

Delineating Early-Modern Factions: A Unique Seventeenth Century Document

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The focus of this essay is a single manuscript document that is at once tantalising and quite possibly unique. It amounts to two large sheets and is located in Oxford University's Bodleian Library, amongst the Clarendon State Papers.¹ While its author is unknown, his political preferences, as will be seen, are clear. Nor is its date of composition entirely certain, though internal evidence suggests sometime between 1639 and December 1640. The document details the alignments of the key figures of the duchy of Savoy, encompassing illegitimate members of the ruling House, the duchy's elites and leading ministers, during a period when the ducal states descended into a civil war over control of a regency government. This essay - the first close discussion of this important source - will examine what the document reveals about Savoy at that given moment, though also about the dynamics of early-modern Italian political culture and, most broadly, factional politics in princely states. It articulates with an unparalleled clarity the complexity and multi-faceted nature of affiliations in ways that do not, to my knowledge, exist in any other contemporary sources.

Factions have long interested historians of pre-modern Europe, alongside scholars of other periods and disciplines: intellectual historians, political scientists and anthropologists.² A precise and universally agreed definition of 'faction' remains elusive, though historians have tended to agree on general qualities. Factions, we are told, were typically hierarchical with leaders at their apexes. While they might not have had clear rules or modes of entry, and might at times have had loose affiliations, they equally might have involved familial ties or other bonds of obligation. Factions could be driven by ideological issues, or associations with particular 'policy' problems such as religious divisions or international/foreign politics. However, even though such considerations might have given shape to factions at certain moments, it remains debatable as to whether early-modern factions were defined by them, or indeed whether they were stable and long-lasting; the emergence of lasting issue-driven groups, within princely states, arguably represented the gradual transition from factions to organised 'parties' (in a more modern sense), from the end of the seventeenth century.³ Factions, in this historiographical framework, are means to ends, rather than ends in themselves, and the ends were the accumulation of economic, political and social resources, typically in competition with rival factions.

While some political scientists working on factions in modern political culture have stressed their functional roles, especially within the frameworks of institutionalised party politics, early-modern factions were often taken as a sign that politics were not working properly; 'faction' was an inherently pejorative term, at least in princely states where affiliation to a ruler was supposed to trump other loyalties (such as to factional leaders), and where a prince might claim a monopoly of violence.⁴ To take one example, the lawyer and natural philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626), while tacitly recognising the reality of factions, nevertheless viewed them as a potential cause and symptom of monarchical frailty. In his essay, 'Of Faction', he observed that rulers who support factions in effect demean themselves to the levels of those beneath them, as happened in the French Wars of Religion.

When factions are carried too high and too violently, it is a sign of weakness in princes; and much to the prejudice both of their authority and business. The motions of factions under kings ought to be like the motions (as the astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may have their proper motions, but yet still are quietly carried by the higher motion of *primum mobile*.⁵

In effect, rulers should be transcendent and disinterested. As will be seen, Bacon's view that factions were inherently dangerous to princely power where rulers themselves effectively became factional players, is especially relevant to regency regimes such as Savoy's from 1637. Since regents ruled on behalf of minor princes, their claims to power were inherently open to challenge and they could easily be viewed as partisan, not least when rivals might claim they were in fact better placed to act impartially for the interests of those minors.

In this essay's context, factions are thus understood as affiliations of individuals, typically under the guidance of leaders, who had possibly common interests or identities and who worked together within larger polities (in this context, princely states), against other factions, for the accumulation of political, social or material capital.⁶ Of all the secular courts of early-modern Italy, arguably none presents a better case study of faction than that of Savoy, the consequences of the duchy's geo-strategic identity and of the place of the ruling House in Europe's dynastic map. Savoy was in effect a composite state, comprising territories on both sides of the Alps. As was the case with other composite states, notably the Spanish monarchy, though also the Holy Roman Empire, power was partly refracted through different elites from the constituent territories. Those elites often competed for what they considered were their rights to the fruits of princely patronage, while on the other side of the equation, princes had to calculate about balancing competing interest groups from those territories. The principal cleavage in Savoy was between the francophone elites to the west of the Alps, and those Italian ones from the cisalpine territories. Following the definitive move of the Savoyard court to Turin in 1563, as the reconstituted Savoyard state's new capital, after the years of occupation by French troops from 1536, power gradually shifted towards the Italian-speaking elites, a process accentuated by the treaty of Lyon (1601), when Savoy exchanged Francophone territories for the marquisate of Saluzzo, which had been under French control since the mid-sixteenth century.⁷

The Savoyard states' location, with France to one side and, from the sixteenth century, Spanish Italy on another, had other ramifications. For the French, the states offered a way into the Italian peninsula, and a potential mechanism for pressurising the Spanish, while the reverse was equally the case. This was certainly a challenge for Savoyard rulers: was it better to support one or the other, or, with greater tactical difficulty, to play them against each other, given the duchy was 'between the anvil and the hammer' ('tra l'incudine e il martello'), as the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Correr put it in a *relazione* of 1566?⁸ But this was not merely a position of weakness, since Savoy had geo-strategic importance leverage too: the French and Spanish were typically keen to retain Savoy as an ally, and this in turn encouraged them to seek dynastic unions with the House of Savoy (though we should add that the Savoys were also one of Catholic Europe's oldest dynasties, with a suitably distinguished pedigree). Thus, Duke Emmanuel Philibert (reigned 1553-1580) married Margaret of Valois, as part of the wider Franco-Spanish peace process of Cateau-Cambrésis (3 April 1559). His sole surviving son, Charles Emmanuel I (reigned 1580-1630), married in Catherina Micaela (1567-97), one of Philip II of Spain's two daughters, bringing with her a distinctly Spanish tone to the Savoyard court, and in 1619 Victor Amadeus (reigned 1630-37) married a Bourbon princess, Marie Christine (1606-1663).⁹ Samuel Guichenon (1607-64), author of the monumental *Histoire généalogique de la Maison royale de Savoye*, and official historiographer to Marie Christine, would in 1660 note that over the course of its genealogical history, the Savoyard House had furnished nine princesses for French marriages and had received no fewer than eleven princesses into the dynasty.¹⁰

Cadet and illegitimate members of the House also served as dynastic resources in balancing France and Spain. We might look, for instance, to the salient example of Jacques de Savoie-Nemours (1531-1585), whose career as a cadet (his paternal grandfather was Duke Philip II of Savoy) did not preclude him establishing his family amongst the high French

aristocracy; while this semi-independence made him something of a dynastic enigma for Savoy, at his core he remained loyal to the family.¹¹ The legitimate ducal Savoyard children proved especially important during the seventeenth century as strategic assets. In this regard, Duke Charles Emmanuel I was extremely fortunate, since through his marriage to Catherina Micaela he had five sons and four daughters. Of the sons, the three eldest, Philip Emmanuel (1586-1605), Victor Amadeus (1587-1637) and Philibert Emmanuel (1588-1624), were in 1603 sent to Madrid, and while the relationship between the Savoy and Habsburgs was strained in the early 1600s by Charles Emmanuel's increasingly Italian-oriented territorial ambitions, which potentially threatened Spanish Italy, the dynastic affinities between the two families generally held.¹² One of those sons, Philibert Emmanuel became viceroy of Sicily, while one of the daughters, Margaret (1589-1655), left Italy in 1633 and was established as the vice-reine of Portugal, evoking Philibert Emmanuel's role in Sicily.¹³

