

A MEDIEVAL *ABBREVIATIO*:
JOHN PECKHAM'S *QUESTIO*
DE EXISTENTIA DEI
INTRODUCTION AND EDITION

William CROZIER

Abstract

This essay offers an introduction to, and an edition of, the *Questio de existentia dei* found in MS. Todi 58, fol. 145ra-rb. This codex, which contains one of the earliest known complete transcriptions of the first book of Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary, as well as the highly contentious *Questiones de theologia* attributed to Bonaventure by G. H. Tavad, Todi 58, – despite its importance for our understanding of mid-thirteenth-century Franciscan theology – has largely been ignored. This essay shows that the *Questio de existentia dei* is an abbreviation of the discussion of God's existence found in the *Sentences* commentary of Bonaventure's most vocal defender and protégé, John Peckham (1230-1292) – the first Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury. To prove the connection to Peckham, the content, argument, and structure of the *Questio de existentia dei* are compared with Peckham's discussion of God's existence as found in his *1 Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 1. This comparison reveals that there is an undeniable convergence between the two texts, thereby justifying the claim that the text found in Todi 58 is in fact an abbreviation of the corresponding text in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary.

1. *Introduction*

In 1950 the eminent Bonaventurian scholar George H. Tavad published a controversial article containing an edition of what he claimed was a previously unknown work by St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.¹

1. G. H. TAVARD, "St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions '*De theologia*,'" in: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 17 (1950), pp. 187-236. Tavad's most authoritative work on Bonaventure is his *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure*, New York 1954.

According to Tavad, the text which he had edited was “the most important event in Bonaventurian science since the Quaracchi edition.”² This text was, of course, the *Questiones de theologia* found within Todi, Biblioteca comunale, MS. 58 (Todi 58).³ According to Tavad, the five lengthy *questiones* contained within this text were disputed by Bonaventure sometime around 1256. Their purpose was to expand upon the innovative description of theology which he had already articulated in his prologue to the first book of *Sentences*. To support this claim, Tavad noted how besides the many, often verbatim, convergences with Bonaventure’s *Sentences* commentary, the *Questiones de theologia* – being split into two halves – were placed in Todi 58 both immediately before and directly after a transcription of the first book of Bonaventure’s *Sentences* commentary, which he remarked was one of the earliest and most reliable copies of this work.⁴ Moreover, Tavad observed that there were many direct

2. ID., *art. cit.*, p. 188. Several other significant works were attributed to Bonaventure during this period. Alongside the *Questiones de theologia* edited by Tavad, perhaps the most notable are the *Questiones de caritate et nouissimis* edited in P. GLORIEUX, *Questions disputées de caritate, de novissimis*. Édition critique, Paris 1950, (Document II) and the numerous draft *questiones* discovered by Henquinet in Assisi, Bibl. Com. MS. 186. See F. M. HENQUINET, “Un brouillon autographe de Saint Bonaventure sur le Commentaire des Sentences,” in: *Études Franciscaines* 44 (1932), pp. 633-655; 45 (1933), pp. 59-85. Also of note are the still unedited *Questiones de ieiunio, de mendicitate, de oratione, and de eleemosyna*. These are to be found in Vatican City, Palat. Lat. MS. 612, fols. 40vb-43va; 43va-46va; 126ra-130rb; and 137rb-148rb, respectively. Limited extracts from these *questiones* are to be found in V. DOUCET, “Quaestiones Centum ad Scholam Franciscanam saec. XIII ut Plurimum Spectantes in Cod. Florent. Bibl. Laur. 17 sin. 7 – Appendix De Quaestionibus S. Bonaventurae adscriptis in Cod. Vat. Palat. Lat. 612,” in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 26 (1933), pp. 183-202 and 474-496. Recently a set of *questiones quodlibetales* has been identified in Paris BnF, lat. 15322, fol. 2ra-rb. See C. ANGOTTI and S. DELMAS, “Protégées par les gardes: Des questions inédites de G. de Tournai et de Bonaventure,” in: A. N. NOBLESSE-ROCHER (ed.), *Études d'exégèse médiévale à Gilbert Dahan par ses élèves*, Turnhout 2012, pp. 161-184. The most recent text to be attributed to Bonaventure is the *Questiones de colore*. See W. CROZIER, “Of Light and Colour: Some Reflections on an Unedited Set of *Questiones* on Colour Attributed to Saint Bonaventure,” in the forthcoming proceedings for the *Science, Imagination, and Wonder – Celebrating the Legacy of Robert Grosseteste* conference held at Pembroke College Oxford 3rd-6th April 2018, ed. G.E.M. GASPER *et al.* (to be published through Brill).

3. When Tavad wrote his article in 1950, the manuscript was numbered as Todi Bibl. Com. MS. 39. However, following a reorganization of the library in the following decades, the manuscript was re-catalogued as Todi, Bibl. Com. MS. 58.

4. The significance of the transcription of the first book of Bonaventure’s *Sentences* commentary in Todi 58 was underscored by the Quaracchi Fathers in their critical edition of the text. They note that “on account of its antiquity” (*propter antiquitatem*) and its

parallels between the *Questiones de theologia* and the works of several of the Seraphic Doctor's principal disciples, including Walter of Bruges and, most interestingly, his chief defender and protégé, John Peckham, the first Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury.

Perhaps most striking, however, was Tavad's observation that there was a significant, sometimes verbatim, similarity between the *Questiones de theologia* and the much celebrated discussion of theology found in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, art. 2. Based upon this convergence, he proceeded to advance a highly controversial thesis, one which, if accepted, had the potential to significantly reshape our thinking on the relationship between the Seraphic and Angelic Doctors, at least on this most important issue. According to Tavad, a good chunk of Thomas's famous discussion of the nature of *sacra doctrina* in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, art. 2, was directly influenced by, and indeed in places lifted from, Bonaventure's *Questiones de theologia*. In essence, Thomas's famous and influential description of theology as a *scientia* had a decidedly Bonaventurian origin. As Tavad put it: "Here lies possibly the novelty of the Disputed Questions of *Todi 39* [58]. The first question of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica* shows that St. Thomas knew and used them."⁵ Indeed, so striking is the convergence between Thomas's discussion of theology's scientific character in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, art. 2 and the *Questiones de theologia* that Tavad proffers: "We are then entitled to conclude to a dependence of St. Thomas in his *Summa*, on the Disputed Questions of *Todi 39* [58]."⁶

Despite the careful arguments which he advanced, Tavad's claim to have found a previously unknown work by the Seraphic Doctor – and one with such potentially important ramifications – has failed to garner much support. Instead, it has been heavily criticised by several scholars, including, most notably, Hyacinthe Dondaine⁷ and

having been "written in the time of Bonaventure" (*cum tempore S. Bonaventurae sit scriptus*) *Todi 58* "holds primacy" (*primatum tenet*) amongst all the codices which they consulted during the production of their critical edition of Bonaventure's text. See BONAVENTURE, *Opera Omnia*, tom. 1, Quaracchi 1882, p. lxxviii.

5. G. H. TAVARD, "St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions '*De theologia*,'" p. 204. See footnote 3.

6. ID., *art. cit.*, p. 207.

7. H.-F. DONDAINE, "L'auteur de la Question *De theologia* du manuscrit *Todi 39*," in: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952), pp. 244-270.

