rovcanin 2021). Accountability, a core principle of transitional justice, has been pursued primarily, through trials routed through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the War Crimes Chamber of the BiH Court and 'poorly equipped and staffed' second instance courts (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009, 20).[10] The ICTY was established by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 to prosecute individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. Over its operational period, the tribunal indicted and tried numerous individuals, including political and military leaders, for their roles in atrocities committed during the war. Yet, it was perceived within the Balkans as an international imposition, external to local preferences, and with a liberal, Western, anti-Serb bias (Clark 2013; Pejic 2001). As of 2008, more complex cases have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while less complex cases have been transferred to the jurisdiction of local courts. As of 2021, a backlog of 571 unresolved cases involving 4,498 suspects remained (Salvioli 2021).

The establishment of truth in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been primarily approached through international, national and second instance prosecutions for most locals (89% according to Valiñas et al 2009). There have been notable attempts at establishing a regional Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For example, The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including all former Yugoslav countries, in 2001 (Pejic 2001), as well as the consortium of regional civil society organizations which established the Coalition for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Establishing Facts about War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations in the former Yugoslavia (RECOM), but the effort also did not take hold primarily because of RECOM's regional nature and its close association with the ICTY (Clark 2013).[11] Unfortunately, 66% of people surveyed in a 2006 study about justice were not familiar with the concept of a truth and reconciliation commission (Valiñas et al 2009, 28. In interviews conducted by the research team,), those few who were familiar with the concept refuted the idea, stating 'we are not in Africa.' Efforts to gather victim testimonies and find missing persons have not been institutionalized and remain scattered (Salvioli 2021).

---

[10] The ICTY's (1993-2017) statistics, according to its website: 161 people were indicted, 90 sentenced, 13 referred to former Yugoslav state courts, 19 acquitted, 37 proceedings were terminated and indictments withdrawn, and two retrials went before the MICT. Crimes that were addressed: genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

[11] RECOM was set up in 2008 in Podgorica, Montenegro by the Humanitarian Law Centre, Serbia, Documenta Zagreb, and Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo and 'has organized 127 public discussions in which 6,187 people have participated' (Touquet and Vermeersch 2016, 65; (Clark 2013).

'Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a national legal framework to ensure effective access to full reparation to all civilian victims of war crimes' (Salvioli 2021). Reparations have been selective and uncomprehensive, including restitution of property to returnees and some benefits to 'civilian war victims' and families of missing persons (Ferstman and Rosenberg 2014, 572). Some civilian victims of war receive administrative reparations in the form of monthly payments related to local disability schemes, although these are lower in value than those received by war veterans (Salvioli 2021). The 2004 Law on the Protection of Civilian War Victims regulates the conditions for acquiring the status of civilian victim, but acquiring this status is difficult and requires a lot of bureaucratic hurdles to pass through on short timelines.

The overall picture has been one of prolonged international attention on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mostar. Donor attentions have not always been directed where local people and elites wanted. As discussed below in the Research Design and Methodology section, research participants were not asked directly about aid preferences, but they were asked to identify indicators of peace in their everyday lives. It stands to reason that people's indicators of peace would indicate their preferences in terms of what kinds of changes they would like to see in their communities. Although some of the indicators were related to signs of existing indicators, such as a youth sharing a meal with another youth from a different ethnic group (something that currently could happen), most of the indicators were aspirational or conditions that respondents would like to see in their city. Thus, for example, if respondents identified better road infrastructure as an indicator that the society is at peace then it is reasonable to believe they would make this a preference for any external assistance. Whether aspirational or not, the indicators point to everyday preferences of peace and the change or status quo that people look to in order to determine whether they feel more or less at peace.

It is worth noting that the policy and programming attention on Mostar has been augmented by very significant academic attention, with numerous projects studying reconstruction and inter-group interaction in the city. One impact of these studies, and the repeated association of the city with the labels 'conflict' and 'post-conflict' has been to reinforce this status in the international imagination. The finding of this paper that many people want to 'move on' is thus somewhat transgressive to a widespread international assumption that the city and country are 'stuck' in conflict mode and are perennially associated with the war.

