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Interpreting and Translation in Military Intelligence Interrogations: A Social-Systemic Perspective

Abstract:
The chapter discusses the dynamics of interrelations in the military intelligence interrogation team from the socio-systemic point of view. It conceptualises military intelligence interrogation agency and translation agency as boundary phenomena, endo- and ectohomorous respectively. In the existing literature on military intelligence interrogation, translation is considered as present only when it is personified by interpreters and translators (also called 'linguists'). The chapter argues that translation is always present in interlinguo-social military interrogation procedures, sometimes intrapersonally, sometimes in a personified fashion – as a third party mediating communication between the interrogator and the interrogatee. There are complex dynamics between these two boundary agencies and various scenarios of their interaction which are the subject of this discussion.

Keywords: social system; boundary phenomena; translation; interpreting; military intelligence; interrogation

1 Introduction

Asked what the role of the interpreter is in a military intelligence (MI) interrogation, a U.S.A. interrogator described metaphorically the interrogation team as a crew in the cockpit and the interpreter as the interrogator's "wingman" (Russano et al. 2014b: 842). The team's goal is to gain intelligence which can be used for planning and carrying out military operations. This goal can be achieved by crossing the linguo-socio-cultural boundary because the interaction is most of the time interlingual and inevitably inter-socio-cultural. The interrogator is responsible for obtaining the information, s/he leads interrogation, but s/he cannot function without translation, the only social agency that makes the crossing of linguo-socio-cultural boundaries possible. Translation can be done by the interrogator him/herself or an interpreter can be involved. In either case, there are complex dynamics between layers of the socio-systemic boundary. These dynamics are the focus of the present chapter.

2 Interrogation

Let us first look at interrogation. In dictionaries, interrogating is defined with modifiers which make it a very peculiar type of questioning. To interrogate is to ask "a lot of questions" and to ask them "formally and systematically" and "in a thorough and often forceful way" or "sometimes using threats or violence"; interrogations may last "for a long time"; and finally, the goal is "to get information."[1]

In the military literature, interrogating is defined more specifically: "Interrogation is […] responsible for MI [Military Intelligence] exploitation of enemy personnel and documents to answer the […] specific information requirements (SIR)" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: vii). It will be noted that while in the general dictionaries the object of interrogation is either not named or referred to vaguely as "someone," military interrogators see the interrogatee as their enemy.

[1] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/interrogate; https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interrogate; https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/interrogate (viewed 17 November, 2022).

Also, the object of interrogation includes not only humans ("enemy personnel") but also the enemy documents. A document seized from the enemy is also part of the interrogation process: "The interrogator extracts intelligence from two primary sources: human sources and material sources (primarily CEDs [captured enemy documents])" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 15). Translation is clearly recognised as a means of interrogating enemy's written sources:

> The DOCEX [document exploitation] section receives documents taken from captured personnel, battlefield casualties, and positions abandoned by the enemy. It processes captured documents; for example, screens for intelligence value, categorizes, and translates. It forwards translation reports on information of immediate tactical value. (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 35)

But translation as part of interrogating human sources is not always recognised as a means of gaining intelligence. It is seen only when it is personified by translators or interpreters. Yet it happens in every interlingual interrogation – sometimes in the form of interpreting and sometimes invisibly, in the interrogator's mind.

The goal of the MI interrogation is defined not just as getting information like in any other interrogation. Interrogation in military contexts can be used for different purposes, for instance to determine the measure of responsibility of a detainee in the enemy's hostile activities or to get a full picture of a military action. After WWII, high-ranking Nazi war criminals were interrogated in London with the goal of "compiling evidence for the war crimes trials" (Fry 2017: 45). But the MI interrogation is after a specific type of information – the information that would answer the specific information requirements (SIR). These SIR responses must satisfy "the force commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR)" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: vii). Interrogators in military intelligence contexts act "in support of the commander's intelligence needs" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: vii). The MI interrogation contributes "to the overall intelligence collection effort" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: vii).

What is noteworthy for the present discussion, the MI interrogation is a meeting point of the interacting parties which, in social-systemic terms, are representatives of two different social systems, each with its own linguo-socio-cultural properties. To achieve its goal – collection of intelligence, the MI interrogation should cross the social-systemic boundary, but the parties cannot interact directly, because they speak different languages and exist in different socio-cultural frameworks. For these two parties to interact across the boundary, another element is necessary – translation.

3 Translation and Interpreting in Interrogation Settings

There have been studies of interpreting and translation in a variety of extreme settings, such as trials of war criminals, concentration camps and military activities (Bowen and Bowen 1985; Gaiba 1998; Morris 1998; Snellman 2016; Tryuk 2016; Wolf 2016; Baigorri-Jalón 2021/2019, to name just a few). The focus of the present chapter is on interpreting and translation in yet another extreme modality in which the interpreter may find him/herself – the interrogation for gaining military intelligence.