Balduinus Distelbrink⁸, the author of the most definitive study on Bonaventure's literary corpus. For Dondaine, the *Questiones de theologia* are to be dated to the 1270s or 1280s and belong to one of Bonaventure's disciples rather than to the Seraphic Doctor himself.⁹ Aside from the various discrepancies between its understanding of theology and that found in Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary, there are, so Dondaine argues, significant advantages to holding this position. The principal one is that it is far more parsimonious. If the text is by one of Bonaventure's disciples, then this offers a far simpler and far smoother explanation of its relationship to Thomas. Rather than having to suggest that Thomas copied his innovative understanding of *sacra doctrina* from a previously unknown work by Bonaventure – one which has survived in only a single manuscript and which is never directly attributed to him by any medieval source – it seems more likely that one of Bonaventure's disciples, writing during the 1270s or 1280s, lifted extracts from Thomas's *Summa theologiae* and gave them a distinctly Franciscan flavour.¹⁰ Given this controversy surrounding the *Questiones de theologia*, it is hardly surprising that most scholars have declined to include them amongst Bonaventure's works and pass over them in silence.¹¹

8. B. DISTELBRINK, *Bonaventurae Scripta authentica, dubia vel spuria critice recensita*, Rome 1975, pp. 174-175.

9. On the question of authorship H.-F. Dondaine notes: "Notre précédente conclusion s'avère donc cohérente avec l'histoire des doctrines: la Question de Todi appartient à une période déjà évoluée de l'école de saint Bonaventure. Deux maîtres y sont spécialement respectés, et amplement pillés: saint Bonaventure en son Prooemium des Sentences, et surtout Jean Peckham en son Prologue des Sentences; mais l'influence prépondérante de ce dernier n'empêche pas l'auteur de s'intéresser aux thèses de l'école dominicaine et d'y prendre son bien à l'occasion, notamment chez Pierre de Tarentaise (1 Sent.) et saint Thomas (1^a pars). Guillaume de la Mare, dont le Prologue des Sentences est aussi utilisé, n'a pas autant la confiance de notre auteur." (See H.-F. DONDAINE, "L'auteur de la Question *De theologia* du manuscrit *Todi* 39," p. 269.)

10. ID., *art. cit.*, pp. 253-261.

11. Perhaps the most influential scholar to accept Tavard's attribution of the *Questiones de theologia* to Bonaventure is Joseph Ratzinger. In his 1959 *Habilitationschrift*, Ratzinger not only affirmed the text's authenticity, but was led to conclude in light of it that the young Bonaventure shared much common ground with Thomas Aquinas. Thus, he writes: "They [i.e., the *Questiones de theologia*] clearly show that Bonaventure does not break the line of development leading to Thomas, but rather, that he develops it consistently further and shows a very close approximation to the position of Thomas." Italics added. See J. RATZINGER, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Z. HAYES, Chicago 1971, p. 230, n. 55. See also M. SCHLOSSER, "Bonaventure: Life and Works,"

What is perhaps most surprising about the debate concerning the *Questiones de theologia*, however, is that no attention has been paid to the other, still largely unedited, works contained in Todi 58. As well as the *Questiones de theologia* and a full edition of the first book of Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary, Todi 58 also contains a lengthy text on the divine attributes (fol. 143ra-va), a question on the existence of God – the *Questio de existentia dei* – (fol. 145ra-rb), and an addendum to *1 Sent.*, dist. 27 (fol. 145rb-v) concerning the identity of the divine persons.¹² Despite their neglect, all of these remaining works are undoubtedly important and worthy of study. This is especially so since they have the potential to help cast some light upon the debate concerning the authorship of the *Questiones de theologia*.

This essay focuses upon, and presents an edition of, the shortest of these, the *Questio de existentia dei*. It shows that this text, despite a handful of discrepancies, demonstrates a high degree of similarity to the discussion of God's existence found in the first book of Peckham's *Sentences* commentary, and can, as such, be attributed to him. As we will see, the *Questio de existentia dei* does not constitute an original work by Peckham but rather is an *abbreviatio* of his discussion of God's existence in his little studied *Sentences* commentary. Although the discovery of the *Questio de existentia dei* and its link to Peckham does not prove the non-Bonaventurian authorship of the *Questiones de theologia*, what can be suggested is that it helps lend weight to Dondaine's argument that Tavad's *questiones* are in fact by one of Bonaventure's disciples, with Peckham certainly being an obvious contender, especially given their convergence with his discussion of theology in his *Sentences* commentary.

in: J. M. HAMMOND – J. W. HELLMANN – J. GOFF (eds.), *A Companion to Bonaventure*, Leiden 2014, pp. 9-59, esp. p. 21; B. F. CHAVERO, "La Quaestio de imagine recreationis del Ms Assisi, Comunale, 1986. 'Un escrito Bonaventuriano?'," in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 92 (1999), pp. 3-58, esp. p. 5; U. KOEPF, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 1974, pp. 285 and 293.

12. Found in several other manuscripts, the *addendum* to *1 Sent.*, dist. 27 is partly published in BONAVENTURE, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 1, p. 473. The remaining part, found in Cracow University MS. 1252, is edited in J. FRIEDRICH, "Zum 'Vorwort' des hl. Bonaventura," in: *Franziskanische Studien* 29 (1942), pp. 78-89, at pp. 86-88. See G. H. TAVARD, "St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions 'De theologia'," p. 189.

2. *Doctrinal contents*

As even a cursory glance reveals, the argument of the *Questio de existentia dei* very much conforms to the general contours of the mid-thirteenth century Franciscan approach towards proofs for God's existence. Thus, like Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Mediavilla, and John Peckham, the author of the *Questio de existentia dei* affirms that God's existence has the characteristic of an "indubitable truth"; one so obvious that it cannot be thought not to be true, at least by any intelligent person.¹³ We are thus told that God's existence is in itself not only true but the most evident of all truths.¹⁴ God's existence, so the *responsio* argues, is known through a threefold witness. First, it is known through "natural impression", whereby, as John Damascene asserts, a habitual awareness of God's existence is impressed upon the soul itself.¹⁵ Second, it is known through the investigation of the natural world and the discovery therein of God's transcendental attributes of unity, truth, and goodness.¹⁶ Third, God's existence is known through the revelation of Scripture, in which God reveals not only His existence, but also His true identity as Trinity, creator, and redeemer.¹⁷

What thus becomes immediately clear is that, like most of the Franciscan authors of the mid-thirteenth century, the author of the *Questio de existentia dei* sees no problem in collating *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments in support of the existence of God and placing them side-by-side with little or no concern for their inner philosophical coherence. In this respect, the text is very much removed from the position articulated by Thomas Aquinas in his famous

13. Todi 58, fol. 145ra.

14. Todi 58, fol. 145ra: "Deum esse est uerum et uerorum euidentissimum quantum est de se; est quidem naturaliter cognitum."

15. Todi 58, fol. 145ra: "Unde Damascenus libro 1° caput 1°: «Cognitio existendi Deum ab ipso naturaliter nobis inserta est; et creatio et permanentia et gubernatio creature magnitudinem diuine predicant nature; sed et per legem et prophetas et cetera sui ipsius manifestauit cognitionem»."

16. Todi 58, fol. 145ra: "Ex naturali dictamine colligitur deum esse; per creaturarum uestigium colligitur ipsum esse unum, uerum et bonum".

17. Todi 58, fol. 145ra: "[...] et fide creditum, quia per reuelationem, que inuenitur in scripturis."

“five ways.”¹⁸ Such casual assimilation of arguments from various traditions is, as Étienne Gilson showed, especially well exemplified by Bonaventure, with the Seraphic Doctor's *Questiones de mysterio trinitatis* (1255-56) offering a classic example of the early Franciscan tendency to combine *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments with one another.¹⁹ Yet, as a careful inspection reveals, Bonaventure's collative method was matched, perhaps even surpassed in some ways, by his pupils, in particular Matthew of Aquasparta. In his *Sentences* commentary, Aquasparta not only places *a priori* arguments from Anselm, Augustine, and Damascene, next to the *a posteriori* arguments based on causality favoured by Aristotle²⁰ and Richard of St. Victor, but he even ‘plagiarizes’ elements of Bonaventure's *Questiones de mysterio trinitatis* and happily incorporates extensive

18. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 2, art. 3.

