How Elections Shape Perceptions of Ideal Leadership

Theodore C. Masters-Waage

University of Houston

Nicolas Bastardoz

KU Leuven

Jayanth Narayanan

National University of Singapore

Olga Epitropaki

Durham University

Corresponding Author: Theodore C. Masters-Waage (theodoremw.2018@smu.edu.sg)

How Elections Shape Perceptions of Ideal Leadership

Abstract

Individuals hold internal leadership representations, termed leadership prototypes. We examined how these prototypes changed in reaction to the 2020 US presidential election. A sample of Republicans (N=200), Democrats (N=200), and individuals who identified with neither major party (N=200), surveyed eight times between October 2020 and January 2021, reported their perceptions of the characteristics of the ideal leader. Results from a regression discontinuity in time and repeated measurement analyses found that the election altered two dimensions of the average US leadership prototype. We specifically find participants' perceptions of Tyranny and Masculinity to decrease, i.e., shifts to more Biden-like and less Trump-like leadership prototypes. Other dimensions of the leadership prototype remained stable, i.e., Charisma, Sensitivity, Dedication, Intelligence and Dynamism. Analyses examined two boundary conditions of the effect: political identification and the acceptance of the election result as legitimate. Only perceived legitimacy was found to moderate the effect with the shift in leadership prototypes being driven by individuals who accepted the result of the election as legitimate. Our findings demonstrate the dynamic nature of leadership prototypes in response to real-world events, and more broadly how an election can shape psychological perceptions.

Public Significance Statement

Elections affect many facets of a society from the economy to foreign policy. In this manuscript we show that they also influence the public's perception of ideal leadership. The widely-covered election of Joe Biden in 2020 led the US public's average prototype for the ideal leader to become less tyrannical and less masculine. However, this shift was only among those who accepted the election results as valid. These findings underscore that elected leaders not only mirror public perceptions of ideal leadership but also shape those perceptions themselves.

Keywords: Leadership Prototypes, Politics, US Presidential Election, Tyrannical Leadership, Regression Discontinuity in Time

Elections are a cornerstone of societal life for a vast majority of the global population. In 2024 alone, more than 70 countries will hold elections determining who will be the political leaders of over two billion people (Beddoes, 2023). These elections captivate nations. Influencing discussions from media rooms to dinner tables. The outcome of elections affects people's lives in numerous ways - healthcare, foreign policy, and social justice, to name a few (Jervis, 2016; Rizvi et al., 2022). Yet beyond the direct policy outcomes, elections also signify the potential for a change in the highest formal leadership roles within societies. We build upon existing research into the psychological effects of elections by exploring how electoral outcomes can change individuals' perceptions of the attributes characterizing an ideal leader.

Decades of leadership research has identified the traits and behaviors that characterize better leaders (Bass, 1997; Bennis, 2007; Hogan et al., 1994; Vroom & Jago, 2007). However, perceptions of an ideal leader remain subjective (Jacobsen & Bøgh Andersen, 2015; Lord & Maher, 2002). Research on implicit leadership theories has shown that individuals hold a schema of associations around the characteristics of a leader (Lord et al., 1982; Lord & Shondrick, 2011). Implicit leadership theories, or leadership prototypes, are the foundation of these schemas, influencing not only how individuals engage with their leaders but also how formal leaders behave when assuming leadership roles (Lord & Maher, 2002). These leadership prototypes have been found to vary across cultures (House et al., 2002), personality types (Carnes et al., 2015), and whether the prototype is for a "typical leader" or an "ideal leader" (van Quaquebeke et al., 2014).

The predominant view on leadership prototypes was that while they vary across people, cultures, and contexts, they are primarily static and stable over time (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Sy et al., 2010). More recently scholars have challenged this static

perspective, proposing a more dynamic view based on evidence from laboratory experiments (Foti et al., 2017; Trichas et al., 2017) and a connectionist perspective (Lord et al., 2020). Nevertheless, this dynamic perspective focusing on within-person changes remains untested in real-world settings, and it has not been demonstrated that such dynamic changes exist outside of short experimental scenarios (e.g., Foti et al., 2008), partly due to the methodological hurdles of field research. In this manuscript, we investigate whether the 2020 US presidential election and its consequential leadership transition led to a (within-person) change in activation of certain dimensions (or nodes) within leadership prototypes.

Elections are pivotal societal events that steer the course of nations, continents, and the global landscape. Political psychologists have observed that elections can affect individual-level psychological variables, creating cognitive dissonance for individuals who supported unsuccessful candidates (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001), eliciting a range of emotional responses from depression to hope (Almudin et al., 2022; Norris et al., 2011; Simchon et al., 2020), and potentially leaving lasting impacts on mental health and well-being (Yan et al., 2021). Expanding on this body of research, we investigate how a fundamental aspect of elections - the nation's decision to elect a new leader - shapes people's perceptions of ideal leadership.

Employing an interdisciplinary approach, we investigate the potential interplay between dynamic changes in leadership prototypes and a person's political identity, alongside the election's perceived legitimacy. Politics has a profound impact on how we see and react to the world around us (Jung et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2022). Notably, there has been a lot of discussion and worry about the ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats in the US (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). We investigate whether partisanship serves as a boundary condition in the public's perception of leadership after the election of

a new President by looking at these split groups in our research. Studying individuals who identify as different politically, not only clarifies the complex nature of implicit leadership theories, but it also provides a deeper understanding of the psychological underpinnings of partisanship. Furthermore, we explore the degree to which people's acceptance of the election results as legitimate acts as a boundary condition in light of the contentious nature of the 2020 election, which included multiple recounts, legal challenges, and the non-announcement of the result on election day. Understanding these underlying dynamics is crucial within a polarized political environment.

To investigate these questions, we conducted a longitudinal field study on the effects of the 2020 presidential election on the average US public leadership prototype. We surveyed a sample of 200 Republicans, 200 Democrats, and 200 individuals who identified with neither party (Independents/Others/No affiliation), eight times around the election date, starting two weeks before the election and ending on Inauguration Day. At each time point, we measured participants' ideal leadership prototype - specifically, perceptions of tyranny, masculinity, charisma, sensitivity, dedication, intelligence, and dynamism - among other variables. We then used a regression discontinuity in time design to examine whether the change in political leadership - from Donald Trump to Joe Biden - led to a significant and stable shift in activation of two dimensions within US ideal leadership prototypes: tyranny and masculinity. Recognizing that elections are not isolated events; we also examine how participants' political identification and perceived legitimacy of the election results affected whether leadership prototypes shifted post-election.

Leadership Prototypes

People use schemas, or a collection of characteristics linked to a category, to help them deal with the complexity of information (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Galambos et al.,

1986; Read & Miller, 2014; Rosch, 1983). According to leader categorization theory, a similar mechanism governs leadership perceptions (e.g., Lord, 1985; Lord et al., 1982; Lord & Shondrick, 2011). Perceptual targets are classified as leaders based on their perceived alignment with the leader category—that is, the implicit leadership theories (ILT)—of a perceiver. Perceivers can use *prototypes* or *exemplars* in their leadership perceptual process (Zarate & Smith, 1990). In the case of prototypes, individuals focus on characteristics associated with the leadership category in memory, whereas in the case of exemplars, they base their categorization on the target's perceived similarity to a person they view as most representative of the category (Shondrick & Lord, 2010).

Leadership prototypes have a similar hierarchical structure to other person or object categories (Rosch, 1983). On the *superordinate* level we find characteristics that distinguish leaders from non-leaders; on the *basic* level we find contextualized prototypes (e.g., business leader); and on the *subordinate* level we find narrower categories (e.g., supervisor). Leadership prototypes are generally assumed to represent a typical leader and most existing scales measuring ILTs ask participants to rate how characteristic certain attributes are for a leader (e.g., Offermann et al., 1994; Offermann & Coats, 2018). Typical prototypes are close to an average of a category (central tendency prototypes; Barsalou, 1985). There is, however, research arguing for the importance of capturing ideal (rather than typical) leadership prototypes (Junker & Van Dick, 2014). Ideals focus on representations that can serve the key goal associated with a category (Barsalou, 1985). Thus, representations of ideal (versus typical) leaders are more likely to reflect leader characteristics contributing to leadership effectiveness. For instance, ideal prototype fit more strongly predicts followers' satisfaction with the leader than typical prototype fit (van Quaquebeke et al., 2014).

Ideal prototypes capture perceptions of how leaders *should be* rather than how they normally *are*. In our study we focus on ideal rather than typical leader prototypes as – given that the US president is elected through a mandate of the people – the US president is more representative of the ideal leader than the typical one. Further, we are interested in examining changes to prescriptive and goal-oriented leadership perceptions. Ideal prototypes are more extreme than typical prototypes (Junker & Van Dick, 2014) and thus more likely to be influenced by changes in highly salient formal leadership roles and extreme members of the leader category such as the US Presidents.

Despite offering significant insights on the structure of leadership schemas and leadership perceptual processes, leadership categorization theory has certain limitations. For example, leader prototypes have been traditionally viewed as stable cognitive representations that are stored as discrete, static units in long-term memory and processed in a serial manner (Smith, 1998; Sy et al., 2010). While prior research generally found support for prototype stability (e.g., Epitropaki & Martin, 2004), there is more recent evidence suggesting that leadership prototypes are dynamic and malleable. Leadership categorization theory has thus been updated to account for these dynamic features of leadership prototypes.