Some research has been conducted into interpreting in interrogation-like settings (Pöllabauer 2005; Inghilleri 2012; Schumann 2020). To be sure, the military intelligence interrogation shares some properties with the other types of interrogation but it differs in what constitutes its goal – gaining information that would allow optimising war activities, and consequently, in the time constraints that are imposed on the interrogating team which frequently act under pressure to get "swift 'hot' information" (Fry 2017: 40). The interaction

between the interrogator and the interpreter needs to be extremely efficient in order to obtain "timely, complete, clear, and accurate" intelligence as quickly as possible (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). MI interrogators should be specially trained even if they have had some other interrogation experience. Consequently, interpreting for MI must be different from other types of interpreting.

Sometimes the MI interrogation is carried out without an interpreter. Seemingly in such situations there is little for the translation scholar to discuss, but arguably translation is still there. It is not visible or personified, and therefore it falls outside the picture for both TIS and military professionals: interrogations are categorised as being either with or without interpreting.

The publications that discuss the role of interpreting in the process of gathering MI are rarely of a research nature such as Russano et al. 2014a and 2014b; rather they are of practical nature. Indeed, mostly, they are either instructions regarding the use of interpreting for interrogations in MI guidebooks and manuals, such as *USArmyIIH* 2005 and *HICO 2006*, or historiographical evidence gleaned from memoirs, such as Newbery 2015 and Fry 2017. In all these publications there has been little attempt to look at translation and its various modes as used in MI contexts with any scholarly depth; rather these publications are either historiographic, that is – describing history with some passages on interpreting/translation here and there, or efforts to disseminate the most efficient techniques of interrogation that includes interpreting, or straightforward instructions about the nuts and bolts of interrogation procedures when interpreting is involved.

The goal of the present chapter is different. This discussion is in line with my research into socio-systemic aspects of translation in general and my recent explorations of translation's interactions with a special body of socio-systemic formations called boundary phenomena (Tyulenev 2012, 2021, 2022).

4 Double-Layered Socio-Systemic Boundary

Viewed macro-sociologically, contemporary nation-states can be described as social systems (Luhmann 1995). They consist of subsystems, and each fulfils a particular function to meet a specific social need. For instance, the political subsystem is responsible for the distribution and handling of power in society; the economy provides everything needed for society's subsistence; education raises new generations of social agents etc. Translation can be viewed as one of the social function subsystems with its own primary function – to mediate across various types of boundary (Tyulenev 2012).

Some subsystems are responsible for fulfilling internal and some for the external functions of the system. Examples of the internal, or inward-oriented, subsystems are politics which is about handling power within the social system, or the economy dealing with material or other necessary supplies for the society and its members. But every social system is surrounded by other social systems, and therefore it needs structures which would enable it to interact with its social environment.

Translation is an example of such outward-oriented social structures: it allows the system to process the information coming into the system from its environment and the information the system projects into its environment. The external types of social structures are referred to as boundary phenomena. Besides translation, boundary phenomena include international trade relations, diplomacy, military actions, cultural exchange as well as espionage and its opposite – counterespionage. The boundary phenomena may be metaphorised as eyes or ears of the social system as they were by both Luhmann, the author of the term (1995: 197), and by intelligence gatherers, such as Admiral Nelson. Nelson called the frigates whose captains watched movements of ships in neutral ports in the Mediterranean "the eyes of

the fleet" (cited in Deacon 1978: 28). Similarly but much earlier, in the fifth century B.C., Sun Tzu, a Chinese theorist of war, wrote that an army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes (cited in Scott 2015: 96).

The boundary of the social system is double-tiered (Tyulenev 2021). There are two layers: the internal, or endohomorous, and the external, or ectohomorous (from Greek 'endon' meaning 'inside', 'ectos' meaning 'outside' and 'homoros'/'horos' – 'border'). The internal, endohomorous layer consists of social agencies which deal with foreign phenomena indirectly, not necessarily familiar with the foreign linguo-cultures. They act on the inside of their home socio-systemic boundary. For instance, diplomats pass on their governments' messages to the governments of the nations in they serve. They may or may not know the language of the other side, and even when they do, they are advised against the direct linguistic contact (Tyulenev 2022). The external, ectohomorous layer is made up of the agencies which are responsible for establishing a direct, unmediated contact with the foreign linguo-cultures. The external layer is most often (but not always) represented by translators and interpreters.

Let us once again consider a diplomat, who represents her/his country, but inevitably does that via translation. The diplomat may know the linguo-culture of the country in which s/he works but even when s/he is using her/his knowledge of the target linguo-culture, there will be translation taking place in his/her mind. When there is a translator/interpreter, translation is visible and personified; when the diplomat works without a translator/interpreter, translation is not visible, but it is still present – it is practiced intrapersonally. Thus, in either case, both endo- and ectohomorous boundary agencies are exercised. The boundary may only look one-layered: in fact, it is always double-layered.