19. Cf. É. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. I. TRETOWAN, New York 1938, pp. 117-138. As he puts it, with regards to the proofs which Bonaventure proposes, especially those based on creatures, he presents them with a “certain unconcern” and that “in any one of these lines of proof, he treats the starting-point as a matter of comparative indifference: and no one of them is worked out with anything remotely resembling the carefully dovetailed argumentation of St. Thomas” (p. 124). Gilson adds: “The choice of a starting-point for these proofs appears to be a matter of indifference to him, and it so appears as he really held it to be so. What is more, he held it better not to choose, but rather to mass together as many proofs as possible, founded on the most diverse imaginable phenomena or natural properties. What, after all, was his purpose? Not to elaborate four or five proofs convincing by their own solidarity, but rather to show that God is so universally attested by nature that His existence is almost self-evident, and scarcely needs demonstration” (pp. 124-125).

20. It is noticeable that Aquasparta draws far more explicitly upon Aristotle's arguments from causality and motion than do Bonaventure and Peckham, repeatedly referencing various texts from the *Metaphysica*, but also the *Physica*. See the transcription of his discussion of God's existence in his *I Sent.*, dist. 2, qq. 1, 3, in: P. A. DANIELS, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Arguments im Proslogion des Hl. Anselm*, Munster 1909, pp. 52-63. The same volume also contains an edition of Peckham's discussion of proofs for God's existence in *I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 1 (this can be found on pp. 41-50); on this text, see also S. P. MARRONE, *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden 2001, Vol. I, pp. 223-227. A critical edition of Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary has been prepared by Francesco de Benedittis (University of Cologne) as part of his PhD research; his edition (based on both MSS. that transmit the text: Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. soppr. G.4.854, and Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII.C.2) is forthcoming. I am very grateful to him for allowing me to consult his provisional edition of Peckham's text. All extracts from Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary are taken from de Benedittis's edition.

extracts of his master's thinking into his own determinations. Consider the following:

Bonaventure, <i>Questiones de mysterio trinitatis</i> , art. 1, q. 1, resp.	Matthew of Aquasparta, <i>1 Sent.</i> , dist. 2, q. 3, resp.
<i>Omnes enim creaturae, sive considerantur secundum proprietates completivas sive secundum defectivas, fortissimis et altissimis vocibus clamant Deum esse, quo indigent propter suum defectum et a quo suscipiunt complementum. Unde secundum maiorem et minorem completionem quam habent, quaedam magnis, quaedam maioribus, quaedam maximis vocibus clamant Deum esse.</i> ²¹	<i>Omnes creaturae sive considerantur secundum conditiones defectivas sive completivas, altissimis et fortissimis vocibus clamant Deum esse, quo indigent propter suum defectum et a quo suscipiunt complementum. Unde secundum maiorem completionem et minorem quaedam magnis, quaedam maioribus, quaedam maximis vocibus clamant Deum esse.</i> ²²

In light of this, mention must also be made of how the *Questio de existentia dei* handles Anselm's famous 'ontological' argument. While Anselm's argument does not form part of the text's response *per se*, it does nonetheless feature in the arguments *pro* and *contra*, with the author quoting from both the *Monologion* and the *Contra insipientem*. Interestingly, no explicit reference is made to the *Proslogion* itself. In what can only be described as a move typical of the way Anselm's argument is handled by many thirteenth-century Franciscan thinkers – in particular Bonaventure, Aquasparta, and Peckham – the *Questio de existentia dei* does not offer a particularly detailed exegesis of Anselm's argument nor is it presented as the pinnacle of the tradition of *a priori* proofs establishing the existence of God. Instead, as already suggested, Anselm's argument is placed alongside other *a priori* arguments designed to show that God's existence is an indubitable truth which is self-evident to the educated mind.

What is also particularly interesting is how the *Questio de existentia dei* appropriates something of Bonaventure's attempt to recast the Anselmian logic in his *Questiones de mysterio trinitatis* using the language

21. BONAVENTURE, *Opera Omnia*, tom. V, Quaracchi 1891, p. 49.

22. P. A. DANIELS, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise*, p. 60.

of 'the best': "*optimum est optimum.*"²³ According to Bonaventure, if the best is the best, then the best must, by necessity, exist.²⁴ For if it did not exist, then, on account of its deficiency of existence, it would not be the best. Since God is in fact the best, then He must exist. The *Questio de existentia dei* thus offers the following version of the Bonaventurian formula: if the best is the best, then it must possess being in act, and must therefore in fact exist. Noticeably, Matthew of Aquasparta in his *Sentences* commentary also employs this argument.²⁵

3. Authorship

Attributing authorship to any previously unknown and unedited text is always a risky business, especially when authorship of other texts

23. Bonaventure's argument concerning the best runs as follows: "Item, nullus potest ignorare, hanc esse veram: optimum est optimum, seu cogitare, ipsam esse falsam: sed optimum est ens completissimum, omne autem ens completissimum hoc ipso est ens actu: ergo si optimum est optimum, optimum est. – Similiter argui potest: si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est adeo verum, quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile" (BONAVENTURE, *Questiones de mysterio trinitatis*, art. 1, q. 1, arg. pro 29, tom. V, p. 48). While Bonaventure offers what is perhaps the clearest and most succinct articulation of the argument for God's existence based on the nature of the best, the same reasoning is also to be found in the *Summa Halensis* and in the earlier *Summa Aurea* of William of Auxerre. William's rather convoluted discussion of the argument is expressed as follows: "Cum dico summum bonum sive optimum, in hoc intelligo omne bonum; in hoc ergo intelligo omnia ista: sapiens, potens et huiusmodi. Cum ergo esse sit tale bonum quod omnia appetant, sequitur quod hoc ipsum esse intelligitur in eo quod dico optimum sive summum bonum. Et ita esse intelligitur in optimo secundum quod optimum. Sed omne inclusum sequitur ad suum includens, ut ex hac specie homo sequitur rationale animal et omnia superiora que clauduntur in ipso. Eodem modo cum in hoc quod dico optimum claudatur esse, ex eo sequitur esse. Et non sequitur ex eo esse nisi de optimo esse, quia esse non intelligitur nisi in optimo, cum dico optimum; ergo ex eo quod dico optimum sequitur optimum esse. Si ergo ex optimo secundum se sequitur optimum esse, ergo ex eo sequitur quocumque adiuncto non diminvente eius rationem. Ergo bene sequitur: si optimum est intelligibile, optimum est; sed optimum est intelligibile, quod constat: ergo optimum est; ergo summum bonum; ergo Deus est" (WILLIAM OF AUXERRE, *Summa Aurea*, lib. 1, tr. 1., ed. J. RIBAILLIER, Rome 1980, pp. 22-23). As presented in the *Summa Halensis*, the argument runs: "Item, per inentionem bonitatis probant idem: optimum est optimum; ergo optimum est, quia in intellectu eius quod est optimum intelligitur esse" (*Summa Halensis*, lib. 1, pars. 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 1, cap. 1, iv, arg. pro, Firenze 1924, p. 42).