Research Design and Methodology

In order to develop neighborhood-specific community-generated indicators, we selected seven *mjesne zajednice* (MZs) or local communities based on the following criteria: national majorities in the MZ (Bosniak; Croat; Serb; mixed), location (urban: central and so-called

east and west sides of the city; peripheral or rural: north/south/west; historically established and less historically established areas), population size (all similar sizes according to informal estimates made by local partners), and recruitment capacity (availability of well-networked people to 'mobilize' participants).[12] We selected the seven local communities to follow a 'most different' research design, where we focused on communities representing the most different sectors of the city according to two criteria: national identity of residents and geography. The aim was to achieve good representation of Mostar and its unique demographics, in order to align most closely to the diversity of the city.[13] All of the focus groups and community meetings were held in local languages and led by a local facilitation team.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Indicator Collection
Data was collected between November 2021 and February 2022. In the first stage of data collection, community members generated indicators through focus group discussions. As noted, we define communities by the local administrative unit called a *mjesne zajednice* (MZs, literally local communities, each of which has its own local governance), which are essentially neighborhoods or quarters of Mostar. We made this choice since everyday indicators operate most effectively at the very local level and often require common geographical references to help generate indicators that are representative of a particular locality.[14] We generated indicators around two separate concepts (after testing our concepts

---

[12] Mostar has a total of 43 official local communities (*mjesne zajednice*). For our seven selected communities, we chose four that are central and urban (two on the so-called east-side which have a Bosniak majority and two 'west side' MZs with a Croat majority), as well as three peripheral/rural MZs (one with a Bosniak-majority to the south of the city, one with Croat-majority to the west and a 'mixed' – no-majority - one to the north).

[13] All fieldwork was conducted under the Institutional Review Board strictures prescribed by Brandeis University, including COVID protocols and approved exemption requests. Personal data was not collected from research participants for research purposes and all participation was via informed consent. IRB Protocol #22035R

[14] Usually, the EPI method would take much more time (months) to determine and select communities based on what locals understand these to be, but given the very tight timeline of the project in which this research was conducted, we chose the official delineations of *mjesne zajednice* (MZs). However, upon carrying out the research, we discovered that at least two of our MZs are made up of more than one neighbourhood (Podhum is made up of Podhum and DUM and Cernica is made up of Cernica and Bulevar). This meant that members of two neighborhoods participated in focus groups meant for one, which had a minor effect on the indicators. For example, Cernica is an old part of town with houses built close together along little alleys where potholes and lose manhole covers were bothersome whereas Bulevar is an area right next door made up of apartment blocks with green spaces in between and parking, with no thoroughfares, where a big concern was lighting of the green areas. In MZ Podhum, one problem of having residents of two neighbourhoods participate in indicator generation together was that some did not perceive themselves as sharing one community (this may have had

in a pilot community[15]), which meant that the process described below was repeated once for the concept of *peace* and a second time for the concept of *life together*. The analysis in this paper deals only with the *peace indicators*.

We conducted a standard Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) process in Mostar making some limited adjustments for COVID in order to comply with our IRB regulations. This methodology has been used in many contexts for research and participatory evaluations using participatory statistics (Chambers 2007; Cornwall and Aghajanian 2017; Firchow 2018; Urwin et al. 2023). The field research team led three indicator-generating focus groups in each geographic community (one each with men, women, youth). The researchers worked with local mobilizers to follow a strict set of criteria outlining factors such as age, time living in the neighborhood, victim status, etc. in order to select a diverse and representative set of 10 to 15 members for each focus group.[16] In these focus groups, community members discussed the signs they use and look for in their communities to judge whether or life in their MZ was more or less at peace.

Focus group discussions began with questions such as 'What signs indicate that your community is at peace? What signs indicate there is a lack of peace? What signs indicate more or less peace in Mostar as a wider city?'. Essentially, we glean indicators that people are already using in their daily lives to measure their own peace, rather than try to gather indicators related with a particular intervention or project. Many, but not all focus group discussions included comments on the community's relationship with other ethnic and religious groups, as well as their relationships with those who caused them harm during the war. While internal issues and dynamics within the communities often arose in connection to these topics, they were not the primary focus of indicator discussions. Questioning and probing during the focus group discussions encouraged participants to concentrate on the local and the everyday dimensions of life. At the end of each focus group, facilitators then extracted a long list of indicators from the transcripts of and notes from the focus group discussions.

A two-step indicator-verification and selection process – wherein community members culled the long list of indicators into a short list – comprised the second stage. First, the field research team presented the long list of indicators to the participants of the original focus

---

also to do with ethnic composition, as DUM is majority-Croat and the neighborhood of Podhum is mixed) and this might have made participants more guarded.

[15] In the pilot community we used the more common colloquial concept of normal(cy) so as not to trigger the prevalent associations around the word 'peace'. However, this concept also proved challenging and, due again to time constraints, we reverted to the standard concept of peace for the indicators used in this article.