5 Translation and Its Allomodes

Interlinguo-cultural translation as a type of social action has what can be termed as allomodes (compare allophones or allomorphs in linguistics), that is, various modes of its manifestation. Translation may be written or oral – the latter is usually (but not always and not by all) referred to as interpreting. These two allomodes of translation may be seen as two extremes of a continuum of various other mixed manifestations, for instance, a written source text may be translated orally. If we include sign language interpreting and kinetic translation (handling gestures, body language and facial expressions, Tyulenev 2018: 37–45), then it becomes clear how rich a repertoire of translation's allomodes is. In the present study, the focus will be on interpreting although the other allomodes will be touched upon as well because interrogations employ a range of translation allomodes.

Let us consider a WWII British interrogation report as an example. The report is a summary of a series of interrogations of survivors of a German U-boat, sunk by the British navy on the 5th April, 1941. The text is a result of mediation between German and English linguo-cultures which processed various pieces of military and industrial information. For example, the interrogated German officers' ranks (spelt with some variation in hyphenation) were supplied with English equivalents: "The Captain, Oberleutnant-zur-See (Lieutenant) Friedrich von Hippel […]," *U 76 1941*: 5). Here, "Oberleutnant-zur-See" was rendered as "Lieutenant." These are examples of translating military information. One of the German officers, "the Junior Officer, Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Hans Peter Klages […] claimed that his father, Professor Dr. August Klages of Göttingen, had invented "Germisan" a germicide now manufactured by the Saccharine Factory of I.G. Farben in Magdeburg" (*U 76 1941*: 6). The interrogator recorded the information about Germisan with an explanation what it was and where it was manufactured. This is an example of industrial information that might turn out useful.

The information in the report is a reflection in writing of statements made orally: "'U 68' seems, from a statement made by a prisoner of war, to have been constructed […]; "'U 69' was said to be available for active service" (*U 76 1941*: 12). From the description it is clear that some, but not all, German survivors could speak English. It was reported that "Von Hippel […] spoke some English" and even "was quite pleasant to talk to"; "The First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant-zur-See (Lieutenant) Hans Joachim Hagemann […] spoke English and French fairly well" (*U 76 1941*: 5–6). Thus, the report is a written document based on oral statements made by German speakers either in German (by those who did not speak English) or in English and possibly also in French.

In the same report there are examples of other allomodes of translation. In Appendix I of the report, there is a "translation of a broadcast in German for Germany on 2nd March, 1941, by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Heinrich Lehamann-Willenbrock" (*U 76 1941*: 26). It is a translation of an entire orally delivered text as opposed to the main body of the report discussed above which was a summarised written translation of a number of oral interrogations. These are two different allomodes – a gist translation of oral communication (in the report) and a written translation of an oral text.

In the translation there are traces of the anonymous translator's work. The following passage provides a few examples (the numbers in the square brackets mark the points which will be commented upon below):

> There were two single (or detached) [1] tankers. One was of 8,000 tons; it was the ('Kenya') [sic, 2], a beautiful, new, modern British tanker which we attacked on the surface -er- [3] which I attacked by day when submerged. One torpedo, which struck amidships, was enough. Is [sic] the heavy sea which was running the ship soon broke up. [4] We then surfaced and sank the two halves with our gun. (The gunner?) [5], who only seldom is able to use his weapon to advantage in a U-Boat, fired quite a number of rounds, and then she -er- [6] the two halves sank one after the other. (*U 76 1941*: 26)

In case [1], the translator hesitated how to render the German term: single or detached. In case [2], (s)he probably did not hear clearly enough the name of the sunk tanker. Cases [3] and [6] are the translator's attempts to render the oral nature of the source text. Case [4] is an example of an incorrect sentence which is clearly the translator's error: a typo 'is' instead of 'in' to read "in the heavy sea"; also English is not quite idiomatic: "the heavy sea which was running." Case [5] is a sign of the translator's hesitance perhaps caused by the imperfect sound quality. Later, there is an omission in the translation: "We then launched ourselves upon this (*one word omitted*)" (*U 76 1941*: 26, the italics are in the original). This translation offers a glimpse into the kind of English-German oral – less than perfect – interactions like those which must have happened during interrogations recorded in the analysed report, but those imperfections were edited out in the summarising translation-report while they were left in the appended translation of the radio transmission. The interrogation report shows that translation was always present even when the interrogators and the interrogatees spoke in one language, be it German or English. Even when there was not interpreter/ing, there was inevitably intrapersonal translation with imperfections. Both layers of the boundary were present, whether visibly or not.

Finally, in Appendix II of the report, there is an example of written-to-written translation mode. It is once again an anonymous translation. It is a translation of "a letter written in German by Steuermannsmaat Carl Becker of "U 76," on board H.M.S. "Arbutus," addressed to Frau Edith Becker, Wiesbaden, Wilhelnstrasse 81, dated Sunday, 6th April, 1941" (*U 76 1941*: 27). The translation is idiomatic and well-written, and in this sense, it is a stark contrast to the lower quality of the oral-to-written translation of the German broadcast in Appendix I.

