In Mark Sagoff's key paper, *On Restoring and Reproducing Art* (1978), he argues that we ought to respect the 'authenticity' of an artwork above all else.[1] In the case of restoring damaged artworks, this commitment amounts to the *preservation* of the work through 'purist restoration'. That is, we may clean up a damaged work, and reattach original parts.[2] 'Integral restoration', by contrast, permits the addition of non-original parts to restore the artwork to its undamaged appearance. Sagoff champions the former, objecting to the latter: purist restoration *secures the original artwork*, albeit damaged, by maintaining its authenticity. Integral restoration further damages the artwork, reducing its authenticity by introducing non-original parts and work. To develop his view, he discusses the case of Michelangelo's *Pietà*, which was damaged and subsequently integrally restored.

I argue that Sagoff's views of authenticity and restoration involve problematic metaphysical commitments. I argue that his conception of what the *Pietà is*, its identity, results in serious modal problems. He secures the persistence of the artwork through damage. However, his view of persistence is also consistent with the artwork's destruction. As such, I take his view of the *Pietà*'s identity to be incoherent. This is not merely an abstract metaphysical problem, for two reasons: purist restoration is favoured, at least in part, because it secures the artwork on the basis of these persistence conditions. Secondly, Sagoff's understanding of how we value artworks operates with this conception of identity. If, however, I am right to say that these identity conditions are incoherent, then purist restoration gains no advantage over integral restoration in this respect. Hence, in evaluating Sagoff's view of restoration, we consider key issues in aesthetic ontology and value which have application to wider aesthetic debates.

I take an original approach to the *Pietà*'s identity and persistence conditions, drawing upon, and developing, aspects of the 'material constitution' debate in contemporary metaphysics. Using my proposed model of identity, I argue that: we can make sense of, and avoid, the aforementioned modal problems; we can rethink the metaphysical commitments of integral restoration so as to avoid Sagoff's complaints. I take it that my approach to the *Pietà*'s identity is commendable and useful to the extent that it secures those aims.

1.1 Sagoff's Metaphysics of Identity

Sagoff's view of the identity of an artwork can be summarized through the following theses:

i) The identity of an artwork is fixed by its origins;
ii) The origins are determined by the intentions of the artist and their materials;
iii) An artwork is *authentic* insofar as it is not constituted in any way by the intentions of another artist/person and/or with non-original materials;
iv) An artwork is numerically identical with another artwork, at any time, inasmuch as they are both authentic, and authentic in the same way (i.e., the same artistic production of the same artist);
v) Maintaining the authenticity of an artwork is a maximal artistic norm and so supersedes other aesthetic considerations which may reduce its overall authenticity;
vi) Hence, if an artwork is damaged but 'authentic', it is more aesthetically valuable than:

- An artwork restored with new material;
- and/or, an artwork that has been subject to restorative work by another person.[3]

An obviously controversial metaphysical commitment is Sagoff's view that we should determine the

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[1] Mark Sagoff, 'On Restoring and Reproducing Art', *The Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1978), 453-470. This claim emerges over the following pages: 453, 456 & 459.
[2] Ibid., 457. Sagoff hedges: saying that if damage obscures the 'style' then 'a few substitutions' may be added – although still not at the expense of authenticity.
[3] Ibid., 460. These theses are distilled from claims on this page.

identity of the artwork by its (historical) origins.[4] However, for the purposes of this discussion, I will grant him this. Besides, I am quite amenable to this position.

Theses (iv) & (vi) are the ones that I am most interested in. I argue that (iv), is modally incoherent. Given the structure of Sagoff's analysis, if I am right, this undermines clauses (v) and (vi).

1.2 The *Pietà* and Metaphysics

In 1972, Michelangelo's *Pietà* was attacked by Laszlo Toth. The Madonna's face and arm were disfigured, and parts of the work were either lost or destroyed. Sagoff argues that the restoration project, led by Professor Redig de Campos, whilst commendable, was misguided. De Campos *integrally restored* the work to its original appearance using non-original material.[5] Nevertheless, de Campos ensured that the non-original material is both distinguishable from the original material, and removable without further damage to the original material. [6]

Sagoff argues that by restoring the original appearance, de Campos valued 'pure aesthetics' over other concerns and has damaged the authenticity of the *Pietà.* In so doing, de Campos has reduced the cultural and artistic value of a masterpiece, producing a confused chimera of his own work and Michelangelo's. As such, the *Pietà* now provides a semi-fraudulent historical and artistic experience. What de Campos should have done was secure the damaged state; thereby, the *Pietà* persists, albeit damaged.[7] If Sagoff is right, and if these conclusions hold for other instances of restorations, integral restoration may be deemed questionable.