Connectionist Perspective

A particularly important theoretical update in the ILT domain is the incorporation of the connectionist perspective (Brown & Lord, 2013; Hanges et al., 2000; Lord et al., 2001). Originating from connectionist theory in cognitive science, this approach emphasizes the dynamic and complex nature of schemas (Read & Miller, 2014). Lord et al. (2001) argue that schemas could be understood in terms of neural networks. A schema is a recurring network composed of many interconnected traits associated with leadership

(e.g., intelligent, charismatic, dominant). Connectionist models allow for both schema stability and change. Stability and consistency come from the pattern of interconnections among dimensions in the perceiver's cognitive schema whereas change comes from contextual inputs that may differ across situations. In other words, the larger set of dimensions that make up the schema network can be stable and consistent, but activation of these dimensions can vary in response to different contextual inputs.

Contextual inputs come in a variety of different forms. A typical example of contextual input is occupation. For example, in their seminal article on connectionism in leadership prototypes Lord et al. (2001) hypothesized that in a military context there may be a strong activation of the masculinity dimension within leadership prototypes whereas in the context of an R&D organization, there may be stronger activation of the intelligence and creativity dimensions. Sy et al. (2010) supported this by finding that individuals' occupation and race (Asian American vs. White American) served as contextual inputs that shifted the activation of specific dimensions within individuals' leadership prototypes. Similarly, Trichas et al. (2017) found in an experiment that leader emotional displays, specifically happiness, also operate as contextual inputs that lead to a decrease in the activation of the tyranny dimension and increase in the sensitivity dimension in leadership prototypes. Critically, while Sy et al. (2010) and Trichas et al. (2017) found evidence for changes in activation across different contextual inputs, this change in activation was localized to specific dimensions of leadership prototypes while other dimensions remained stable.

In this manuscript we focus on a leadership schema with seven large nodes (or dimensions) associated with leadership (Tyranny, Masculinity, Charisma, Sensitivity, Dedication, Intelligence, and Dynamism). We examine how the election of a new president

serves as a contextual input on leadership prototypes. In line with past scholarship on the connectionist framework (Lord et al., 2020; Shondrick & Lord, 2010), we expect that the contextual input of presidential elections will change the activation of specific (but not all) nodes of the leadership schema. Unlike prior research that has focused on between-person differences (House et al., 2002; Sy et al., 2010), we examine within-person change in leadership prototypes resulting from shifts in contextual input (pre- and post-election). It is important to highlight that the contextual input operates at the national level, given that a presidential election results in a change of leadership for the entire nation.

In sum, connectionism provides a valuable framework for examining dynamic changes in leadership prototypes. Importantly, we do not test the connectionist theory but instead - similar to prior work (Sy et al., 2010; Trichas et al., 2017) - use it as an underlying framework. We examine a specific type of change in leadership prototype, which is a change in the mean-level of activation for dimensions of leadership prototypes across a population. In the next section, we theorize the specific dimensions of leadership prototypes we expect to change and those dimensions we expect not to change as a result of Biden's election.

Presidential Elections and Prototype Change

Presidential elections can result in a formal leadership change in arguably the most prominent leader in a society: the head of state. In the United States, the president is the highest formal leadership position in the US political system and takes on a high-profile societal role, reinforced through constant contact with the US public: press briefings, news outlets, and social media. Furthermore, the president is elected by an electoral college system that is based on a public vote, meaning that to some extent they have earned their position due to being perceived as an ideal leader by a substantial portion of the electorate.

In theory, the election of a new president could lead to a shift in activation of any dimension of the leadership prototype (Foti et al., 2017). However, given this manuscript is based on a real-world event, our theorizing is tailored to the specifics of the 2020 US election and based on the contrast between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. We specifically focus our attention on two dimensions in which Trump and Biden's leadership were most divergent. This is the extent to which their leadership approach can be perceived as tyrannical and masculine.

Tyranny is the act of behaving in a domineering, pushy, manipulative, loud, conceited, and selfish way (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Offermann et al., 1994), and has previously been linked with destructive leadership (Krasikova et al., 2013; Schyns & Schilling, 2013) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970). There has been frequent discussion of Donald Trump's tyrannical leadership style from political commentators. From his candidacy to incumbency as president, he was frequently embroiled in scandals in which commentators portrayed him as conceited, selfish, manipulative, or domineering: these include but are not limited to sexual scandals, insensitive comments, and fraudulent business deals (Woodward & Costa, 2021). Supporting this, reports conducted by sociolinguists (Sclafani, 2017) and psychologists (Immelman, 2017; Immelman & Griebie, 2020) on Donald Trump's leadership style describe it as "Dominant/Controlling," "Ambitious/Exploitative," and "Self-focused." The tyrannical style of Trump has been argued to be an appealing factor to some of his voters (Griebie & Immelman, 2021), positioning him as a "primal leader" that shuns the conventions of political leadership (McAdams, 2017) and appealing to individuals who seek tyrannical leaders (Walker et al., 2020). In contrast, Biden is not characterized as tyrannical and instead has been described

as being "accommodating" (Griebie & Immelman, 2021). These contrasting behaviors and perceptions make tyranny a key dimension on which the two leaders differ.

Another leadership dimension repeatedly associated with Donald Trump is masculinity. Masculinity as a leadership trait is not just a reflection of the ascribed gender of the leader, but also whether they lead in a stereotypically masculine fashion, that is, more focused on agency/competency and less on communion/warmth (Martin & Slepian, 2021). Scholars have noted Trump's hyper-masculine style of leadership (Kolb, 2019; Neville-Shepard & Neville-Shepard, 2021) and argued that he displays this masculinity through demagoguery, positioning the ordinary *man* against the elite (Johnson, 2017). This hypermasculinity contrasts with Biden style, who as a leader shuns some of the norms of masculinity, instead displaying more warmth and communion (Fisher, 2021).

In sum, we argue that Biden behaves and is perceived as less tyrannical and stereotypically masculine than Trump. Therefore, we hypothesize that the election of Biden as president will lead to a mean-level decrease in activation of both the tyranny and masculinity dimensions of the US public average leadership prototypes.

Hypothesis 1: The US 2020 presidential election (i.e., leadership transition from Trump to Biden) will lead to a decrease in the level of activation for tyranny (1a) and masculinity (1b) in the US public's ideal leadership prototype.

By making the above specific hypothesis, we expect that the level of activation of other dimensions of leadership prototypes – charisma, sensitivity, dedication, intelligence, and dynamism – will not change post-election. This is because we would argue that Trump's and Biden's leadership style does not differ substantially on these dimensions.

The Role of Political Identification and Legitimacy

Along with hypothesizing a main effect of the election, we also propose two boundary conditions related to the political context in which this study took place. The first factor that could affect the change in the level of activation of the masculinity and tyranny dimensions in response to the election of a new president is an individual's political identification. Political identification has been studied extensively in the behavioral sciences as a factor that determines how individuals perceive the social world around them (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Petersen & Aarøe, 2013; Schreiber, 2007). In this manuscript we measured political identification as whether individuals identify with the (Trump's) Republican party, (Biden's) Democratic party, or they identify with neither (independent/other/non-affiliated).

Individuals can perceive the same event differently. This is in part due to motivated cognition, which is when individuals' motives alter how they process the world around them (Kunda, 1990). In other words, the contextual input from an event is not necessarily consistent across individuals and is instead a function of their motivation to view their current situation in a self-serving manner. Motivated cognition is particularly pronounced in the political domain where group identities are clearly defined and distinguished from each other (Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, we argue that individuals' political identification will affect the extent to which the contextual input of the election of a new President results in changes in activation of the tyranny and masculinity dimensions.

Specifically, we expect individuals who identify as Democrats will be highly motivated to view Biden as their (ideal) leader. As a result, they will react strongly to the contextual input of his election, leading to a greater shift in activation of the tyranny and masculinity dimensions. In contrast, Republicans or individuals identifying with neither party will be less engaged or even actively divert attention away from the election result,

resulting in a reduced reaction to the contextual input of the election. This could lead to a lesser shift in the activation of tyranny and masculinity.

> **Hypothesis 2:** Political identification moderates the effect of election (i.e., leadership transition from Trump to Biden) on the level of activation for tyranny and masculinity in the US public's ideal leadership prototype, such that the change is more accentuated for Democrats than Republicans and individuals identifying with neither party (i.e., independent/other/non-affiliated).

The second boundary condition relates to the perceived legitimacy of the election. The nature of the 2020 US election also allowed us to examine this boundary condition. While we did not hypothesize it before we began data collection, the legitimacy of the election was extensively challenged by politicians immediately after it occurred (Zucher, 2020). Researchers have extensively studied perceptions that the 2020 election result was a fraud (e.g., Calvillo et al., 2021; Green et al., 2022; Matatov et al., 2022). Here we examine whether the perceived legitimacy of the event affected the extent to which individuals integrated Biden into their leadership prototype.

The acceptance of an event as legitimate can be defined as a post-hoc evaluation of whether this event *should* have occurred (Morgeson et al., 2015). For individuals who do not accept the result of the elections as legitimate, Trump is still the legitimate president and thus Biden's election will be less likely to change the activation of tyranny and masculinity in their leadership prototype. Therefore, this ex-post hypothesis not only tests a condition under which the activation of leadership prototypes will (or will not) shift, but it also provides a fundamental test of our central argument: for individuals not accepting the election results as legitimate, there *has not been an election of a new leader* (i.e., no

new contextual inputs), but for individuals who do accept the election results as legitimate, there *has been a leadership transition*.

