

## 2. AMERICAN LEADERSHIP INTO THE NEW CENTURY

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In 1987, George Shultz, Secretary of State under President Reagan, declared that 'the great ideological struggle that has marked this century ever since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 has essentially been decided'.<sup>1</sup> Speaking two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, George Shultz was a little premature in proclaiming the termination of the Cold War. However, the significance, not least for American thought and culture, of the late 20th-century ideological and material 'victory' over Soviet communism can scarcely be overstated. The international business of the 20th century – admittedly diverted by the rise of fascism in the 1930s – was the contest between communism (or at least bureaucratised state socialism) on the one hand and democratic capitalism on the other. The geopolitical cataclysm symbolised by the crashing wall in Berlin appeared not only a vindication of national mission and American exceptionalism. It also seemed to signify, as Francis Fukuyama famously put it, that 'all the really big questions had been settled' – in favour of America and the liberal idea.<sup>2</sup>

The present chapter concerns itself with ideas of American global leadership as they developed between 1989 and the first decade of the new century. The discussion will then turn to consider leadership in a domestic context. Just as Fukuyama's 'end of history' had huge implications for American leadership in the world, so did the end of the Cold War and the onset of the War on Terror profoundly affect concepts of leadership at the national level. By 2002, contrary to the expectations of the early 1990s, the power of the US President was following an aggrandising trajectory. Not only did the conditions of the post-9/11 era stimulate an enormous growth of executive power and authority in the realms of foreign policy and domestic security, the early 21st-century White House also advanced a

species of 'big government' presidentialist conservatism, which had severe implications for traditional Madisonian notions of fragmented national leadership. We turn first to the international debate over leadership.

#### POST-COLD WAR AMERICAN GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

The global transformations that accompanied the collapse of Soviet communism brought with them an almost inevitable burst of American triumphalism. Neoconservative commentator Charles Krauthammer hailed in 1991 'the unipolar moment' and called on American elites to make the most of the unique opportunities presented by the Soviet implosion.<sup>3</sup> The national mood, however, in this immediate post-Cold War period was far from universally confident. Perceptions of American decline overshadowed the electoral politics of the early 1990s and even had an impact on the first presidential effort to set out a framework for American leadership in the new global context: President George H. W. Bush's New World Order speech of September 1990. Though attacked from the left as revamped imperialism, the New World Order rather reflected a conception of American leadership that was rooted in multilateralism, limited liability and the upholding of international law.<sup>4</sup> In a speech at West Point military academy in January 1993, the outgoing President Bush declared that the US would use force in the future only 'where its application can be limited in space and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice'.<sup>5</sup> If this was a new imperialism, it was an imperialism tailored to an awareness of the limits to US globalism.

The 1992 presidential election was concerned more with the trade and budget deficits than with any post-Cold War celebration. President Bill Clinton's conception of America's world leadership was circumspect and geared primarily to the economic sphere. Clinton followed the route of 'selective engagement', prioritising international issues that had either a significant domestic overspill or which had direct relevance to core US economic or security interests. Presidential Decision Directive 25, issued in May 1994, declared that the US would participate in United Nations peacekeeping only if risks were 'acceptable' and objectives clear. In Stephen Walt's marvellous phrase, Clinton sought 'hegemony on the cheap'.<sup>6</sup>

Lurking behind this cautious approach to international leadership were memories of over-extension in Vietnam, along with the post-Cold War visibility of the kind of 'new populism' that surfaced in Ross Perot's 1992 electoral challenge to both Bush and Clinton. 'New populism' disavowed seamless international engagement, especially when (on the right) it was associated with the United Nations and 'foreign policy as social work', and (on the left) when it appeared to embrace capitulation to the forces of economic globalisation. Elements of the 'new populism' of the right – notably a revived nationalism and a willingness to favour unilateralism in

foreign relations – found their way into the Republican Party programme which triumphed in the 1994 Congressional elections, and continued to affect attitudes towards international leadership into the new century.