These claims revolve around Sagoff's view of the identity of the *Pietà* and how that object persists through time. For him, the *Pietà is* the lump of marble, worked on by Michelangelo. The value of the marble is indexed to its historical properties and origins. Hence, authenticity and persistence co-vary. Restoration may be sanctioned inasmuch as it secures the authenticity of the work. There seems to be something right about this view: the *Pietà* surely is, in some way or other, a particular lump of marble fashioned by Michelangelo. Therefore, its value and authenticity does seem inextricably linked to the lump of marble in some way. However, as it stands, and regardless of its prima facie plausibility, Sagoff's view is modally incoherent. To understand just how, a basic understanding of the metaphysics of identity is needed; how statues, and their material, pose special problems for identity. Sagoff's views concerning 'what the *Pietà* is', and of restoration become suspect.

1.3 Material Constitution and the Metaphysics of Identity

There are well-known metaphysical debates over material constitution, identity and persistence conditions. Those debates have taken special interest in statues. What is an ordinary object, such as statue, 'made of'? What is the identity of that object? And, what sorts of changes can that object survive and still be the *same* individual object?

The standard metaphysical analysis of this problem is as follows: if an object, O_2 at a time, t_2, is identical to an object, O_1, at a time, t_1, then O_2 has certain properties just in case O_1 has those same properties. Or: the numerical identity of O_2 and O_1 consists in the fact that anything that is true of O_2 is true of O_1. This is to set the bar of identity by the indiscernability of identicals – Leibniz's Law. More simply: if two objects are the same, they have the same properties. Or: if two objects are the same, what is true of one is true of the other. If these conditions are not met, they are not the same object. This notion of identity is crucial to the modal worries I raise below.

Metaphysicians have noted that statues provide particularly knotty case studies given this

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4   Ibid., 460. To this end he draws upon Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968)
5   See section 2.4 for more on appearances.
6   Ibid., 458.
7   Ibid., 460-462.

view of identity.[8] Despite the fact that an object such as the *Pietà* appears to be just one physical object, our dealings with "statues" seem to involve two different entities: "statues" and "lumps". Why? Because a bronze statue cannot survive being melted down, but the lump of bronze can. Alternatively, the statue may survive being hollowed out, as long as it retains its appearance; the lump may not. They have different *persistence conditions*. It is *true* that one can persist through smelting, the other cannot; one can survive being hollowed out, and the other cannot. Statues and lumps appear to be different objects by Leibniz's law.[9]

Implicitly, Sagoff *works with* this metaphysical distinction – albeit unacknowledged. Sagoff is motivated, quite reasonably, by aesthetic and cultural issues of value. He reasons that the statue, which persists insofar as it maintains some particular appearance, is not the appropriate object of value. A forgery of the *Pietà*, for example, may be identical in appearance but it is not to be valued as the *Pietà* is. The *Pietà*'s appearance does not ground value so what does? The lump of marble does: *it* is fashioned by Michelangelo; *the lump of marble* bears the appropriate historical and artistic properties. I will elaborate on why he thinks this in due course. However, *integrally* restoring this lump confuses the identity of the lump with non-original material motivated by an inappropriate regard for appearances. Integrally restoring the *Pietà* produces a chimerical object – a de Campos/Michelangelo hybrid – of severely diminished value.

Crucially then, the *Pietà's* identity provides a basis for how he grounds its value. He values the authenticity of the *Pietà*, and so says that the *Pietà* persists insofar as the lump is the authentic work of Michelangelo. By placing a particular notion of value first, then coordinating his view of identity around those values, he holds that Michelangelo's *Pietà* persists through changes to *both* the lump and to changes in its shape. For Sagoff, the *Pietà* persists just insofar as Michelangelo's lump of marble remains authentic – even if damaged. The Pietà is, for Sagoff, the lump, as long as the lump remains authentic.

Something about this must be correct because, in some way, artworks do withstand damage. Our theorising must be able to give an account of persistence through damage. The problem is, Sagoff's working view of identity enables the *Pietà* to persist into destruction.

1.4 Modal problems in Sagoff's Metaphysics

Sagoff insists that the damaged *lump is* Michelangelo's *Pietà* just insofar as it is authentic: consists only of original marble and work by Michelangelo. His reason is that the authentic lump is value bearing in the right way. Unfortunately this view of the *Pietà*'s identity is open to a devastating modal counterargument.

Consider a profile of counterfactual situations under which Laszlo's attacks had different results to the actual results. These counterfactuals include: no effects, the *Pietà* losing its nose (damage), to the possibility of the *Pietà* exploding into pieces (destruction). If the *Pietà* persists just to the extent that the marble is authentic, and if the appearance of the *Pietà* is not necessary for counting as the *Pietà*, these conditionals are consistent with the conclusion that an authentic *mound of rubble is* Michelangelo's *Pietà*.

Sagoff could not block this argument by saying that the rubble is not identical to the authentic lump because lumps and rubble are different kinds of things. He has given us no principled metaphysical account of how *the lump*, may withstand damage and still be the lump in terms of the *Pietà*. The problem is that his account of the integrity of the lump is analysed solely in value terms:

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[8] For representative discussions see: John Heil, *From and Ontological Point of View* (Oxford: OUP, 2003) Chapter 16; David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) Chapter 4.5; David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) Chapter 1.