> **Hypothesis 3:** Perceived legitimacy of the election results moderates the effect of election (i.e., leadership transition from Trump to Biden) on the level of activation for tyranny and masculinity in the US public's ideal leadership prototype, such that the change is more accentuated for individuals who accepted the election result as legitimate.

METHOD

Pre-Study

Before conducting our main study, we conducted a short survey to assess the US public's perceptions of Biden and Trump as leaders. The goal of this study was to assess whether, as suggested, Trump is viewed to be more tyrannical and masculine than Biden.

A sample of 300 participants from across the political spectrum was collected (100 republicans; 100 democrats; 100 Independents/Others/No affiliation). Political identification was screened automatically through the Prolific.ac system. Each individual surveyed rated both Trump and Biden on each of the 7 ILT dimensions (see Table 1). The presentation order of the two leaders was randomized across participants.

As expected, we observed a high degree of polarization on the perception of ILT dimensions (see Table 1 for the descriptive statistics). Republicans viewed Trump as being more dedicated, sensitive, dynamic, intelligent, charismatic, and masculine, whereas Democrats viewed Biden as being more dedicated, sensitive, dynamic, intelligent, charismatic, and masculine (see Table 1 for t-tests comparing means across groups). One deviation was that individuals from across the political spectrum agreed that Trump was

more tyrannical than Biden. Using a paired-samples t-test, our analyses show this difference to be significant for Republicans (t(99)=5.79, p<.001), Independents/Others/No affiliation (t(99)=17.57, p<.001), and Democrats (t(99)=21.02, p<.001). These results provide support for Trump being viewed as more tyrannical than Biden, laying the foundation for hypothesis 1a. Contrary to our predictions Trump was *not* viewed as more masculine than Biden across the entire sample, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 1b. Based on these results, we expect the effect of the election to be most pronounced for tyranny.

------ Insert Table 1 about here ------

Main Study

Participants

We recruited 600 participants in the first survey (October 20th). These participants were pre-screened based on their political identification through a double verification process in order to obtain an equal number (i.e., 200 participants) who identify as i) Democrats, ii) Republicans, and iii) neither (i.e., Independents/Others/No affiliation) who are referred to as "others" in analyses. First, participants were screened *automatically* through the Prolific.ac system such that the survey was made available to 200 republicans, 200 democrats, and 200 Others. Second, participants *manually* reported their political identification. We then cross verified these two screening processes to ensure participants in the final sample were registered on Prolific.ac with the same political identification that they reported in the pre-survey. In addition, participants were screened to be US nationals, along with the following characteristics: (a) had completed at least 50 previous surveys; (b) had a past participant approval rating of 95% and above, following best practices for

ensuring participant quality (Keith et al., 2017), and (c) were eligible to vote in the 2020 US presidential election. Participants were removed (with replacement) after the pre-screening survey if their self-reported political identification did not match what they were registered as on Prolific, ensuring a full cohort size of 600.

Procedure

Participants registered for the study by completing the first survey (October 20th). Participants then received two more surveys before the election, one week before the election (October 27th) and one day before the election (November 2nd). The cohort received a survey one day after the election (November 4th), one week after the election (November 10th), three weeks after the election (November 24th), six weeks after the election (December 15th), and the day after inauguration day (January 21st; ≈11 weeks after the election). All surveys were sent at 9am EST each day and were available for completion for three days apart from the surveys sent the day before and after the election, which were only available until midnight that day. Participants who had not completed the assigned surveys were reminded via the Prolific platform one day and two days after the study was posted. Participants were reimbursed for each survey and received bonus payments for completing all the surveys.

All the surveys contained the same set of core questions. The primary focus of the core questions is the measurement of individuals' ideal leadership prototypes. In addition, to mask the intentions of the study, we included a series of "filler" questions on unrelated topics such as COVID-19 and climate change. In response to the initial tightness of the election result and continued doubt of the results after it had been confirmed by the media and congress, we included a one-item measure of *acceptance of the election results* from Survey 5 onwards.

Measures

Leadership Prototypes (Ideal Leader). Participants' leadership prototypes were measured using an adapted version of the 21-item scale developed by Epitropaki & Martin (2004), measuring ideal leader prototypes. These items measure six dimensions: sensitivity, dedication, intelligence, dynamism, tyranny, and masculinity. In addition, we appended three items to measure charisma as an additional dimension (Offermann & Coats, 2018). We presented these 24-items to participants who were asked to judge each item in terms of how characteristic it is of an ideal leader, on a 7-point scale running from 1 (Very Uncharacteristic) to 7 (Very Characteristic); scale reliabilities are shown in Table 3.

We organized items for each dimension into separate pages and presented them in a randomized order. At the top of each page participants saw the following message: "To what extent are the following [two/three/four/five/six] adjectives in **bold** characteristic of an ideal leader?". The different characteristics for each dimension directly followed (e.g., for the dynamism characteristic, the items were "**Energetic**", "**Strong**", and "**Dynamic**").

Political Identification. Participants' political identification was measured using the same question from the Prolific.ac prescreening criteria. Specifically, the questions asked which political group the participant most identifies with, i) republican, ii) democrat, iii) independent, iv) other, and v) none. Responses were then coded into a categorical variable for analyses; republican [1], democrat [2], and others [3; independent/other/no affiliation]. Note, in the "others" category a total of 150 participants reported being "independents," 22 reported "other," and 28 reported "no affiliation."

Perceived Legitimacy. We asked participants to respond to a single item question – "To what degree do you accept or reject the result of the US presidential election as legitimate?" – on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 "Completely Reject" to 7 "Completely

Accept." We use the first measurement (i.e., the fifth survey, one week after the election) in our moderation analyses, after most major news channels and political commentators had confirmed the election result. Note that only 504 participants responded to this survey, reducing the sample for analyses. Given that this measure was based on individuals' subjective perception of whether the election was legitimate or not, we refer to this variable as *perceived legitimacy*.

RESULTS

Data Analysis Plan

We tested our theory using a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design (Hausman & Rapson, 2018), a modeling procedure similar to a discontinuous growth model with absolute changes (Bliese & Lang, 2016). RDiT is a quasi-experimental procedure that allows for estimating the causal effect of certain events on a given outcome variable. In the present case, the event is the leadership transition from Trump to Biden following the 2020 US presidential election, the outcome variable is each dimension of an individuals' ideal leadership prototype, and the selection procedure is the number of days before and after the election date (ranging from *-14* for the first survey to *+80* for the eighth and final survey). For Hypothesis 1, we model a linear specification by regressing the different dimensions on a) a treatment variable (β_1) indicating whether the measurement was before (0) or after (1) the election; b) time as indicated by the number days before and after the election (β_2); and c) the interaction between the treatment and time (β_3). The latter interaction allows for the effect of time before and after the event to differ. To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we included participants' political affiliation (H2) or participants' perceived legitimacy (H3) as a moderator and interacted them with the treatment variable.

Because we have repeated observations per individual, we modeled the multilevel nature of our data to estimate the within-individual effect of a change in US president. We first tested for whether the random-effect (RE) assumption held based on a Wald test (see Table 2) with clustered robust standard errors (Antonakis et al., 2021). Because the RE assumption was not respected in a majority of cases, we opted for using a correlated random effects (CRE) approach along with cluster-robust standard errors at the participants' level (Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 2015). A CRE approach includes all lower-level independent variables' cluster means in the estimation and is consistent when the random-effect assumption is not respected, mimicking a fixed-effects approach (Antonakis et al., 2021; Hamaker & Muthén, 2020). Furthermore, this modeling procedure allows estimating the effect of variables at different levels (what a FE model cannot do) and allows for the inclusion of the higher-level moderator variables, i.e., political identification (H2) and perceived legitimacy (H3).

Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) Statement

All data and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/ts9dp/. The hypotheses and analysis plan of this paper were not pre-registered before data collection.

------ Insert Table 2 about here ------

Descriptive Statistics

The complete data set had responses from 600 participants recording 3,858 observations, meaning participants completed on average 6.43 of the 8 surveys sent. The sample was 48.17% female with a mean age of 32.24 ($SD = 10.84$). On average, acceptance of the election (i.e., perceived legitimacy) as legitimate was 5.61 of out 7 ($SD = 1.86$), which was significantly above the midpoint ($t(503) = 19.47$; $p < .001$). Variability was found across political identification with republicans perceiving the election to be the least

legitimate ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 2.14$), followed by others ($M = 5.72$, $SD = .64$) and then democrats ($M = 6.72$, $SD = 1.60$). Descriptive statistics and correlations are displayed in Table 3.

We computed ICC(1) values for each leadership prototype dimension, and values ranged between .56 (charisma) and .72 (tyranny). These values indicate relatively high within-individual agreement but demonstrate enough within-person variation in participants' responses for contextual factors to predict. ICC(2) for each leadership prototype dimensions were between .89 (charisma and dedication) and .94 (tyranny) (see Table 2).

Examining the impact of the election on leadership prototypes

We examined how the election affected leadership prototypes by assessing the treatment effect of the election at the time of the discontinuity. We ran the same analyses for each of the seven ILT dimensions but only report in text the results for tyranny (H1a) and masculinity (H1b), see Table 4 for the full breakdown.

Consistent with hypotheses 1a and 1b, we found a significant negative effect of the election on the dimensions of tyranny ($\beta_{1tyranny} = -0.09$, $p = .007$) and masculinity ($\beta_{1masculinity} = -0.07$, $p = .046$). We found no effect of time (β_2) or time*treatment interaction (β_3) for either. These results indicate a decrease in the level of activation for tyranny and masculinity in respondents' ideal leader prototypes after the election of Biden (see Fig. 1 and 2, respectively).