24. BONAVENTURE, *Questiones de mysterio trinitatis*, art. 1, q. 1, arg. pro. 29, tom. V, p. 48.

25. Thus, quoting Bonaventure verbatim Matthew writes: "optimum est optimum: sed optimum est completissimum: ergo hoc est ens is actu: ergo si optimum est optimum, optimum est. Similiter potest argui: Si Deus est Deus, Deus est" (MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA, *1 Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 3, arg. pro. 9, p. 58).

contained in the same MS. and written in the same hand is a controversial issue. Yet in the case of the *Questio de existentia dei* it seems an attribution of authorship can be made with accuracy. There is, as even a cursory glance reveals, a direct, indeed undeniable, parallel, both in terms of structure, argument, and language, between the *Questio de existentia dei* and Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary. Indeed, the parallels are so striking that it seems extremely difficult to deny that the two texts are in fact by the same author. Not only do most of the arguments *pro* and *contra* in the *Questio de existentia dei* have verbatim parallels in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary but they follow the same order. Consider the following:

Peckham, <i>1 Sent.</i> , dist. 2, q. 1	<i>Questio de existentia dei</i> , Todi 58
<p>Circa primum <i>queritur an Deus sit</i>, et ostenditur <i>quod sic</i>. Arguit enim <i>Augustinus in Soliloquiis: si ueritas non est, uerum est ueritatem non esse; et si hoc aliquid est uerum, ergo ueritas est: sed Deus est ueritas.</i></p> <p>Quod <i>si dicas hic esse paralogismum secundum quid et simpliciter, contra: omne secundum quid reducitur ad simpliciter et omne incompletum ad completum; ergo si hoc est uerum secundum quid: "uerum est ueritatem non esse", aliquid est uerum simpliciter.</i></p> <p><i>Item sic arguit Augustinus II De libero arbitrio: lumen, in quo uidemus ueritates incommutabiles, ut principia scientiarum et regulas numerorum, aut est mente nostra inferius, aut equale, aut superius. Si inferius, ergo possemus de illo lumine et illis enuntiabilibus, que in illo ostenduntur, iudicare, acceptando uel respuendo, quod omnino</i></p>	<p><i>Queritur hic primo an sit Deus. Quod sic: [1] Augustinus in Soliloquiis libro 2 cap 9 sic: si ueritas non est uel interit, secundum Augustinum uerum est ueritatem non esse; et si hoc, aliquid est uerum; vel sic: nihil autem uerum sine ueritate; ergo ueritas est; deus autem est ueritas.</i></p> <p><i>Si dicas quod hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia ueritatem non esse uerum ponit ueritatem secundum quid, contra: omne secundum quid reducitur ad simpliciter, et omne incompletum ad completum. Igitur si hoc est uerum secundum quid: "uerum est ueritatem non esse", aliquid est uerum simpliciter.</i></p> <p><i>Item secundo De libero arbitrio sic arguitur: lumen in quo uidemus ueritates incommutabiles ut principia scientiarum et regulas numerorum, aut est mente nostra inferius aut equale aut superius. Si inferius, ergo possemus de huiusmodi iudicare acceptando uel respuendo, quod falsum est; huiusmodi enim quis recognoscens non examinatur</i></p>

<p>non possemus: non enim iudicamus illa, sed per illa; nullus enim iudicat de ista: “omne totum est maius sua parte”, uel de ista: “tria et septem sunt decem”; hec enim <et> huiusmodi <i>quis cognoscens non examinatore corrigit, sed letatur inuentor. Si illud lumen est equale</i> mentibus nostris, ergo <i>est mutabile</i>, sicut sunt mentes nostre necessario per obliuionem, quod est impossibile: illa enim <i>enuntiabilia immutabiliter uera sunt. Quod si lumen illud est supra mentes nostras, deus est, quia supra mentes nostras non nisi deus est; ergo deus est.</i></p> <p><i>Contra: Si deus est, esse predicatur de deo; aut ergo conuertibiliter, et tunc omne ens est deus; aut non conuertibiliter, et tunc deus est ens aliquo addito: ergo compositus est; sed omne compositum est ab aliquo componente: ergo deus erit ab aliquo, si est, et ita, deus non est.</i></p>	<p><i>corrigit sed letatur inuentor. Si equale, ergo illud lumen est mutabile, quod falsum est, quia huiusmodi enuntiabilia omne: totum, et cetera, sunt immutabiliter uera. Quod si lumen illud est supra mentem, deus est, quia supra mentes nostras nihil est nisi deus; ergo et cetera.</i></p> <p><i>Contra: Si deus est, esse predicatur de deo: aut ergo conuertibiliter, et tunc omne ens est deus; aut non conuertibiliter, et tunc deus est ens aliquo addito; ergo compositus. Sed omne compositum est ab aliquo componente; ergo deus erit ab alio, si est, et ita deus non est.</i></p>
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While the *Questio de existentia dei* does not contain all of Peckham's arguments *pro* and *contra*, what is important to note is that it does not introduce any new ones.

A particularly striking degree of convergence, however, is to be found when the responses of the two texts are compared side by side. Although the *responsio* in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary is slightly longer than that of the *Questio de existentia dei*, the two are nonetheless almost identical:

<p>Peckham, <i>1 Sent.</i>, dist. 2, q. 1</p> <p>Respondeo. <i>Deum esse est uerum et uerorum euidentissimum, et quantum est de se, est quidem naturaliter cognitum; sed naturalia imperfecta sunt, nec sufficiunt, nisi arte uel gratia promoueantur. Unde dicit Damascenus</i></p>	<p><i>Questio de existentia dei</i>, Todi 58</p> <p>Responsio. <i>Deum esse est uerum et uerorum euidentissimum quantum est de se; est quidem naturaliter cognitum. Sed naturalia imperfecta sunt nisi arte uel gratia promoueantur. Unde Damascenus libro 1 cap. 1: “Cognitio existendi</i></p>
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*libro 1 cap. 1: "Cognitio existendi deum ab ipso, naturaliter nobis inserta est et prouidentia et gubernatio creature magnitudinem diuine predicat nature. Sed et per Legem et Prophetas, deinde per unigenitum Filium, secundum quod possibile est nobis, sui ipsius manifestauit cognitionem". Ex hiis uerbis colligitur quod deus a nobis tripliciter cognoscitur, scilicet per naturalem impressionem, per inuestigationem que ex creaturis colligitur, et per reuelationem, que in Scripturis inuenitur. Ex naturali dictamine colligitur Deum esse; per creaturarum uestigium colligitur ipsum esse unum, uerum, bonum; per Scripturarum oracula ipsum esse trinum et unum, creatorem vel reparatorem. Propterea Deum esse est naturaliter cognitum, demonstratione probatum et fide etiam creditum; natura cognitionem initiat, demonstratio iuuat, fides consummat, in quantum non pro ratione ei assentitur, dum super omnem rationem esse creditur, et sic est articulus uel ad articulum antecedens. Demonstratur quidem, quoniam bonum non dicitur de omnibus per essentiam; quod enim accipit suam bonitatem non est ipsa. Et si est ens, participans <est> ens non participans necessario, quoniam si quodlibet bonum diceretur participatione, nullus esset intellectus dicendi: "Hoc est bonum" nec alicubi finiretur. Uerbi gratia: sit *a* bonum habendo bonitatem, que est *b*, et *b* est bonum participando bonitatem aliam a se ex ypoythesi: aut igitur habendo *a*, et tunc idem erit causa sui, aut habendo aliud et sic ibitur in infinitum.*

deum ab ipso naturaliter nobis inserta est; et creatio et permanentia et gubernatio creature magnitudinem diuine predicant nature; sed et per legem et prophetas et cetera sui ipsius manifestauit cognitionem".

Ex quibus uerbis colligitur quod deum esse tripliciter a nobis cognoscitur, scilicet per naturalem impressionem, per inuestigationem que ex creaturis colligitur, et per reuelationem que in Scripturis inuenitur. Ex naturali dictamine colligitur Deum esse; per creaturarum uestigium colligitur ipsum esse unum, uerum et bonum; per Scripturarum oracula ipsum esse trinum et unum, creatorem et reparatorem. Item Deum esse est naturaliter cognitum, quia cognoscitur per naturalem impressionem, et demonstratione probatum, quia cognoscitur per inuestigationem que est ex creaturis, et fide creditum, quia per reuelationem, que inuenitur in Scripturis. Natura cognitionem initiat, demonstratio iuuat, fides consummat, in quantum non ratione ei assentitur, dum super omnem rationem esse creditur, et sic Deum esse est articulus uel ad articulum antecedens.

Again, a similar degree of convergence is to be found in the arguments *ad obiecta* between the two texts.