[16] Participants were selected to include diversity in terms of education, employment, self-perceived level of community engagement and time lived in the community and in Mostar. Our aim was 10-15 participants, however this varied more than usual because of Covid regulations.

groups, who were themselves gathered during a verification process, wherein the facilitators read through each indicator aloud. In this large group, the facilitators asked for clarifications on indicators that were uncertain and participants reassessed their indicators and were able to change, eliminate or add indicators to the lists. Next, alongside additional community members who joined the original focus group participants, community members were invited to cast 15 votes for their top indicators of peace. A rigorous ranking and vetting process resulted in a short list of the most meaningful and representative indicators for each community.

Following this process, the indicators were typed into lists and the votes were tallied in total, as well as by demographic (youth, women and men) characteristics. This created a consolidated list per MZ, with an average of 158 peace indicators in each community, depending on the diversity of indicators at each verification round, with a total of 1109 peace indicators collected.

Indicator Analysis
The analysis was carried out by a team of researchers from Brandeis University and from the EPI Mostar research team. In the first stage of analysis, the indicators were compiled and cleaned. During the cleaning process, our team confirmed that there were no repeat indicators and verified the translations to ensure that there were no incorrect interpretations of the indicators' meaning and edited the English translations for correctness and accuracy to the original language. In addition, the cleaning process allowed the researchers to identify broad categories into which the indicators could be classified, which is the beginning stage of the codebook creation. Categorization of indicators allows us to understand broad trends within the indicators, rather than simply examining individual indicators. These trends provide information that can be fed into program design as well as broader program learning.

In keeping with inductive research, the categorization is dependent on the indicators that are collected. In other words, there is no standard set of categories for the EPI methodology. Rather, through the analysis of the individual indicators, researchers identify relevant patterns and design a coding system and codebook to classify them.[17] Categories may be specific actors or phenomena, such as 'motor vehicles'. During the initial indicator analysis phase, the research team developed a set of categories that best reflects the indicators collected and thereby developed a codebook that defines each category. Initial categories can be broad and are subsequently refined by being divided into sub-categories. In the codebook, each category and sub-category is defined using examples from the indicators. Most of the time, the indicators are coded into two categories, permitting the analysis of correlation

---

[17] See Appendix 1 for the Category codebook.

between categories. For this project, 23 categories were developed, all with multiple sub-categories and each indicator was coded in one or two identifying categories (See Table 2). All results are then weighted by each indicator's 'importance score' (IS), a calculation that weighs each indicator according to its relative importance to the community, based on votes and normalized across the eight communities.[18]

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Coders based at Brandeis University and in Mostar conducted concurrent coding to ensure that the codebook was defined well enough to allow other team members to code the everyday indicators with limited external guidance. Each coder involved in this project coded all lists, and the lead researcher cross-examined any coding discrepancies. Because each coder codes all indicators, it was not necessary to derive inter-rater reliability scores. The analysis of independent indicators from collection provides localized context and a granular understanding of on-the-ground dynamics. The indicators are first analyzed qualitatively to gauge emerging categories and to make note of defining characteristics in each area. As the categories were defined, we began a systematic evaluation of categories to assess trends, to measure frequencies and correlations, and to gain a better understanding of the most prevalent themes in the community-driven indicators.

Finally, for the purposes of this article, we used these inductively created categories to code them to specific sectors that represent sectors of civil society and donor funding within the international community: Statebuilding, Development, Reconciliation, Justice and Security (See Table 2). Although this process is not clear-cut (there are intersecting categories and sub-categories), this process allows us to get a better understanding of the sectors to which the indicators align most. Considering each indicator was coded into two categories, it also means that in most cases this gave them the opportunity to be coded into two sectors if necessary (e.g. reconciliation and justice). This process permits the identification of correlations and relationships between categories and sectors. The resulting analysis provides the foundation for the findings presented in the next section and allows us to reflect on the extent to which international aid paradigms and post-conflict preferences overlap.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE (CAN ALSO BE AN APPENDIX)

---

[18] The 'importance score' used by the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) is a metric that weighs each community-generated indicator according to its relative significance to that community. This score is calculated by taking the number of votes an everyday peace indicator receives, multiplied by the total number of indicators in the category, and then divided by the total votes cast within the community. This normalization allows for comparison across communities with varying numbers of participants and indicators. The score measures the actual proportion of votes an indicator receives compared to what would be expected if all indicators were equally valued, enabling a standardized comparison across different community contexts.