These inter-mixed strategic and dynastic calculations had factional consequences. This was a context where the Savoys in effect alternated French and Spanish marriages, while flipping support for the two in pursuit of various territorial interests. It was also a context where those leading powers were determined to retain Savoy's favour largely because of the duchy's geographic importance, and were in turn willing to play the dynastic game. We can well-understand why there might have been clear divisions separating those who advocated pro-French or pro-Spanish alignments for what they might offer Savoy.¹⁴ These divisions were even manifested within the ruling dynasty: while Philibert Emmanuel was evidently groomed by his father as a point of contact with the Spanish, another son, Cardinal Maurice (1593-1657), followed a different path when in 1621 he was named as France's cardinal-protector. This can be placed in the context of the ruling House seeking to ensure members in both Spanish and French camps, though a potential for rivalry between the sons remained. Writing in 1622, for example, Venice's ordinary ambassador in Turin, Marc Antonio Morosoni, reported that, 'Somewhat sharp letters have passed between Prince Philibert and the Cardinal-Prince, since the one, a follower of the Catholic King [Philip IV] who is well-treated, criticises the other that his service to the Most Christian King [Louis XIII] bears few advantages of note.'¹⁵

These various factors were sharply focused during the tumultuous events that overtook Savoy's ruling dynasty and states during the 1630s. On 25 September 1637, Victor Amadeus I attended a banquet organised by the French military commander, the duke of Crequy, whose forces were engaged against the Spanish as part of a Franco-Savoyard alliance that had been agreed in 1635. A fortnight later, the duke was dead (7 October), along with his leading court-minister, Augusto Manfredo Scaglia, the count of Verrua (born 1581); another of the duke's military commanders, the Ferrarese *condottiere* marquis of Villa fell seriously ill, but survived. The duke left behind his wife, the Bourbon Marie Christine, and two sons, Francis Hyacinth (1632-38), aged five at that time, and his younger brother, the three years old Charles Emmanuel (1634-75). Since Francis Hyacinth was a minor, Marie Christine assumed responsibility for the regency.

Against this backdrop of profound dynastic uncertainty, relations between the dowager duchess and her brothers-in-law, the restless and ambitious Cardinal Maurice and Thomas Francis, prince of Carignano (1596-1656), strained to the point of breaking. Maurice, the elder of the two brothers, had from 1621, as mentioned above, operated as France's cardinal-protector, but in 1636 had switched to the cardinal-protectorship of the Holy Roman Empire. For his part, Thomas Carignano had, in April 1634, left Italy, taking a command in the Spanish army of Flanders. This double defection was set against a backdrop of deepening concern over French influence in Savoy, dating back at least to the two treaties of Cherasco (April and June 1631) that had concluded the War for Mantua and Monferrato; French troops, in defiance of the treaty, continued to occupy the Piedmontese fortress of Pinerolo.¹⁶ Quite

understandably, the open Habsburg alignment of the two brothers was suspected as a deliberate strategy on the part of the ruling family of spreading their options, though no unequivocal evidence supports this, and, as suggested above, some doubted Maurice's constancy.¹⁷

Almost exactly a year after Victor Amadeus's suspicious death, the child-duke Francis Hyacinth was himself dead (4 October 1638); the duchy's future thus lay with a single male infant, Charles Emmanuel, barely four years old and of fragile health. What had amounted to a cold war from October 1637, when Maurice and Thomas Carignano had just about accepted Marie Christine as regent, was replaced by a hot civil war over control of fragile infant duke, the duchess backed (somewhat reluctantly on her part) by the French regime, the princes supported by the Spanish. Thomas Carignano returned from the Low Countries to north Italy, and in March 1639 entered the Savoyard states at the head of an armed force, taking a series of towns and eventually occupying Turin over the summer of 1639, and submitting the capital to a second siege in 1640. It was not until June 1642 that the conflict was finally settled.¹⁸

In this civil war over control of the regency, in a state that in any case was already receptive to divisions because of its geo-strategic and dynastic profile, we thus have obvious ingredients for a factional conflict. Here, we should turn to the Bodleian document, and while care should be exercised about extrapolating too many broad observations from a single source, it nevertheless yields significant insights into early-modern factions. The document is in the form of a table comprising twelve columns, with explanatory text at the top and the bottom. Along the top of the table, the twelve columns are labelled, and are largely self-explanatory. The last column refers intriguingly – and importantly – to 'true Piedmontese', which resonates with the language of 'good Piedmontese' in the opening superscript and which will be discussed later. The fact that the author does not tabulate those who are anti-Spanish as it does with the French, confirms the sense of the document's pro-prince and anti-French affiliations.

The tabulation of loyalties and identities according to no fewer than twelve variables is striking. The only other early-modern documents that seem to approximate to this source, to my knowledge, are the division lists for the English Parliament, that first began appearing from the mid-seventeenth century, detailing the political preferences of members in the House of Lords in response to specific issues.¹⁹ One might also place the voting outcomes that were often leaked during papal conclaves, or made known afterwards, in a similar context, delineating, for example, those loyal to papal families, or to powerful cardinals, or to leading powers, such as the emperor, Spain or France.²⁰ Nevertheless, both sets of sources are, by comparison with the Bodleian document, considerably more limited in their subtlety. A closer comparison might be found in a history of the reign of Louis XVI by the French scientist, diplomat and historian, Jean-Louis Soulavie (1752-1813), in which Soulavie sought to describe in a tabular form, with almost scientific precision, how factions during the French Revolution formed and dissolved like chemical compounds, though it should be added that Soulavie was writing with the benefit of hindsight.²¹

The twelve columns in the Bodleian document clearly afford the author considerable nuance in detailing not only the affiliations of those listed, but also the different ways in which individuals might simultaneously be categorised. We might well ask which affiliation was the most important? As noted earlier, factional identity was often defined by loyalty to a leader, which the Bodleian document ostensibly confirms. Virtually all those named are defined as followers of Marie Christine, or of either one or both of the princes (the majority of those listed as followers of the elder of the two brothers, Maurice, who was closer to the throne by reason of his age; fewer are defined as followers of Thomas Carignano alone). There are only two exceptions. The papal nuncio, Fausto Caffarelli (1595-1651), bishop of