During the 1990s, those politicians and intellectuals who favoured strong US global leadership battled consciously against what they perceived as the forces of isolationism. Within the Republican Party, this contest took the form of neoconservative assaults on the narrow nationalism that distinguished the programme of the post-1994 majority in Congress. Joshua Muravchik rebuked 'neo-isolationism' in 1996, noting 'History will long marvel at the denouement of the cold war'. Not only had Soviet leaders 'just upped and threw in the towel', their American counterparts responded to victory 'not with triumphalism but with a similar collapse of confidence'.<sup>7</sup> On the Democratic side, Bill Clinton attacked protectionists and 'neo-isolationists' on the left and labour wing of his party. In his second inaugural address (January 1997) Clinton used a phrase that came to signify his administration's commitment to international leadership: 'America stands alone as the world's indispensable nation'.<sup>8</sup>

By the time Clinton made this inaugural address, the US debate over post-Cold War global leadership had shifted significantly. The recessionary economic climate of the early 1990s had disappeared. The huge Reagan budget deficit was now under control. The American consumer boom, the computer revolution and US-sponsored globalising free trade had transformed outlooks and expectations. The promise of 1989 at last seemed to have been made real. Clinton announced that 'for the very first time in all of history, more people on this planet live under democracy than dictatorship'.<sup>9</sup> US leadership was now geared to the 'family of nations': market democracies embracing free trade and acknowledging the indispensability of American leadership. The new confidence of the late 1990s, underpinned by the nationalism of the Republican Congress, also contributed to a new willingness to conceive international leadership in unilateralist terms: certainly, as in Kosovo in 1999, to act militarily without any United Nations remit. This new assertion of leadership also required a degree of remilitarisation, reversing the secular decline in defence spending which had begun in the very last years of the Cold War. By 2000, the US was spending \$280 billion annually on defence – a sum completely beyond the aspiration of any rival.

As American political and intellectual elites looked forward to the new century, concerns ranged from the emergence of 'new threats' to the problems and possibilities of undisputed global supremacy. By 2000, America's international eminence was indeed extraordinary. The most cited threats of this period were the 'borderless threats' identified by the Clinton administration: refugee flows, HIV-AIDS, environmental pollution and international terrorism. Two major reports produced in 1999 by the US Commission on National Security, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart

and Warren Rudman, concluded that 'borderless threats' embraced new vulnerabilities, notably over-reliance on attackable information systems and the unpredictable nature of globalised economic shifts.<sup>10</sup> Clinton's 'bridge' to the new century involved a cornucopia of programmatic 'pathways', emphasising cultural diversity as well as the 'indispensability' of American international leadership. More ominously, Samuel Huntington's notion of the 'clash of civilizations', the putative replacement of global economic and ideological cleavages by cultural ones, gained huge currency, even before the terror attacks of 9/11.<sup>11</sup>

In general, however, the American turn-of-the-century mood was as much preoccupied with the undisputed nature of US global leadership *per se*, as with any threats to that leadership. By the turn of the century, the combination of 'hard' military power, economic strength and 'soft' cultural assets – the international attractiveness of the United States – seemed to have carried all before it.<sup>12</sup> National Security Advisor Sandy Berger announced in January 2001, 'Today, as President Clinton leaves office, America is by any measure the world's unchallenged military, economic and political power. The world counts on us to be a catalyst of coalitions, a broker of peace, and a guarantor of financial stability'.<sup>13</sup>

In the early post-Cold War years, Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson warned America of 'the imperial temptation'.<sup>14</sup> As the new century dawned, shelves of books appeared, all criticising, condemning or celebrating a new imperial age. Andrew Bacevich wrote that empire was un-American. Its characteristics – 'pomp and privilege, corruption and excess' – were 'quite alien to America's Puritan heritage'.<sup>15</sup> Yet Rome had travelled a not dissimilar path. Could the US not learn from Rome's mistakes? What about Britain's more recent experiences with empire? Perhaps the US could pick up tips from its imperial predecessors. At least on the neoconservative right, the whiff of 'empire' was in the air even before 9/11. What 9/11 did, of course, at least in the short term, was to weaken those inhibitions on the projection of power that had so affected the presidencies of the elder Bush and Clinton.<sup>16</sup>

As the younger Bush entered the White House in January 2001, the US was poised between 'unilateralist' and 'cooperativist' conceptions of international leadership. In some ways, the US was now so unlike other countries – its economic and military power was now so unchallenged – that cooperative leadership, at least in so far as that concept implied some kind of partnership among equals, was scarcely feasible. Under the new President, however, American global leadership was to become increasingly militarised and its global instincts more unilateralist.