------ Insert Table 3 & 4 and Figure 1 & 2 about here ------

Robustness Checks. We estimated different estimators and specifications to ensure the robustness of these results and report these results in Supplementary Tables S1-S8. To

begin with we tested whether the results were robust to different model specifications. First, we tested a specification in which we did not allow the slopes before and after the election to differ (i.e., not estimating the interaction between the election and time, see Table S1). These results are in line with our main specification ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -0.11, $p < .001$; and $\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -0.09, $p = .002$). In this specification, the election also affected the level of activation of dynamism ($\beta_{1dynamism}$ = 0.05, $p = .014$). Next, we estimated a model where we allowed for non-linear effects by including a quadratic effect of time (see Table S2). Results showed that no quadratic relationships are significant, providing confidence in the linear nature of the relationship (Gelman & Imbens, 2019).

Next, we conducted a donut hole analysis in which the two surveys closest to the critical event were removed (see Table S3). Regression discontinuity scholars have raised concerns that data close to the discontinuity can bias the treatment effect, recommending the donut hole approach (Barreca et al., 2011). This approach "investigates the sensitivity of the empirical conclusions by removing the few observations closest to the cutoff and then implementing estimation and inference" (pp. 844-845, Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022). We conducted such analyses to (1) reduce the role of the pre-election slopes and (2) reduce the impact that "expectancy" could play in shifting prototypes. To do so we removed survey 3 and 4 from the analyses. The results replicate our prior findings for H1a such that the effect of the election on tyranny is significant and negative ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -.21; $p = .007$) but the support for H1b was weakened as the effect of the election on masculinity was still negative but not significant anymore ($\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -.14; $p = .090$), possibly due to the reduced sample size for this analysis.

Similar to the donut hole approach, we retested our main specification omitting data from Survey 4 sent one day after the election (see Table S4). We performed this analysis because at this point in time, it was still unclear who had won the election. Results remain in line with hypothesis 1 ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -0.11, p = .003), although the result for masculinity again became non-significant ($\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -0.08, p = .058). In another set of sensitivity analyses, we excluded Surveys 7 and 8 to focus only on data close to the election and excluding data from after the Capitol Hill riots (January 6th) that could have also affected perceptions of leadership. This model replicated the results ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -0.11, p = .004; and $\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -0.09, p = .022), providing confidence that the data far from the threshold nor the events of the Capitol Hill riots are driving the results.

Next, we performed a sensitivity analysis by including all collected demographics (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, employment status, education, income, and socioeconomic status) as control variables (see Table S6). Inferences remained consistent ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -0.09, p = .007; and $\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -0.07, p = .046).

We also used a discontinuous growth modeling instead of a RDiT design (see Table S7). Theoretically, by testing the difference of the estimated values at the discontinuity, a RDiT is similar to a test of absolute change (in the variable "trans"), and we expected our main results to mirror results from the discontinuous growth model (Bliese & Lang, 2016). Consistent with these expectations, we replicated our main estimated treatment effect using this modeling strategy ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -.09; p = .006; and $\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -.07; p = .030).

Finally, we estimated all seven equations simultaneously using a structural equation model (see Table S8). This estimation strategy is appropriate when the various dependent variables potentially share common unobserved variation. We used the *sem* command in

Stata 17 with correlated disturbances for all endogenous variables and cluster robust standard errors. Inferences remain similar using this procedure ($\beta_{1tyranny}$= -.08; p = .023; and $\beta_{1masculinity}$= -.08; p = .040). The joint test for the significance of the election on the tyranny and masculinity dimensions indicated a significant effect of the election (Wald $\chi^2(2)$ = 8.28, p = .016); there was however no significant joint effect of the election on the other five dimensions (Wald $\chi^2(5)$ = 3.16, p = .675).

Discussion. The results of the above analyses provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1. The results indicate that the mean-level activation of the tyranny and masculinity dimensions in average US ideal leadership prototypes decreased after the election of Biden, while the mean-level activation of other dimensions of leadership prototypes – charisma, sensitivity, dedication, intelligence, and dynamism – remained stable. These results are robust to various specifications, subsamples, control variables, and statistical approaches.

Boundary Conditions

Given the election significantly affected the mean-level activation of both tyranny and masculinity, we tested the boundary conditions for both of these effects.

Political Identification. Our second hypothesis refers to the moderating role of political identification in how elections would affect a change on the level of activation for tyranny and masculinity in the US public's ideal leadership prototype. To test this hypothesis, we include the political identification variable and its interaction with the election variable. If the *political identification*election* interaction is significant, it would indicate that the election affected individuals with different political identifications in a different manner.

As shown in Table 5, the interaction term is not significant suggesting that the effect of the election for tyranny or masculinity (found in *H1a* and *H1b*) does not significantly differ across the different political identifications. It is still noteworthy to observe that Republicans have significantly higher scores than Democrats and others on dynamism (β_{dem}= -.20, *p* = .001; β_{others}= -.17, *p* = .008), masculinity (β_{dem}= -.67, *p* < .001; β_{others}= -.57, *p* < .001), and tyranny (β_{dem}= -.60, *p* < .001; β_{others}= -.55, *p* < .001), and lower scores on sensitivity (β_{dem}= .15, *p* = .033; β_{others} = .14, *p* = .035).

We also investigated the origin of the effect reported for Hypothesis 1 by testing for which political identification group the effect of the election would be significant; we did so by probing marginal treatment effects. Regarding tyranny, the election significantly reduced how ideal this leader dimension is for Republicans ($\chi^2(1) = 7.87$, *p* = .005), but such an effect was not observed for Democrats ($\chi^2(1) = 1.46$, *p* = .227) or others ($\chi^2(1) = 2.81$, *p* = .094).

Robustness Checks. We performed several checks to ensure that these results are robust to other specifications or subsamples and report these results in the supplementary materials (see tables S9-S15 for results). The first set of tests mirrored those used in hypothesis 1: no "time x election" interaction (Table S9), omitting survey 4 (Table S10), omitting survey 7 and 8 (Table S111), including demographic controls (Table S12), and using discontinuous growth modeling (Table S13). Across all these analyses the interaction between election and political identification consistently remained non-significant, as in the main analyses.

We also performed additional robustness checks unique to hypothesis 2. Specifically, we used alternative operationalizations of political identification in order to address the potential limitations of the political identification measure used in the main

analyses. First, when using who participants voted for (Trump, Biden, or Other) as a moderating variable (Table S14), results remained consistent with the main analyses. Second, we used a measure of political identification that represented individuals' identification on a spectrum from 1 "Strong Democrat" to 7 "Strong Republican" (Kroh, 2007). This measure accounts for the fact that, in the main analyses, individuals identifying with neither party may vary in identification across this continuum. Using this measure, results of the main analyses were replicated (Table S15). In sum, across all the robustness checks the interactions were never significant.

------ Insert Table 5 about here ------

Perceived Legitimacy. Our third hypothesis refers to the moderating role of perceived legitimacy. To test this hypothesis, we include the perceived legitimacy variable and its interaction with the election variable. If the *perceived legitimacy*election* interaction is significant, it would indicate that the election affected individuals with different stances towards the perceived legitimacy of the election in a different manner.

Results are shown in Table 6. The interaction term was not significant for tyranny ($\beta_{1tyranny}$ = -.02, p = .180) although it was in the predicted direction. The interaction term for masculinity was significant ($\beta_{1masculinity}$ = -.03, p = .021) and in the predicted direction.

Next, we conducted post-estimation tests to further probe the interaction pattern and direction of the results for tyranny and masculinity. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, post-estimation tests indicated that the drop in the mean-level activation of tyranny in the US ideal leadership prototype was driven by individuals who "completely accepted" ($\chi^2(1)$ = 9.50, p= .002), "accepted" ($\chi^2(1)$ = 9.20, p = .002), and "somewhat accepted" ($\chi^2(1)$ =

6.36, $p = .011$) the election as legitimate, but not by individuals who neither accepted nor rejected the result ($\chi^2(1) = 3.01$, $p = .083$) or who rejected the result (all $\chi^2(1) < 1.07$, $p > .300$).

Further supporting Hypothesis 3, post-estimation tests indicated that the drop in the mean-level activation perceptions of masculinity in US ideal leadership prototypes was driven by individuals who completely accepted ($\chi^2(1) = 7.67$, $p = .006$) or accepted ($\chi^2(1) = 5.58$, $p = .018$) the results of the election as legitimate, but not by individuals who somewhat accepted the result ($\chi^2(1) = 2.82$, $p = .093$), who neither accepted nor rejected the result, or who rejected the result (all $\chi^2(1) < 0.77$, $p > .383$).

Robustness Checks. We performed several checks to ensure that these results are robust to other specifications or subsamples and report these results in the supplementary materials. The checks mirrored those used in hypothesis 1: no "time x election" interaction (Table S16), omitting survey 4 (Table S17), omitting survey 7 and 8 (Table S18), including demographic controls (Table S19), and using discontinuous growth modeling (Table S20). Across all these analyses the interaction between election and perceived legitimacy was significant for masculinity in all but Table S18, probably due to the lower sample size. Furthermore, the inferences based on post-estimation tests were all consistent with the main analyses.

------ Insert Table 6 about here ------

Discussion. We find no evidence supporting the role of political identification (H2) as a boundary condition but do find support for perceived legitimacy (H3). While the interaction between perceived legitimacy and election was not significant for tyranny, the pattern of results was in the hypothesized direction, with significant shifts in individuals

26

who perceived the election as legitimate and not for those who did not perceive the election as legitimate. Furthermore, the interaction between perceived legitimacy and election was significant for masculinity and the pattern of results is again in the hypothesized direction.