The translations in Appendices I and II are materials added to the intelligence obtained in orally conducted interrogations. In the interrogations, translation as the ectohomorous layer of the boundary between the involved linguo-cultures was not personified by the interpreting agency, translation was exercised intrapersonally by those speaking English and German (and French?). However, in the appended translations, the ectohomorous agency of translation has manifested itself in plain sight – the appendices were even called translations. For the present discussion it is important to note that the quality of translation varied: the oral-to-written translation of the German broadcast in Appendix I is rather poor, while the written-to-written translation of the letter in Appendix II is considerably better written. It is legitimate to assume that the author of the translation in Appendix I must have been an unprofessional/untrained translator; it is likely that s/he was a non-native English speaker. The only professionally made translation (if fluency and absence of glaring errors can serve as criteria) is the translated letter in Appendix II.

It is safe to conclude that the interrogation was conducted drawing on linguistic capacities of the participants, interrogators and interrogatees, who were endohomorous agents – British interrogators and German military men. They were trained to act endohomorously, on the inside of their respective systemic boundary – between the United Kingdom and Germany. They tried or rather were forced by circumstances to act ectohomorously, that is, they crossed the external linguo-cultural side of the intersystemic boundary, although not always successfully. When the ectohomorous agent, a professional translator, took part in the interrogation process, there was an admittedly successful action. But perhaps the notion of success should be redefined for this type of interrogation: the point was to gain intelligence about the German U-boats and reflect it in a summarising translation-report for optimising further British military activities. A summarising translation based on the gist translation of German POWs' statements was sufficient, while the next-to-perfect translation in Appendix II looks almost a superfluity.

6 MI Interrogation and HUMINT

Military Intelligence consists of three parts. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is obtained from radio-electronic emissions. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from radar and electro-optical imagery. Finally, human intelligence (HUMINT) is the information that is gained from human sources. Interrogation is part of gaining HUMINT.

HUMINT is a result of (direct) interhuman interactions. Any interhuman communication is complex because it takes place at the intersection of different psychological and sociocultural systems. HUMINT settings are usually connected with risk, danger and duress which add to the complexity of interhuman interactions. According to a WWII survey in the USA, despite all problems, 84 percent of all the HUMINT obtained was produced by interrogation and it was recognised as "the most valuable of all collection operations" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 3).

To be valuable, MI should be timely (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). Time pressure affects interrogation which may be conducted at the tactical or strategic levels. As is clear from the terms, tactical interrogations aim at resolving immediate operational tasks while strategic interrogations are supposed to gain information for developing long-term counter-enemy plans. Tactical interrogations are especially time-sensitive and therefore, they are kept as brief as possible and they aim at obtaining a specific type of information – PIR (priority intelligence requirement). PIR-informed intelligence is supposed to inform military decision makers about the "size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE)" of the enemy forces (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). At the strategic level, there is more time and "a more expanded interrogation effort" is possible (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8).

At the tactical level, the combination of endo- and ectohomorous agencies in one person is optimal because of the time and effort constraints. An example of MI interrogations conducted at the tactical level is the type of interrogation that happened in the London Cage, WWII prisoner-of-war facility for captured German military personnel. The goal there was to obtain "vital intelligence from prisoners as quickly as possible" (Fry 2017: 36). The urgency to gain hot intelligence was such that one of the London Cage interrogators, Randoll Coate, suggested to send interrogators with commando raids and, between 1940 and 1942, he himself participated in a number of them. Every time, "[o]n return to the home port, the main priority for Coate was to make sure he disembarked with the prisoners quickly, to avoid any delay in interrogation that could reduce the intelligence value of any material or prisoners captured" (Fry 2017: 41). In addition to POWs who were to be quickly interrogated, there could be materials such as seized documents or codes that needed to be processed as fast as possible to meet priority intelligence requirements (Fry 2017: 41). Coate, who was born in Switzerland to British parents and educated in Lausanne, was fluent in German, French, Dutch and Italian. He was an example of the interrogator-cum-translator who could combine endohomorous interrogator agency and ectohomorous translation agency in interrogating POWs and processing the captured documents. This combination of the two boundary agencies in one person was extremely useful when time and staff were limited.

At the strategic level, the interrogation is conducted on a different time scale and more personnel can be involved. For instance, intelligence gathered from interrogations of POWs at the London Cage was obtained over a longer period of time, with new POWs being constantly brought in. The goal was to identify not only key military targets, but also industrial ones in Germany that could be attacked or sabotaged (Fry 2017: 58). Information about factories that built component parts for aeroplanes, about work on the production of Tiger tanks, or about chemical works was obtained from interrogated prisoners. British intelligence gained a comprehensive understanding of the Nazi military industry of the time. The interrogations produced this intelligence a year before the invasion of Europe by the Allies in 1944. Thanks to this intelligence well before D-Day, already during 1943, the Allies could prepare for that decisive operation. The map of German industrial heartlands allowed focussed military planning and strategic bombing raids that crippled the enemy's war machine (Fry 2017: 61).