San Severina, who served as Urban VIII's nuncio to Turin from 1634 until December 1640 and who ostensibly tried to mediate in the civil war, is nevertheless listed as a partisan actor in the civil war, 'disgusted with Marie Christine', 'of the Spanish faction', and 'opposed to the d'Agliè'.²² The other is 'P're Monodo Gesuita, in Momiliano [Montmélian]', clearly identifiable as Pierre Monod (1586-1644), the Jesuit polemicist, born in Bonneville (Faucigny). Monod had in the earlier-1630s played a key role in promoting Savoy's monarchical credentials following the 1632 royal declaration, through his court-sponsored treatise, the *Trattato del titolo regio* (Turin, 1633). He also served on missions to France during the 1630s, though it was during this period that his relations with Richelieu deteriorated to the point that following Victor Amadeus's death, the cardinal-minister pressurised Marie Christine to have Monod arrested; after attempting to flee from internal exile in Savoy, in January 1639 Monod was transferred to Montmélian Castle (providing a date from which the document was produced), a prelude to his imprisonment at Richelieu's instigation in the fortress-prison of Miolans, where he remained until his death.²³ According to the Bodleian document, Monod was opposed to Marie Christine and to both princes, he was disgusted with the French and adverse to the d'Agliè. His response to the civil war in Savoy, and to his treatment by the regency regime, under pressure from France, was one of pointed disengagement.

Returning to the broader point, it seems, given the identification of all but two with support for either Marie Christine or the princes, that the Bodleian document confirms the typological conception of factions as hierarchical in structure, with leaders at their pinnacles. It should be reiterated that regency regimes were especially liable to faction. Regents lacked the intrinsic authority of reigning adult sovereigns, and by the nature of their power, they often found themselves challenged by others who claimed that they were better placed to govern on behalf of minors. Such a diminution of authority meant that regents themselves could easily be viewed as factional players, not least as they might depend, or be seen to depend, on the support of self-interested followers. This seems to have been the case with Marie Christine. Indeed, when Cardinal Maurice and Thomas Carignano issued, on 15 June 1639, a manifesto justifying their claim to the regency, they explicitly noted how she had become subject to ambitious courtiers, even before Victor Amadeus's death. While they claimed that their concern for the welfare of Savoy transcended personal interests, the same was not true of her regime.²⁴ In effect, the dowager duchess was no different to a prince who, in Francis Bacon's words, had become 'also one among us [tanquam unus ex nobis]'.²⁵

However, the document goes well-beyond a simple *Madamisti-Principisti* bi-polarity, defined solely by loyalty to the factional leaders: the factions themselves were factionalised. Accordingly, the document affords for historians a more nuanced and complex picture of how early-modern factions worked. As implied above, the document does not lump all the *principisti* together. Loyalty to Maurice is distinguished from that to Thomas Carignano, with more individuals named as supporting the cardinal. During the civil war there were simmering tensions between the brothers, not least as Maurice's own loyalties remained suspect. What is more, some individuals are named as being simultaneously obedient to Marie Christine and devoted to Maurice, complicating even a simplistic assumption of loyalty to a single factional leader (only one individual, Maurizio Capris, the governor of Turin's citadel, is described as obedient to Madama and devoted to Thomas Carignano).

Loyalty to a single member of the ruling House as a 'leader' might be seen as one way to define the factions in Savoy, but this was evidently not the case for all. Did support for the duchess and princes also equate to support for the French and Spanish, and might that have provided an alternative way to categorise identities? Certainly, Richelieu was keen to strengthen his grip over Marie Christine's regency, in the classic manner of paying pensions to her followers.²⁶ A similar story might possibly be told of the princes' followers. Yet the

Bodleian document does not in fact assume that support for the factional leaders was synonymous with being in either French or Spanish factions. A significant number of Marie Christine's supporters are not explicitly categorised as 'of French faction', while a number of the princes' supporters are likewise not 'of Spanish faction'. The only general point that holds is that only one person 'obedient to Madama' is designated as being of the Spanish faction (devoted also to both princes), while none of the princes' supporters are of the French faction.

To what or whom, then, might individuals have been loyal, if not solely to factional leaders from the Savoyard House, or to the French or Spanish? Here, the document provides one potential answer. Two columns list those who either support or oppose the d'Agliè family. The San Martino d'Agliè were the most powerful clan attached to Marie Christine's regime after Victor Amadeus's death in 1637, though their fortunes had been on the rise for some time, signalled by promotions to Savoy's sovereign chivalric order, the *Annunziata*. At Charles Emmanuel I's sixth creation, on 18 March 1608, Niccolò san Martino d'Agliè (died 1614) was promoted to the order; his son, Ludovico (1578-1646) was admitted at Victor Amadeus I's third creation in 1636.²⁷ Since the order had a strictly fixed membership, family politics at court was a zero sum game: gains made by one family, through promotions to the *Annunziata*, necessarily limited the opportunities of rivals.

As is well-known, to the point of salacious scandal, Filippo S. Martino d'Agliè (1604-67) was reputed, from the 1630s, to have been a lover of the duchess, evoking the kinds of rumours that were to surround Cardinal Mazarin's relationship with Anne of Austria during her regency government in France - it was the potential danger posed to female regents with male favourites, underscoring again the potential that regents, and female regents in particular, might seem partisan. Given the influence he enjoyed with the dowager duchess, he probably represented the leader of the clan, its factional head.²⁸ Three other close family members are mentioned in the Bodleian document: Filippo's two surviving brothers, Ottaviano, the marquis of San Germano (died 1676), and Gianfrancesco (died 1678), named here as the 'Abbate di Pinerolo', in addition to their uncle, Ludovico d'Agliè, the marquis d'Agliè, who, as noted above, had been promoted to the *Annunziata* in 1636.²⁹ All had served in various court offices and diplomatic missions before the civil war, and evidently they remained tightly organised in their affinities during the war. It is worth adding that they are all listed as being of the French faction, though Filippo famously was dramatically seized on New Year's Day 1640, by the French and imprisoned in Valenciennes, probably because the French had long suspected his loyalties, as they had done with Pierre Monod. Before the outbreak of the civil war, Filippo had opened a secret negotiation with the Spanish governor of Milan, the marquis of Leganes (1580-1655), if primarily to extract greater concessions from the French by giving the appearance of leaning towards the Spanish (a classic Savoyard negotiating tactic that did little to assure Savoy's allies).³⁰ Filippo's arrest also provides another clue for when the Bodleian document must have been written, given his description as 'count Filippo d'Agliè, who governs'.

