New Zealand:

Parliamentary Speeches under a Mixed-Member

Proportional Electoral System[*]

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Abstract

This chapter studies debate participation in New Zealand's parliament from 1996 to 2002. New Zealand has a mixed-member proportional electoral system and a multiparty system. Its parliamentary rules and procedures give parties considerable control over the allocation of speaking time in debates and questions during question times. The empirical analysis, based on 125,088 speeches, studies the number of speeches that parliamentarians delivered and the number of words they spoke during two legislative periods. I find that ministers and party leaders participate significantly more and use more words in parliamentary debates than other parliamentarians. I also show that female politicians and ethnic minorities are less likely to participate.

Introduction

Comparative scholars have studied parliamentary speeches to increase our understanding of intra-party politics, political communication, and democratic representation (e.g., Bäck et al. 2014; Baumann et al. 2017; Martin and Vanberg 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2012). While comparative studies frequently investigate the case of New Zealand (e.g., Kam 2009; Lijphart 1999; Morelli et al. 2020; Williams and Indridason 2018), its parliamentary speeches have received limited attention in the political science literature. One exception is Proksch and Slapin (2015), who examine parliamentarians' participation in budget debates to test their theory of parliamentary speechmaking. Curran et al. (2018) investigate the content of parliamentary speeches and find that the number of topics discussed has increased over time. Osnabrügge et al. (2021) show that the country's 1996 electoral reform from a first-past-the-post to a mixed-member electoral system increased discussions about political stability and party competence.

In this chapter, I study speeches delivered in New Zealand's Parliament. I first describe the rules and practices for speaking in debates and asking questions during question times. I then analyze 125,088 parliamentary speeches, collected from the official Hansard reports, to determine which factors influence debate participation in the country's parliament. I use both descriptive and multivariate analyses to investigate the number of speeches delivered and the number of words spoken by parliamentarians in a legislative period. The period of analysis is from 1996 to 2002, which corresponds to the first two legislative periods after the 1996 electoral reform.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it provides novel empirical insights into the factors that influence debate participation in New Zealand. The study tests existing knowledge about the role of parties, seniority, gender, and the electoral mechanism in parliamentary debates (e.g., Bäck et al. 2014; Proksch and Slapin 2012), and documents how politicians' ethnic background of politicians influences their debate participation. Hence, the empirical analysis informs theory building and provides evidence on substantive representation (e.g., Blätte and Wüst 2017; Saalfeld 2011). Second, the systematic description of the institutional rules helps comparative researchers make an

informed selection of their cases. The chapter also includes references to important sources regarding parliamentary procedures and practices in New Zealand.

Several political developments occurred during the period of analysis. The National Party, the main conservative party, won the 1996 elections and formed a coalition government with the populist New Zealand First. However, this coalition was unpopular and ended before subsequent election. Jenny Shipley replaced Jim Bolger as National Party leader and prime minister in 1997. The 1999 elections led to a change in government: the Labour Party formed a minority government together with the left leaning Alliance, and its leader, Helen Clark, became prime minister. The Green Party supported this coalition on votes regarding supply and confidence. The Labour–Alliance coalition exhibited more political stability than the previous one, but an early election took place in 2002 (Martin 2004, 328–330; Vowles et al. 2002).

The chapter reports two main findings. First, parliamentary rules and procedures give parties considerable influence over the allocation of parliamentary speeches. In particular, the parties are represented in the Business Committee of the New Zealand Parliament, which manages the allocation of speaking time in debates as well as questions during question time. Furthermore, parties prepare speaking lists for long debates and oversee the submissions of questions. According to the Standing Orders, the Speaker should prioritize party spokespersons when calling members in debates. Second, the regression analysis shows that ministers give significantly more speeches and use more words than other parliamentarians during a given legislative period. Furthermore, party leaders talk significantly more than backbenchers, and women and ethnic minorities give fewer speeches.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section "Institutional and Party System Background" describes New Zealand's electoral and party system. Section "The Institutional Setting of Legislative Debates" examines the procedures and rules for speaking in parliament. Section "The Determinants of Floor Access in New Zealand" analyzes the number of speeches held in the New Zealand Parliament using descriptive and multivariate analyses, and a final section concludes.