General Discussion

Elections are widely recognized for their profound impact on societies, often through direct policy changes. Our study further reveals that elections shape public perceptions of the "ideal leader." Over a three-month study following the 2020 US Presidential election, we documented a notable and persistent shift, with the activation of tyranny and masculinity in ideal leadership prototypes both diminishing. These findings indicate that the average US concept of the ideal leader is shaped by the political environment and thus undergo dynamic changes as a result of national elections. Considering the critical role that ideal leadership models play in the selection, emulation, and allegiance to leaders (Bass & Avolio, 1989; Carnes et al., 2015; Epitropaki et al., 2013; Lord & Maher, 2002), our study underscores the extensive societal impact of elections and the intricate interplay between politics, leadership, and psychology.

Contributions

Our findings provide the strongest evidence to date for within-person dynamic changes of leadership prototypes in a real-world context (Foti et al., 2017; Lord et al., 2020). Thus, we provide additional evidence supporting the argument to move away from a symbolic-level view of leadership (Lord et al., 2001; Sy et al., 2010) such as that proposed by leadership categorization theory, in which individuals' prototypes are stored as discrete, static units in long-term memory and processed in serial manner (Smith, 1998). Our study also goes beyond past work on the dynamic nature of leadership prototypes. First, whereas past work has focused on how different contextual inputs between subjects is related to

differential activation within leadership prototypes (e.g. occupation and race, Sy et al., 2010; culture, House et al., 2002; emotional displays, Trichas et al., 2017), building on the laboratory work of Foti et al. (2008), this manuscript examined how different real-world contextual inputs (i.e., a different president pre-and post-election) can lead to within-person changes in dimension activation within leadership prototypes. Second, answering calls to go beyond laboratory work (Lord et al., 2020), this manuscript is also the first to show the effect of a real-world event on leadership prototypes. Third, we examine how a contextual input that operates on a national level has an effect across a nation. Based on this, we pave the way for further research on how leadership prototypes are created and evolve over time. This dynamic viewpoint may offer a more comprehensive explanation of how people perceive and engage with their leaders.

Beyond the contribution to implicit leadership theory, this manuscript also contributes to knowledge on psychological reactions to an election (Almudin et al., 2022). Building on the connectionist framework, we theorized that the political environment is a contextual input that drives dynamic changes in leadership prototypes. We demonstrate how presidential elections have an ongoing effect on the public's perceptions of leadership, with the election of each new leader potentially triggering a change in the activation of certain dimensions of the ideal leadership prototypes. Furthermore, this research also showed that these changes are constrained by individuals' political attitudes. First, we looked at how political identity moderated the impact of the election on ideal leadership prototypes, drawing on the expanding body of research on political polarization in political psychology (Jung et al., 2019; Valdesolo & Graham, 2016; van Baar & FeldmanHall, 2021). Contrary to our hypothesis and although the 2020 US election happened in the backdrop of intense political polarization (French, 2020), the findings suggest that political

identification did not moderate the observed shifts in the mean-level activation of tyranny and masculinity. That said, post-hoc analyses indicate that Republicans experienced the strongest decrease in the activation of tyranny following the election of Biden. These findings contradict a strong (politically) motivated cognition perspective and instead are consistent with system justification theory (Jost et al., 2004), which argues that all individuals are motivated to justify the system they belong to and thus the leader they see.

The second political factor we incorporated into our model was the individual's acceptance of the election results as legitimate. This variable is of particular interest given the "misinformation campaign" to present the 2020 election result as illegitimate (Kennedy et al., 2022) and the global rise in authoritarianism increasing misinformation campaigns and reducing the legitimacy of elections around the world (Beddoes, 2023). Research on misinformation in political and psychological science has rapidly increased since the 2020 election (Calvillo et al., 2021; Green et al., 2022; Matatov et al., 2022). Our findings demonstrate the psychological effect that misinformation can have on how the US public responded to election results. Specifically, individuals who did not accept the result of the election as legitimate did not show any change in the activation of tyranny or masculinity post-election. This finding highlights the far-reaching effects of misinformation in how individuals react to their political environment and supports calls for more research on this topic along with methods to reduce the influence of misinformation (Pennycook et al., 2021; Pennycook & Rand, 2019). It also highlights a potential boundary condition for the effects of an election on the public's psychological states such as for instance mental health (Yan et al., 2021).

Strengths and Limitations

A strength and limitation of this study is that it was conducted in the field. Measuring changes in leadership prototypes in the field is challenging but important (Lord et al., 2020). In order to demonstrate that the activation of ILT dimensions in leadership prototypes shift dynamically in response to an exogenous shock, there needs to be a specific event, prominent enough, that can affect an entire nation. Such events are rare and challenging to study, which can potentially explain why a static view of leadership prototypes has persisted, and the only evidence counter comes from laboratory-based studies that have been criticized for lacking ecological validity (Lord et al., 2020). Therefore, a major strength of this study is its utilization of a prominent, real-world, temporally defined event that changed the national political environment and the activation of tyranny and masculinity dimensions in the average leadership prototype of an American. The use of the regression discontinuity in time design and the spacing of the surveys allowed us to examine the causal effect of the prominent leadership transition at a very specific point in time: election day.

A limitation of using field data is that we could not control for other factors that might have affected ideal leadership prototypes during this period (e.g., economic, social, political events). However, these issues can be partially addressed conceptually. First, the RDiT design allows to examine a single and stable shift in a data trend, i.e., a discontinuity, at a specific point in time. Given that the event focused on in this study was the election, it is challenging to argue that any other economic, social, or political event was more salient to the US public on this specific day. Second, if there did happen to be another event during this period that was responsible for shifting the activation of specific nodes within leadership prototypes, then it would be equally challenging to argue why this event would *only* lead to a shift in activation of tyranny and masculinity. Finally, perhaps the strongest

evidence that the shift in activation of tyranny and masculinity observed is attributable to the election is the moderation by perceived legitimacy. The finding that individuals who did not view the election results as legitimate did not show a change in leadership prototypes demonstrates that the election was a key mechanism driving the change in the activation of specific nodes within leadership prototypes.

A related issue arising from this quasi-experiment concerns the exogeneity of the election. An important assumption of RDiT designs is that the event was "as-if random." Of course, the US election in itself is expected and thus an endogenous event (Bastardoz et al., 2022). However, the event (or shock) under study in this manuscript is not the national election per se, but a change in president. Given that the result of the election was unclear until the proclamation of the results, it can be argued that the change in president from Trump to Biden is close to being exogenous. Furthermore, it is important to note that studying field events requires concessions. The closest example of an exogenous leadership transition in politics would be when a politician unexpectedly dies (e.g., assassination) and is immediately replaced. Such an event is not only exceptionally rare, making it almost impossible for a research team to predict and plan around, but also other factors (e.g., the public emotional state of despair or anger) could affect the level of prototype activation.

Another limitation of this study is the survey-based design. The rationale for using this approach is that RDiT designs require frequent measurements of variables and thus place a high load on participants who were asked to complete eight surveys over approximately three months. Therefore, we used easily administered explicit measures of leadership prototypes. A consequence is the possibility of demand effects (i.e., participants conforming to the researcher's hypothesis). However, the design of this study can temper some of these concerns. The leadership prototype measure never mentioned the word

"politics" and were interspersed among other general surveys about topics such as climate change and COVID-19. Therefore, the main way individuals could ascertain that the surveys were about the election would be the spacing and timing of the study. However, given that there were a large number of surveys before and after the election, for the result to be attributed to demand effects participants would have had to identify the critical point in the survey (i.e., election) and then stably report a shift in activation of nodes in their leadership prototypes after this point. Furthermore, participants on Prolific can complete multiple surveys a day making it less likely that they noticed the pattern in the survey administration. Thus, we are confident that demand effects cannot explain our findings.

Another notable limitation is that we only examined mean-level changes in the activation of seven leadership prototype dimensions after the election. Within connectionist theory this is one mechanism through which prototypes can change, which has received the most scholarly attention (e.g., Sy et al., 2010; Trichas et al., 2017). However, we acknowledge that our survey-based method could not examine changes in the weights of between node connections and in the overall pattern activation in the participants' leadership schema. Different methodologies, such as neural networks analysis (e.g., Lord, Hanges & Godfrey, 2003) could be needed to capture such complex activation patterns. We also could not capture radical changes (or gamma change; Epitropaki & Martin 2004; Golembiewski et al., 1976) in participants' schemas, that is, whether they have incorporated novel dimensions into their ideal leadership schema beyond the seven dimensions measured in our study. We used connectionist theory as a supporting theoretical framework, but our methodology did not allow us to test the theory itself.

Future Directions

This manuscript provides a critical piece of evidence in support of the dynamic view of leadership prototypes that can inform and develop future theory. A particularly interesting avenue for future research is to consider the extent to which leadership prototypes are dynamic. Previous work has shown that as much as a video can change activation within leadership prototypes (Foti et al., 2008), and connectionist models have argued that leadership schemas may constantly change as a response to contextual input (Lord et al., 2001); however, it remains unclear for how long these effects may last. Furthermore, with respect to the influence of political elections on leadership prototypes, the pendulum-like nature of presidential elections, typically rotating between republican and democrat presidents every 4 to 8 years, suggests that there may also be pendulum-like swings in leadership prototypes that cycle. Along these lines, research could also examine whether other exogenous events such as wars, economic crises, and terrorist attacks (Bastardoz et al., 2022) dynamically affect activation within leadership prototypes.