Findings

When looking at all seven neighborhoods in aggregate, development-related issues of sports (1), health (2) and public space (3) are most prioritized in average by residents across the seven Mostar communities as indicators of everyday peace in their neighborhoods (see Figure 3, which demonstrates the rankings of each individual neighborhood and all seven overall). Urban residents in particular were focused on sport activities, especially activities that gather 'all' people (not only from various ethnicities but also from the region), such as the Mostar half marathon, those of the Blagaj mountain climbing club, and activity offerings for youth in the center of town at Kantarevac sports center. Health is also a key concern, especially for communities with a Bosniak majority. Key topics include the accessible location and sufficient working hours of local clinics, and the availability of timely health services ('A female patient doesn't have to wait two years to get an appointment for a mammogram.' [Zalik]). Significant concern also exists for public space in Mostar and more specifically about the public sense of ownership of public space (e.g. not littering), social integration in those spaces (all feeling welcome) and appreciation of cultural/historic landmarks (not only the famous Old Bridge but also less known sites around Mostar). The reconciliation sector category Integration & Acceptance is also a significant theme in Mostar (ranked fourth overall).[19] While the development sector themes do often implicitly refer to the war, indicators in this category point more directly to socio-psychological aspects of the conflict remaining in postwar daily life: e.g. 'A person's name [denoting group identity] is not important, but rather his/her value as a human.'; 'We [on the east side] don't have any personal negative issues on the west side of the city.' As such, while development-related indicators are of highest priority, they also hint at conflict dynamics which remain in the city and therefore show that development can also impact traditional peacebuilding issues.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

It is worth making the obvious point that there are differences in the data for women, men and youth. Overall, Mostar's women and men agreed that issues related to infrastructure are important for peace. While both prioritized infrastructural topics that relate to safety (e.g. 'In Bulevar's 'circle', where the ping pong table is located, drug users do not gather, because it's well lit'), urban women voted on more of these safety-related topics (especially lighting), whereas urban men also highlighted construction (an intersection being repaved and a new children's playground). Other basic services were highly voted, such as the presence of more trash containers in rural and touristic Blagaj and irrigation in rural and agriculturally

---

[19] While the category of Integration & Acceptance was most important for only four out of seven communities, these four are 50/50% rural/urban and Bosniak/Croat majority locales. Women and youth considered this theme of higher priority (top 5) than men (who still ranked it in the top 10 out of 23 categories).

focused Potoci. Based on interviews with residents, the lacking infrastructure is largely due to the long period without a city council to ensure these basic services to the populace. This lack of local representation is clearly tied to the remaining conflict – between internationals and locals as well as between Bosniaks and Croats – but appears to an outsider as standard (re-)development issues that could exist in any city in the world.

If we look closer at the demographic groups, we see that women's concerns (Figure 4) are often related to safety and comfort. We see this in the top indicators of their most important categories:
- Infrastructure: 'A girl from Bijeli Brijeg is not scared to walk alone at night up/down the big stairs because they are lit' (Bijeli Brijeg); 'The old ruins where drug users and dealers used to gather have been demolished.'(Cernica)
- Gender: 'A woman from Cim feels at home both on the left and on the right side [of the city]' (Cim); 'A woman does not feel uncomfortable walking through Podhum by herself, because the streets are well-lit' (Podhum)
- Business: 'Young people stay in Mostar because the local government offers safety in terms of employment' (Podhum); 'A woman from Cim doesn't have to think 24 hours a day about how to make money for her family' (Cim)

Looking at the cross-cutting theme of gender, it is notable that only women in Mostar prioritized these issues, and that gender most often referred to women (as opposed to men or non-binary gender references). Issues related to gender relations did not fall into the top five – or even top 15 – concerns of men or youth. While gendered indicators were often safety and comfort-related, the highest voted indicator in this category refers to a traditional peacebuilding and development activity: 'A joint project of educational workshops has been launched in Potoci, bringing together women from all three nations.' In relation to the differing preferences for men, women and youth, it is worth noting that many of these are aspirational and look towards ideal scenarios. As a result it is reasonable to make inferences from this data in relation to aid preferences or what Mostarians would like to see supported.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Business related issues of livelihoods and job opportunities are of great importance to women (ranked third, see Figure 4), especially as it pertains to children and youth. In particular, in Croat majority and mixed neighborhoods, women highly ranked indicators related to 'brain drain' or the tendency for educated and talented young people leaving Mostar to find work (e.g. 'Young people who finish school are not forced to go abroad for

work' [Potoci]). These may be slightly less prevalent in the Bosniak neighborhoods since fewer Bosniaks have Croatian/EU citizenship and therefore lack the ease of going abroad.[20]

For men (see Figure 5), the development-related categories of public space, governance and infrastructure were the most important signs of peace, even though the reconciliation sector categories social relations and legacies of war were also highly voted by men. In their top categories, men seem especially concerned with accountability and responsibility, as seen in indicators focusing on local-level decision-making (in the category of governance) and public ownership (public space).