[9] Everyone in the debate accepts that statues and lumps have different persistence conditions. The difference between metaphysical theories lies in what import these differences in persistence conditions actually contribute to a metaphysics of statues. See for example: David Wiggins, 'On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time', and Allan Gibbard, 'Contingent Identity', both in Michael Rea (ed), *Material Constitution: A Reader*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997)

authenticity. To block the modal argument, we need a *substantial* link between the identity of the *Pietà* and its material manifestation in physical, non-value terms. Something like: the *Pietà*, qua lump of marble, persists if that very lump of marble does not lose parts, and/or does not change shape. Sagoff could not admit the former addition to his account of identity because he maintains that the lump of marble can withstand some damage and still be the *Pietà* – reasonable enough by itself. Neither does he want to accept the appearance as a necessary condition for the identity of the *Pietà*. Indeed, his paper is, in a sense, a rejection of the appearance as either a necessary or sufficient condition of counting as the *Pietà*. Given the resources we find in his paper, I think he is out of options. Or, he bites the bullet and says: the rubble *is* the *Pietà*.

This is not just an abstract modal point: firstly, his implicit notion of identity is working to secure purist restoration. If Sagoff's view is to have any purchase on those ends, beyond the *actual* results of damage to the *Pietà*, he is going to have to take seriously this modal concern. Secondly, his view of identity is a function of his view about how we value the *Pietà*, and *what is* the proper object of our aesthetic and cultural values. This he certainly does care about. The modal problems concern his understanding of what the *Pietà* is, how we value it, and what is to be done when it is damaged.

2. Saving or Abandoning Sagoff's View?

If the above criticism holds, should we rescue Sagoff's account or abandon it? He thinks that his view is commendable because it captures important intuitions about aesthetic norms and values. He considers two issues of identity, showing their link to value judgements: authentic historical properties are necessary and sufficient for determining the identity of the *Pietà*; our use of 'sortals' shows a compromise to the identity of the *Pietà* in integral restoration. He also argues that valuing appearance over authenticity is flawed in itself. I consider each point in turn.

2.1 Historical Properties

Sagoff argues that historical properties ground a difference in value between a damaged *Pietà* restored on purist principles, and one restored integrally. The integralist *Pietà* has parts with historical properties that have nothing, in the relevant sense, to do with Michelangelo. If the statues at times t_1 and t_2, are identical, then that identity will be, in part, a function of the two statues having the same (valuable) historical properties. If the statue at t_2 is damaged, it still bears only historical properties indexed to Michelangelo – even if it has fewer of them than the statue at t_1 as a result of damage. If the statues have different historical properties (as in the case of integral restoration) then they are not identical and that difference in properties diminishes the value of the restored statue. Hence purist rather than integral restoration is preferred in cases of damage.

He is clearly right that a damaged *Pietà* has different historical properties than an integrally restored version using non-original pieces. The latter has *parts* with very different histories, and so the integrally restored lump of marble has crucially different historical properties. I think that he is also right to say that the historical properties of the original *Pietà* have aesthetic, artistic and socio-cultural value that a copy, say, does not have. However, historical properties will not secure the greater value of a *Pietà* restored on purist principles rather than one restored on integral grounds.

Consider the following possible situations:

> (w_1), the *Pietà* is untouched throughout the course of its life;
> (w_2), the *Pietà* is damaged, loses its nose, and receives a purist restoration, retaining its noseless state;

(w_3), the *Pietà* is damaged, loses its nose, and is restored by someone other than the artist to its original shape with non-original parts.

These possible situations are identical in all other respects. At the instant *before* the damage the '*Pietà,* in each situation, bears the same historical properties. These include M, where M = 'is solely the original work of Michelangelo'. It is clear that the *Pietà* in w_1 and w_2 bears the property, M. However, the *Pietà* in w_3 cannot bear M. Being worked on by de Campos entails that the '*Pietà*' is no longer *solely* the work of Michelangelo. If bearing the historical property, M, is crucial to the value of the *Pietà* we might conclude that Sagoff is right. Historical properties are difference makers in terms of value, and that they motivate an argument in favour of purist preservation. The integralist's and the purist's *Pietà* bear different historical properties; they have different values.

However, this conclusion does not follow. The view of the historical properties involved, and of the property bearers, is confused. The integralist's *Pietà* (w_3), has the appearance of the original. But it cannot be identical to the original work precisely because it has parts and work that are not Michelangelo's. However, it is *part* composed of original work where that part is identical to the purist's '*Pietà*' (w_2). The *part* of the *Pietà* in w_3 that is identical to the *entirety* of the *Pietà* in w_2, *still bears M*. In short, taking the historical property of M as exemplar, it does not ground a difference in value between the purist and the integral restoration.

Whatever *part*(s) persists of the original work, those *parts do not lose* historical properties by being integrally restored. Nevertheless, one may rightly point out that the *Pietà as a whole*, in w_3, does not have, M. One may worry that it is the whole that is important and not the parts. If the whole of the integrally restored *Pietà* fails to have M then it *is not enough, qua value,* that a part of it has M – even though the part of the *Pietà* that does bear M is identical to the whole of the purist restoration in w_2 that bears M. However, the claim requires argument.