This research also opens the door to practical interventions aimed at *changing activation of certain dimensions of ideal leadership prototypes in society*. Building on the idea that leaders we see shape who we think leaders should be, it provides practitioners and educators an avenue for changing the activation of specific dimensions of ideal leadership prototypes by actively exposing people to different leaders (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004). Such approaches could be based in schema therapy (Masley et al., 2012), in which practitioners attempt to reorganize individuals' schematic associations to make schemas that service themselves and others more positively. This manuscript suggests that the same logic can be applied to leadership schemas. Practically, the findings draw attention to how future elections will affect dimension activation in US leadership prototype. Most notably, the election of under-represented groups (e.g., women, non-white, LGBTQ+) could shift

activation of dimensions in the leadership prototype to view marginalized members of society as leaders (Eagly & Chin, 2010).

Another important future direction within political psychology is examining the cross-national and long-term effects of changes in leadership prototypes on future elections. For example, given the prominence of the US in world politics, do changes in the US president trigger changes in perceptions of the "ideal leader" in other nations? Similarly, does the increased prominence of populist leaders in western societies (Rodrik, 2021) have a knock-on effect on the success of populist leaders around the world? Such an effect would be expected based on evidence that leadership prototypes affect who we view as leaders in society (Lord & Maher, 2002). However, based on real-world political events after the election, even after the election of Biden, many leaders adopting Trump's more tyrannical and masculine leadership characteristics still prevailed in the US midterm elections. These and many more questions are sparked by this research and the perpetual cycle of presidential elections around the world provides numerous opportunities to study the intricate interplay between politics and leadership.

References

Almudin, A., Gacrama, M., Natividad, P., Miguel, M., Sulit, C. M., & Wapano, M. R. (2022). A review on the psychological reactions after a presidential election. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, *6*(7), 342–349.

Antonakis, J., Bastardoz, N., & Rönkkö, M. (2021). On ignoring the random effects assumption in multilevel models: Review, critique, and recommendations. *Organizational Research Methods, 24*(2), 443-483.

Barreca, A. I., Guldi, M., Lindo, J. M., & Waddell, G. R. (2011). Saving babies? Revisiting the effect of very low birth weight classification. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *126*(4), 2117–2123.

Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *11*(4), 629-654.

Bass, B. M. (1997). Does the transactional–transformational leadership paradigm transcend organizational and national boundaries? *American Psychologist*, *52*(2), 130-139.

Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1989). Potential Biases in Leadership Measures: How Prototypes, Leniency, and General Satisfaction Relate to Ratings and Rankings of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Constructs. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *49*(3), 509–527.

Bastardoz, N., Jacquart, P., & Antonakis, J. (2022). Effect of crises on charisma signaling: A regression discontinuity design. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 101590. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2021.101590

Beasley, R. K., & Joslyn, M. R. (2001). Cognitive dissonance and post-decision attitude

    change in six presidential elections. *Political Psychology*, *22*(3), 521–540.

Beddoes, Z. M. (2023). 2024 will be stressful for those who care about liberal democracy.

    The Economist, The World Ahead. https://www.economist.com/the-world-

    ahead/2023/11/13/2024-will-be-stressful-for-those-who-care-about-liberal-

    democracy

Bennis, W. (2007). The challenges of leadership in the modern world: Introduction to the

    special issue. *American Psychologist*, *62*(1), 2–5.

Bliese, P. D., & Lang, J. W. (2016). Understanding relative and absolute change in

    discontinuous growth models: Coding alternatives and implications for hypothesis

    testing. *Organizational Research Methods*, *19*(4), 562–592.

Brown, D. J., & Lord, R. G. (2013). Leadership and perceiver cognition: Moving beyond

    first order constructs. In M. London (Ed.), *How people evaluate others in

    organizations: Person perception and interpersonal judgment in I/O psychology*

    (p. 181-202). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum

Calvillo, D. P., Rutchick, A. M., & Garcia, R. J. (2021). Individual differences in belief in

    fake news about election fraud after the 2020 US election. *Behavioral Sciences*,

    11(12), 175.

Carnes, A., Houghton, J. D., & Ellison, C. N. (2015). What matters most in leader

    selection? The role of personality and implicit leadership theories. *Leadership &

    Organization Development Journal, 36*(4), 360-379.

Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2022). Regression discontinuity designs. *Annual Review

    of Economics*, *14*, 821–851.

Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). Chapter I-Why Machiavelli. *Studies in Machiavellianism*, 1–9.

Dasgupta, N., & Asgari, S. (2004). Seeing is believing: Exposure to counterstereotypic women leaders and its effect on the malleability of automatic gender stereotyping. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *40*(5), 642–658.

Eagly, A. H., & Chin, J. L. (2010). Diversity and leadership in a changing world. *American Psychologist*, *65*(3), 216-224.

Epitropaki, O., & Martin, R. (2004). Implicit leadership theories in applied settings: Factor structure, generalizability, and stability over time. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *89*(2), 293-310.

Epitropaki, O., Sy, T., Martin, R., Tram-Quon, S., & Topakas, A. (2013). Implicit leadership and followership theories "in the wild": Taking stock of information-processing approaches to leadership and followership in organizational settings. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *24*(6), 858–881.

Fisher, K. (2021, January 19). *The Differing Masculinities of Trump and Biden – PRIO Blogs*. https://blogs.prio.org/2021/01/the-differing-masculinities-of-trump-and-biden/

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social cognition*. Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.

Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008). Political polarization in the American public. *Annual Review of Political Science, 11*, 563-588.

Foti, R. J., Hansbrough, T. K., Epitropaki, O., & Coyle, P. T. (2017). Dynamic viewpoints on implicit leadership and followership theories: Approaches, findings, and future directions. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *28*(2), 261–267.

Foti, R. J., Knee Jr, R. E., & Backert, R. S. (2008). Multi-level implications of framing

    leadership perceptions as a dynamic process. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *19*(2),

    178–194.

French, D. (2020). *It's Clear That America Is Deeply Polarized. No Election Can*

    Overcome That. Time. https://time.com/5907318/polarization-2020-election/

Galambos, J. A., Abelson, R. P., & Black, J. B. (1986). *Knowledge structures*.

    Psychology Press.

Gelman, A., & Imbens, G. (2019). Why High-Order Polynomials Should Not Be Used in

    Regression Discontinuity Designs. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*,

    37(3), 447–456.

Golembiewski, R. X, Billingsley, K., & Yeager, S. (1976). Measuring change and

    persistence in human affairs: Types of change generated by OD designs. *Journal*

    of Applied Behavioral Science, 12(2), 133-157

Green, J., Hobbs, W., McCabe, S., & Lazer, D. (2022). Online engagement with 2020

    election misinformation and turnout in the 2021 Georgia runoff election.

    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, *119*(34), e2115900119.

Griebie, A. M., & Immelman, A. (2021). The Personality Profile and Leadership Style of

    U.S. President Joe Biden. *Psychology Faculty Publications*.

    https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/132

Hamaker, E. L., & Muthén, B. (2020). The fixed versus random effects debate and how it

    relates to centering in multilevel modeling. *Psychological Methods*, *25*(3), 365-

    379.

Hanges, P., Lord, R., & Dickson, M. (2000). An information-processing perspective on

> leadership and culture: A case for connectionist architecture. *Applied Psychology*,
> *49*(1), 133–161.

Hausman, C., & Rapson, D. S. (2018). Regression discontinuity in time: Considerations

> for empirical applications. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, *10*, 533–552.

Hogan, R., Curphy, G. J., & Hogan, J. (1994). What we know about leadership:

> Effectiveness and personality. *American Psychologist*, *49*(6), 493-504.

House, R., Javidan, M., Hanges, P., & Dorfman, P. (2002). Understanding cultures and

> implicit leadership theories across the globe: An introduction to project GLOBE.
> *Journal of World Business*, *37*(1), 3–10.

Immelman, A. (2017). *The leadership style of US president Donald J. Trump*. (Working

> Paper No. 1.2). Collegeville and St. Joseph, MN: St. John's University and the
> College of St. Benedict, Unit for the Study of Personality in Politics.

Immelman, A., & Griebie, A. M. (2020). *The personality profile and leadership style of*

> *US president Donald J. Trump in office*. Paper presented at the 43rd Annual
> Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Berlin,
> Germany, July 14–16, 2020. Retrieved from Digital Commons website:
> http://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/129/

Jacobsen, C. B., & Bøgh Andersen, L. (2015). Is leadership in the eye of the beholder? A

> study of intended and perceived leadership practices and organizational
> performance. *Public Administration Review*, *75*(6), 829–841.

Jervis, R. (2016). Introduction: Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy. *Political

> Science Quarterly*, *131*(2), 217–236.

Johnson, P. E. (2017). The art of masculine victimhood: Donald Trump's demagoguery. *Women's Studies in Communication*, *40*(3), 229–250.

Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. *Motivation and Emotion*, *36*(1), 55–64.

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. *Political Psychology*, *25*(6), 881–919.

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*(3), 339-375.

Jung, J., Grim, P., Singer, D. J., Bramson, A., Berger, W. J., Holman, B., & Kovaka, K. (2019). A multidisciplinary understanding of polarization. *American Psychologist, 74*(3), 301-314.

Junker, N. M., & Van Dick, R. (2014). Implicit theories in organizational settings: A systematic review and research agenda of implicit leadership and followership theories. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *25*(6), 1154–1173.