Peckham, 1 Sent., dist. 2	Questio de existentia dei, Todi 58
<p><i>Ad primum dicendum</i> dicit Anselmus <i>Monologion</i> 31, quod sicut homo dicitur de homine uiuo et picto, sic ens dicitur de deo et de creatura: homo enim pictus dicitur homo, quia est similitudo hominis ueri; sic esse uere et plene est solius dei, aliorum autem inquantum illi assimilantur. Dicendum igitur quod ens quod de deo dicitur plenum est et de ipso conuertibiliter predicatur et analogice de creatura.</p> <p>Ad secundum quod ueritas cuiuslibet essentialis potest considerari quadrupliciter: uel secundum quod est in fundamento, in re scilicet significata; uel secundum quod est in intellectu diuino; uel secundum quod est in intellectu composito; uel secundum quod est in signo, idest in uerbo enuntiabili exterius prolato. Et hec omnia intelliguntur equiuoce in eo quod est deum esse. Uera est enim illa: “deum esse fuit uerum ab eterno”, primo et secundo modo; uera etiam est ista: “deum esse probatur a disputatore”; uerum etiam est dicere quod deum esse est enuntiable. Loquendo primo modo de ueritate huius: “deus est”, uera est causaliter uel intellectualiter; secundo modo sic simpliciter deum esse est deus; loquendo de ueritate, uera est complexionaliter uel uera est uocaliter; sic creatura est et incipit esse cum intellectu composito. Primo modo ergo deum esse est deus, quia deus est suum esse, et secundo modo; sed substantia creata non est suum esse, et ideo non est simile de aliis enuntiabilibus.</p> <p><i>Ad tertium dicendum quod “ad idem affirmatum et negatum non sequitur idem” secundum idem. Omnis enim propositio est affirmatiua sui dicti, sed</i></p>	<p><i>Ad primum dicendum</i> secundum Anselmum <i>Monologion</i> 31 quod sicut homo dicitur de homine uiuo et picto, sic dicitur ens de deo et creatura. Homo enim pictus dicitur homo, quia est similitudo hominis ueri; sic esse uere et plene est solius dei, aliorum autem inquantum illi assimilantur. Dicendum igitur quod ens quod dicitur de deo plenum est, et de ipso conuertibiliter predicatur et analogice de creatura.</p> <p><i>Ad aliud dicendum quod “ad idem affirmatum et negatum non sequitur idem” secundum idem. Omnis enim propositio est affirmatiua sui dicti, sed</i></p>

sola affirmatiua affirmat predicatum de subiecto; hec igitur “uerum est ueritatem non esse”, inquantum est affirmatiua sui dicti, infert affirmatiuam, scilicet uerum esse; inquantum uero remouet predicatum a subiecto, infert negatiuam.

*Ad quartum dicendum quod propositiones necessarie uidentur in luce eterna. Unde Augustinus in Soliloquii 1: “Omnia que in disciplinis traduntur nisi ab alio, quodam quasi suo sole illustrentur, uideri atque intelligi non possunt”. Dicendum ergo quod secundum Augustinum, quamuis extrema talium propositionum sint in fantasmate ut species totius et partis, uel ad minus in memoria intellectuali, ut ternarii et quaternarii, quando dicitur: “tria et quatour sunt septem”, ista tamen ad ueritatis infallibilis euidenciam non sufficiunt, nisi eorum rationes eterne et incommutabiles uisu aliquantiter attingantur a mente rationali. Igitur de enuntiabilibus istis est dupliciter considerare: uel secundum quod representantur in speciebus abstractis uel secundum quod ostenduntur in rationibus sempiternis. Primo modo sunt commutabilia et ab anima per obliuionem delebilis et in singulis animabus numerata et inceperunt, quando ab intellectu formata sunt; secundo modo sunt eterna incommutabilia in rationibus eternis lucentia. Unde Augustinus II libro *De libero arbitrio*: “Nullo modo negaueris esse incommutabilem ueritatem, hec omnia que incommutabiliter uera sunt continentem, quam non possis dicere tuam uel meam, sed omnibus incommutabilia, uera cernentibus tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen presto esse ac se prebere communiter”; quomodo autem sit secretum et publicum, patebit infra dist. 3.*

sola affirmatiua affirmat predicatum de subiecto. Hec igitur: ueritas non est, inquantum est affirmatiua sui dicti infert affirmatiuam, scilicet uerum esse; inquantum uero remouet predicatum de subiecto, infert negatiuam.

Ad tertium dicendum quod propositiones necessarie uidentur in luce eterna, secundum Augustinum I Soliloquii. Dicendum ergo secundum mentem Augustini quod quamuis extrema talium propositionum sit in fantasia, utpote totius et partis, uel ad minus in memoria intellectuali, ut ternarii et quaternarii, quando dicitur “tria et quatuor sunt septem”, ista tamen ad ueritatis infallibilis euidenciam non sufficiunt, nisi eorum rationes eterne et incommutabiles uisu aliquantiter attingantur. Igitur de enuntiabilibus istis est dupliciter considerare: uel secundum quod representantur in speciebus abstractis uel secundum quod ostenduntur in rationibus sempiternis. Primo modo sunt commutabilia et ab anima per obliuionem delebilis et in singulis animabus numerata et inceperunt, quando ab intellectu formata sunt; secundo modo sunt eterna incommutabilia, in rationibus eternis lucentia.

As the above comparisons make clear, the primary difference between the two texts is one of length. As is perhaps to be expected, Peckham's *Sentences* commentary text is noticeably longer than that of the *Questio de existentia dei*. It not only contains more *pro* and *contra* arguments, but it offers a much fuller *responsio* than the *Questio* text. One further difference to note is that Peckham's *Sentences* commentary text forms part of a twofold question concerning God's existence. Distinction 2 of the first book of Peckham's *Sentences* commentary asks two questions – “*an sit Deus*” and “*an possit cogitari Deus non esse*.” The arguments *pro* and *contra* for each *questio* are presented first, followed by their respective responses and the arguments *ad obiecta*. It is interesting to note that this practice of intertwining *questiones* is not to be found in any of Bonaventure's authentic writings, either his *Sentences* commentary or any of his *questiones disputate*, yet, interestingly, it is found in Tavad's *Questiones de theologia*. Although a minor point, this can perhaps be taken as further evidence that the latter text is not by Bonaventure.

4. *Manuscript Todi 58*

Once owned by the Franciscan Cardinal Bentivenga de Bentivengis, MS. Todi, Biblioteca comunale 58 was donated to the Franciscan convent of St. Fortunatus at Todi in 1289.²⁶ Gifted in its present form, with little to no evidence suggesting its alteration afterwards, Todi 58 is written in two distinct hands, both of which can be confidently dated to the latter third of the thirteenth century, and consists of 145 folios. The division of the text is as follows: *Questiones de theologia* (part 1), fols. 2ra-3vb; *Commentaria super primum librum sententiarum*, fols. 4-140; table of contents for the later text, fols. 141ra-143vb; *Questiones de theologia* (part 2), fols. 144ra-145ra; *Questio de existentia dei*, fol. 145ra-145rb; *addendum ad 1 Sent.*, dist. 27, fol. 145rb-vb.

26. For information on the manuscript's heritage see BONAVENTURE, *Opera Omnia*, tom. I, p. lxxviii, n. 34; L. LEONI, *Inventario dei codici della Comunale di Todi* (Todi: 1876), p. 18; G. H. TAVARD, “St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions ‘*De theologia*,’” p. 189; G. MIGNINI, “I codici del convento di S. Fortunato in Todi,” in: *Archivio storico per le Marche e per l'Umbria* 3 (1889), pp. 523-535.

5. *Dating and nature*

To establish a date for the *Questio de existentia dei*, we must first enquire as to what type of text it is. Three options present themselves. The first is that the *Questio de existentia dei* is a draft text which Peckham composed while he was a theology student in Paris and which he intended to include in his *Sentences* commentary. If this position is accepted, then the text ought to be dated to Peckham's time as a *baccalaureus sententiarum* during the years 1267-1269.²⁷ The second option is that the text is a *reportatio* of a previously unknown disputation which Peckham conducted during his Parisian (1269-1271) or Oxonian (1271-1275) regencies, or perhaps even during his time as the *lector* at the papal court at Viterbo (1277-1279). Should the text be accepted as a *reportatio* of a magisterial *questio disputata*, then a *terminus post quem* of 1270 and *terminus ante quem* of 1279 would be in order. The third possibility, by contrast, is that the *Questio de existentia dei* is an abbreviation of Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary or perhaps of some unknown *questio disputata*. If we accept this position, then the dating of the *Questio de existentia dei* is somewhat harder to establish, though a *terminus ante quem* prior to the manuscript's donation in 1289 to the convent of St. Fortunatus at Todi by Cardinal Bentivenga de Bentivengis would be required.