The presidency of George W. Bush saw a prolonged debate between 'new nationalist' and 'neoconservative' understandings of how America should exercise global leadership. 'New nationalism' seemed to be the President's own default position on leadership. It derived from a tradition that weaves its

way back to the Frontier and the nationalism of President Andrew Jackson.<sup>17</sup> More immediately, it derived from the rather narrowly defined nationalism that had been such a prominent feature of Republican Party thinking in the 1990s. Bush, particularly early on, presented himself as a 'new nationalist': prepared to exercise international leadership, but only in a manner congruent with strictly and narrowly understood American interests. Remove those interests and the world would have to resolve its own problems.<sup>18</sup> In 1999, Bush declared that, unless the leader of America 'sets his own priorities, his priorities will be set by others'.<sup>19</sup>

Against the new nationalist version of international leadership, the version embraced by the top echelon of Bush's foreign policy team, stood neo-conservatism and militarised democracy-promotion. The tradition of democracy-promoting global leadership associated with President Woodrow Wilson stood opposed to that deriving from Jackson and President Theodore Roosevelt. Sometimes understood as a form of interests-based realism, neoconservatism is more sensibly construed as a coming together of democratising idealism with a commitment to military primacy, all strongly rooted in the soil of American exceptionalism.<sup>20</sup> Neoconservatives, like Paul Wolfowitz, deputy to Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the first George W. Bush administration, tend to see 'interests' and 'ideals' as interpenetrative.<sup>21</sup> In America's case, at least, the one reinforces the other. Neoconservatism frequently, as with the 1992 Defence Guidance (the framework for post-Cold War US leadership written under Wolfowitz's sponsorship by Lewis Libby and Zalmay Khalilzad), does express itself in 'interests' terms.<sup>22</sup> Yet America's exceptionalist, democratising vision never lags far behind. For Charles Krauthammer, the realist/idealist circle is squared by the concept of 'democratic realism', wherein pro-democracy interventionists accept a commitment to more traditionally conceived national interests, such as access to Middle Eastern oil and strong national defence.<sup>23</sup>

The shock of 9/11 immeasurably strengthened the hand of those within the administration, and particularly within the Pentagon, who favoured a neoconservative construction of American global leadership. Charles Krauthammer wrote on 21 September 2001 that this was no time for 'agonized relativism'.<sup>24</sup> As originally conceived, the War on Terror reflected new nationalist rather than neoconservative conceptions of global leadership: more forward defence than democracy-promotion, more Theodore Roosevelt than Woodrow Wilson. The neoconservative position was that 9/11 had opened the way for transformative action, conceived in moral as much as in narrow strategic terms. At least in relation to the Middle East, the neoconservative agenda rapidly gained ground. 'Forward defence' in Afghanistan gave way to an approach that embodied more strongly the theme of democracy-promotion/imposition. The shift to a democracy-promoting rhetoric, seen at its most spectacular in Bush's second inaugural

address of January 2005, was also unquestionably connected to the failure to unearth weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. However, the notion of leadership defended by the administration after 9/11 always combined the new nationalist (with 'American interests' defined more expansively than before 9/11) and the neoconservative versions of global leadership. Speaking at West Point in June 2002, Bush not only claimed a virtually absolute right to 'pre-empt' threats from other countries by taking military action against them, he also promised to 'extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent'.<sup>25</sup> By November 2003, speaking in London, Bush was defending a Wilsonian form of world leadership: a concept of leadership rooted in the interdependence of ideals and interests, drawing also from the post-Cold War doctrine, very dear to the Clinton administration, that international democracy guarantees international peace.<sup>26</sup> The administration's mind-set was still shaped by the Cold War victory. The events of 1989 had, it felt, been a vindication of American ideals; market democracy was *bound* to prevail, provided always that Washington did not lose its nerve. The 2002 National Security Strategy opened thus: 'The great struggles of the 20th century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise'.<sup>27</sup>

Failure and chaos in Iraq called into question the entire expansive conception of global leadership that underpinned Washington's response to 9/11. The terror attacks themselves revealed starkly that the global hyper-power was vulnerable to the asymmetric threat mounted by international terrorism. The widespread opposition to American action in Iraq – not least in the ranks of traditional allies – threatened also to erode US 'soft power'.<sup>28</sup> By this time, American commentators were examining problems of over-extension and international 'blowback'.<sup>29</sup> John Ikenberry called on America to rediscover its cooperativist version of global leadership, 'based on the view that America's security partnerships are not simply instrumental tools but critical components of an American-led world political order that should be preserved'.<sup>30</sup> Global domination, argued Stephen Walt in 2005, was simply too demanding and was ultimately destructive of sustainable leadership.<sup>31</sup>