- Public space: 'Neighbours in Potoci cooperate with each other to improve the situation because it is not enough that peace reigns' (Potoci); 'People don't throw trash into the Neretva River' (Cernica)
- Governance: 'Cim has its own mjesna zajednica' (Cim) and 'The mjesna zajednica of Cernica has a commissioner' (Cernica)

When considering public space as a peace priority, men were also concerned with historical cultural monuments in a Croat-majority (semi-)rural area of town. By voting in equal number on two related indicators, men in Cim seemed to emphasize also valuing local, less-known places of pride ('the bridge in Ilići is a tourist attraction') alongside the established sites ('The Old Bridge' is a tourist attraction'), indicating that they saw the value of expanding the emphasis of public spaces beyond those usually considered in Mostar.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

Youth (see Figure 6) were much more interested in social cohesion and conflict resolution related issues than adults, which is significant insofar as these youth have not experienced war personally and have been subject to the post-war, divided educational system. Further analysis is needed to explore how these EPI data compare with other research about youth in BiH (e.g. the claims that youth are very keen to 'move on' and the fact that many youth emigrate). It will be necessary to rely on qualitative data to understand better why these concerns are more notable with the younger generation, since the EPI data can say a lot about *what* people view in their everyday lives as important, but not elaborate on *why* this may be the case. Of their top five categories, only two are directly related to development: sport (especially the key subcategories activities, facilities) and youth (subcategories infrastructure, activities). The other categories prioritized by young Mostarians, aged 12-25

---

[20] Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have Croatian EU passports, thereby facilitating access to work in other European Union member countries.

– legacies of war, integration and acceptance, tranquility/security and other subcategories of youth – deal with signs of the war disappearing:

- 'There is no graffiti with Ustasha signs on the streets' (Cernica)
- 'Demolished buildings are being rebuilt' (Podhum).
- 'There are no murals depicting war criminals' (Blagaj)
- 'Trust between people in Mostar is rebuilt after the war.' (Cim)

Young people in Mostar were also notably concerned with the reoccurrence of war, which was prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina more generally during the period when the research was done: 'People don't ask themselves every day if there will be a war (Potoci); 'Foreign investors invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because in Bosnia, war is not being discussed.' (Podhum); 'A reasonable person does not want war.' (Blagaj). This concern was clearly highest in the mixed, rural community of Potoci.

Avoidance of 'problems' (conflict) and engagement with the other group is also frequently voted highly, such as in Zalik: 'When you explain that there are no differences between people of different nationalities, kids hang out with each other without any problems.' Youth stressed this engagement, especially in café life, in this and other categories: 'Young people from Bijeli Brijeg hang out at Nina's, a local cafe' Bijeli Brijeg); 'There are also pancakes served in the patisserie in Potoci, so that young people can socialize while eating pancakes' (Potoci).

FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE

Finally, since we selected communities based on nationality and location, we disaggregated the data by these variables to understand the results of the indicators according to ethnic group preferences and whether this was aligned with location (See Figure 7). Overall, Croats and Bosniaks prioritized sport when defining peace and were not very concerned with gender, otherwise their priorities differed significantly. On average, the Croat communities were most concerned with youth, sport and religion when it came to selecting indicators of peace. In particular, the community of Podhum selected several religion related indicators that were highly voted, such as 'people of different religions learn how to live together in Mostar' and 'the ezan [call to prayer] from the mosque and the bell from the Catholic church can be heard in Podhum.' Similarly, the indicator 'a girl from Cim is taught to love her faith and respect another's' was voted highly in Cim. Interestingly, Podhum generated fifteen indicators around religion that generated votes, whereas Cim and Bijeli Brijeg only generated one each. Of all the categories that the peace indicators fell into, Croat communities were least concerned with nationalism, gender and the police.

The Bosniak communities together prioritized health, sport and integration and acceptance. As stated above, health issues in these communities are most crucially tied to availability

(open hours, location). While many if not most of the important sport indicators are about facilities and activities, there is more concern for football fan clubs and violence (i.e. hooliganism) in the Bosniak communities than the majority Croat ones: 'The football games between Velež and Zrinjski end without issues' (Zalik); 'People go to Velež football matches to cheer for them, not to fight' (Cernica). For the rural community of Blagaj, integration and acceptance were much more important than for the other two Bosniak communities: e.g. 'We demonstrate that all people are welcome in Blagaj' and 'the Eco Center is open to everyone.' Interestingly, this category was not very important for the mixed community of Potoci, where people were more concerned with physical security, drugs and alcohol and issues related to gender.