Sagoff could argue something like the following. D is the historical property, 'the product of work by de Campos'. In the integral restoration, the whole does not bear M, but bears, D; some proper part bears M, and not D. In the purist case, the whole and all its proper parts bear M, and not D. To the extent that the *Pietà* does not bear M, let us say that it is 'fraudulent'. An artwork may be fraudulent in at least the following way: an object appears to be the original work of the artist on the basis of its appearance; however, to some extent, is not. To that extent at least, the object is fraudulent. Moreover, for the argument to work, 'fraudulence' must have a diminishing effect on the value of the parts which are original. If this is right, an integral restoration having a proper part that is identical to the whole of a purist restoration is not enough for the former to be of equal value to the latter – due to the proposed diminishing effects of fraudulence.

Perhaps, as well, our aesthetic phenomenology and intentionality supports this idea. Artworks are attended to, and appreciated, as wholes. The pleasure of our aesthetic experience can be thought of as a response to the satisfactory integration of an artwork's parts within the whole.[10] If some proper part of the artwork is 'fraudulent', even aside from being duped, having to attend to, and appreciate, the artwork on the basis of its parts rather than the whole, would seem to disrupt our aesthetic appreciation. What will be decisive over this issue are arguments concerning aesthetic value rather than arguments concerning the metaphysics of identity. To that end, I will show in 2.3 that we have good reason to question the value structure, along with the view of aesthetic experience, at play here.

Nevertheless, the modal problems of identity would return were Sagoff to run this counter-argument. To ground a principled argument against integral restoration, we must say the following about fraudulence: the diminishing effects of non-original parts on the value of its original proper parts must be such that the integral restoration would always have less value than a purist restoration of the same work. If this were not the case, and if value is the difference maker in restoration practices, then some integral restoration may be justified over purist restoration.

Take the following counterfactual situations: the *Pietà* is attacked and loses its arm and nose. It is restored on purist grounds; it is attacked again, losing parts. And it receives a purist restoration.

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[10]   For a plausible example, See John Dewey, *Art as Experience,* (London: Pedigree, 1980) Chapter 3.

It is then, sadly, repeatedly attacked and the process iterates to the point that the *Pietà* is almost annihilated, say. Contrast this to the counterfactual that the Madonna loses the tip of her finger. The tip is destroyed, and the *Pietà* is integrally restored. To maintain purist restoration over integral restoration, the diminishing effects on the value of the statue resulting from the 'inauthentic' finger-tip, must outweigh the value of the part of the statue which is still original. This is because the statue must have less value still than a purist restoration where the *Pietà* is all but annihilated. It seems odd to think that a *Pietà* with a replaced finger-tip is of less value than a decimated '*Pietà*'. And it seems odd to think that fraudulence is so powerful as to erase – or, outweigh depending on how this diminishment works – the value of a statue that's almost entirely authentic. Again, without a sound metaphysics of identity, modal problems can put serious stress on the value judgements involved in Sagoff's position. That is without even questioning his notion of value as I will do in 2.3.

On the above analysis, Sagoff's view of the identity of the *Pietà* enjoys no advantages for its association with preservation of historical properties.

2.2 Sortals

Sortals, and Being 'a Michelangelo'

Sagoff makes an interesting claim that the problems of integral restoration are revealed in our use of sortal terms. Sortals, like any philosophical concept, are the subject of controversy. Nevertheless, I do not believe the points made here are too controversial a use of the concept. A sortal is a general term which we may use when counting individual objects with determinate identity conditions. Hence, 'table' is a sortal term, as we can count individual objects (tables) with this term. Insofar as we can, there must be some identity conditions for counting as a 'table'. [11]

What sortals might we use when identifying the object(s) the *Pietà* consists in? – '*Pietà*' of course, is not a sortal but a name. 'Artwork', 'statue', 'lump of marble' are all plausible sortal terms we could use to identify the object(s) that the *Pietà* consists in. We have already seen in section 1.3, a case for differing identity and persistence conditions for 'statues' and 'lumps (of marble)'. Having these general terms with different persistence conditions enable counting and individuating the *Pietà* in different ways. The identity conditions involved in the use of these sortals have turned out to be crucial in determining problems in Sagoff's theory.

Sagoff considers another useful and important sortal in his analysis of the *Pietà*: 'a Michelangelo'. This sortal term, if it is one at all, individuates an object on the basis that it is the original and authentic work of Michelangelo. Sagoff claims, plausibly, that an integrally restored *Pietà* may not be sorted as 'a Michelangelo' because it is no longer the original and authentic work of Michelangelo. Moreover then, being 'a Michelangelo' is co-extensive with an object's value precisely because Michelangelo is a great artist. The sortal, 'a Michelangelo' is an index of value. If the integral restoration no longer counts as 'a Michelangelo', perhaps it is not valuable as that artist's work. The worry might then be, of what value is it?