Institutional and Party System Background

New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy that uses a mixed-member proportional electoral system to elect parliamentarians. Its electoral system is similar to Germany's (Vowles 2018). Voters have two votes: They can vote for both their preferred party (party vote) and a candidate in their electoral district (candidate vote). It also has parallel Māori districts, the number which can change over time. In the 1996 elections, there were five such districts. In 1999 the number increased to six districts, and since 2002 there have been seven. Citizens with a Māori background have to decide whether they want to vote in their general or Māori electoral district every five years.

The number of party votes is used to calculate the overall share of seats based on the Saint Laguë formula. The seats are allocated first to the candidates who won a simple majority in their electoral district. The remaining seats are then assigned to parliamentarians based on national party lists, which rank the candidates. In order to be represented in parliament, parties either need at least one candidate who wins a district or to achieve at least 5 percent of the party votes.[1] In 1996, the New Zealand Parliament included 120 Members of Parliament (MPs), sixty of whom were elected in general districts, fifty-five via national party lists, and five in Māori electoral districts. In 1999, the parliament included sixty-one members who were elected in general electoral districts, fifty-three via national party lists, and six in Māori districts (Barker et al. 2001; McGee 2005, chapter 2).[2]

In mixed-member electoral systems, the party leadership has an incentive to create a coherent party brand because voters have a party vote, which is used to calculate the overall share of seats. At the same time, parliamentarians elected in electoral districts have an incentive to gain their constituents' support in order to ensure their re-election (Barker et al. 2001; Proksch and Slapin 2012). As in Germany, parliamentarians in New Zealand often compete for both list and constituency seats (McLeay and Vowles 2007). According to Barker and McLeay (2001, 139), the speaking and voting behavior of list and

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[1] Like Germany, New Zealand also has overhang seats.
[2] The election result data come from https://www.electionresults.govt.nz/ (accessed March 13, 2020). Further information on the electoral system can be found here https://elections.nz/ (accessed May 22, 2020).

constituency parliamentarians did not differ substantially in the legislative period from 1996 to 1999 (see also Lin and Osnabrügge 2018).

New Zealand has a multiparty system. For the 1996–2002 period considered, the following main political parties were represented in parliament: ACT, Alliance, Green, Labour, National, NZ First, United (Hayward 2015; Miller 2005). The Labour Party was formed in 1916 as a socialist party, but has been characterized as a social democratic party since 1951; it focused on the welfare state and economic intervention (Aimer 2015, 210; Miller 2005, 34). The National Party was founded in 1936 as a merger of Reform and United, two conservative parties, to oppose the Labour government. The National Party is a conservative center-right party with liberal tendencies, which has a reputation for fighting for free enterprise and the interests of farmers and businesses (e.g., James 2010; Miller 2005).

New Zealand First is a populist party formed in 1993 by Winston Peters, a former Minister of Māori Affairs for the National Party, who was dismissed from the cabinet in 1991. The party uses anti-establishment and nationalistic rhetoric, and is less robustly organized than National and Labour (Joiner 2015). ACT, formed in 1994, is a right-wing liberal party that started as an interest group ("Association of Consumers and Taxpayers"), led by Roger Douglas, a former Labour Party finance minister. It supports policies that reduce taxes and bureaucracy (Miller 2005). In the 2017 elections, it only won one seat.

The left-wing Alliance was formed in 1991 as an alliance of five small parties. It gained 18 percent of the votes in 1993 and 10 percent in 1996. However, the party failed to get re-elected in 2002 after the departure of Jim Anderton, the party leader. The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, formed in 1990, advocates environmental responsibility, fairness, and inclusive decision-making. It was part of the Alliance until it decided to leave in 1997 (Ford 2015). The United New Zealand Party was a centrist party and was formed in 1995 by former National and Labour parliamentarians. In 2000 it merged with Future New Zealand to form the United Future New Zealand Party (Edwards 2010). [3]

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[3] More parties are currently active. For example, the Māori Party was set up in 2004.