Of these three options the first seems the least likely: it is hard to imagine why a draft text by a theology student, presumably one composed for private use, should be placed alongside the works of established theology masters, including a former Franciscan Minister General. Moreover, it is hard to understand why it should end up in a manuscript which is clearly the product of much expense. The second hypothesis, however, is not so easy to dismiss. As even a cursory glance reveals, the *Questio de existentia dei* conforms to the style employed in

27. The scholarly consensus maintains that Peckham, like most other thirteenth-century students undertaking a commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, produced his commentary over a two-year period, with the dates for Peckham's commentary traditionally given as 1267-1269. Recent research, however, has challenged the assumption that students composing commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* during the late thirteenth-century did so over a two-year period, with evidence suggesting that students completed this task in just one year. See W. DUBA – C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris," in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143-179.

many of Peckham's known *questiones disputate* – that is to say, of treating one question at a time, as opposed to intertwining different questions as he does in his *Sentences* commentary.²⁸ What counts against the suggestion that the *Questio de existentia dei* is a *reportatio* of a previously unknown *questio disputata*, however, is that it is noticeably shorter than most of Peckham's edited *questiones disputate*. Not only do these nearly always contain far more arguments *pro* and *contra* than the *Questio de existentia dei*, but their responses are often much more developed. This is particularly the case, for example, with the *Questiones de beatitudine anime et corporis* and the important *Questiones de eternitate mundi*.²⁹ One notable exception, however, is the *Questio de preceptis divinis*, which is comparable in length to the *Questio de existentia dei*.³⁰

In my opinion, therefore, the third position is the most likely: the *Questio de existentia dei* is an *abbreviatio*. Of what though is it an abbreviation? As noted above, two options present themselves. Either the text is an abbreviation of Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary or it is an abbreviation of a previously unknown *questio disputata* on the same subject. Given the high degree of conformity to Peckham's *Sentences* commentary, the most likely solution, so it seems, is that it is an abbreviation of the latter, as opposed to some previously unknown *questio disputata*. As we have seen, not only does the *Questio de existentia dei* bear an exceedingly high degree of similarity to Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary, often matching it verbatim, but equally important is the fact that its arguments *pro* and *contra*, as well as its arguments *ad obiecta* – at least where they find parallel in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary – follow the same order as the latter. Such a high degree of similarity is hard to explain unless the original scribe of the *questio* had Peckham's *Sentences* commentary before his eyes. Moreover, if the text were a *reportatio* of a *questio disputata* it is even harder to explain how such

28. It is important to note that in some of his *questiones disputatae* Peckham does employ the practice of intertwining different questions. Such is the case, for example, in his little studied *Questiones de stellis*. See IOANNIS PECKHAM *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. G. J. ETZKORN – H. SPETTMANN – L. OLIGER, Grottaferrata 2002, pp. 195-223.

29. The *Questiones de beatitudine anime et corporis* and *Questiones de eternitate mundi* have both been published in: *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. G. J. ETZKORN *et al.*, pp. 459-549 and 563-594, respectively.

30. The text is to be found in: *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. G. J. ETZKORN *et al.*, pp. 137-138.

verbatim similarity could be achieved, especially given what is known about how divergent or faulty the *reportatio* of mid- to late-thirteenth-century scholarly disputations could be.³¹

Further evidence suggesting that the *Questio de existentia dei* is an abbreviation of Peckham's *Sentences* commentary text is the fact that it conforms to known examples of medieval abbreviations. Whilst a handful of thirteenth-century abbreviations creatively reinterpret, and in some cases actively expand upon, the text which they abbreviate – such is the case, for example, with Richard Rufus of Cornwall's abbreviation of Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary – most known abbreviations closely follow the structure of the text from which they are derived, albeit offering a highly condensed version of it.³² Thus, for example, the early-fourteenth-century *abbreviatio* of Pseudo-Aristotle's *De plantis* edited by R. J. Long consists of close paraphrases of the main sections of the Pseudo-Aristotelian text and follows its structure faithfully.³³ Crucially, however, it is only 44% of the *De plantis*'

31. To see this one need only consider Bonaventure's remarks in his *Questiones de perfectione euangelica* where he laments how unreliable some of the reportations of his work have been. See BONAVENTURE, *Questiones de perfectione euangelica*, art. 2, q. 2, ad ob., *Opera Omnia*, tom. V, p. 149. Note also the diversity between the *reportatio A* and *reportatio B* versions of Bonaventure's *Collationes in hexaameron*. The *reportatio B* version found in the Quaracchi *Opera Omnia* significantly differs from the *reportatio A* version of the text edited by F. Delorme. See F. DELORME (ed.), *Collationes in Hexaameron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta*, Firenze 1934. See esp. the discussion of the two different manuscript traditions found on pp. vii–xviii.

32. For a discussion of Richard Rufus of Cornwall's abbreviation of Bonaventure's *Sentences Commentary*, see P. RAEDTS, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology*, Oxford 1987, pp. 40–63. As Raedts (p. 40) notes: "the work [i.e., the abbreviation] is considerably more interesting than the title suggests, since the author does not confine himself to summarizing Bonaventure's questions, but adds his own comments and arguments in many places." Raedts (p. 48) goes on to note: "the abbreviation, although it is a very good and clever summary of Bonaventure's commentary, is very much the work of a man with a mind of his own, which he uses in a modest but firm manner, when he is convinced of the inadequacy of Bonaventure's solutions or when he misses an essential question. In this respect the work is unique among the many abbreviations of his commentary made throughout the Middle Ages", p. 48. For further literature on Rufus's abbreviation of Bonaventure's *Sentences Commentary* see Z. ALSZEGHY, "Abbreviations Bonaventurae: Handschriftliche Auszüge aus dem Sentenzenkommentar des hl. Bonaventura im Mittelalter," in: *Gregorianum* 28 (1947), pp. 474–510.

33. See R. J. LONG, "A Thirteenth-Century Teaching Aid: An Edition of the Bodleian Abbreviatio of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Plantis*," in: G. FREIBERGS (ed.), *Aspectus and Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honour of Richard C. Dales*, New York 1993, pp. 87–104.

full length.³⁴ When we look at the *Questio de existentia dei* we find that it constitutes approximately 62% of the length of the corresponding text in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary. This is reduced to 51% if the second question – *an possit cogitari Deus non esse* – is excluded. Thus, where the *Questio de existentia dei* consists of seven arguments *pro*, six arguments *contra*, and six arguments *ad obiecta*, the same *questio* in Peckham's *Sentences* commentary consists of ten arguments *pro*, ten arguments *contra*, and nine arguments *ad obiecta*.

Prima facie it thus seems that we are left with a rather wide range of dates for the *Questio de existentia dei*. On the one hand, given that it is an abbreviation of Peckham's *Sentences* commentary, it must postdate Peckham's completion of his studies as a *baccalaureus sententiarum* in 1270. On the other hand, it must antedate the donation of Todi 58 to the Communal Library of St. Fortunatus in 1289. We are thus left with a period of some 19 years in which the text could have been composed. It seems possible, however, to narrow this time frame somewhat. Given that it is likely that Peckham's *Sentences* commentary would have received far greater scholarly attention during his magisterial periods at Paris and at Oxford (1270-1275) or immediately thereafter – a time when he succeeded for several years in establishing himself as the chief defender of Franciscan orthodoxy – it seems plausible to suggest that the composition of the *Questio de existentia dei* most probably dates from earlier in this period than from later. This, in turn, would fit with the *Questio*'s nature as an abbreviation. After all, it seems less likely that an abbreviation of Peckham's discussion of God's existence in his *Sentences* commentary would be produced in the years after he left his academic posts. This is especially so given that following his departure from Paris and Oxford other voices quickly established themselves as the dominant Franciscan forces at these universities.³⁵

34. *Id.*, *art. cit.*, p. 87.