The Bodleian document additionally reveals that the d'Agliè had supporters, notably the count della Monta and the abbé della Monta, along with a string of other courtiers and ministers. The abbé had also been in receipt of a gift from Richelieu of the returns from the abbey of Nante, said to be worth 3000 *scudi* a year.³¹ Tellingly, though, the document's author was more than willing to mark-out several supporters with pejorative language, no doubt reflecting the author's own position. President Bollone, for example, is described as a 'greedy and self-interested man' ('huomo avaro come all'interesse'), while Senator Cauda is marked as 'mischievous embroiler' ('maligno Inbrogliatore'), both descriptions loaded with connotations of self-interest above loyalty to Savoy and its ruling House. Just as striking, though, is the level of opposition to the family expressed in the document, for which there is

a separate column. If we were to take this document as an accurate record, the fact that the majority of those named are indeed specified as being either pro- or anti-d'Agliè suggests how divisive the family was as a factional interest group in Savoyard court politics. There was, it seems, not much middle ground for indifference. In this respect, the d'Agliè clan was as much the defining feature of Savoy's factions during the civil war as Marie Christine and two Savoyard princes.

How, though, does support or opposition to the d'Agliè map to loyalties to the duchess and princes? Again, close scrutiny reveals the absence of defining loyalties applied consistently to everyone: there were even *principisti* seemingly amongst the d'Agliè's supporters. Three individuals are marked as simultaneously devoted to Maurice and friends or adherents of the d'Agliè, despite the family's close association with Marie Christine's regency regime, though it should at least be added that none of the d'Agliè's supporters are designated members of the Spanish faction. These three nevertheless seem to be exceptions. The remaining named supporters of the d'Agliè's are defined as obedient to Marie Christine. However, to add yet more complexity to this picture, not all of the duchess's supporters were affiliated with the d'Agliè. One family, notably, had already marked itself as a rival to the d'Agliè: the Scaglia di Verrua, and their place in the Bodleian document adds yet another dimension to this factional puzzle. During Charles Emmanuel I's reign, the Scaglia di Verrua were the more powerful of the two court families, quite possibly the single most powerful aristocratic clan in Turin. But while they had largely dominated Savoyard politics during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, their influence had been checked – if not terminally weakened – by the emergence of the d'Agliè during the 1630s, not least as Abbé Alessandro Scaglia (1592-1641), one of the Scaglia di Verrua's most prominent members, had entered self-imposed exile in the Spanish Netherlands in 1632.³² The Scaglia di Verrua are named in the Bodleian document. Carlo Vittorio Scaglia (died 1653), Alessandro's nephew and head of the family House following the count of Verrua's death in 1637 (at the feast organised by Crequy mentioned earlier), is listed here as the 'conte di Verrua', obedient to Marie Christine, of the French faction, and – importantly – opposed to the d'Agliè. Further down, there is an entry for 'abati di Verrua', which probably refer to Alessandro Scaglia, already mentioned, and Filiberto Scaglia (died 1658), the youngest of Alessandro's three nephews – the name 'abate di Verrua' was one used for Filiberto in the period. Alessandro's elder brother, the count of Verrua, had remained in service to Victor Amadeus during the 1630s, along with his eldest son, named as the 'conte di Verrua' in the Bodleian document. Filiberto, the third and youngest son, by contrast, left Savoy in 1636 and joined his uncle in the Spanish Netherlands.³³ Accordingly, these two churchmen are categorised as disgusted with Madama, devoted to the princes, of the Spanish faction, opposed to the d'Agliè.

All the family members clearly shared an aversion to the d'Agliè, but what might we extrapolate from the fact that they were seemingly on different sides of the civil war? In the first place, the fact that the count of Verrua could remain obedient to Marie Christine yet opposed to the d'Agliè reminds us that the basic conception of 'faction' as a collection of individuals defined and unified by loyalty to a leader simply does not hold. Evidently, individuals might share a loyalty to a leader as one facet of their identities, yet also be defined as much by their opposition to each other. Secondly, the document hints at a strategy a family might understandably use during a crisis like a dynastic civil war. While the d'Agliè family clearly pinned their collective fortunes to those of Marie Christine by consistent support for her, the Scaglia di Verrua seem to have hedged their bets by supporting both camps (just as the switch of Maurice and Thomas Carignano to the Habsburgs earlier in the 1630s had been suspected as part of a tacit strategy for placing members of the ruling House in both the French and Spanish camps). The surviving documentary evidence elsewhere does not provide an unequivocal answer to this possibility, though it was, by inference, suspected at the time.

The document, however, points to yet another political identity, one that was ideologically loaded at the time and remained charged with meanings well into the nineteenth century. The table's last column lists those defined as 'true Piedmontese' ('veri Piemontesi')-the 'abbés of Verrua' among them - even if only a small number of the overall named individuals are actually marked out accordingly. What defined someone as 'true Piedmontese'? By looking at the other characteristics of those named in this column in the Bodleian document, it seems that the language had a specific set of political meanings. Most simply, it meant being opposed to France's involvement in Savoy. That is not to say that all the princes' supporters are listed as 'true Piedmontese', or vice-versa; yet again, the Bodleian document does not afford entirely consistent political classifications. Two individuals named as 'true Piedmontese' are also listed amongst Marie Christine's adherents: the 'Gran Cancelliere, disparagingly characterised as a 'timid man', and the 'destro' Presidente Morozzo, presumably Count Carlo Filippo Morozzo, the first president in the Senate of Piedmont, and a member of a family with a long record of service to the Savoy. More significantly, though, neither is listed as being of the French faction, and on this point, the document does offer some definitional clarity.³⁴

Being 'true Piedmontese' also signified more than opposition to France alone. It resonates with the superscript at the beginning of the document, referring to 'good Piedmontese', and, more generally, with contemporaneous languages used in France too. The idea of the 'good French' [bon français] had a particular importance during Richelieu's ministry (1624-1641), designating those who were anti-Spanish and who thus supported the cardinal's policies and were loyal to the state under his ministry. Just as tellingly, those who opposed the cardinal sought their own labels as 'good Catholics' [bons catholiques], arguing instead that France should seek a closer alignment with their Spanish co-religionists.³⁵ Domestic politics during Richelieu's ministry was partly fought on a conceptual background; these competing languages were short-hands for how best to conduct foreign policies and for support or opposition to Richelieu and his conception of state loyalty, and were used by their proponents to appeal to domestic and international audiences.³⁶ Correspondingly, being 'true Piedmontese' or a 'good Piedmontese' was to be understood as designating a position of moral superiority, of being motivated not for personal gain as a factional member, but by a higher sense of loyalty to some kind of 'national' interest, however fuzzy the 'nation' might have been.³⁷ That sense of loyalty could be sharpened at moments when Savoy was confronted by one of the leading powers, either France or Spain. When in March 1610 Venice's ordinary ambassador in Turin, Gregorio Barbarigo, reported back to the Senate a series of conversations he had with the duke and several leading political figures, he wrote that he had put it to one of them the claim that he was in receipt of a Spanish pension. Laughing, the official replied that he was neither pro-Spanish nor indeed pro-French, but was rather a 'good Italian'.³⁸ This conception of loyalty as something that transcended personal interest also resonated with another powerful conceptual language current in the early-modern period, that of 'Italian liberty'. During the 1610s, as Duke Charles Emmanuel I's diplomatic, dynastic and territorial strategies focused on north Italy and inevitably brought Savoy into confrontation with Spain, Charles Emmanuel and his ministers predictably laid claim to this language as a way of galvanising support in Italy and further afield.³⁹ The language of liberty was the obvious recourse for any Italian power during moments of international crisis, implying a sense of independence, of moral 'right' and of self-sacrifice in the face of foreign (that is to say Spanish) domination⁴⁰, even if, in Savoy's case, the claim that the duchy was defending liberty was in reality a fig leaf to cover more grubby ambitions.