Conclusion: Getting Back to Normal

When examining post-conflict preferences around peace thirty years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can observe less of an emphasis on justice and security-related needs and more concrete demands for traditional development-related needs such as infrastructure, jobs, improvement of public spaces and business. In our discussions with people in each of the seven neighborhoods, the theme of 'getting back to normal' emerged repeatedly. Mostarians (in particular, adults) were reluctant to discuss topics related to the war, displaying a resistance to be labeled in terms of conflict, justice or reconciliation. For them, getting back to normal means focusing on development-related issues such as the provision of basic services (e.g. utilities, pensions, social services), employment based on training/skills rather than acquaintances or connections, youth staying in Mostar because they have jobs, and politics that focus on actual local needs rather than national agendas. Further research/data analysis is needed to consider why youth differ from to adults in their openness or interest to discuss topics related to war.

In our analysis, we found that Mostarians prioritize development needs above more obviously conflict-related activities such as dialogue or conflict resolution, although such indicators were also prioritized (See Figure 8). We can see that although people prioritize development when it comes to their everyday peace, other issues related to integration and acceptance, legacies of war, youth, gender, and media are also important (see Figure 8). The link between post-war activities and development was most salient in indicators that demonstrated bringing people together for initiatives addressing common concerns such as playgrounds for children or cleaning a park to foster relationships across divides, promoting reconciliation through productive activities. What is markedly missing from the data are references to judicially related transitional justice related themes such as trials, truth seeking or reparations, although memorialization and return efforts were highlighted in the legacies of war category.

FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE

While our data pertains to a single context, and we must be careful about extrapolations, it is worth noting that there are multiple contexts that have experienced a similar trajectory to Mostar and the former Yugoslavia. This trajectory has seen an arc from conflict to peace accord to international peace support and then international attention and resources moving elsewhere. It is not unreasonable to think that attitudes in these other contexts would have similarities to perceptions in Mostar. For example, our data show a diversity of needs and priorities related to peace depending on people's gender, age, ethnicity or nationality and location. Evidence from other research projects (Brett et al. 2024) points to considerable diversity and intersectionality in post-war contexts and thus the need for peace and development programming to be multi-modal, flexible, and able to recognize different timelines. Certainly, our research illustrates the need for the aid industry to recognize the inter-linked nature of activities undertaken after violent conflict, and how building peace and reconciliation should best be regarded as a package guided by each interlinking group. Therefore, efforts around the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus are in line with local priorities in Mostar, although when and how each sector's activities should be introduced continues to depend on the timing of interventions and how they interact with local values and priorities.

References

Aguilar, Paloma, Laia Balcells, and Héctor Cebolla-Boado. 2011. "Determinants of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(10): 1397–1430. doi:10.1177/0010414011407468.

Aloyo, Eamon, Geoff Dancy, and Yvonne Dutton. 2022. "Retributive or Reparative Justice? Explaining Post-Conflict Preferences in Kenya." *Journal of Peace Research*: 00223433211065573. doi:10.1177/00223433211065573.

Andersen, Jørgen Juel, Niels Johannesen, and Bob Rijkers. 2022. "Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts." *The Journal of political economy* 130(2): 388–425. doi:10.1086/717455.

Audet, François. 2015. "From Disaster Relief to Development Assistance: Why Simple Solutions Don't Work." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 70(1): 110–18. doi:10.1177/0020702014562595.

Barnett, Michael. 2018. "Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Practices of Humanity." *International Theory* 10(3): 314–49. doi:10.1017/S1752971918000118.

Barnett, Michael N., ed. 2020. *Humanitarianism and Human Rights: A World of Differences?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108872485.

Baroncelli, Eugenia. 2023. "Implementing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in a Post-Pandemic World: Multilateral Cooperation and the Challenge of Inter-Organisational Dialogue." *Global Policy* 14(S2): 22–28. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.13186.

Benites-Lazaro, L. L., and N. A. Mello-Théry. 2019. "Empowering Communities? Local Stakeholders' Participation in the Clean Development Mechanism in Latin America." *World development* 114: 254–66. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.10.005.

Bieber, Florian. 2005. "Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brčko." *International Peacekeeping* 12(3): 420–33. doi:10.1080/13533310500074523.