The parties represented in New Zealand's parliament have formed single-party or coalition governments since the reform of the electoral system. After the first elections under the new system in 1996, a coalition government formed and the government parties held a majority of seats. However, all single-party and coalition governments since 1999 have been minority governments (Vowles 2018). The parties in government have to make agreements with parties that are not part of the government in order to receive votes of confidence and pass legislation, which has strengthened parliament's role vis-à-vis the government. Confidence and supply agreements are the norm in New Zealand (Malone 2008; Palmer and Palmer 2004, chapter 3).

The country's electoral system gives parties an incentive to develop a national party brand. At the same time, parties have an incentive to allow district parliamentarians to appeal to the voters in their electoral district (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 2015).

The Institutional Setting of Legislative Debates

The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives stipulate formal rules for allocating speaking time in debates and questions during question times. They also provide guidelines on the number, manner, and content of interventions. This section examines the parliamentary rules and practices based on the Standing Orders of September 8, 1999, and McGee's book *Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand* (McGee 2005; NZ House of Representatives 1999).[4]

The Business Committee plays an essential role in organizing House business and allocating speaking time in parliament (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives 2017). This committee was established in 1995 before the first elections under the new system in order to manage the more complex workflow of a multiparty parliament. The Speaker of the House chairs its meetings. Parties with at least six MPs send one or more party representatives to the meetings; those with fewer than six can send joint representatives (Standing Order No. 74). Usually, the party whips, the Leader of the House

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[4] See NZ House of Representatives (2020) for the current version of the Standing Orders.

and the Shadow Leader of the House, attend the Business Committee meetings. Committee decisions are made based on consensus (Martin 2004, 325; McGee 2005, 167–168; McGee 2017, 119).

The Business Committee has several roles in the allocation of speaking time. First, it allocates speaking time to parties in debates and decides on "the speaking times of individual members on an item of business" (Standing Order No. 76(d)). Second, the committee can alter the time limits of particular debates, such as Address in Reply, the Budget debate, or the debate on the Prime Minister's statement. Third, it specifies the allocation of questions and their rotation. Its binding agreements are published in the *Parliamentary Bulletin* (McGee 2005, 179, 181, 549; Standing Order No. 76).

The Speaker must take four factors into account when he calls on members to speak in debates (Standing Order No. 103). First, the Standing Orders state that "if possible, a member of each party should be able to speak in each debate". Second, the Speaker should use the proportionality principle when allocating speaking time. Third, party spokespersons are prioritized "in order of the size of party membership in the House". Members' seniority and expertise is the fourth criterium. Note that small parties may not be represented in all debates. According to McGee (2005, 182), party whips often pre-arrange slots for long debates by preparing speaking lists, which the Speaker tends to follow.

The Standing Orders state rules on the number and length of speeches for debates. Members may speak, "except as otherwise provided, … once to a question before the House" (Standing Order No 106). One exception are debates held in the committee of the whole House, where members may speak multiple times. Appendix A of the Standing Orders summarizes the time limits for the debates. Below, I focus on five important debates: debates in the second reading of the legislative process, debates in the committee of the whole House stage, budget debates, Address in Reply debates, and debates on the

Prime Minister's statement. Table 1 summarizes the speaking time for these debates (see NZ House of Representatives 1999).[5]

Table 1: Parliamentary debate types in New Zealand

Debate type	Debate time	Speaking time by Members
Second reading of bills	12 speeches	MPs: 10 minutes
Committees of the whole House (in the legislative process)	-	Minister/member in charge: Multiple 5 minutes speeches Other MPs: Three 5 minutes speeches
Budget debate	14 hours (excluding Budget statement)	Minister of Finance: unlimited (Budget statement), 10 minutes (on reply) Party leaders: 20 minutes Other MPs: 10 minutes
Address in Reply	19 hours	Party leaders: 30 minutes Members with maiden speech: 15 minutes Other MPs: 10 minutes
Prime Minister's statement and debate	14 hours (excluding Prime Minister's statement)	Prime Minister: unlimited Party leaders: 20 minutes Other MPs: 10 minutes

Source: Appendix A of the Standing Orders 1999.