It is telling, though, that while Spain was identified as the principal threat to Savoyard 'independence' in the 1610s, by the time of the civil war and the Bodleian document, France seems to have taken on the mantle of Savoy's greatest external enemy, not least because of

Richelieu's apparent determination during the 1630s to exert a controlling hand over the ducal states. As mentioned from the start, this probably reflects the partisanship of the author, but the point is nonetheless important. Ideas such as 'true Piedmontese', 'good Italian' and the 'liberty of Italy' were malleable; their meanings might be susceptible to change, and thus subject to competing interest groups seeking to claim ownership over them. Politics and power could be linguistically constructed, as the contributors to the influential study, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (1989), argued, borrowing largely from the works of linguistic philosophers such as J. L. Austin, whose work on performativity is currently providing historians with a rich new vocabulary for interpreting the early modern period.⁴¹ It is tempting, certainly, to draw an obvious conclusion from the shifting target of this language. By the 1630s, France had supplanted Spain as the focal point of opposition for defenders of 'liberty' and those who were 'true Piedmontese', as Spain's power around Europe, and indeed the world, was beginning to wane.⁴²

The Bodleian document concludes with further qualitative observations that deserve attention. The comments referring to the supporters of Marie Christine and the d'Agliè can be taken as they are: clearly the document's author knew how to besmirch his opponents, motivated, so he suggested, by fear or self-interest, rather than, as might be inferred, higher motives of principle. Equally, the author's claim that the princes enjoyed a wider base of support should be treated with caution, but that last point is important, reflecting back also to the concluding remark in the document's initial caption that 'all the rest [aside from those listed] are good Piedmontese, who will follow the favour of the princes of the blood'. The precise definition of who constituted 'the people' is not articulated, but it might suggest the engagement of a wider public in the civil war. Factionalism seems fundamentally to be a court phenomenon, predicated on a view that the court represented the greatest concentration of patronage and power, but did court factions also seek or galvanise support from a wider nation, and if so, were such expressions of popular politics necessarily dependent on elite leadership? This important question is a difficult one to answer, and has been a point of contention for scholars of the French Wars of Religion, for example, seeking to challenge the boundaries between elite and popular political culture in a comparable context of rival court factions and civil war.⁴³ The same scholarship is lacking for the Savoyard civil war, so it remains difficult to come to definitive conclusions, but some initial, albeit anecdotal, observations can be made. The papal nuncio, Caffarelli, who, as we have seen, was named in the Bodleian document as being partial to Spain, indeed reported his impression shortly after Victor Amadeus's death that the Piedmontese were not inclined to the French, who were suspected of wishing to prolong the war in Italy against the Spanish. The English secretary in Turin, Peter Morton, certainly shared this impression, recording in November 1639 the 'irreconcilable hatred...of the generality of this people against that nation [the French]'.⁴⁴ Earlier in the year, Morton had recorded, on several occasions, the seemingly popular support for the princes. When, to take one example, Thomas Francis made his surprise move into Turin in July 1639, Morton wrote that the prince's Piedmontese troops, "dispersed themselves through the streets of Turin, crying 'viva Savoia e il Principe Tomaso', which was corresponded unto by the Inhabitants in all places, as if they knew no other patron but him".⁴⁵

It might be added that Federico Sclopis, the nineteenth century Turinese jurist and scholar who was instrumental in the unification of Italy, for one, had few doubts about the levels of popular backing for the princes. The majority of the population in Piedmont were *principisti* and thus more pro-Spanish than French for two reasons, he claimed, first because at that moment the French were a greater threat to the duchy's independence, and secondly because of an inherent loyalty to the princes and their ostensible wish to preserve the duchy from foreign [French] domination.⁴⁶ This particular articulation of loyalty, it seems, would remain lodged in Savoyard political mentality for a long time. In a parallel episode, when, at

the end of the 1670s, the prospect emerged of the young Duke Victor Amadeus II (reigned from 1675 as duke of Savoy) marrying his Portuguese cousin, sections of the Piedmontese nobility became vocal in their opposition to the duke leaving Savoy, and a popular demonstration beyond the court was mobilised in Turin against the duke leaving (though it is unclear as to whether this event was in fact manufactured by courtiers).⁴⁷

In drawing conclusions, it must be noted first that the Bodleian document should be treated with caveats. Aside from the opening and concluding remarks, it does not offer a narrative account of factional politics during the Savoyard civil war. On the contrary, as a descriptive table it presents a political snapshot, a moment rather than an extended process. Affiliations might change; the patterns of factions could shift, not least as individuals' political fortunes waxed and waned. Yet the document provides fascinating, and important, insights into the politics of Savoy, and its significance as an historical source resonates more widely still. The very fact that affiliations were tabulated as they were marks the document out: it delineates in a way that seems to be entirely unique the complex gamut of responses to civil war, and of the flexible nature of political identity and affiliation. In doing so, it encourages us to re-think factions as multi-dimensional. 'Faction' in the document is understood in three inter-related but also distinct senses, first of loyalty to a leader, whether Marie Christine, Cardinal Maurice and/or Thomas Carignano. These loyalties were largely, though not always, consistent, as some individuals were listed as adhering to more than one leader; at the same time, the loyalties corresponded in the second place with French or Spanish affiliations, though again not in every case. Lastly, though, individuals divided along family lines, and principally whether they supported the dominant d'Agliè clan, whose members were themselves defined as loyal to Marie Christine. But one's stance towards the d'Agliè clearly signified something different to support for the duchess. These were clearly meant to designate separate definitional categories. Factions, and individuals, could thus be configured differently, whether they were defined according to princely leaders, to the French or Spanish (or neither), or the d'Agliè as a court clan. Which affiliation or identity was the more powerful? Could a supporter of the duchess who was nevertheless an opponent of the d'Agliè cooperate with that clan? What is more, the document alludes to another, arguably transcendent, political position, of 'loyalty', expressed through the language of the 'true' or 'good Piedmontese'. Therein the author offers what is arguably an alternative political language to faction in this civil war setting, with its pejorative connotations of partisanship. As we have seen, this language was not itself conceptually anchored on a single specific political meaning (whether it was liberty defined against either the Spanish or French), though it broadly implied an opposition to 'foreign' domination. But perhaps its application represents a critical conceptual junction between self-interest and principle, even if, as was so typical of the early-modern world, the boundaries between the two remained at best ill-defined.