At the strategic level as exemplified by the London Cage operation, there was also a great deal of interrogators who, being bilingual in English and German, could act both endo- and ectohomorously. It is also clear from the memoirs and the historiography of the London Cage, that some interrogators who were exceptionally fluent in German and knowledgeable in the German culture acted not only as interrogators, but also as interpreters for other interrogators. For instance, Captain W. Kieser worked as a schoolmaster before WWII. In 1942, he was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps and specifically to the London Cage. One of his advantages was the "all-around knowledge of German" and, therefore, besides interrogating on his own, "his services [were] sought after as an interpreter" (Fry 2017: 40).

7 Translation and Interpreting in Different Stages of the MI Interrogation

The main sources of HUMINT are dialogues during MI interrogations between the interrogator and the prisoner. To elicit as much information from the interrogatee as possible, various other components of the interrogation are used. The MI interrogation may seem a point in time when the dialogue takes place but in fact it is a process. Translation and interpreting exercise their social ectohomorous agency with each stage in this process.

Captured documents may be confiscated from captured military personnel, and they may prove "a good starting point for interrogation" (Fry 2017: 53). Identity cards of German pilots interrogated at the London Cage gave information about the units to which they

belonged, and their savings bank books with the records of last deposits of their pay made it possible to locate those units on the map. German officers carried notebooks with lists of their regiments and codes for all kinds of aircraft and notes of problems in their units. Such pieces of information leaked during an interrogation session gave the prisoners the impression that the interrogators were omniscient and there was no point in putting up resistance.

Of course, to equip the interrogator with the knowledge that could be obtained from the captured documents, the documents had to be read and translated, or translated and read, depending on the interrogator's expertise in the interrogatees' language (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 35). Translation could happen within the head of the bilingual interrogator. S/he might combine the endohomorous (interrogator) and ectohomorous (translator) agencies. Or translation could be done by a translator for an interrogator who prepared for an interrogation session. In that case the endo- and ectohomorous functions were responsibilities of different social agents. In any case, processing captured documents is a preparatory stage of an MI interrogation session, and translation, whether intra- or interpersonal, is indispensable.

Another source of information may be studying the interrogatee outside the interrogation sessions. For example, covert listening to conversations of detainees may be used as was the case with the British Forces in Aden, Yemen, in the mid-1960s:

> At Fort Morbut, monitoring equipment was installed so that conversations between detainees in the cells could be listened to remotely. It was learned that the presence of listening devices was suspected by detainees. Staff accordingly faked their departure for the night whilst secretly remaining behind to monitor conversations. The detainees were fooled and information was gained. (Newbery 2015: 40).

The recorded conversations would have made little sense unless they were translated for the British interrogators, especially because few of them understood Arabic. Interpreting made them accessible to the interrogators.

Little wonder translation and/or interpreting figure prominently whenever there is a discussion of interrogation, whether in the past or present, in the special literature. Translation and/or interpreting is inevitable because information to be elicited in interrogations had to be rendered "clear" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). This implies crossing the intersystemic linguo-socio-cultural boundary, and there is only one social function subsystem which can do that – translation in its various allomodes and with its ability to render the required intelligence clear which otherwise would make little, if any, sense.

8 Agents

Since they work across the social-systemic boundary, military intelligence officers exercising their endohomorous function should, at least to an extent, be able to act ectohomorously. That is why they are required to have at least some knowledge of the interrogatees' language and culture – actually, the more the better. In other words, MI interrogators should be able at least to 'peek' into the other linguo-socio-cultural system.

The notion of the linguo-socio-culture in this context includes familiarity with the mindset, behavioural patterns, ethics of the detainees to be interrogated. The interrogator should be conversant with the social, political, and economic aspects of the target country as well as its geography and history (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 18). Cultural aspects influence the interrogation process: interrogation methods "will differ based on the ethnic and cultural background of the enemy, and our failure to understand and adapt to this could hamper the collection effort" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 7). The interrogator's knowledge of the interrogatee's

culture may allow flexibility in the interrogation and make the difference between success and failure: a non-cooperative source may be willing to discuss nonmilitary topics and the interrogator "may gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain insight about the conditions and attitudes in the target country" (*USArmyIIH 2005:* 18).

In addition to the knowledge of the general culture of the target country described above, the interrogator must know the military culture of the target country. S/he must know enemy materiel, armed forces uniforms and insignia (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 18). S/he is also required to know relevant international conventions and the order of battle – the current disposition of troops or ships participating in or prepared for combat.

Ultimately, the goal of the application of the interrogator's expertise in the target culture is twofold. On the one hand, it will help him/her in interrogation sessions and on the other, it will make his/her exploiting available sources, including captured documents, effective.