By the second half of the first decade of the new century, it was clear that America would face significant challenges to its global leadership. A specialist literature emerged on yet more 'new threats': not just 'borderless' ones like terrorism, but also the more traditional 'threat' posed by a rising (and in political terms at least, still communist) China. Such threat-mongering tended to underplay the difficulties in China's path and to overplay the likelihood of conflict between what are almost bound to be the world's two most powerful countries in the medium-term future.<sup>32</sup> What was evident, however, some years after the Iraq invasion, was that American conceptions of global leadership were likely – as in the era following the Vietnam War – to develop against the background of a keen awareness of limits. Hillary

Clinton, running for the Democratic nomination in 2007, gave her support to US democracy promotion, but only in 'digestible packages'.<sup>33</sup>

#### LEADERSHIP AT HOME

The end of the Cold War affected conceptions of leadership at home almost as much as views on America's world role. The domestic and international politics of the pre-1989 era combined to create a 'heroic' model, in particular, of presidential leadership. The 'imperial presidency' of Richard Nixon (1969–74) and the defeat in Vietnam had, it is true, produced a reaction to various excesses and abuses of presidential authority. The presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–81) was, at some level, an antidote to the heroic presidential model. Yet the conditions of the Cold War – high levels of defence mobilisation, ever-present nuclear threat, prolonged invocation of crisis – invited enhanced executive power. The heroic model of presidential leadership was not simply the product of international conditions. It related also to the rise of television and to expectations of mobilisation for domestic change, whether in a liberal (as in the cases of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson) or (as in the case of President Reagan) a conservative direction. Heroic presidential leadership also reflected the relative strengths of state and federal levels of political authority; although, of course, the Cold War era also witnessed the spectacle of heroic presidents, notably Nixon and Reagan, actually espousing the cause of rolling power back to the states. What was undeniable about the strong post-New Deal presidency was the sustaining context of the Cold War.<sup>34</sup>

In a sense, the Cold War victory was a victory for presidential power, a victory made possible (according to preference) by John Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, or by Ronald Reagan's strategy of negotiation from strength. Despite all this, the ending of the Cold War was accompanied by expectations that the ability of the presidency to survive as the prime focus for national leadership would be compromised. A 1993 report by the American Assembly on 'Public Engagement in US Foreign Policy after the Cold War' noted: 'We have inherited a conception of the "man in the Oval Office" hearing all the evidence, making lonely decisions, and then persuading the nation.' With the ending of the Cold War, however, 'foreign policy making increasingly resembles the process by which domestic policies are made, and the president must be prepared to build mutually supportive coalitions at home and abroad that will give authority and legitimacy to his/her decisions'.<sup>35</sup>

Bill Clinton's leadership style was certainly presidentialist and activist. He had no intention of emulating the semi-detached style of President Reagan, nor of surrendering to a constrained model of post-Cold War leadership. Yet Clinton's own orientation to the job of being leader involved more than mere super-activity. To some extent Clinton's thinking on national

leadership reflected at least a hint of the suspicion of power that was characteristic of the generation that came to political maturity during the era of the Vietnam War. More importantly, Clinton's leadership was consciously fashioned for a post-liberal, 'post-heroic' America. As a founder of the Democratic Leadership Council in 1985, Clinton had been part of a movement within the Democratic Party to prepare for executive office in times that demanded fiscal caution and the exaltation of compromise ('triangulation') over ideology. In this line of thought, successful leadership meant not repeating the McGovern mistakes of 1972 by racing too far ahead of public opinion. Clinton's style was emotional; it involved a good deal of 'listening' and searching out consensual 'pathways' to the new century. According to Margaret Hermann, his style was one of 'search and check': 'search for information that will bring about good policy and check where relevant constituencies stand to see if consensus is possible'.<sup>36</sup>

Clinton's contribution to the development of presidential leadership – his legacy to the new century – differed significantly between domestic and foreign policy. In foreign policy, in defiance of the expectations of the early 1990s, Clinton generally kept the process under presidential control. Congress and other non-executive actors gained important new leverage in some areas; such an area was policy towards Cuba, now relegated from the high importance accorded to it during the Cold War. However, the reins of 'high' foreign and security policy-making were kept in the White House. The means of doing so involved, as during the Cold War, the frequent invocation of external 'threat' and the plausible assertion that, if the US were to have a clear international direction, only the President could provide it. Like his Republican predecessor and his Republican successor in office, Clinton paid only minimal and largely symbolic heed to legislative war powers.<sup>37</sup>