35. Thus, as Friedman has shown, Peckham's thought enjoyed a great deal of authority and influence during the early 1270's. However, following his departure from university life other Franciscan masters – most notably Matthew of Aquasparta, William de La Mare, and Nicholas of Ockham – quickly established themselves as the dominant voices of the Franciscan tradition, particularly at Paris. See R. L. FRIEDMAN, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350*, Leiden 2013, esp. pp. 139-169.

By way of a tentative suggestion, therefore, it seems that a dating of 1270-1275 can be suggested as a working hypothesis for the production of the *Questio de existentia dei*.³⁶

6. Conclusion

We began this investigation by noting the controversy which surrounds George H. Tavad's attribution of the *Questiones de theologia* found in Todi 58 to St. Bonaventure. As noted earlier, while the discovery of the *Questio de existentia dei* and its connection to John Peckham does not directly resolve the debate surrounding Tavad's controversial hypothesis, it does nonetheless lend weight to some of the criticisms which have been levelled against it, especially those raised by Dondaine. The discovery of the *Questio de existentia dei* and its relationship to Peckham is also particularly timely at another level. Recent decades have witnessed something of a resurgence of interest in the early Franciscan approach towards 'proofs' for God's existence.³⁷ In particular, much debate has arisen concerning how

36. One possible piece of evidence which could help shed further light on the dating of the *Quaestio de existentia dei* is the career of Cardinal Bentivenga de Bentivengis himself. It seems likely that Bentivenga studied at Paris at some point and that this might explain why Todi 58 came to be in his possession. Sadly, however, the dates for Bentivenga's sojourn in Paris are not clear, though the late 1260s and early 1270s seem plausible, and this would fit with the proposed dating of the *Questio de existentia dei* to 1270-1275. It also needs to be borne in mind, however, that given his connection to the papal curia following the election of Nicholas III (1277-1280) it is highly likely that Bentivenga came into contact with Peckham while the latter was lector at the Papal court in Viterbo. This raises the possibility that the *Questio de existentia dei* may, contrary to this essay's hypothesis, have been produced after 1270-1275. Having said this, it is difficult to imagine why, as a papal chaplain and then Bishop of Todi and later Cardinal Bishop of Albano, Bentivenga would have requested the production of the *Questio de existentia dei* – or indeed any of the texts found in Todi 58. It seems far more likely, if the texts found in Todi 58 were transcribed at Bentivenga's personal request that this would have occurred during his time as a student at Paris rather than as a busy member of the papal curia and diocesan bishop.

37. A particularly notable study in this respect is S. MATTHEWS, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars*, Aldershot/Burlington 2001. Also important is J. SEIFERT, "Si Deus est Deus, Deus est: Reflections on St. Bonaventure's Interpretation of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument," in: *Franciscan Studies* 52 (1992), pp. 215-231, and R. E. HOUSER, "Bonaventure's Threefold Way to God," in: R. E. HOUSER (ed.), *Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of E. A. Synan*, Houston 1999, pp. 91-145.

the early Franciscan masters appropriated Anselm's famous argument and whether, as the traditional, Gilsonian scholarly narrative maintains, they offered a faithful articulation of the proofs developed in his *Proslogion*.³⁸ Although by its very nature as an *abbreviatio* the *Questio de existentia dei* is a relatively short text, it is nonetheless hoped that its discovery, coupled with the edition presented here, can be used to help shed light on how the Franciscan masters of the latter third of the thirteenth century approached the subject of proofs for God's existence. Furthermore, aside from augmenting the already extensive corpus of literature connected to John Peckham, the *Questio de existentia dei* also serves as a reminder of the intellectual fecundity of this much neglected Franciscan thinker and apologist, as well as the degree to which Peckham – like many of the Franciscan masters of the 1260's and 1270's – remained faithful to the approach towards God's existence proffered by Bonaventure and the previous generation of Franciscans.

38. Recently a highly novel thesis has been advanced by Lydia Schumacher, who, as part of her extensive work on the *Summa Halensis*, argues that the early Franciscan 'proofs' for God's existence represent a sharp departure from the pre-existing Augustinian-Anselmian tradition. According to Schumacher, the early Franciscan masters – contra Gilson – were not faithful defenders of Anselm's argument, but were in fact the originators of a highly original proof for God's existence, one more indebted to Avicenna's Necessary Existent than to Anselm's *Proslogion*. Thus, according to Schumacher, it was the early Franciscans – and not Anselm of Canterbury – who were the authors of the ontological argument as we know it today. The result, so Schumacher argues, is that we are led to conclude that Aquinas's famous rebuke of the ontological argument in his *Summa Theologiae* is in fact a critique not of Anselm's *Proslogion*, but rather of the style of argument propounded by Franciscan Summists, and presumably Bonaventure as well. See L. SCHUMACHER, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation*, Cambridge 2019, pp. 103-188, esp. pp. 117-118.

TODI, BIBLIOTECA COMUNALE, MS. 58, FOL. 145RA-RB
QUESTIO DE EXISTENTIA DEI

Queritur hic primo an deus sit

5 Quod sic: [1] Augustinus in *Soliloquiorum* libro 2 cap. 9 sic: si ueritas non
 est uel interit, secundum Augustinum uerum est ueritatem non esse; et si hoc,
 aliquid est uerum; uel sic: nihil autem uerum sine ueritate; ergo ueritas est; deus
 autem est ueritas.

[2] Si dicas quod hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia ueritatem
 non esse esse uerum ponit ueritatem secundum quid, contra: omne secundum
 10 quid reducitur ad simpliciter, et omne incompletum ad completum. Igitur, si
 hoc est uerum secundum quid: “uerum est ueritatem non esse”, aliquid est
 uerum simpliciter.

[3] Item secundo *De libero arbitrio* sic arguitur: “lumen in quo uidemus
 ueritates incommutabiles, ut principia scientiarum et regulas numerorum, aut
 15 est mente nostra inferius, aut equale, aut superius. Si inferius, ergo possemus de
 huiusmodi iudicare, acceptando uel respuendo, quod falsum est; huiusmodi
 enim quis recognoscens non examinatur corrigit, sed letatur inuentor”. Si equale,
 ergo illud lumen erit mutabile, quod falsum est, quia huiusmodi enuntiabilia
 “omne totum”, et cetera, sunt immutabiliter uera. Quod si lumen illud est supra
 20 mentem, deus est, quia supra mentes nostras nihil est nisi deus; ergo et cetera.

[4] Item Anselmus *Contra insipientem*: “deus est quo maius excogitari non
 potest”; sed omne tale habet esse non solum in intellectu sed etiam in re.

[5] Item sic arguunt aliqui: “optimum est optimum”. Hec est uera omni casu
 contingente; sed de ratione optimi est esse in actu; ergo si optimum est opti-
 25 mum, optimum est in actu.

[6] Item Richardus 1 *De Trinitate* cap. 6-7: “Quod non est ab eterno, non
 est a semet ipso”, quia quod non est ab eterno fit quando non fuit, et tunc non
 sibi <initium> nec alteri; ergo erit ab alio, quod est ab eterno et a se ipso.