Debates in the second reading concern bills that have passed the first reading in the legislative process. In the second reading, members "discuss the main purpose and contents of the bill and matters reasonably related to it" (McGee 2005, 363). These debates include twelve speeches, and members can speak for up to ten minutes. The second reading takes place after a select committee has considered a bill (McLeay 2001, 134).

The committee of the whole House consists of all MPs and is chaired by the Deputy Speaker. The parliament spends up to one-quarter of its sitting time in this committee, most commonly discussing bills. This committee stage takes place after the second reading if

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[5] Another example are general debates, which usually take place each Wednesday after the questions for oral answers conclude. In general debates, members can "raise matters of concern to them" (Standing Order No 379(2)) and include 12 speeches of up to 5 minutes. Parties often give their members guidance on the topics they should address (McGee 2005, 579-580).

the bill was not defeated. The debate focuses on a technical, in-depth discussion and on making amendments and finalizing the text of the bill. The minister or member in charge can hold multiple speeches of up to five minutes. Other members can make up to four oral contributions of five minutes (McGee 2005, 367–370).

Budget debates take place once a year and constitute the second reading debate of the main Appropriation Bill. At the beginning of the second reading, the Minister of Finance delivers a budget statement, which has no time limit. In the budget debate, the party leaders have a speaking time of up to twenty minutes if their party has at least six MPs, and other members can speak for a maximum of ten minutes. The Minister of Finance has ten minutes to reply to the debate. The total debate takes a total of fourteen hours, excluding the budget statement (McGee 2005, 477–479; NZ House of Representatives 1999).

The Address in Reply debate takes place at the beginning of each legislative session after the Governor-General delivered the Speech from the Throne, which outlines the government's program for the parliamentary session. The Address in Reply debate is wide-ranging and similar to the Queen's Speech debates in the British House of Commons. Leaders of parties with at least six members have thirty minutes of speaking time, members that make a maiden speech fifteen minutes and other members ten minutes. This debate takes nineteen hours (McGee 2005, 144–145).

The Prime Minister's statement is usually given on the first parliamentary sitting day of a calendar year. The Prime Minister reviews the situation in New Zealand and the yearly government agenda (Standing Order No. 338–340). He/she receives unlimited time for her statement. In the debate on the Prime Minister's statement, party leaders of parties that have at least six MPs receive twenty minutes and other members ten minutes of speaking time. The debate takes a total of fourteen hours, excluding the Prime Minister's statement (McGee 2005, 221–222; NZ House of Representatives 1999, Appendix A).

In parliamentary debates, parliamentarians may speak in English or Māori and can use visual aids in their speeches (Standing Order No. 105, 109), although very few speeches were held in Māori during the study period. The content of the speech must be relevant to the issue being discussed. The Standing Orders specify that members may not use unparliamentary language such as "offensive or disorderly words" (Standing Order No.

116). Nor are members allowed to use offensive language against the judiciary or the House nor to be disrespectful toward the Governor-General (Standing Order No. 114, 115). Furthermore, "a member may not make an imputation of improper motives against a member, offensive reference to a member's private affairs or a personal reflection against a member" (Standing Order No. 117). Further rules regarding the content of speeches can be found in the Standing Orders and in McGee's *Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand* book (McGee 2005, chapter 16; NZ House of Representatives 1999).