On the domestic side, especially after the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, Clinton was more obviously committed to 'listening', 'triangulation' and compromise. A key example here was the welfare policy reform of 1996. Even in domestic policy, however, Clinton achieved some remarkable victories for traditional, liberal notions of strongly activist presidential leadership. The 1994 Republican Contract with America was, in effect, a blueprint for a system of national Congressional government. The Contract was complex and included provisions, notably the item veto (allowing the President to cancel specific items in appropriations bills), which actually augmented presidential authority. The main thrust of the Contract, however, was to put forward a national manifesto for Congressional leadership, with a detailed schedule for '100 days' legislative action. In the event, this new era of post-Cold War Congressional government never appeared. It was destroyed by Clinton's grasping of the initiative in foreign policy; by overreaching and misjudgement by the would-be 'prime minister', House Speaker Newt Gingrich; by the lack of a veto- or filibuster-proof Republican majority in the Senate; and by a skilled combination of

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compromise and confrontation (especially in the annual budget battles) by the White House. In 2001, Clinton handed on to George W. Bush a presidential office whose wings remained surprisingly unclipped, despite the impeachment and the vicious partisan political warfare of the 1990s.

The new, post-2000 presidential style was assuredly not one of 'search and check'. The Republicans who entered the White House in 2001 were strong proponents, not of Gingrich-style Congressional government, but of firm executive leadership. The White House developed doctrines of the strong presidency, rooted in notions of 'inherent power', which echoed those advanced by President Richard Nixon's Justice Department in the early 1970s, and in ideas of the 'unitary executive', which had been developed during the 1990s.<sup>38</sup> In a truly Nixonian touch (though also one which echoed Clinton's response to the Lewinsky scandal), the new administration relied heavily on notions of 'executive privilege' in order to protect sensitive information.<sup>39</sup> The argument advanced by Vice-President Richard Cheney and other leading administration conservatives was that America needed to rediscover the tradition of assertive presidential leadership which had been lost during the national overreaction to Watergate and the Vietnam War. Cheney himself emerged as possibly the most powerful Vice-President in US history. According to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, President George W. Bush (even before 9/11) 'wanted to restore the executive authority the president had traditionally been able to exercise'.<sup>40</sup> Management in this new order was perfunctory in style and, despite Bush's famous status as the first President with an MBA, strangely disordered.<sup>41</sup> Bush tended to equate explanation with weakness. Bob Woodward quoted him thus: 'I'm the commander – see, I don't need to explain – I do not need to explain why I say things'.<sup>42</sup> According to James Pfiffner, Bush 'eschewed deliberation, and his White House does not adhere to any regularized policy development process'.<sup>43</sup>

At the level of legal argument, the White House put its faith in a controversially presidentialist reading of constitutional history.<sup>44</sup> Such assertions of authority naturally found fertile ground in the political conditions which followed the 9/11 attacks. The US Congress lacked the political will seriously to raise issues of constitutional propriety when, for example, it delegated huge powers relating to national security surveillance to the executive in the Patriot Act of 2001. Such legislation raised major questions relating to civil liberties and to legislative authority. Democrat Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia emerged as the most conspicuous defender of Congressional prerogatives after 9/11; in the atmosphere that prevailed, at least in the period 2001–5, his case for Congress asserting *its* right to lead assumed the same practical irrelevance as that of the legislative opponents of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution.<sup>45</sup> In domestic policy, the administration was, of course, anxious to obtain legislation. This was 'big government', rather than 'do nothing', conservatism. Legislation such as the

No Child Left Behind education reform, signed into law by President Bush in January 2002, sprang from a familiar process of compromise and adjustment in Congress, though it certainly marked a new high point for federal involvement in (usually state government-led) educational practice. Unsurprisingly, it was for policy areas related to the War on Terror that the fiercest assertions of executive power were reserved.