The interrogator is an endohomorous agent yet his/her ectohomorous proficiency, albeit inevitably more limited than that of a professional translator/interpreter who is an ectohomorous agent par excellence, is not only desirable but necessary. It is described in *USArmyIIH 2005* in the strongest possible modalities. For instance, "[t]he interrogator *must* be knowledgeable on a variety of subjects" which include the target language, the target country's culture, international agreements, enemy military structures and the order of battle (p. 17; highlighted by me). S/he "must" be proficient in foreign languages (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 17). This shows that the endohomorous agency cannot be exercised without at least some involvement with the ectohomorous side of the socio-systemic boundary.

Among the ectohomorous aspects of the endohomorous interrogator expertise, a paramount one is the interrogatee's language. A special section *USArmyIIH 2005* is devoted to the proficiency in the target language:

> The interrogator must be proficient in one or more foreign languages to exploit both human sources and C[aptured] E[nemy] D[ocument]s. According to the GPW [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949], a prisoner must be questioned in a language he understands. The more proficient an interrogator is with the target language, the better he will be able to develop rapport with his source, understand the nuances of the source's speech, and follow up on source leads to additional information. The skilled linguist will be able to translate CEDs quicker and more accurately than the interrogator who is merely familiar with the target language. (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 17–8)

It will be noted in the above citation that the line between the endohomorous agency ("the interrogator") and the ectohomorous agency ("the skilled linguist") is blurred. This interpenetration of the two socio-systemic boundary agencies is ideal and examples of such a combination are known in history of the MI interrogation and have already been mentioned above. But let us dwell on this point to appreciate it fully.

In the London Cage, fluency in German was a prerequisite for being employed as an interrogator. In the beginning of WWII, the British Directorate of Military Intelligence, Sector 9, published an advertisement in *The Times* in which people "fluent in languages" were invited to apply (Fry 2017: 41). Colonel Alexander Paterson Scotland, the head of the London Cage, "insisted that any good interrogator or intelligence officer had to have an intuitive understanding of the German mindset: understanding the psyche of the prisoner meant that information could be extracted from him" (Fry 2017: 37). In this case interrogators were supposed to act both endo- and ectohomorously. For instance, Antony Terry, a London Cage interrogator, was born in London in 1913 but spent most of his life in pre-war Berlin where his

father worked in the British Embassy. “This gave him an invaluable knowledge of pre-war Germany, as well as of the inner workings of the Nazi military and civilian regime” (Fry 2017: 44). He was described in British intelligence files as “bi-lingual German with good French” (Fry 2017: 44). Another officer, that is, Randoll Coate who worked in the London Cage, was mentioned above.

However, it is not always possible to find interrogators meeting such high requirements, or in socio-systemic terms – endohomorous agents capable of acting ectohomorously (sufficiently well). In such cases, there are two ways of solving this problem – to involve interpreters and/or to rely on the detainee’s knowledge of the interrogator’s language. For instance, in the 1960s, British interrogators in Aden did not speak Arabic well enough and that created “an occasional language barrier between detainee and interrogator” (Newbery 2015: 39). There were some “higher-grade [Arabic speaking] detainees” who spoke English; with the rest, interpreters had to be brought in. The same happened with US MI interrogators. Among “extreme challenges for interrogation operations” there may be “limited number of language-qualified interrogators,” as was the case for the US forces in LIC [low-income] countries like Grenada and Panama (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 43).

Interrogators’ proficiency in the language of the enemy is a problem to reckon with and it is taken into account in tactical planning:

> Interrogation element commanders often have to contend with a mismatch between language-qualified personnel assigned to the unit and languages needed to perform the mission. They overcome the mismatch by acquiring local national (LN) interpreter support throught the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel). They can also augment their interrogators by requesting other available linguists within the supported command to serve as interpreters. (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 7)

The endohomorous agency cannot be exercised without the ectohomorous agency, but even if the interrogator has some expertise in the interrogatee’s language and culture, it is advisable, according to the modern MI requirements, that they rely on the interpreter. One of the US interrogators in a relatively recent interview said: “I am a member of a team, and without involving me as an interpreter and an expert on the culture, the interrogation might not bring about the desired result” (Russano et al. 2014b: 842). Unlike in the London Cage case, there is a realisation here that the two boundary agencies should be exercised by experts rather than combined in one person. No matter how proficient the endohomorous agent may be in the target language and culture, it is hard for them to compete with the ectohomorous agent. The two agencies interact but are still distinguishable from each other.

Moreover, the ectohomorous agency of the interpreter may have an added value for the endohomorous agency of the interrogator. The interpreter may flag up inconsistences in the behaviour of the interrogatee. For example, the interrogatee may claim to be an officer, but s/he uses excessive slang and profanity. The interpreter tells the interrogator about this discrepancy and the latter will be able to modify his/her assessment of the source (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). In other words, the ectohomorous agent may see finer details that the endohomorous agent may miss.

The interpreter may be asked to assist with preparing reports of interrogation sessions (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). The interpreter may help the interrogator “to fill in gaps and unclear areas in the interrogator’s notes” (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 95). S/he may also do transliterating, translating, and explaining foreign terms.