Black, J. F. P., G. de Giacomi, and I. Barreto. 1996. "Priorities in Mostar and Manica." *The Lancet* 347(9005): 906. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(96)91389-6.

Brett, Roddy, Roger Mac Ginty, Thia Sagherian-Dickey, and Clara Voyvodic. 2024. "The Micro-Dynamics of Peace and Conflict." *Security Dialogue*. doi:10.1177/09670106241269753.

Carey, Sabine C., Belén González, and Christian Gläßel. 2022. "Divergent Perceptions of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies: Insights from Sri Lanka." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66(9): 1589–1618. doi:10.1177/00220027221104719.

Chambers, Robert. 2007. "Who Counts? : The Quiet Revolution of Participation and Numbers." https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/4098 (May 25, 2021).

Chandler, David. 2000. *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*. Pluto Press.

Clark, Janine Natalya. 2013. "Does Bosnia Need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission? Some Reflections on Its Possible Design." *Ethnopolitics* 12(3): 225–46. doi:10.1080/17449057.2012.688374.

Cornwall, Andrea, and Alia Aghajanian. 2017. "How to Find out What's Really Going On: Understanding Impact through Participatory Process Evaluation." *World Development* 99: 173–85. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.010.

Décobert, Anne. 2020. "'The Struggle Isn't over': Shifting Aid Paradigms and Redefining 'Development' in Eastern Myanmar." *World Development* 127: 104768. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104768.

Dohrn, Gillian. 2018. "Come Together: How Music Is Rebuilding Bridges in Divided Balkans." *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/mostar-rock-school-bosnia-herzegovina (February 7, 2024).

Field, Matt. 2019. "Mostar Deserves Better | Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Blogs." https://blogs.fcdo.gov.uk/mattfield/2019/10/31/mostar-deserves-better/ (December 1, 2023).

Findley, Michael G., Adam S. Harris, Helen V. Milner, and Daniel L. Nielson. 2017. "Who Controls Foreign Aid? Elite versus Public Perceptions of Donor Influence in Aid-Dependent Uganda." *International Organization* 71(4): 633–63. doi:10.1017/S0020818317000273.

Firchow, Pamina. 2018. *Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War*. Cambridge University Press.

Firchow, Pamina, and Yvette Selim. 2022. "Meaningful Engagement from the Bottom-Up? Taking Stock of Participation in Transitional Justice Processes." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 16(2): 187–203. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijab031.

Gilbert, Andrew C. 2016. "From Humanitarianism to Humanitarianization: Intimacy, Estrangement, and International Aid in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina." *American Ethnologist* 43(4): 717–29. doi:10.1111/amet.12386.

Gilbert, Andrew C. 2020. *International Intervention and the Problem of Legitimacy: Encounters in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Cornell University Press.

Gusic, Ivan. 2019. *Contesting Peace in the Postwar City: Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar*. Cham, SWITZERLAND: Springer International Publishing AG. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/durham/detail.action?docID=5989068 (February 7, 2024).

Guterres, Antonio. 2018. "Secretary-General's Remarks to the Peacebuilding Commission | PEACEBUILDING." https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/news/secretary-generals-remarks-peacebuilding-commission (December 1, 2023).

Hedges, Chris. 1997. "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/28/world/on-bosnia-s-ethnic-fault-lines-it-s-still-tense-but-world-is-silent.html (February 7, 2024).

Hennessey, Jack, Duncan Mortimer, Rohan Sweeney, Maame Esi Woode. 2023. "Donor versus recipient preferences for aid allocation: A systematic review of stated-preference studies." *Social Science & Medicine* 334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116184.

Knaus, Gerhard, and Felix Martin. 2003. "Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj." *Journal of democracy* 14(3): 60–74. doi:10.1353/jod.2003.0053.

Korf, Benedikt. 2006. "Dining with Devils? Ethnographic Enquiries into the Conflict–Development Nexus in Sri Lanka." *Oxford Development Studies* 34(1): 47–64. doi:10.1080/13600810500495998.

Land, Tony, and Volker Hauck. 2022. *HDP Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Its Implementation - Final Report*. Brussels: European Commission.

Lang, Louise, and Una McInerney. 1999. "Music Therapy at the Pavarotti Music Centre, Mostar, Bosnia." *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Musikkterapi* 8(2): 186–87. doi:10.1080/08098139909477973.

Lederach, John Paul. 2005. *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. New York: Oxford Univ Pr. https://libproxy.unm.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=reh&AN=ATLA0001564374&site=ehost-live&scope=site (May 6, 2021).

Li, Darryl. 2021. "Aid as Pan-Islamic Solidarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *American Ethnologist* 48(3): 231–44. doi:10.1111/amet.13031.