The most swingeing assertion of presidential authority in foreign policy was the doctrine of pre-emption. At West Point in June 2002 and in the National Security Strategy published later in the year, President Bush averred a limitless personal authority to order military action against any nation that posed – in the President’s judgement, and in the President’s judgement alone – either an immediate or even a longer-term threat to US security.<sup>46</sup> The doctrine thus effectively conflated ‘pre-emption’ (the heading-off of an immediate threat) with ‘prevention’ (cancelling remote threats). The Iraq invasion of 2003 was, in this terminology, actually ‘preventive’ rather than ‘pre-emptive’.<sup>47</sup> Presidentially adjudicated pre-emption is not entirely novel, but never before had this aspect of effective executive authority been expressed quite so starkly. Anthony Lewis wrote that the doctrine overthrew ‘the commitment that the United States and all other members’ of the United Nations ‘have made ... to eschew attacks across international frontiers except in response to armed aggression’.<sup>48</sup> As an ‘inherent’ presidential power, pre-emption also left no apparent room for checks by the US Congress, much less by any international body. Assertion of executive authority was remorseless, with particularly striking examples involving the treatment of ‘enemy combatants’. In 2002, following the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush’s Justice Department argued that Congress could ‘no more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements in the battlefield’. The President, according to the Office of Legal Counsel, ‘has the inherent authority to convene military commissions to try and punish enemy combatants even in the absence of statutory authority’.<sup>49</sup> Such claims amount to an assertion of presidential supremacy. Intense controversy extended not only to the detention of ‘combatants’ – notably at Guantánamo in Cuba, but also in a range of clandestine sites – but also to their interrogation. Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona led a major effort in 2005 to outlaw torture of terror suspects. The resulting legislation was accepted by President Bush, but only with the attachment of a ‘signing statement’, declaring the executive’s intention to enforce the law only ‘in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief’.<sup>50</sup>

Sweeping and controversial claims of executive authority are bound to be challenged, at least in the medium to long term. In the case of the Bush presidency, formal and effective challenge emerged firstly at the judicial level. The key Supreme Court cases involved the *habeas corpus* rights of detainees.

In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* (2004), Justice Sandra O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the administration position on denying legal appeals from detainees could not be supported by 'any reasonable view' of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, since it 'serves only to condense power within a single branch of government'. The Court reaffirms 'today the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law'.<sup>51</sup>

The *Hamden v. Rumsfeld* decision of 2006 further damaged the administration's absolutist stance. The military commissions established to deal with War on Terror detainee cases were deemed improper, since they lacked statutory backing and contravened the Geneva Conventions. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, opposed the administration's assertion of a 'sweeping mandate for the President to invoke military commissions whenever he deems them necessary'.<sup>52</sup> As with the McCain torture legislation, the administration found an escape: this time by achieving statutory backing for the tribunals. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 explicitly denied admissibility to evidence extracted under torture; yet it also provided a framework for trial by military commission, with no clear right for a non-US citizen to appeal detention before American courts. Towards the end of 2007, the stage appeared set for further Supreme Court determinations regarding *habeas corpus* and due process rights.<sup>53</sup>

Legislative reassertion was part of the agenda for the Democratic Congress, which convened in January 2007 and proceeded to investigate executive conduct of foreign policy and to challenge administration claims to exclusive leadership rights over the conflict in Iraq. For House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the priority was to achieve legislation that 'ends the blank check for the President's war without end'.<sup>54</sup> The ability of the new Congress radically to affect the conduct of the Iraq conflict was reduced by its inability to muster enough votes to override presidential vetoes. The administration view was clearly put by Vice-President Cheney: 'military operations are to be directed by the President of the United States, period.'<sup>55</sup>

As America waved goodbye to the Cold War, it seemed that leadership by and in the United States might be transformed. When George Washington returned to his farm at the end of his presidency in 1797, he invoked the memory of the Roman leader Cincinnatus, who had swapped dictatorship and the ways of war for modesty and peace. As we have seen, any expectation that post-1989 America would emulate Cincinnatus, destroy its sword and revert to modest leadership was quickly disappointed. The Cold War victory produced a long, albeit initially hesitant, period of extreme confidence in the universal currency of American democratic, capitalist values. By the early years of the new century, White House assertion of presidential authority also matched, in truth exceeded, those made by Cold War presidents. The political conditions of the immediate post-9/11 years encouraged sweeping

assertions of American global power, just as they underpinned presidential aggrandisement at home.

Much commentary on Bush's presidential leadership – certainly much European commentary – tends towards the hysterical. In the final few sentences of this chapter, let us try to restore a sense of proportion. Bush's globalist presidentialism was driven by ideology: a mixture, as we have seen, of new nationalism, neoconservatism and the assumption that Congress is incapable of acting responsibly, especially in any area connected to foreign policy. Such doctrines and assumptions are highly contentious at best; at worst, they transgress fundamentally constitutional provisions concerning checks on executive power and separation of powers. Yet the American system of shared and limited leadership will work only if all elements within it act to protect their interests and jurisdictions. In the period between 2001 and early 2007, the US Congress – at the federal level, *the* representative branch – singularly failed to do this. From 2008 onwards, the agenda would seem to be one of 'rebalancing': at home, the move to restrain presidential authority; and abroad, adjustment (yet again) to a newly constrained internationalism.

#### NOTES

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