¹ Oxford, Bodleian Library, Clarendon State Papers, 5, fols. 15-v. For a transcription of the document, see the appendix, with the generous permission of the earl of Clarendon. I first came across this document while researching for my doctorate in the early 1990s, and mentioned it in passing in my book, *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy. Political Culture and the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, 2002), 267-8.

² On pre-modern factions see, for example, Jacques Heers' influential work, *Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West* (Amsterdam, New York, 1977). More recently, see the excellent essay by Marco Gentile, 'Factions and Parties: Problems and Perspectives', in Andrea Gamberini and Isabella Lazzarini (eds.), *The Italian Renaissance State* (Cambridge, 2012), 304-22. See also Robert Shephard, 'Court Faction in Early Modern England', *The Journal of Modern History* 64 (1992), 721-45; Maria Anonietta Visceglia, 'Factions in the Sacred College in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', in Gianvittorio Signorotto and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (eds.), *Court and Politics in Papal Rome, 1492-1700* (Cambridge, 2002), 99-131; Jelle Haemers, 'Factionalism and State Power in the Flemish Revolt (1482-1492)', *Journal of Social History* 42 (2009), 1009-

39. For some broader reflections from other disciplinary approaches see, for example, Ralph W. Nicholas, 'Factions: a Comparative Analysis', in Steffen W. Schmidt et al. (eds.), *Friends, Followers and Factions* (Berkeley, 1977), 55-73, and more recently, Françoise Boucek, 'Rethinking Factionalism. Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism', *Party Politics* 15 (2009), 1-31.

³ The relationship between factions and parties has been of particular interest to scholars of both the late-middle ages and the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though in the medieval context, a 'party' seems closer to 'faction' than to its more modern definition. Aside from the works by Heers and Gentile mentioned above, see also Patrick Lantschner, *The Logic of Political Conflict in Medieval Cities. Italy and the Southern Low Countries, 1370-1440* (Oxford, 2015), 68-77. For two classic works on the origins of 'party' politics in the later period, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of Party System. The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840* (Berkeley, 1969), Chapter 1; Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, 1976), especially Part I. See also the wide-ranging essay by Terence Ball, 'Party', in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge, 1989), 155-176.

⁴ This is a potentially important point that might distinguish factions in princely regimes to those in republican polities, such as in late-medieval Italy, where factions might achieve lasting and even institutional roles. Here, Gentile's essay, 'Factions and parties', provides a fine overview of the historiography of Italian factions.

⁵ Francis Bacon, *The Essays or Counsells, Civill and Morall*, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford, 1985), 156.

⁶ To refer again to Gentile's essay, this definition inherently follows an assumption that factions were inherently rational. Gentile, by contrast, has suggested that scholars might also look to the 'irrational' for understanding how emotions might define affiliations. Gentile, 'Factions and parties', 321-322.

⁷ Consult Lino Marini, *Savoardi e Piemontesi nello stato sabaudo (1418-1601)* (Rome, 1962); Pierpaolo Merlin, *Tra guerre e tornei. La corte sabauda nell'età di Carlo Emanuele I* (Turin, 1991), 89-94. For an overview of Savoyard elites see Andrea Merlotti, 'Disciplinamento e contrattazione. Dinastia, nobiltà e corte nel Piemonte sabaudo da Carlo II alla Guerra civile', in Paola Bianchi, Luisa C. Gentile (eds.), *L'affermarsi della corte sabauda. Dinastie, poteri, élites in Piemonte e Savoia fra tardo Medioevo e prima età moderna* (Turin, 2006), 227-284.

⁸ Eugenio Albèri (ed.), *Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato*, Series II, Volume 5 (Florence, 1858), 7.

⁹ Catherina Micaela understandably maintained a household with a strong Spanish element. José Martínez Millán, 'La casa de Catalina Micaela y sus hijos', in José Martínez Millán and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (eds.), *La monarquía de Felipe III* (Madrid, 2008), vol. 1, 1064-7.

¹⁰ Samuel Guichenon, *Histoire généalogique de la Maison royale de Savoie* (Lyons, 1660), vol. 1, 84. See also Andrea Merlotti, 'Politique dynastique et alliances Matrimoniales de la maison de Savoie au xviiè siècle', *Dix-septième siècle* 234 (2009), 239-255.

¹¹ Matthew Vester, *Renaissance, Dynasticism and Apanage Politics: Jacques de Savoie-Nemours, 1531-1585* (Kirksville, 2012), especially Chapter 7.

¹² For the princes in Madrid see, for example, Millán, 'La casa de Catalina Micaela', 1067-72; María José Del Río Barredo, 'El viaje de los príncipes de Saboya a la corte de Felipe III (1603-1606)', in Bianchi and Gentile, *L'affermarsi della corte sabauda*, 407-434. On the complexities of Savoyard-Spanish relations in this period see Claudio Rosso, 'España y Saboya: Felipe III y Carlos Manuel I', in Martínez Millán and Visceglia, *La monarquía de Felipe III* (Madrid, 2008), vol. 4, 1092-1100.

¹³ Blythe Alice Raviola, 'The three lives of Margherita of Savoy-Gonzaga, Duchess of Mantua and Vicereine of Portugal', in Anne J. Cruz and Maria Galli Stampino (eds.), *Early Modern Habsburg Women: Transnational Contexts, Cultural Conflicts, Dynastic Continuities* (Farnham, 2013), 59-78.

¹⁴ Merlin, *Guerre e tornei*, 94-119; Idem, 'La corte di Carlo Emanuele I', in Giuseppe Ricuperati (ed.), *Storia di Torino. III: Dalla dominazione francese alla ricomposizione dello Stato (1536-1630)* (Turin, 1998), 266-78.

¹⁵ 'Tra il Prencipe Filiberto, et il Prencipe Cardinale, sono passate lettere un poco pungenti, mentre l'uno servitore del Cattolico [Philip IV] et ben trattato, rimprovesa l'altro la servitù del X.mo [Louis XIII] non apportargli vantaggio di considerazione'. Morosini to the Senate, 3 October 1622, Archivio di Stato, Venice [ASVe], Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato [DS], Savoia 56.

¹⁶ On resentment against the French see Carlo Evasio Patrucco, 'L'Antifrancesismo in Piemonte sotto il regno di Vittorio Amedeo I', *Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino* 2-3 (1896), 158-74. On Thomas Francis's defection see Romolo Quazza, *Tommaso di Savoia-Carignano: nelle campagne di Fiandra e di Francia, 1635-1638* (Turin, 1941).