Lund, Michael. 1996. "Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy." *United States Institute of Peace*. https://www.usip.org/publications/1996/04/preventing-violent-conflicts (February 27, 2023).

Mabera, Faith. 2016. "THE PEACEMAKING PEACEBUILDING-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: MARRYING SOUTH AFRICA'S PEACE DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA." *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 38(2). doi:10.35293/srsa.v38i2.130.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2021. *Everyday Peace: How So-Called Ordinary People Can Disrupt Violent Conflict*. Oxford University Press.

Marten, Kimberly Zisk. 2004. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McCandless, Erin. 2021. "Critical Evolutions in the Peacebuilding-Development Praxis Nexus: Crisis and Complexity, Synergy and Transformation." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 16(2): 131–47. doi:10.1177/15423166211017832.

Meernik, James, and Kimi King. 2014. "A Psychological Jurisprudence Model of Public Opinion and International Prosecution." *International Area Studies Review* 17(1): 3–20. doi:10.1177/2233865913515449.

Milner, Helen V., Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael G. Findley. 2016. "Citizen Preferences and Public Goods: Comparing Preferences for Foreign Aid and Government Programs in Uganda." *Review of International Organizations* 11(2): 219–45. doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9243-2.

Morfit, Simon. 2011. "'AIDS Is Money': How Donor Preferences Reconfigure Local Realities - ScienceDirect." *World Development* 39(1): 64–75.

OECD-DAC. 2023. *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*. Paris: OECD-DAC.

Peacebuilding Support Office. 2023. "Support Office | PEACEBUILDING." https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/supportoffice (December 1, 2023).

Pejic, Jelena. 2001. "The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start." *Fordham International Law Journal* 25: 1.

Pham, Phuong Ngoc, Patrick Vinck, Bridget Marchesi, Doug Johnson, Peter Dixon, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2016. "Evaluating Transitional Justice: The Role of Multi-Level Mixed Methods Datasets and the Colombia Reparation Program for War Victims." *Transitional Justice Review* 1(4): 1–37. doi:10.5206/tjr.2016.1.4.3.

Pickering, Paula M. 2012. "Explaining the Varying Impact of International Aid for Local Democratic Governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Problems of Post-Communism* 59(1): 31–43. doi:10.2753/PPC1075-8216590103.

Richmond, Oliver P. 2018. "Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation." *Global Society* 32(2): 221–39. doi:10.1080/13600826.2018.1451828.

Salvioli, Fabián. 2021. "Preliminary Observations from the Official Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina." *OHCHR*. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/12/preliminary-observations-official-visit-bosnia-and-herzegovina (March 4, 2024).

Samii, Cyrus. 2013. "Who Wants to Forgive and Forget? Transitional Justice Preferences in Postwar Burundi." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2): 219–33. doi:10.1177/0022343312463713.

Seebacher, Andreas. 1999. "The Work of Technisches Hilfswerk in Housing Repair." In *Rebuilding Mostar: Urban Reconstruction in a War Zone*, Liverpool, UNITED KINGDOM: Liverpool University Press, 52–64. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/durham/detail.action?docID=380779 (February 7, 2024).

Tellez, Juan Fernando. 2019. "Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4): 1053–76. doi:10.1177/0022002718775825.

UNHCR. 1999. *UNHCR Global Report*. New York. https://www.unhcr.org/us/sites/en-us/files/legacy-pdf/3e2d4d51a.pdf.

United Nations Peacebuilding. 2023. "Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus | PEACEBUILDING." https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/humanitarian-development-and-peace-nexus (November 30, 2023).

United Nations Security Council. 2000. "SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS BRIEFING ON SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON ACCORDS | UN Press." https://press.un.org/en/2000/20000509.sc6854.doc.html (February 7, 2024).

United Nations Security Council. 2001. "SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA HIGHLIGHTS PROGRESS IN FORMING STATE INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES | UN Press." https://press.un.org/en/2001/sc7150.doc.htm (February 7, 2024).

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. 2021. *Realizing the Triple Nexus: Experiences from Implementing the Human Security Approach*. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FINAL-Triple-Nexus-Guidance-Note-for-web_compressed.pdf.

Urwin, Eliza, Aisalkyn Botoeva, Rosario Arias, Oscar Vargas, and Pamina Firchow. 2023. "Flipping the Power Dynamics in Measurement and Evaluation: International Aid and the Potential for a Grounded Accountability Model." *Negotiation Journal* 39(4): 401–26. doi:10.1111/nejo.12448.