After examining the allocation of speaking time in debates, I focus on oral questions. These oral questions are asked during the question time, which is the first substantive issue on the parliamentary agenda and usually takes from forty-five minutes to over an hour. On each sitting day MPs can ask twelve oral questions to ministers, and in restricted circumstances to other members (Standing Order No. 367). After the reply, members may ask supplementary questions (Standing Order No. 373). To ask an oral question, members deliver a notice to the Clerk in the morning before the question time. The Standing Orders also allow for urgent questions, which are asked after the regular questions have terminated (Standing Order No. 374). These questions can be lodged at any time until the question time is finished. Unlike in the British House of Commons, there is no question time for members to ask questions exclusively to the Prime Minister (McGee 2005, chapter 40).

The Business Committee is in charge of "the weekly allocation and rotation of questions" (Standing Order No. 367). Moreover, the committee allocates the questions "on a basis that is proportional to party membership in the House" (Standing Order No. 367). The parties oversee and coordinate the submission of questions to the Clerk. Hence, the questions that are important to the party receive priority (McGee 2005, 547, 549). The Standing Orders also include rules regarding the content, manner of questions, and answers. For example, parliamentarians have to formulate concise questions, and unparliamentary language is not allowed. According to Standing Order 372, an answer "must be concise and confined to the subject-matter of the question asked".

In sum, this section showed that parties in New Zealand can influence the allocation of speaking time and questions via the Business Committee. Several prominent debates, such as the Address in Reply and Budget debate, reserve more time for party leaders than for

backbenchers. Furthermore, the Standing Orders give party spokespersons priority in the allocation of speaking time in debates.

The Determinants of Floor Access in New Zealand

In this section, I use descriptive and multivariate analysis to examine parliamentary speechmaking in the New Zealand Parliament in the period from 1996 until 2002. I consider all parliamentary speeches delivered in this period, which encompasses the first two legislative periods following the first elections held under the mixed-member proportional electoral system. I use the term parliamentary speeches to denote all oral contributions held in Parliament, which includes speeches in debates and questions.

The speech data come from official Hansard reports, which have documented parliamentary proceedings since 1867 (Ralphs 2009). I access the data via *The Knowledge Basket.*[6] Osnabrügge et al. (2021) introduce this dataset and provide more details on how it was processed. Similar to prior studies (Peterson and Spirling 2018), I focus on speeches that have at least forty characters and at least one word. New Zealand's parliamentary debates contain a significant number of short oral contributions. For example, one important setting is the oral questions to ministers (McGee 2005, 545). The questions (and some answers) often total less than fifty words. In addition, debates in other stages, such as the second reading and the committee of the whole House stage, often involve a number of short speeches. Thus, I consider contributions shorter than fifty words, unlike other chapters in this volume. Furthermore, I remove all speeches from the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the New Zealand Parliament.[7]

The dataset includes 125,088 speeches and encompasses speeches from parliamentarians of seven different parties: ACT (11,730), Alliance (9,575), Green (2,904), Labour (46,463) National (41,302), New Zealand First (12,311) and United (803). Note that the party

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[6] The Knowledge Basket, PO Box 3152, Ohope 3161, New Zealand. The speech data can also be accessed via the New Zealand Parliament website and the website https://www.vdig.net/ (see also Rauh and Schwalbach 2020).

[7] The Speakers were Doug Kidd (1996–1999) and Jonathan Hunt (1999–2002). The Deputy Speakers were Ian Murray Revell (1996–1999) and Geoffrey Bernard Braybrooke (1999–2002).

affiliation is measured for each parliamentarian at the beginning of the legislative period.[8] Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the number of speeches and the number of words in parliamentary speeches as well as the explanatory and control variables.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
# Speeches	514.765	485.554	4	3502
# Words	96,721	66,208	2966	398,086
Gender	0.313	-	0	1
Seniority	1.860	1.951	0	10
Committee Chair	0.124	0.327	0	1
Minister	0.159	0.346	0	1
Government	0.494	-	0	1
Party Leader	0.074	0.248	0	1
Ethnic Minority	0.165	-	0	1
List Parliamentarian	0.461	-	0	1
Age	47.617	7.424	26	64
Age Squared	2322	690	676	4096
Party Size	33.267	15.147	1	49
Left Party	0.095	-	0	1
Green Party	0.029	-	0	1
Social Democratic Party	0.350	-	0	1
Liberal Party	0.070	-	0	1
Populist Party	0.095	-	0	1
Period 1996-1999	0.506	-	0	1