¹⁷ For instance, Nicastro to Barberini, 15 April 1634, Archivio Segreto Vaticano [ASV], Segretaria di stato, Savoia, 60, fol. 72. See also the comments in Emanuele Tesaurò, *Origine delle guerre civili del Piemonte* (Cologne, 1673), 7. Victor Amadeus, for his part, dispatched an envoy to Paris to assure Richelieu that this was not a ploy. Vittorio Siri, *Memorie recondite dall'anno 1601 sino al 1640* (Lyon, 1677-1679), vol. 8, 8.

¹⁸ The best secondary accounts of the civil war are to be found in Gaudenzio Claretta, *Storia della reggenza di Cristina di Francia, duchessa di Savoia* (Turin, 1868-1869), vol. 1, and Guido Quazza, 'Guerra civile in Piemonte, 1637-1642 (nuove ricerche)', *Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino* 57 (1959), 281-321; 58 (1960), 5-63. For a recent essay on the ambivalent relations between France and Marie Christine see Matthieu Gellard, 'Négociier avec Madame Royale. Les relations compliquées des ambassadeurs de Louis XIII et Louis XIV avec Christine de France 1637-1663', in Alain Becchia and Florine Vital-Durand (eds.), *Édififier l'État: politique et culture en Savoie au temps de Christine de France* (Grenoble, 2014), 173-89.

¹⁹ Consult G. M. Ditchfield, David Hayton and Clyve Jones (eds.), *British Parliamentary Lists 1600-1800. A Register* (London and Rio Grande, Ohio, 1995); Esther S. Cope, 'Groups in the House of Lords, May 1626', *Parliamentary History* 12 (1993), 164-170.

²⁰ On the factionalisation of papal elections see Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Morte e elezione del papa. Norme, riti e conflitti* (Rome, 2013), Chapter 6.

²¹ Jean-Louis Soulavie, *Mémoires historiques et politiques du règne de Louis XV depuis son mariage jusqu'à sa mort* (Paris, 1801), vol. 6. I am very grateful to Dr Tom Stammers of Durham for this reference.

²² Rotraud Becker, 'Fausto Caffarelli', *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* [DBI], vol. 16 (1973).

²⁴ Felice Amato Duboin (ed.), *Raccolta per ordine di materie delle leggi, cioè editti, patenti, manifesti, etc... pubblicati dal principio dell'anno 1681 sino all'8 dicembre 1798 dalla real Casa di Savoia*, Book VIII, vol. 10 (Turin, 1832), 71-2.

²⁵ Bacon, *Essays*, 156.

²⁶ 'Mémoire des gratifications que l'on juge nécessaire de donner pour parvenir aux fins de la negotiation qui se traite en Piedmont', 13 March 1639, transcribed in Augusto Bazzoni, *La reggenza di Maria Cristina, duchessa di Savoia (con nuovi documenti)* (Turin, 1865), 151-2.

²⁷ Vittorio Amedeo Cigna Santi, *Serie cronologica de' cavalieri dell'ordine supremo di Savoia detto prima del Collare indi della Santissima Annunziata* (Turin, 1786), 109, 138.

²⁸ For further information on Filippo see Renzo de Felice, 'Filippo san Martino d'Agliè', *DBI*, vol. 1 (1960); Clelia Gallina, 'Le vicende di un grande favorito: Filippo san Martino d'Agliè', *Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino* 21 (1919), 185-213, 292-305; 22 (1920), 63-157.

²⁹ Filippo and Ottaviano were both promoted to the *Annunziata* at Carlo Emanuele II's first promotion as an adult ruler, on 21 August 1648. Cigna Santi, *Serie cronologica*, 157-8.

³⁰ Bazzoni, *Reggenza*, Chapter 9.

³¹ Claretta, *La reggenza*, I, 460. The list of those pensioned by Richelieu, mentioned in footnote 26, included one 'colonel Monty', possibly the conte della Monta.

³² Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*, Part 4.

³⁵ Seung-Hwi Liu, 'Mathieu de Morgues, bon français ou bon catholique?', *Dix-septième siècle* 213 (2001), 655-672.

³⁶ Cardinal Richelieu himself was conscious of the need to appropriate morally loaded political rhetoric to justify his aggressively anti-Spanish foreign policies. See, for example, Herman Weber, "'Une bonne paix". Richelieu's foreign policy and the peace of Christendom', in Laurence Brockliss and Joseph Bergin (eds.), *Richelieu and his age* (Oxford, 1992), 45-69.

³⁷ The emergence amongst cardinals in Rome of the *squadron volante* during the mid-seventeenth century, and possibly the subsequent emergence of *zelanti* cardinals, bear comparison with this aspiration of capturing a moral high ground above factional interest. See Gianvittorio Signorotto, 'The *squadron volante*: "independent" cardinals and European politics in the second half of the seventeenth century', in Signorotto and Visceglia (eds.), *Court and Politics*, 177-211; Visceglia, *Morte e elezione*, 368-386.

³⁸ Barberigo to the Senate, 10 March 1610, ASVe, DS, 32, fol. 10.

³⁹ Venice's ambassadors in Turin reported numerous discussions with Duke Charles Emmanuel I and various ministers during the 1610s in which they deployed this language of liberty in the context of creating an alliance between Savoy and Venice, with the inclusion of the papacy as well. For a few examples, Zen to the Senate, 12 January and 31 May 1615, ASVe, DS, 37, fol. 53; 38, fol. 58. See also, Rosso, 'España y Saboya', 1099-1100.

⁴⁰ On 'liberty' in the first half of the seventeenth century see, Silvano Giordano, 'Urbano VIII, la Casa di Austria, e la libertà d'Italia', in Irene Fosi and Alexander Koller (eds.), *Papato e impero nel pontificato di Urbano VIII (1623-1644)* (The Vatican, 2013), 63-82; Sven Externbrink, 'Le Cœur du monde et la Liberté de l'Italie: Aspects de la politique italienne de Richelieu 1624-1642', *Revue d'Histoire diplomatique* 114 (2000), 181-208; Vittorio di Tocco, *Ideali d'indipendenza in Italia durante la preponderanza spagnuola* (Messina, 1926).

⁴¹ Ball, Farr and Hanson, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*. The introductory essay in particular makes the case for political language as subject to contestation and change.

⁴² Though Duke Odoardo Farnese of Parma (reigned 1622-1646) was not unwilling to use the imagery himself during his largely unsuccessful campaigns against the Spanish after 1635, suggesting there was some life left in liberty as an anti-Spanish language. Gregory Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy. Odoardo Farnese, Duke of Parma, his Soldiers, and his Subjects in the Thirty Years' War* (Oxford, 2014).

⁴³ See especially Stuart Carroll, *Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion. The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy* (Cambridge, 1998).