Being ready to cooperate with the interpreter is a difference between a skilled and less skilled interrogator:

> A skilled interrogator might also develop a good rapport with the interpreter and brief the interpreter prior to the interrogation about the planned line of questioning, objectives and things for the interpreter to look for (e.g., based on cultural knowledge, body language, tone of voice and the choice of words, the interpreter might be able to advise if the target is avoiding the interrogator's question, buying for time, or outright lying). Without this insight, a less skilled interrogator may misunderstand the body language and arrive at a wrong conclusion. (Russano et al. 2014b: 842)

These are the words of another interviewed interrogator. Interestingly, he starts with describing what "a skilled interrogator" might do – seek the interpreter's expertise in the target culture. He finishes his answer by stating what the result of ignoring the interpreter's potential input into the interrogation might be, and ignoring the interpreter's role is the line between a "skilled" and a "less skilled" interrogator. In other words, the skilled interrogator knows his (endohomorous) limits and seeks assistance from the ectohomorous expert – the interpreter, the agent who would help him/her cross the socio-systemic boundary.

9 Rules of Interrogating with Interpreters

While involving interpreters may be inevitable, it has been viewed by interrogators as less desirable and "always unsatisfactory" (Newbery 2015: 39). The reasons for that are as follows:

(1) Interrogation with interpreting is time-consuming "because the interpreter must repeat everything said by the interrogator and source" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). Interrogation via interpreters is "inevitably slower" (Newbery 2015: 39), and this is a problem "[i]n a fast-moving war, [when] a piece of intelligence one day [i]s history the next" (Fry 2017: 36). There is another aspect of the time concern. "The interrogator had to produce immediate results while a prisoner was still disoriented by the shock of capture" as there is always a risk that after the first shock, the prisoner may become "uncooperative" (Fry 2017: 37). Obviously when time is a key factor in military contexts, the combination of the endo- and ectohomorous agencies by means of intrapersonal translation, rather than personified interpreting is seen as preferable, although in real life, the complex interaction of the three parties involved – interrogator, interrogatee, interpreter – is more probable.

(2) Interpreting makes it harder for the interrogator to control and affect the emotional state of the detainee. Interpreting coming between a question and a response inevitably dampens the interrogator's push. Among the London Cage interrogators was Major Hans Kettler. Although in interrogations there was no physical torture, Kettler's interrogation style could be "a traumatic experience" (Fry 2017: 43). Kettler used psychological pressure and his treatment of interrogatees was described as "rough" in that sense (Fry 2017: 43). Physically, he was short and had a physically deformed body but a powerful mind and a great deal of energy, that is why the German prisoners nicknamed him *der Giftzwerg* (the poison-dwarf). It would be very hard for him to have the effect on his interrogatees that he did if he had to act via an interpreter.

Kettler's is an extreme case, but each interrogator tries to interact with the interrogatee taking into account and sometimes exploiting his/her psychological traits. Interpreting is inevitably an additional complicating element. The interrogator is recommended to have "[a] firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude [which] may create a proper environment for a successful interrogation" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 17). Ideally, this needs to be carried across in interpreting. But can this be guaranteed with all interpreters, especially with those who have not been specially trained or who are simply bilingual locals? Yet another scenario is when, in some situations, "the interrogator can deliberately portray a different (for

example, casual or sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the cooperation of the source" (*USArmyIIH 2005:* 17). This kind of thespianism, ideally, should be rendered across interpreting. But once again, can that be guaranteed?

One of the solutions always discussed about interrogation interpreting, is sitting arrangement. It is not seen as a trivial matter, but as a way to let the interrogator stay in control: "Ideally, the interrogator and the source should face each other with the interpreter behind the source. This enhances interrogator control by allowing him to simultaneously observe the source and interpreter" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). Obviously, it is only a partial solution.

(3) To solve the a-third-person-between-the-two problem, there are recommendations how the interrogator should work with the interpreter. In addition to preparing for the contact with the interrogatee, the interrogator must prepare for the contact with the interpreter. The interrogator "obtains information about his interpreter from the senior interrogator" and analyses it (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). S/he also talks with the interpreter before the interrogation session. One of the goals of this talk is to brief the interpreter (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 94) which includes the current tactical situation, the background information about the interrogatee, interrogation objectives and the method of interpreting. But there is also another goal – to learn more about the interpreter in order to choose, among other things, the method of interpreting – simultaneous or "alternate" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). After the interrogation session, the interrogator is required to evaluate the interpreter. Thus, using interpreting/interpreter complicates for the interrogator not only the interrogation session but the entire process as a whole.

For the interpreter, interpreting in MI interrogations comes with its own specific requirements and complications as well. First of all, the psychological pressure is considerably higher than in many other types of interpreting. The MI interpretation is comparable with the most extreme interpreting modalities (compare Tryuk 2016; Wolf 2016). The interpreter is required to interpret "using the same content, tone of voice, inflection, and intent" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93). The interpreter is subjected to military discipline even if s/he does not have a military rank (compare Snellman 2016). The attitude of the interpreter is described in the strongest modalities: "The interpreter must not inject his own personality, ideas, or questions into the interrogation. The interpreter should inform the interrogator if there are any inconsistencies in the language used by the source" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 93).