In the regression analyses, the dependent variable is the number of speeches a parliamentarian delivered in a legislative period. I also use the number of words by parliamentarian and legislative period as a robustness test. The minimum number of speeches held in a legislative period is four, which corresponds to Jim Gerard (National)

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[8] Some parliamentarians changed parties during the legislative term. For example, in 1998 several parliamentarians left the New Zealand First Party and joined Mauri Pacific.

in the period 1996–1999, who resigned in 1997. The maximum number, 3502, was delivered by Michael Cullen (Labour), who was Minister of Finance and deputy party leader in the legislative period from 1999 until 2002. The aggregated data encompasses 243 observations.

I also collect meta-data on the parliamentary speeches, which are used as explanatory and control variables in the regression analyses. This data comes from the Hansard, the parliamentary information center of the New Zealand Parliament, as well as Seki and Williams (2014).

As explanatory variables, I use two indicator variables on gender and ethnicity that are equal to 1 if a parliamentarian belongs to the corresponding category, and 0 otherwise. The *Seniority* variable captures the number of legislative periods a parliamentarian has served in parliament. For example, it is coded 1 if a parliamentarian who speaks in the term 1996–1999 was elected in 1993 and 0 for parliamentarians who have just entered. I create variables on select committee chairs, ministers, and party leaders, which are equal to the share of time that a parliamentarian held the corresponding office in the legislative period. For example, if a parliamentarian was a minister for the entire legislative period, the variable *Minister* equals 1, and 0 if they did not hold a ministry during a legislative period. The variable *Party Leader* also takes into account the deputy leaders of the National and Labour parties. The variable *Government* equals 1 if a parliamentarian belongs to a government party in a legislative period, and 0 otherwise. I also create a variable that is coded 1 if a parliamentarian was elected via a party list, and 0 otherwise.

The chapter includes the following control variables. The variable *Age* denotes the year a legislative period started for a parliamentarian minus the year of birth. I also incorporate the variable *Age Squared* because the effect of age might be non-linear. The variable *Party Size* is equal to the number of seats of each party holds, and I also incorporate indicator variables for party families. I create an indicator variable for the first legislative period, which is equal to 1 if a speech was held in the period from 1996 until 1999, and 0 otherwise.

I start by describing the number of parliamentary speeches by party and gender. Figure 1 illustrates for each party the share of speeches delivered and words spoken by women parliamentarians in the period 1996 to 2002. As a reference category, the figure also

illustrates the share of women parliamentarians at the party. The parties are labeled using the name of the party family to facilitate comparisons of results across book chapters.

The figure shows that, in most parties, the share of speeches from women politicians is lower than that of women politicians in parliament. I observe this pattern for Alliance (Left), Labour (Social Democratic), National (Conservative), ACT (Liberal), and NZ First (Populist). For example, 36.4 percent of the parliamentarians from the liberal ACT Party were women, but these women parliamentarians delivered only 18.1 percent of the speeches. The only exception to this pattern is the Green Party, where women appear to speak slightly more than men politicians. The Green Party had seven parliamentarians in the 1999–2002 term. Among the party's three female politicians, the party co-leader Fitzsimons and Sue Bradford were particularly active. Furthermore, it appears that the share of women parliamentarians and women's speeches is lower for rightist than leftist parties. Overall, the figure is in line with the evidence of Bäck et al. (2014), who show that women speak less frequently than men in parliament.