4-7 cf. Aug., *Soliloquia*, II, 2, ed. W. Hörmann, Vindobonae 1986 (CSEL 89), p. 48,
 20 8 cf. Arist., *Soph. el.*, 7, 169b10-11 (transl. Boethii, AL 6.1, ed. B. G. Dod, Bruxelles
 1975, p. 19) 9-10 cf. *Summa Hal.*, I, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 3, q. 2, m. 1, c. 1, ad 2, Ad Claras
 Aquas 1924, p. 139b 13-20 cf. Aug., *De libero arbitrio*, II, 12, 34, ed. W. M. Green,
 Turnholti 1970 (CCSL 29), pp. 260, 21 - 261, 51 21-22 Ans., *Prologion*, 2, *Opera*
Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, tom. 1, Edinburgi 1946, pp. 101, 3-102, 3 23 cf. Bonav.,
Quaestiones de mysterio Trinitatis, art. 1, q. 1, arg. pro 29, *Opera Omnia*, tom. 5, Ad Claras
 Aquas 1891, p. 48 26-27 Rich. de St. Victore, *De Trinitate*, I, 7, ed. J. Ribaillier, Paris
 1958, p. 93, 22-23

8 fallacia *coni.*: fabula *T* 27 fit *coni.*: fuit *T*

[7] Item Philosophus 11 *Methaphisice*: est reperire mouens et motum et aliquid motum et non mouens; ergo et aliquid mouens tantum et non motum, et hoc erit simpliciter primum. 30

Contra: [1] Si deus est, esse predicatur de deo: aut ergo conuertibiliter, et tunc omne ens est deus; aut non conuertibiliter, et tunc deus est ens aliquo addito; ergo compositus. Sed omne compositum est ab alico componente; ergo deus erit ab alio si est, et ita deus non est. 35

[2] Item argumentum primum Augustini non uidetur ualere, quoniam ad idem affirmatum et negatum non sequitur idem; sed ad deum esse sequitur ipsum esse; ergo ex deum non esse non sequitur idem.

[3] Item nec secundum, quia enuntiabile est in anima ut in subiecto; ergo si anima est mutabilis, omne scitum ab ea est mutabile; uel si est simpliciter immutabile, erit deus; ergo duo et tria esse quinque erit deus. 40

[4] Item nec illud Anselmi quia illa ratione posset probari quod esset insula perdita omnibus terris prestantior et melior, quia si non, tunc cum omnis terra uel insula que est in intellectu et re sit melior quam illa que est in solo intellectu, tunc quelibet terra esset melior quam illa que est melior omnibus, et sic illa que est melior omnibus terris, non est melior omnibus terris. 45

[5] Similiter nec ualet argumentum de optimo, quia posito quod nullus lapis sit, hec est uera: "optimus lapis est optimus lapis", nec tunc ex hac sequitur lapidem esse in re.

[6] Similiter nec ualet argumentum Philosophi, quia aliquid est compositum ex materia et forma, aliquid est quod est forma tantum, ut deus; nihil tamen est quod sit materia tantum. 50

Responsio: deum esse est uerum et uerorum euidentissimum, quantum est de se, est quidem naturaliter cognitum. Sed naturalia imperfecta sunt nisi arte uel gratia promoueantur. Unde Damascenus libro 1 cap. 1: "Cognitio existendi deum ab ipso naturaliter nobis inserta est; et creatio et permanentia et gubernatio creature magnitudinem diuine predicat nature; sed et per legem et prophetas et cetera sui ipsius manifestauit cognitionem". Ex quibus uerbis colligitur quod deum esse tripliciter a nobis cognoscitur, scilicet per naturalem impressionem, per inuestigationem que ex creaturis colligitur, et per reuelationem que in scripturis inuenitur. Ex naturali dictamine colligitur deum esse; per creaturarum uestigium colligitur ipsum esse unum, uerum et bonum; per scripturarum oracula ipsum esse trinum et unum, creatorem et reparatorem. Item deum esse est naturaliter cognitum, quia cognoscitur per naturalem impressionem, et demonstratione probatum, quia cognoscitur per inuestigationem que est ex creaturis, et fide creditum, quia per reuelationem, que inuenitur in scripturis. Natura cognitionem initiat, demonstratio iuuat, fides consumat, inquantum non ratione ei 65

29 cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, XII, 7, 1072a23-25 (recensio Guillelmi, AL 25.3.2, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden 1995, p. 256) 42-46 cf. Ans. uel potius Gaunilo, *Pro insipiente*, 6, *Opera Omnia*, tom. 1, p. 128, 14-32 55-58 Ioh. Dam., *De fide orthodoxa (Burgundionis versio)*, 1, 2, ed. E. Buytaert, Louvain 1955, p. 12, 22-27

67 consumat] *an scribendum consummat?*

assentitur, dum super omnem rationem esse creditur, et sic deum esse est articulus uel ad articulum antecedens.

70 [1] Ad primum dicendum secundum Anselmum *Monologion* 31 quod sicut homo dicitur de homine uiuo et picto, sic dicitur ens de deo et creatura. Homo enim pictus dicitur homo, quia est similitudo hominis ueri; sic esse uere et plene est solius dei, aliorum autem inquantum illi assimilantur. Dicendum igitur quod
75 ens quod dicitur de deo, plenum est et de ipso conuertibiliter predicatur et analogice de creatura.

[2] Ad aliud dicendum quod “ad idem affirmatum et negatum non sequitur idem” secundum idem; omnis enim propositio est affirmatiua sui dicti, sed sola affirmatiua affirmat predicatum de subiecto. Hec igitur: “ueritas non est”, inquantum est affirmatiua sui dicti infert affirmatiuam, scilicet uerum esse;
80 inquantum uero remouet predicatum de subiecto, infert negatiuam.

[3] Ad tertium, dicendum quod propositiones necessarie uidentur in luce eterna, secundum Augustinum 1 *Soliloquiorum*. Dicendum ergo secundum mentem Augustini, quod quamuis extrema talium propositionum sint in fantasia, utpote totius et partis, uel ad minus in memoria intellectuali, ut ternarii et quaternarii, quando dicitur: “tria et quatuor sunt septem”, ista tamen ad ueritatis infallibilis euidenciam non sufficiunt, nisi eorum rationes eterne et incommutabiles uisu aliquo attingantur. Igitur de enuntiabilibus istis est dupliciter considerare: uel secundum quod representantur in speciebus abstractis, uel secundum quod ostenduntur in rationibus sempiternis. Primo modo sunt commutabilia et ab anima per obliuionem debilia et in singulis animabus numerata et in ceperunt, quando ab intellectu formata sunt; secundo modo sunt eterna, incommutabilia, in rationibus eternis lucentia.

[4] Ad obiectum de insula dicendum quod “id quo nihil maius excogitari potest” excludit non esse in re et intellectu: ponit enim oppositum, scilicet esse in re et intellectu. Unde cogitare tale “non esse” est cogitare duo opposita; sed nec esse montis, nec eius magnitudo, nec alicuius creature repugnat ei quod est posse non esse; preterea nulla creatura est qua nihil maius cogitari possit.

[5] Ad obiectum de optimo dici potest quod optimum | simpliciter dicit plenitudinem essendi, et ideo includit esse actuale; sed optimus equus dicit esse coartatum et defectibile per consequens: unde non ita concludit esse actuale. Sed re uera multis uidetur illud argumentum non ualere et dicerent ibi esse <secundum> quid et simpliciter. Concedunt enim hanc: “optimum est optimum”, predicando significatum de significato, non autem de subposito. Preterea predicatio est habitualis, nec ponit esse actuale sed habituale, non esse essentie sed
100
105 existentie. 145rb

70 cf. Ans., *Monologion*, 31, p. 49, 1-3

105 existentie *coni.*: consequentie *T*

[6] Ad illud de argumento Philosophi dicendum quod illa forma arguendi tenet tantum in formis et rebus disparatis in essentia uel subsistentia, sicut est de mouere et moueri. Non sic est de materia et forma, quia proprie hiis acceptis neutra potest esse sine alia; unde Deus non est forma nisi equivoce.

William CROZIER
Leverhulme Early Career Fellow
University of Durham, Department of Theology and Religion
Abbey House, Palace Green
DH1 3RS Durham
United Kingdom
william.e.crozier@durham.ac.uk