⁴⁴ San Severina to Barberini, 14 October 1637, ASV, Segretaria di stato, Savoia, 59, fol. 342v; Morton to Coke, 18 November 1639 [new style], The National Archives, Kew [TNA], State Papers [SP] 92/23, fols. 202v-203.

⁴⁵ Morton to Coke, 6 August 1639 [new style], TNA, SP92/23, fols. 137v-8.

⁴⁶ Federigo Sclopis, *Documenti ragguardanti alla storia della vita di Tommaso Francesco di Savoia Principe di Carignano* (Turin, 1832), 30-2.

⁴⁷ Toby Osborne, "Notre grand dessein": O projecto de casamento entre o Duque Victor Amadeu e a Infanta Isabel Luisa e a politica dinastica dos Saboia (1675-82)', in M. Antonia Lopes and B. Alice Raviola (eds.), *Portugal e o Piemonte: a casa real portuguesa e os Sabóias. Nove séculos de relações dinásticas e destinos políticos (XII-XX)* (Coimbra, 2012), 215-6.

Cav'ri, et Ministri del Piemonte più considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarj, ó favorevoli, contrassegnati con la + à loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono buoni Piemontesi, che seguiranno il favore de Prencipi del Sangue	Obbedienti a Madama	Disgustati da Madama	Divoti al S.r P'npe Card'le	Contrarj al S.r P'npe Card'le	Divoti al S.r P'npe Tomaso	Contrarj al S.r P'npe Tomaso	Disgustati da Francesi	Di fattione Francese	Di fattione Spagnuola	Amici pare'ti et adherenti alli d'Agliè che governano	Avversarj alli d'Agliè	Veri Piemontesi
Conte di Cumiana	+									+		
Carlo Passerano	+											
Marchese Florì	+							+				
Marchese di Caraglio	+											
Co. Carlo Castellamonte Ingniero	+											
Principe di Messerano			+					+			+	
Barone d'Allamagna	+									+		
Marchese Bobba	+			+		+					+	
Abbati d'Verua		+	+		+			+			+	+
Nuntio		+						+			+	
Co. Gio. Fran.co Carretto fr't'o di Bagnaseco		+	+								+	
S.r D'Enuie	+		+									
Sig.r di Parella	+		+								+	
Caprio Gov.re della Cittadella di Torino	+		+		+							
Sig.r di Santena		+									+	
Commend.re Balbiano					+						+	
Ss.ri Broglia			+								+	
Marchese Clavesana			+					+			+	
Marchese Forno	+										+	
Conte di Collegno	+		+							+		
Archivescovo di Torino	+		+							+		
Conte di Frossasco	+											
Gran Cancelliere huomo timido	+										+	+
P.o Presid.te Bellone huomo avaro come all'interesse	+						+			+		
Presid.te Benzo, huomo maligno saputo il Genero è suddito di S. M. Cat.ca - [?] d'Agliano	+			+		+		+			+	
Presid.te Morozzo, destro	+											+
Presid.te Humolio ostinato	+		+									
Presid.te Duchì dolce			+		+							+

Cav'ri, et Ministri del Piemonte pi considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, ó favorevoli, contrassegnati con la + à loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono buoni Piemontesi, che seguiranno il favore de Prencipi del Sangue	Obbedienti a Madama	Disgustati da Madama	Divoti al S.r P'npe Card'le	Contrarÿ al S.r P'npe Card'le	Divoti al S.r P'npe Tomaso	Contrarÿ al S.r P'npe Tomaso	Disgustati da Francesi	Di fattione Francese	Di fattione Spagnuola	Amici pare'ti et adherenti alli d'Agliè che governano	Avversarÿ alli d'Agliè	Veri Piemontesi
Presid.te Cauda maligno, ignorante		+		+		+		+			+	
Presid.te Ferraris huomo d'essecu.ne			+		+							+
Presid.te Frino interessato	+		+		+				+			
Presid.te Richelmi, maligno				+				+				
P're Monodo Gesuita, in Momiliano		+		+		+	+				+	
Presid.te Pellegnino, uscito di Piem.te		+										+
P.o segr'io Pasero, uscito di Piem.te		+	+		+				+		+	+
Il Conte Messarati, uscito di Piem.te		+	+		+				+		+	+
Il Seg.rio Carone	+			+		+		+		+		
San Tomaso seg'rio, figlio del sud.o	+			+		+		+		+		
Claretti seg'rio, destro		+	+						+		+	
Dionigi Meyner seg'rio	+							+			+	
Sena.re Barberis Maligno		+		+								
Sen.re Silanis maligno	+					+	+					
Sen.re Leone			+									+
Sen.re Cauda maligno Inbrogliatore	+									+		
Aud.re Baronis malitioso	+							+		+		
Presid.te Montoliveto		+	+			+						
Commiss.io g'n.ale Gabaleone	+									+		
Gn'ale delle Poste Conterio	+									+		
Conte Scarnaffigi			+								+	
Conte di Piossasco	+		+							+		
Conte di Masino di gran seguito		+	+		+							
Conte Carlo Cacherano			+									
Conte Perrone			+		+							

Cav'ri, et Ministri del Piemonte più considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, ó favorevoli, contrassegnati con la + à loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono buoni Piemontesi, che seguiranno il favore de Principi del Sangue	Obbedienti a Madama	Disgustati da Madama	Divoti al s.r P'npe Card'le	Contrarÿ al S'r P'npe Card'le	Divoti al S'r P'npe Tomaso	Contrarÿ al S'r P'npe Tomaso	Disgustati da Francesi	Di fattione Francese	Di fattione Spagnuola	Amici pare'ti et adherenti alli d'Agliè che governano	Avversarÿ alli d'Agliè	Veri Piemontesi
Ponti di Casalgrasso			+									
Conte Amedeo Benzo			+								+	
Conte di Gorzegno			+					+			+	
Conte di Montuè			+									
Conte Asinaro			+									
Conte Boeri			+									
Marchese Mutti			+		+						+	
Conte Boetto, uscito di Piem.te			+		+							
Marchese di Lulino					+							
March.e di Bernezzo, avaro	+				+							
Gov.re di Nizza												
Conte di Desana	+		+								+	
Conte di Muzzano			+		+						+	+
Emanuel di Savoia naturale			+		+						+	+
Marchese Giulio Rangoni		+						+				
Frat'lli Vibò segretarÿ	+			+				+				

E da notare che la maggior parte de gl'obbedienti à Madama, sono, tali p. timore et che la maggior parte anco degl' Amici delli d'Agliè sono ò p il favore, ò p l'interesse. E sono in gran numero li disgustati da Madama, et che odiano li d'Agliè non descritti in questo foglio, essendo anco in gran numero li divoti de Principi del Sangue frà la Nobiltà, essendo tale la maggior parte del Popolo il quale è più adherente à Spagna, che à Francia.