The Return of Modal Problems

Sagoff argues that the integrally sorted *Pietà* is not 'a Michelangelo'; a purist restoration of the *Pietà* would have been. [12] If he is right, this may be a good reason to take Sagoff's view about the identity of the *Pietà* seriously, and to take a principled stance in favour of purist restoration. However, Sagoff is mistaken. His claim that there is nothing about the integrally restored *Pietà* that is 'a Michelangelo' is a consequence of his view of identity of the *Pietà*. I have already shown that his idea of identity is

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[11] E.J. Lowe, *More Kinds of Being*. (Oxford: Wiley and Blackwell, 2009). See chapter 2, for further discussion.
[12] Sagoff, 'On Restoring and Reproducing Art', 459.

fatally under-resourced for dealing with modal problems. However, is he right that there is no way that the integral restoration counts as 'a Michelangelo'? If so, then perhaps purist restoration is to be favoured.

In order to deal with this problem, I favour of an alternative view of the identity and constitution of the *Pietà*. This view involves extending our sortal vocabulary, generating a more complex set of identity conditions to account for this semantic extension, and rethinking the substantial constitution of the *Pietà*. In so doing, there is a way that an integrally restored *Pietà* counts as 'a Michelangelo' – and so is valuable as 'a Michelangelo'. Moreover, we can use these resources to block the modal problems found in Sagoff's position. Furthermore, my view provides a mandate for integral restoration – although it is consistent with purist restoration.

In effect, Sagoff argues that integral restoration introduces its own modal problems: integral restoration could be re-applied until the resulting object has no properties indexed to Michelangelo. Call this maximal integral restoration. Instead the maximally-restored object only has properties indexed to de Campos, the restorer. This object is not sortable as 'a Michelangelo', but as 'a de Campos'. Indeed, even a single instance of integral restoration results in the *Pietà* not being sortable as 'a Michelangelo'. If right, this is clearly undesirable and should be avoided if possible; with purist restoration, so Sagoff argues, it is possible.

He is right to say that the restored *Pietà* is not sortable as 'a Michelangelo' *in the way* that the purist's *Pietà* is. If, as discussed in 2.1, being 'a Michelangelo' requires that the whole lump of marble bears an historical property such as *M*, I have admitted above that the integralist's *Pietà* is not 'a Michelangelo'. However, there are two points to make here. In the case of maximal integral restoration, it is a result of multiple attacks, or a devastating single, counterfactual attack. Favouring integral restoration is not to accept forgery, or art vandalism. These counterfactuals which result in maximally restored '*Pietà*'s, involve restoration in good faith. It is a virtue of a restoration theory if it can cope with extreme counterfactuals. In those extreme situations, were it not for the multiple integral restorations, the *Pietà could just end up as a pile of rubble* if Sagoff is to be followed. Because, given his view of the value of the *Pietà*, and the identity of the object that bears that value, we are only allowed purist restoration. And for modal problems discussed above, this may end up requiring that the *Pietà* persist into annihilation. So, Sagoff's view definitely does not, in principle, secure 'a Michelangelo' from destruction. Bearing that in mind, I will show that we can secure 'a Michelangelo' from destruction through integral restoration. Hence, my view of identity enjoys a significant advantage over Sagoff's.

Extending Sortal Vocabulary: 'Lumps', 'Statues', and 'Sculptures'

To avoid these modal problems, to secure 'Michelangelos', Sagoff's view will not do. The identity of the *Pietà* must be thought about differently. Sagoff treats the *Pietà* as an homogeneous entity, say, sortable only as 'a de Campos' or 'a Michelangelo'. However, in the manner of the metaphysics of constitution introduced above, I suggest that the *Pietà* is a complex of objects, each with their own identity conditions, and each, individually sortable in the manner of 'a Michelangelo' or 'a de Campos'.

It should be granted that there is *something* right in saying that an integrally restored *Pietà* may not be sorted as 'a Michelangelo'. Rather, it is 'a de Campos-Michelangelo' hybrid in non-maximal cases. But what is right about these claims? Remember that, for Sagoff, the shape of a statue is neither necessary nor sufficient for counting as some particular statue. We may continue to use the name of an artwork to refer to some particular artwork just in case there is a physical object bearing only authentic properties. Likewise, we use sortals like 'a Michelangelo' or 'de Campos' just on the basis of the properties borne by the lump of marble. Working with such a notion of countability and identity – and if we are concerned in restoration practices to secure 'Michelangelo's rather than 'de Campos's whenever possible – it is unsurprising that Sagoff rejects integral restoration. Sagoff holds that the appearance of the *Pietà* was never enough to secure being 'a Michelangelo'; the integrally restored 'lump' is, at best, 'a Michelangelo-de Campos', and thereby no longer authentic. However,

I think we can give a more complex account of the metaphysics of the *Pietà*. One which deals with the problems raised so far, and which shows that the integral restoration should be sorted as 'a Michelangelo' – albeit in some restricted sense.