*Figure 1: Gender numeric representation and speechmaking in New Zealand*

Figure 2: Average number of speeches, by seniority and gender in New Zealand

Since multiple female politicians entered the parliament after the electoral reform and had potentially less experience than their male colleagues (e.g., Barker et al. 2001; Vowles et al. 2002), Figure 2 examines the average number of parliamentary speeches by gender and seniority. I measure seniority as the number of legislative periods a member has served in parliament. The figure suggests that seniority is correlated with the number of speeches delivered in a legislative period. Also, the figure illustrates that women parliamentarians speak on average less than male parliamentarians. This difference exists for all levels of seniority but appears to be particularly large for parliamentarians who have been in parliament for one or two legislative periods.

The multivariate analysis uses negative binomial regression models to study the number of speeches delivered and the number of words spoken by a parliamentarian in a legislative period (Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Long and Freese 2014). I incorporate exposure time into all negative binomial regression models and cluster the standard errors at the MP level. The negative binomial model is a regression model for count data and was chosen for both dependent variables to increase the comparability of findings. I also applied zero-truncated

negative binomial and OLS regression models, and the main results are robust. For each dependent variable, I run two regression models. The first model only includes the explanatory variables and, the second considers the explanatory and control variables.

Table 3 summarizes the results. Models 1 and 2 study the number of speeches held in a legislative period and reveal that women appear to speak less than men in parliament, holding the other variables constant. Model 2 suggests that senior parliamentarians tend to speak more in parliament than their junior colleagues, but this association is not robust. The coefficient of the variable *Committee Chair* is not statistically significant. The coefficients for the variables on party leaders and ministerial positions are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Parliamentarians who belong to a party in government tend to speak less than those from an opposition party, holding the other variables constant. Furthermore, the variable on ethnic minorities has a negative and statistically significant association with the number of speeches. The coefficient of the indicator variable on parliamentarians elected in an electoral district is not statistically significant.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 study the number of words used in speeches. I find that women use fewer words than men in their speeches delivered during a legislative period, holding the other variables constant. The variable on committee chairs does not have a statistically significant effect on the number of words spoken in parliamentary speeches during a legislative term. Ministers and party leaders use more words in a legislative period than other parliamentarians. This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. I also find that members of government parties speak less than members of the opposition parties. Further, the variable on ethnic minorities is negative and statistically significant. In sum, the main results are robust to the change in the dependent variable.

Table 3: Determinants of floor access and words uttered in legislative debates in New Zealand

	Number of Speeches		Number of Words	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Gender	-0.328***	-0.309***	-0.191***	-0.171**
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Seniority	0.041	0.087***	-0.003	0.024
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Committee Chair	-0.162	-0.042	-0.044	0.072
	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.092)
Minister	0.878***	0.863***	0.677***	0.740***
	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.089)
Government	-0.403***	-0.458***	-0.738***	-0.836***
	(0.090)	(0.155)	(0.073)	(0.154)
Party Leader	0.763***	0.700***	0.581***	0.581***
	(0.237)	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.181)
Ethnic Minority	-0.352***	-0.377***	-0.395***	-0.444***
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.127)	(0.113)
List Parliamentarian	-0.084	-0.045	0.010	0.056
	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.075)	(0.088)
Age		0.146***		0.087***
		(0.042)		(0.034)
Age Squared		-0.002***		-0.001***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Party Size		0.011		0.004
		(0.019)		(0.020)
Intercept	6.271***	2.849**	11.756***	9.810***
	(0.120)	(1.218)	(0.085)	(1.084)
Dispersion Parameter	0.347	0.305	0.267	0.227
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Party Family FE		YES		YES
Period FE		YES		YES
Observations	243	243	243	243
AIC	3347	3331	5865	5840
Pseudo R^2	0.041	0.051	0.021	0.028

Standard errors clustered by MPs in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To understand the effect sizes, I calculate the average marginal effects based on model 2 and model 4. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of the main explanatory variables and the 95 percent confidence intervals. The variable *Minister* has the most considerable effect: ministers that served an entire legislative period deliver an average of 443 more speeches than backbenchers. The variable *Party Leader* exhibits an average marginal effect of 360.