Overall, the interrogator and the interpreter are supposed to work and be seen by the interrogatee as working together – as a team. During the interrogation session, the interrogator may need to correct the interpreter if s/he violates any instructions on which s/he was briefed, for example, if the interpreter injects her/his own ideas into the dialogue between the interrogator and the interrogatee. But corrections should be made "in a low-key manner" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 94). The interrogator should not rebuke the interpreter "sternly or loudly while they are with the source" or argue with him/her "in the presence of the source" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 94). If the interpreter cannot be corrected in a low-key manner, the interrogator and the interpreter are advised to leave the interrogation site and discuss the issue, but that can be done only when necessary.

I will finish with the following observation. The interpreter is instructed to behave as if s/he were not there:

> When the initial source contact is made, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since rapport and control must be established, the interpreter should be able to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by the interrogator and source. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way it would be if no interpreter were used. During the termination phase, too, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the

> interrogator and source is important. The approaches used are reinforced, and necessary sincerity and conviction must be conveyed to the source. (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 94–5)

The MI understanding of interpreting is controversial. On the one hand, it should be practiced as if it were transparent. This is how translation in any of its allomodes viewed by many clients everywhere and this is not a surprise for the interpreter/translator or the scholar of translation/interpreting. But this view is found in the same documents, such as the cited *USArmyIIH 2005* instructions, together with a detailed and frank discussion of interpreting as a factor that must be taken into consideration by the interrogator, that is, as a tangible and important agency to which entire sections are denoted. In some respects interpreting is seen as complicating the interrogation process, but in the other respects it is appreciated as facilitating the work of the interrogator. Moreover, *USArmyIIH 2005* advises to use reports that interrogators submit about their interpreters to the senior interrogator not only to update information about individual interpreters. "This evaluation may also be used to develop training programs for interpreters" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 95). This is an extremely important point for the present social-systemic discussion of the MI interpreting. While the MI endohomorous agents wish the translation/interpreting ectohomorous agency to be invisible, they contribute to its institutionalisation: they theorise it, albeit in the prescriptional and therefore somewhat idealistic fashion; they also champion a better interaction between the endo- and ectohomorous agents; and finally, they advise collecting information for MI interpreting training.

10 Conclusion

Interrogation is normally described as an interaction between two parties: "An interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities—the source and the interrogator" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). Interrogators are specially trained officers. Interrogatees are primarily enemy prisoners of war.

When it is necessary and possible, interpreters may constitute a third party. Obviously the interaction of three, instead of two, personalities is more complex as it takes yet another set of psychological characteristics as well as capabilities, but the focus of the present discussion is not on the psychological interactions of the parties in the interrogation process. The focus is on the socio-systemic structure of interrogation.

Whether there are the two or three parties involved, the MI interrogation is inevitably an interaction of the endo- and ectohomorous agencies. This means that there is a dialogue between the source and the interrogator across the socio-systemic boundary. Crossing the boundary requires a great deal of knowledge on the part of the interrogator. A part of the knowledge is military but another part is the nonmilitary linguo-socio-culture. While in the former, the interrogator claims undivided expertise, the latter is best provided by the ectohomorous agent – the interpreter/translator (often referred to as linguist in the MI literature).

Even when there is no third party (the interpreter) in an interrogation session, the socio-systemic structure of interrogation is the same as with an interpreter/translator/linguist present. There is the internal boundary, or endohomorous, agency – the interrogator or interrogatee, that crosses the socio-systemic (linguo-socio-cultural) boundary with the help of the ectohomorous agency – translation, whether exercised infrapersonally or in the personified mode. If the interrogator or the interrogatee speak the other side's language, they translate intrapersonally. If there is an interpreter involved, translation, in its interpreting allomode, is personified.

Thus, the MI interrogation is more accurately defined as an interaction between the interrogators and interrogatees made possible by translation. Translation may be exercised by

the interpreter/translator who can be a professional translator/interpreter ("linguist") or a "trustworthy" local (Newbery 2015: 39). Sometimes interrogators themselves can act as interpreters for their colleagues. Ideally, the endo- and ectohomorous agencies should be in as close a contact as possible – they may occasionally be even combined in one person. However, nowadays, this option is viewed as exceptional: "The challenge is for interrogators to be proficient linguists and skilled members of a highly organized collection activity. This ensures the acquisition of the maximum amount of pertinent information regardless of time available" (*USArmyIIH 2005*: 8). So, the interrogator's language proficiency allows them to act directly on the interrogatee and save time. But in real life, the two agencies are kept apart and for good reasons (Russano et al. 2014b: 842).

Overall, the dynamic of the relationship in the interrogation team (including the interrogatee) is complex. From the socio-systemic point of view, it is an interaction of the two boundary phenomena – MI and translation. There are various scenarios of their interaction but both boundary phenomena are always at work in the MI interrogation.

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