What did Michelangelo do to make the *Pietà*? He fashioned a lump of marble in some way and thereby he made the appearance of the Virgin Mary holding the body of Jesus which he dubbed, *Pietà.* Sagoff's metaphysics revolves around the idea that Michelangelo did nothing more than fashion a lump of marble. Hence, an object may be 'a Michelangelo' if and only if it is the material object worked on just by Michelangelo. If de Campos fashions a copy or maximally-restores the *Pietà,* it is not the *Pietà*; nor is there *anything* sortable as 'a Michelangelo' in de Campos' work.

With a more fine-grained account of the *Pietà*'s identity, we can see that this claim is false. De Campos may have chosen the lump and fashioned it into some shape, thereby making an object with determinate persistence conditions and countable under the sortal, '*a statue*'. However, this statue's appearance is made to exactly resemble the *Pietà* made by Michelangelo – call this object, '*the sculpture*'. Like the sortal 'statue', the sortal 'sculpture' has its own identity conditions and countable extensions. Crucially, these are non-identical entities and provide a sound basis for explaining why the integrally restored *Pietà* may be countable as 'a Michelangelo' in respect of its being a statue that resembles the *Pietà* in appearance, whilst not being 'a Michelangelo' due to its non-identity to Michelangelo's *sculpture*.

'A Michelangelo' 'Statue'

As seen in section 2.1, it is necessary for a statue that it maintains its particular appearance. The integralist's Pietà appears identical to the original Pietà. To that extent, any work with the appearance that exactly resembles Michelangelo's original Pietà, is 'a Michelangelo'.

Note that the claim is neither of the following *de dicto* claims that necessarily a statue with some particular appearance exists, or is 'a Michelangelo'. This appearance might not exist in a possible world; or, it may not be the work of Michelangelo. Rather it is the *de re* claim that in a world, such as ours, where some particular appearance is that of Michelangelo's *Pietà*, then a statue that has that particular appearance is necessarily 'a Michelangelo'. It will persist as such unless it loses that shape. It may become 'a Michelangelo' again, were that appearance to be restored to the statue.

The truth of this *de re* claim requires that the *Pietà*'s appearance is a function of Michelangelo's artistic work vis-a-vis his *Pietà*. The appearance may come apart, modally, from the lump of marble fashioned by Michelangelo precisely because objects may appear that way and are *not* fashioned by Michelangelo. Crucially, however, it is not clear that this appearance being the work of Michelangelo may come apart, modally, from Michelangelo in any possible world where there is a *Pietà*, and where the *Pietà* is the original work of Michelangelo. Hence, in those possible worlds, such as ours, any object that appears exactly like *Pietà*, is 'a Michelangelo' at least in this respect - but perhaps no more. For my alternative account to go through, all that is required is that there is some way that the restored *Pietà* may be identical to Michelangelo's *Pietà* and thereby countable as 'a Michelangelo'. Given that this identity in terms of appearance is actually case and so possible, identity by way of appearance seems uncontroversial.

'A Michelangelo' 'Sculpture'

Is there then nothing more to Michelangelo's artistic work than 'making some appearance'? That anyone replicating the *Pietà's* appearance is as much an artist as Michelangelo? No: this problematic view does not follow. It can be avoided by developing our sortal vocabulary to include a particular notion of 'a sculpture'. The conceptual distinctions captured by these sortals must map to non-identical kinds of artistry: fashioning marble as such; fashioning marble according to someone else's (aesthetic) design; and, fashioning marble in one's own (aesthetic) design.

De Campos' integral restoration is not 'a Michelangelo'. Saying an integral restoration is in some way 'a Michelangelo' by saying that it is baldly identical with Michelangelo's original *Pietà* is wrong-headed. Sagoff would be right to baulk if my view committed us to such a result. How then should we understand the sortal, 'sculpture', such that it may fulfil this theoretical role? I suggest that this sortal be used to refer, in this case, to the original *artwork*.[13] The *Pietà*, sorted by 'sculpture' is Michelangelo's artwork – and only Michelangelo's. Its persistence conditions are plausibly determined according to Michelangelo's first-order aesthetic intentions and work. Michelangelo decided that the *Pietà* be just as he fashioned it; using just the lump he used; in order to express just his artistry. Hence the persistence conditions of 'a sculpture' are very strict. Nevertheless, Michelangelo's statue and Michelangelo's sculpture are perceptually identical and equally manifest by the *Pietà*.[14] However, we may say that they are different entities as they may come apart modally. For example, it is possible to have a Michelangelo *Pietà* (statue), which is an *exact* copy, but this is clearly not his *sculpture*. His sculpture, is a function of all and only his aesthetic and artistic decisions.