Keith, M. G., Tay, L., & Harms, P. D. (2017). Systems Perspective of Amazon Mechanical Turk for Organizational Research: Review and Recommendations. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *8*.

Kennedy, I., Wack, M., Beers, A., Schafer, J. S., Garcia-Camargo, I., Spiro, E. S., & Starbird, K. (2022). Repeat spreaders and election delegitimization: A comprehensive dataset of misinformation tweets from the 2020 US election. *Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media*, *2*.

Kolb, D. M. (2019). Her Place at the Table: Gender and Negotiation after Trump. *Negotiation Journal*, *35*(1), 185–189.

Krasikova, D. V., Green, S. G., & LeBreton, J. M. (2013). Destructive leadership: A

    theoretical review, integration, and future research agenda. *Journal of*

    Management, *39*(5), 1308–1338.

Kroh, M. (2007). Measuring left–right political orientation: The choice of response

    format. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 71*(2), 204-220.

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, *108*(3), 480-

    498.

Lord, R. G. (1985). An information processing approach to social perceptions, leadership

    and behavioral measurement in organizations. *Research in Organizational*

    Behavior.

Lord, R. G., Brown, D. J., & Harvey, J. L. (2001). System constraints on leadership

    perceptions, behavior and influence: An example of connectionist level processes.

    In M. Hogg, & R. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology:

    Group Processes (p. 283-310). Blackwell

Lord, R. G., Epitropaki, O., Foti, R. J., & Hansbrough, T. K. (2020). Implicit Leadership

    Theories, Implicit Followership Theories, and Dynamic Processing of Leadership

    Information. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational*

    Behavior, *7*(1), 49–74.

Lord, R. G., Foti, R. J., & Phillips, J. S. (1982). A theory of leadership categorization. In

    J. Hunt, U. Sekaran, & C. Schriesheim (Eds.), *Leadership: Beyond establishment*

    views (p. 104-121). Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Lord, R. G., Hanges, P. J., & Godfrey, E. G. (2003). Integrating neural networks into

    decision-making and motivational theory: Rethinking VIE theory. *Canadian*

    Psychology / Psychologie canadienne, 44(1), 21–38.

Lord, R. G., & Maher, K. J. (2002). *Leadership and information processing: Linking perceptions and performance*. Routledge.

Lord, R. G., & Shondrick, S. J. (2011). Leadership and knowledge: Symbolic, connectionist, and embodied perspectives. *The Leadership Quarterly, 22*(1), 207-222.

Martin, A. E., & Slepian, M. L. (2021). The Primacy of Gender: Gendered Cognition Underlies the Big Two Dimensions of Social Cognition. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *16*(6), 1143–1158.

Masley, S. A., Gillanders, D. T., Simpson, S. G., & Taylor, M. A. (2012). A systematic review of the evidence base for schema therapy. *Cognitive Behaviour Therapy*, *41*(3), 185–202.

Matatov, H., Naaman, M., & Amir, O. (2022). Stop the [image] steal: The role and dynamics of visual content in the 2020 us election misinformation campaign. *Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction*, *6*(CSCW2), 1–24.

McAdams, D. P. (2017). The appeal of the primal leader: Human evolution and Donald J. Trump. *Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture*, *1*(2), 000010266131245.

Morgeson, F. P., Mitchell, T. R., & Liu, D. (2015). Event System Theory: An Event-Oriented Approach to the Organizational Sciences. *Academy of Management Review*, *40*(4), 515–537.

Mundlak, Y. (1978). On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data. *Econometrica*, *46*(1), 69–85.

Neville-Shepard, R., & Neville-Shepard, M. (2021). The pornified presidency: Hyper-masculinity and the pornographic style in U.S. political rhetoric. *Feminist Media Studies*, *21*(7), 1193–1208.

Norris, C. J., Dumville, A. G., & Lacy, D. P. (2011). Affective forecasting errors in the

    2008 election: Underpredicting happiness. *Political Psychology*, *32*(2), 235–249.

Offermann, L. R., & Coats, M. R. (2018). Implicit theories of leadership: Stability and

    change over two decades. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *29*(4), 513–522.

Offermann, L. R., Kennedy, J. K., & Wirtz, P. W. (1994). Implicit leadership theories:

    Content, structure, and generalizability. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *5*(1), 43–58.

Pennycook, G., Epstein, Z., Mosleh, M., Arechar, A. A., Eckles, D., & Rand, D. G.

    (2021). Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online. *Nature*,

    592(7855), 590-595.

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Fighting misinformation on social media using

    crowdsourced judgments of news source quality. *Proceedings of the National

    Academy of Sciences*, *116*(7), 2521–2526.

Petersen, M. B., & Aarøe, L. (2013). Politics in the mind's eye: Imagination as a link

    between social and political cognition. *American Political Science Review*,

    107(2), 275–293.

Read, S. J., & Miller, L. C. (2014). *Connectionist models of social reasoning and social

    behavior*. Psychology Press.

Rizvi, F., Peters, M. A., Zembylas, M., Tukdeo, S., Mason, M., de Souza, L. M. T.,

    Chengbing, W., Soudien, C., Lingard, B., & Tarc, P. (2022). The long read: On

    the global relevance of the US elections. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*,

    54(14), 2389–2408.

Rodrik, D. (2021). Why does globalization fuel populism? Economics, culture, and the

   rise of right-wing populism. *Annual Review of Economics, 13*, 133-170.

Rosch, E. (1983). Prototype classification and logical classification: The two systems. In *New Trends in Conceptual Representation: Challenges to Piaget's Theory*, 73–86. Psychology Press.

Shondrick, S. J., & Lord, R. G. (2010). Implicit leadership and followership theories: Dynamic structures for leadership perceptions, memory, leader-follower processes. *International review of industrial and organizational psychology, 25*, 1-33.

Schreiber, D. (2007). Political cognition as social cognition: Are we all political sophisticates. *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*, 48–70.

Schyns, B., & Schilling, J. (2013). How bad are the effects of bad leaders? A meta-analysis of destructive leadership and its outcomes. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *24*(1), 138–158.

Sclafani, J. (2017). *Talking Donald Trump: A sociolinguistic study of style, metadiscourse, and political identity*. Routledge.

Simchon, A., Guntuku, S. C., Simhon, R., Ungar, L. H., Hassin, R. R., & Gilead, M. (2020). Political depression? A big-data, multimethod investigation of Americans' emotional response to the Trump presidency. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *149*(11), 2154.

Smith, E. R. (1998). Mental representation and memory. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 391–445). McGraw-Hill.

Sy, T., Shore, L. M., Strauss, J., Shore, T. H., Tram, S., Whiteley, P., & Ikeda-Muromachi, K. (2010). Leadership perceptions as a function of race–occupation fit: The case of Asian Americans. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *95*(5), 902-919.

Trichas, S., Schyns, B., Lord, R., & Hall, R. (2017). "Facing" leaders: Facial expression and leadership perception. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *28*(2), 317–333.

Valdesolo, P., & Graham, J. (2016). *Social psychology of political polarization*. Psychology Press.

van Baar, J. M., & FeldmanHall, O. (2021). The polarized mind in context: Interdisciplinary approaches to the psychology of political polarization. *American Psychologist*.

Van Quaquebeke, N., Graf, M. M., & Eckloff, T. (2014). What do leaders have to live up to? Contrasting the effects of central tendency versus ideal-based leader prototypes in leader categorization processes. *Leadership, 10*(2), 191–217.

Vroom, V. H., & Jago, A. G. (2007). The role of the situation in leadership. *American Psychologist*, *62*(1), 17-24.

Walker, D. O., Reichard, R. J., Riggio, R. E., & Keller Hansbrough, T. (2020). Who might support a tyrant? An exploration of links between adolescent family conflict and endorsement of tyrannical implicit leadership theories. *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, *27*(4), 340–356.

Wang, Q.-J., Feng, G.-F., Wang, H.-J., & Chang, C.-P. (2022). The influence of political ideology on greenhouse gas emissions. *Global Environmental Change*, *74*, 102496.

Woodward, B., & Costa, R. (2021). *The Woodward Trilogy: Fear, Rage, and Peril*. Simon and Schuster.

Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). *Introductory econometrics: A modern approach*. Cengage learning.

Yan, B. W., Hsia, R. Y., Yeung, V., & Sloan, F. A. (2021). Changes in Mental Health Following the 2016 Presidential Election. *Journal of General Internal Medicine*, *36*(1), 170–177. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-020-06328-6

Zarate, M. A., & Smith, E. R. (1990). Person categorization and stereotyping. *Social Cognition*, *8*(2), 161–185. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1990.8.2.161

Zellner, A. (1962). An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias. *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* *57*(298), 348-368.

Zucher, A. (2020, November 10). US election: Justice lawyer quits after attorney general orders "vote fraud" inquiries. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54882647

Figure 1

Longitudinal plot of the change in perception of tyranny as a characteristic of the ideal leader.

Note. Each data point represents averaged participants responses for each of the 8 surveys, plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line indicates the day of the election with lines of best fit plotted before and after the election.

Figure 2

Longitudinal plot of the change in perception of masculinity as a characteristic of the ideal leader.

Note. Each data point represents averaged participants responses for each of the 8 surveys, plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line indicates the day of the election with lines of best fit plotted before and after the election.

Table 1.

Rating of Trump and Biden on ILTs dimensions (from pre-survey conducted before the main survey).