Note that United New Zealand only had one MP in both legislative periods. If the analysis does not take into account the party leader of United New Zealand, the effect of party leaders increases to 425. According to Figure 3, MPs from government parties give, on average, 242 fewer speeches than opposition MPs. The figure also shows that women deliver an average of 147 fewer speeches than men. Having served one additional legislative period in parliament increases the number of speeches by forty-five, on average. The coefficient of committee chairs is not statistically significant.


Figure 3: Marginal effects on predicted number of speeches in New Zealand

Figure 4 summarizes the average marginal effects on the number of words and the 95 percent confidence intervals. Similar to the results presented in Figure 3, the effects of the variables *Minister* and *Party Leader* are relatively strong. Ministers that served an entire legislative period speak an average of 71,955 more words than backbenchers. The average marginal effect of the variable *Party Leader* is 56,528. Figure 4 also shows that members

of a government party speak an average of 81,767 fewer words than members of the opposition parties. In line with Figure 1, the regression analysis suggests that the difference between men and women is smaller when examining the number words rather than the number of speeches. More specifically, women speak 16,062 fewer words than men, on average. The effects of the variables on committee chairs and seniority are not statistically significant.


Figure 4: Marginal effects on predicted number of words uttered in legislative debates in New Zealand

Further analysis reveals that the presented coefficients are robust to controlling for parliamentarians who entered after the electoral reform in 1996. In particular, I re-run the regression models incorporating an indicator variable equal to 1 for parliamentarians who entered after the electoral reform and 0 otherwise.

Conclusions

This chapter examines speeches in the parliament of New Zealand, focusing on the period from 1996 until 2002. New Zealand uses a mixed-member proportional electoral system that is similar to Germany's. Voters have two votes in an elections. They vote for both a party and a candidate in their electoral district. As party votes influence the overall number of seats a party receives in parliament, party leaders have an incentive to create a coherent party brand. This electoral system is associated with a multiparty system as well as the formation of coalition and minority governments.

The formal rules and procedures of the New Zealand Parliament acknowledge the role of parties. The Business Committee manages the allocation of speaking time in debates and questions during question times. The parties send representatives to the Business Committee, which is chaired by the Speaker. Furthermore, party members coordinate speaking lists and oversee the submission and content of questions. The Standing Orders specify that the Speaker should prioritize party spokespersons when calling on parliamentarians in debates. In several key debates, such as the debate on the Prime Minister's Statement and the budget debates, party leaders receive more speaking time than backbenchers.

The regression analysis focuses on the number of speeches delivered a parliamentarian during a legislative period. I show that women speak less than men, which is in line with existing evidence (Bäck et al. 2014). Committee chairs do not speak significantly more than other parliamentarians. Moreover, the results suggest that ministers deliver more speeches than backbenchers. The variable on party leaders also has a strong association with the number of speeches. Ethnic minorities tend to speak less in parliament, holding other variables constant. The analysis also reveals that members elected via a party list do not differ in terms of their debate participation from members elected via direct elections.

This chapter has at least two important implications for research building upon the theory of Proksch and Slapin (2012). First, the empirical analysis outlines that it might be promising to directly incorporate other factors into their model. For example, the variable on ministerial status tends to increase debate participation in the empirical analysis. Second, the description of the institutional setting revealed that the rules and procedures

differ substantially across debates. Hence, the findings of Proksch and Slapin (2015, chapter 5) on budget debates in New Zealand might not necessarily be generalizable to all forms of debates in the country's parliament.

Future research in three areas would further increase our knowledge of speech-making behavior in New Zealand's Parliament. First, it would be promising to study how debate participation varies across different debates. Are women and underrepresented groups less likely to speak in all debates? Second, future research could expand the analysis to include more recent parliamentary debates. This extension is important, as parliamentary practices in New Zealand have evolved over time and the party system has stabilized (NZ House of Representatives 2011; Vowles et al. 2017). Third, speechmaking could be assessed using novel techniques in quantitative text analysis. For example, future research could investigate which rhetorical tools are used by parliamentarians to create a party or personal brand.

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