Does de Campos make a sculpture? In cases of non-maximal integral restoration it will be a hybrid sculpture, if a sculpture at all: 'a Michelangelo-de Campos'. Nevertheless, if de Campos 'sculpts' anything, it is the product of *his* aesthetic and artistic intentions. His intentions are parasitic on the artistic intentions of Michelangelo and so have a different intentional structure. Somewhat artificially: *I, de Campos, fashion the marble thus and so because Michelangelo fashioned the marble thus and so*; as opposed to: *I fashion the marble thus and so because I have artistic aims, x, y, and z*. Thereby, de Campos produces something distinct of Michelangelo's *sculpture*. Hence, the integral restoration is not 'a Michelangelo' in terms of its being a *sculpture*. However, de Campos' artistic intentions, coordinated by the aims of integral restoration, entails that given his skill, he is able to produce 'a Michelangelo' *statue* that exactly resembles the *sculpture* in appearance. Undoubtedly something very important has been lost if we only have de Campos' lump of marble – or 'a Michelangelo-de Campos' hybrid sculpture. Yet it need not follow that such a world is entirely bereft of 'a Michelangelo' – we may have something that exactly resembles his artwork in appearance. This should be considered Michelangelo's statue.

We are now in a position to reject Sagoff's claim that the restored work is not 'a Michelangelo', *at all*. Sagoff's view of what the *Pietà* is, and how it persists, is mistaken. Sagoff holds that the *Pietà*, is an homogenous object; it ought to be preserved at the damaged state just after the attack by Laszlo precisely because the *Pietà* only persists, as 'a Michelangelo', at the moment and in the state it is in. If, however, the *Pietà* consists in entities (the lump, and the sculpture) that have at least been compromised, perhaps destroyed, then the status of the *Pietà* after the attack is far from clear. Based on the arguments above, Sagoff's purist restoration does not appear to secure the Pietà; certainly not in counterfactual situations. However, Michelangelo's statue seems salvageable by way of integral restoration. What is left of the lump and the sculpture is also secured by integral restoration as argued in section 2.1. Hence, it appears that the integral restoration will secure at least as much of Michelangelo's work as a purist restoration, and more in at least some counterfactual situations.

2.3 Appearance and Value

The above discussion focuses on metaphysical issues in aesthetics. Sagoff's view is seen to be problematic; an alternative view of the *Pietà*'s identity was offered. Clearly, my account emphasizes the appearance of the *Pietà*. I think this emphasis is justified by the benefits of the position in the debates above. Also, surely, the appearance is important on aesthetic grounds. Nevertheless, Sagoff would take the reliance on appearances to be a deep flaw. He argues that integral restoration's commitment to appearances is problematic in three ways:

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[13]   I do not by this wish to suggest that a sculpture is identical to an artwork. Being an artwork is a more complicated state of affairs again, and one which this paper does not broach. Indeed, I am inclined to think that you cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for something's counting as an artwork.

[14]   That is not to say that I am committed to the strange view that two distinct physical objects occupy the same spatio-temporal location. Objecthood may be a function in some way, of conceptual distinctions.

1. Integral restoration is most successful when it looks original. What looks original, but is not, is fraudulent to the extent that it looks original. A completely successful integral restoration would therefore be wholly fraudulent.[15] What is fraudulent is an inappropriate object of our value concerns;

2. The veridicality and authenticity of our aesthetic experience is indexed to the authenticity of the object experienced. As the integral restoration is a kind of fraud, the value of our experience can only be maintained if we are duped. If we find out that it is a fraud, the value we had placed on that experience disappears;

3. Co-ordinating the value of our aesthetic experiences around appearance, particularly the appearance of an integrally restored piece, is unsophisticated.
(i) A purist restoration can be *imagined* in its original appearance if needs be. The need for integral restoration is undermined along with appearances.
(ii) Regardless, appreciation of appearances is also figuratively superficial compared to a sophisticated appreciation of artworks which is 'individualising', 'historical', 'relational', and 'cognitive'.[16]

I cannot provide comprehensive discussion of these points here. This paper is primarily concerned with the underlying metaphysics of the debate, rather than issues of value, mental content, and phenomenology. That said, the first two arguments can be undermined using the preceding analysis. The assumptions of the third claim can be questioned, pushing the burden of proof back on Sagoff. The dialectical aim is to maintain the prima facie plausibility of my position in terms of value.

The first two arguments rest on the idea that an appearance may not be that of the authentic artwork. Hence: restoring in terms of appearances is misguided; experiences of appearances are liable to lose their value. In section 2.2, I have accepted that appearances are not necessarily authentic in terms of the original artwork. However, I have gone to some lengths to show that thinking of authenticity and identity only in those terms is deeply problematic. Moreover, the appearance is in some way authentically 'a Michelangelo'. And this is not withstanding the arguments in 2.1, showing that valuable historical properties may be meaningfully borne by integral restorations that have also favoured appearances. Whilst this requires a much more complex view of aesthetic experience and intentionality, I see no prima facie reason to think that this should not be the case. It does not seem impossible to appreciate the appearance of the integral restoration as Michelangelo's work whilst bearing in mind this is not (entirely at least) Michelangelo's sculpture.