	REPUBLICANS (N=100)					INDEPENDENTS/OTHER (N=100)					DEMOCRATS (N=100)				
	Trump		Biden		t-test	Trump		Biden		t-test	Trump		Biden		t-test
	M	SD	M	SD	t	M	SD	M	SD	t	M	SD	M	SD	t
Charisma	5.64	1.26	3.46	1.63	9.80***	3.40	1.80	3.76	1.47	1.51	2.40	1.40	4.89	1.27	12.20***
Dedication	5.99	0.99	4.36	1.61	7.72***	4.00	1.75	4.83	1.32	4.00***	3.03	1.53	5.80	0.96	15.82***
Dynamism	5.97	1.00	3.43	1.62	11.91***	3.91	1.80	3.53	1.44	1.57	2.99	1.57	4.59	1.23	7.42***
Sensitivity	5.26	1.45	4.07	1.63	4.61***	2.60	1.57	4.35	1.41	7.90***	1.50	0.89	5.50	1.09	27.00***
Intelligence	5.79	1.15	4.31	1.51	7.12***	3.43	1.83	4.63	1.27	5.38***	2.34	1.38	5.75	0.95	20.17***
Masculinity	6.36	0.68	5.49	1.01	7.72***	5.51	1.19	5.74	0.85	1.70	5.27	1.22	6.13	0.71	8.03***
Tyranny	5.02	1.17	4.00	1.16	5.24***	6.03	0.85	3.54	1.04	17.57***	6.33	0.98	2.81	1.05	21.03***

Note: Means and standard deviations for ratings off Biden and Trump across each of the three political identifications investigated. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. This sample did not overlap with the sample of the main study.

Table 2.

Leadership characteristics with adjectives/items, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for each trait, and Wald tests comparing fixed vs. random effects.

TRAIT	ITEMS	ICC(1)	ICC(2)	Wald test comparing fixed vs. random effects
Charisma	Charismatic, Inspiring, Enthusiastic	.56	.89	$\chi^2(3) = 1.81,$ $p = .61$
Dedication	Dedicated, Motivated, Hard-Working	.56	.89	$\chi^2(3) = 8.22,$ $p = .04$
Dynamism	Energetic, Strong, Dynamic	.59	.90	$\chi^2(3) = 12.48,$ $p = .01$
Sensitivity	Helpful, Understanding, Sincere	.59	.90	$\chi^2(3) = 3.07,$ $p = .38$
Intelligence	Intelligent, Educated, Clever, Knowledgeable	.62	.91	$\chi^2(3) = 2.44,$ $p = .49$
Masculinity	Male, Masculine	.68	.93	$\chi^2(3) = 16.46,$ $p < .001$
Tyranny	Domineering, Pushy, Manipulative, Loud, Conceited, Selfish	.72	.94	$\chi^2(3) = 37.53,$ $p < .001$

Table 3.

Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. **Election**	0.60	0.49	-	.88**	.12**	-.02	-.03	.03	-.13**	-.01	-.08	-.22**	-.23**
2. **Time**	13.26	27.75	.63**	-	.10*	-.02	-.02	.04	-.15**	.00	-.07	-.20**	-.28**
3. **Political identification**	2.03	0.80	.01	.01	-	.31**	-.00	.02	-.11**	.09*	-.04	-.28**	-.21**
4. **Perceived legitimacy**	5.59	1.87	-.00	-.00	.30**	-	.09	.07	-.08	.20**	.11	-.30**	-.20**
5. **Charisma**	6.13	0.72	.01	.01	-.01	.07**	(.77)	.63**	.69**	.53**	.67**	.03	-.21**
6. **Dedication**	6.47	0.63	-.03	-.02	-.02	.05**	.55*	(.83)	.53**	.64**	.63**	-.08**	-.39**
7. **Dynamism**	5.84	0.78	-.00	-.03	-.09**	-.07**	.59**	.46**	(.76)	.40**	.66**	.18**	.02
8. **Sensitivity**	6.20	0.79	.02	.01	.06**	.16**	.46**	.54**	.33**	(.86)	.56**	-.18**	-.52**
9. **Intelligence**	6.15	0.66	-.02	-.02	-.02	.09*	.59**	.57**	.55**	.49**	(.79)	.07	-.17**
10. **Masculinity**	4.17	1.10	-.05**	-.04*	-.20**	-.26**	.04*	-.04*	.12**	-.15**	.02	(.92)	.43**
11. **Tyranny**	2.51	1.25	-.07**	-.07**	-.12**	-.17**	-.17**	-.30*	.00	-.46**	-.16**	.36**	(.90)

Note: Correlations below the diagonal are based on all observations (N = 3,850-3,858); Correlations above the diagonal are based on between-participants means (N=600); Cronbach's alpha reported in parentheses on the diagonal; Political affiliation (1=Republican; 2= Independents/Others/No affiliation; 3=Democrat); **p>.01; *p<.05.

Table 4.

Regression Discontinuity in Time estimates using a correlated-random effect approach (H1)

	Charisma	Dedication	Dynamism	Sensitivity	Intelligence	Masculinity	Tyranny
Election	-.00	-.00	.02	.03	.00	-.07*	-.09**
	(0.06)	(.38)	(.77)	(1.12)	(.13)	(1.99)	(2.71)
Time	.00	-.00	.00	.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(1.56)	(1.53)	(1.29)	(.44)	(.24)	(.52)	(.89)
Election x Time	-.00	.00	-.00	-.00	.00	.00	.00
	(1.64)	(1.48)	(1.67)	(.45)	(.09)	(.61)	(.85)
Cluster-mean Election	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.
Cluster-mean Election x Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Constant	6.25**	6.46**	5.99**	6.28**	6.19**	4.56**	2.52**
	(45.00)	(50.88)	(41.63)	(44.74)	(43.80)	(21.81)	(10.22)
R^2 within	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01
R^2 between	.00	.00	.02	.00	.01	.05	.08

Note: $N = 3{,}849\text{-}3{,}851$ for all models; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Random-effects GLS estimator; Unstandardized coefficients with cluster robust z-statistics in parenthesis.

Table 5.

Regression Discontinuity in Time estimates using a correlated-random effect approach and political identification as moderator (H2)

	Charisma	Dedication	Dynamism	Sensitivity	Intelligence	Masculinity	Tyranny
Election	.02	-.00	.03	.03	.04	-.04	-.14**
	(.56)	(.09)	(.63)	(.75)	(1.05)	(.81)	(2.81)
Time	.00	-.00	.00	.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(1.57)	(1.53)	(1.29)	(.44)	(.22)	(.50)	(.89)
Election x Time	-.00	.00	-.00	-.00	.00	.00	.00
	(1.65)	(1.49)	(1.67)	(.45)	(.06)	(.59)	(.85)
Political ident. - Democrat	.07	.10	-.20**	.15*	.06	-.68**	-.60**
	(1.17)	(1.89)	(3.32)	(2.13)	(1.03)	(7.39)	(5.56)
Political ident. – Others	.02	.01	-.17**	.14*	.01	-.57**	-.55**
	(.35)	(.14)	(2.67)	(2.10)	(.12)	(6.18)	(5.09)
Election x Democrat	-.02	-.01	-.02	.01	-.03	-.05	.08
	(.41)	(.28)	(.40)	(.25)	(.70)	(.76)	(1.17)
Election x Others	-.05	-.00	.01	-.02	-.07	-.05	.06
	(1.11)	(.08)	(.12)	(.31)	(1.92)	(.75)	(.95)
Cluster-mean Election	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.
Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.
Cluster-mean Election x Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Constant	6.22**	6.43**	6.09**	6.20**	6.17**	4.89**	2.82**
	(44.08)	(50.05)	(42.34)	(43.13)	(42.84)	(24.58)	(11.38)
R^2 within	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01
R^2 between	.01	.01	.04	.01	.01	.15	.14

Note: N = 3,849-3,851 for all models; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Random-effects GLS estimator; Unstandardized coefficients with cluster robust z-statistics in parenthesis.

Table 6.

Regression Discontinuity in Time estimates using a correlated-random effect approach and perceived legitimacy as moderator (H3)

	Charisma	Dedication	Dynamism	Sensitivity	Intelligence	Masculinity	Tyranny
Election	.04	-.04	-.02	-.03	.02	.08	.01
	(.65)	(.69)	(.25)	(.49)	(.36)	(1.04)	(.08)
Time	.00	-.00	.00	.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(1.12)	(1.53)	(1.20)	(.35)	(.93)	(.37)	(.37)
Election x Time	-.00	.00	-.00	-.00	.00	.00	.00
	(1.24)	(1.44)	(1.57)	(.41)	(.75)	(.49)	(.32)
Perceived legitimacy	.03*	.01	-.03*	.06**	.03*	-.13**	-.11**
	(2.05)	(1.11)	(2.13)	(3.44)	(2.43)	(5.61)	(4.19)
Election x Perceived legitimacy	-.01	.01	.01	.01	-.00	-.03*	-.02
	(.57)	(.75)	(.73)	(1.14)	(.06)	(2.32)	(1.34)
Cluster-mean Election	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.	n.s	n.s.	n.s.
Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Cluster-mean Election x Cluster-mean Time	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Constant	6.38**	6.72**	6.46**	6.01**	6.52**	5.39**	3.31**
	(17.88)	(22.79)	(20.39)	(21.42)	(20.88)	(11.34)	(5.12)
R^2 within	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01
R^2 between	.01	.01	.01	.05	.02	.10	.08

Note: N = 3,582-3,583 for all models; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Random-effects GLS estimator; Unstandardized coefficients with cluster robust z-statistics in parenthesis.