I will not dwell further on these issues. The third argument is more interesting, but requires a deeper engagement with the nature of 'artworks' as such, our experience and their value. I will limit myself to questioning Sagoff's key assumptions. His idea that we can imagine the original's appearance goes with his view that appearances can be replicated without replicating the value of the original; and, that appreciation of appearances is, by itself, unsophisticated. Appearances of paintings may be captured by photographs yet we do not think that the photograph is as valuable as the original; appreciating an appearance is akin to a mouse responding to stimulus.[17] Offset such triviality against what sophisticated appreciation consists in: understanding what makes an object an artwork; understanding the object as a result of a historical process; evaluating it in relation to other artworks; reflecting on the artwork's properties. Appreciation of appearances, and coordination of restoration thereby, looks vacuous by contrast.

He does not elaborate his view of appearances such that they may be replicated, imagined and responded to in this way. Nevertheless, the physical properties of that which manifests the appearance

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[15] Of course, Sagoff is not making the claim that fraudulence is always in bad faith. De Campos is honest about the status of the restoration. However, for Sagoff, this does not militate the fact that it is a serious case of fraudulence.
[16] These claims are made over: Ibid., 457-8; 465; 460; and 466 respectively.
[17] Ibid., 467.

must not be necessary to it: otherwise his analogy of photographing paintings' appearances and thereby replicating their appearance would not work. Furthermore, appearances must be simple enough to be imaginable in the case that I have an all but destroyed purist restoration of the *Pietà* before me. Appearances must not be a function of cognitive or conceptual processes either.

Frankly, I think these claims are questionable. Applying Leibniz's Law to the appearances of a photograph of a painting, the appearances are patently non-identical. The properties of the two appearances under lighting conditions will differ because the photograph will have particular lighting conditions rendered into the image, whereas the appearance of the painting will not. Their appearance will differ due to the physical properties of their different surfaces and how they reflect light. Hence their appearances are not identical.

Can I imagine the appearance of the original *Pietà* when faced with Purist restoration that is 'good enough'? Surely, but only if I have little respect for the complexity of the appearance: I have no doubt that my mental rendering of the appearance and the actual appearance of the *Pietà* will differ radically. That is notwithstanding important phenomenological concerns with this view. When one imagines the physicality of the appearance of a great statue, trying to capture the rich phenomenology in the imagining, it seems plausible that there is just no substitute for direct experience of the actual object. Imagination may approximate the image, even the phenomenology, but I would need to be convinced that the imagination of the appearance involves no relevant qualitative differences to the original.

As for the final point, that the appreciation of appearances is unsophisticated; again, I would need some convincing of that. Appearances and experiences of them are likely to be more complex and sophisticated than Sagoff admits. Appreciation of appearances turned out to be critical to individuating artworks throughout the discussion thus far. Moreover, it is clearly contestable the idea that appearances are non-cognitive stimuli without any crucial role in sophisticated appreciation. This assumption could be questioned with appeal to competing views of mental content. On more aesthetic grounds, there are at least aesthetic theories in the Hegelian tradition, for example, that take appearances as crucial to our understanding of historical, and relational aspects of artworks. They maintain this precisely because appearances are not to be treated as something just to be enjoyed but to be understood.[18] In turn, this indicates the final rather strange assumption in Sagoff's view that those who are interested and appreciate appearances just do so, and could only do so, for simple pleasure. This seems empirically false.

Clearly these observations and suggestions do not amount to arguments. That said, they are plausible bases that could be developed to undermine the normative concerns of the purist. The dialectical point of this section for my purposes is: it is far from clear that his position enjoys any obvious advantage due to normative and value considerations vis-à-vis appearance.

Conclusion

Sagoff's paper is a significant paper on the aesthetics and philosophy of restoration. It has been revisited recently by De Clercq who, like me, disagrees with Sagoff's position concerning integral restoration, offering his own position.[19] What I wanted to do with this paper was delve deeper into the metaphysical commitments that underpin Sagoff's position. At its heart, it is a deeply problematic theory because it does not have a proper grip on the identity of the *Pietà*. The position is motivated, quite reasonably by certain value and aesthetic commitments. In the final section I have gestured that there might be problems with even those commitments. However, this is a case where getting clear on metaphysical commitments and entailments of a position is crucial. In so doing we generate a

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[18] Adorno's aesthetics is arguably such an example. Whether or not Adorno is right, it is begging-the question to think that appearances are problematic because they can only be enjoyed. Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (London: Continuum, 2004), Chapter 7.

[19] Rafael De Clercq, 'The Metaphysics of Art Restoration', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 53 (2013), 261-275.

firm foundation for honing aesthetic theories.

The extent to which the conclusions here are relevant to other particular artworks, will depend on case by case analysis. I am reticent to roll out theories in aesthetics, especially when the aesthetics of why and how it is that the '*Pietà*' counts as an 'artwork' has been bracketed in the discussion. Nevertheless, if my analysis works, we have some theoretical support for the view that restoration is at least of value in some cases. Furthermore, I have provided some resources for maintaining a clear conception the complex identity conditions of an object such as the '*Pietà*'. Yet, whilst we should not be too quick to generalize, I do think that my discussion is likely to provide resources for theories beyond   the   issue   of   restoration.