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Metaphor, Lexicography, and Rabelais's Prologue to *Gargantua*

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Introduction

Rabelais's fictions offer an excellent testing ground for this volume's claim that renaissance literature can make heightened calls on our kinesic intelligence, inviting complex responses to the language of movement in ways shaped by the cognitive ecology of the Renaissance. Conversely, a cognitive approach grounded in kinesic intelligence has much to offer our understanding of key concerns in Rabelais scholarship, such as friendship, the body, the relationship between letter and spirit, and various pronounced stylistic traits.[1] This essay addresses two of these issues. It offers fresh insights into the body and its relationship to knowledge in Rabelais. It also casts new light on a striking aspect of Rabelais's style: his tendency to shift playfully between abstract meanings and embodied ones, often by reviving the embodied meanings of either metaphors or Latin etymons. A key claim in this essay is that style should be understood--in part, at least--in cognitive terms, as an indicator of the modes of cognition which the writer utilises and invites his readers to utilise. I shall suggest that the implications of the stylistic practice studied here are both cognitive and historical. First, Rabelais shifts between calling on embodied cognition to a greater or a lesser extent, in what I term in this essay a "modality switch." Kinesic intelligence is likely to be heightened and may be brought to the level of conscious reflection. Second, the calls Rabelais's "modality switches" make on kinesic intelligence constitute a literary mode of exploring the humanist interest in language as "seamless web," as well as its cognitive implications.[2] To investigate this, I will bring

Rabelais's writing into dialogue with the *Commentarii linguae latinae* (*Commentaries on the Latin Language*) composed by Rabelais's Lyonnais contemporary and friend, Etienne Dolet.[3]

The practice of shifting between abstract and embodied meanings is omnipresent in Rabelais's fictions. Indeed, according to François Moreau, Rabelais switches between the "literal" and the "metaphorical" more than any other renaissance writer.[4] Timothy Hampton has analysed some of these "slippages from metaphorical to literal language" to shed light on how literature constructs nationhood.[5] This essay aims to further our understanding of such moves between the "literal" and "metaphorical"; however, I avoid using these terms (except to report other research in its own terms). For a start, Rabelais renews the embodied content not only of "metaphors" but also of Latin etymons. More importantly, it is critical to my argument that what is most cognitively relevant is the *degree* to which abstract or embodied meaning is prominent, for example, the degree to which a "metaphorical" use is lexicalised or, conversely, novel or "renewed." Yet the dominant theories of "metaphor" detract attention from such questions of *degree* by focusing instead on *status* as metaphorical. Ancient philosophers and rhetoricians such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian--from whom both the modern and renaissance periods derive definitions of "metaphor"--concentrate on clearly demarcating metaphor (*translatio*), conceived as the not-proper or the borrowed, from proper meanings (the *proprius*, often translated as the "literal").[6] Modern conceptual metaphor theory differs sharply from the Aristotelian view in emphasising the pervasiveness of metaphor in our conceptual thinking, yet it too focuses attention on *status as metaphorical* rather than on the *degree* to which metaphor is novel or lexicalised, or the degree to which embodied or

abstract meanings are foregrounded. Therefore, this essay for the most part avoids the terms "metaphor" and the "literal," referring instead to degrees of embodiedness or abstraction.

Shifts between embodied and abstract meanings, while found throughout Rabelais's fictions, play a central role in some episodes, often where cognition is a central theme. This essay will examine just one such well known passage, an extract from the prologue to *Gargantua*:

> Crochetastes vous oncques bouteilles? Caisgne. Reduisez à memoire la contenance qu'aviez. Mais veistes vous onques chien rencontrant quelque os medulare? C'est comme dict Platon. *lib. II. de rep.* la beste du monde plus philosophe. Si veu l'avez: vous avez peu noter de quelle devotion il le guette: de quel soing il le guarde: de quel ferveur il le tient, de quelle prudence il l'entomme: de quelle affection il le brise: et de quelle diligence il le sugce. Qui le induict à ce faire? Quel est l'espoir de son estude? Quel bien pretend il? Rien plus qu'un peu de mouelle. Vray est que ce peu, plus est delicieux que le beaucoup de toutes aultres: pource que la mouelle est aliment elabouré à perfection de nature, comme dict Galen. *III. facu. natural.* et. *XI. de usu. parti.*
>
> À l'exemple d'icelluy vous convient estre saiges pour fleurer, sentir, et estimer ces beaulx livres de haulte gresse, legiers au prochaz: et hardis à la rencontre. Puis par curieuse leçon, et meditation frequente rompre l'os, et sugcer la sustantificque mouelle. C'est-à-dire: ce que j'entends par ces symboles Pythagoricques avecques espoir certain d'estre faictz escors et preux à ladicte lecture. Car en icelle bien aultre goust trouverez, et doctrine plus absconce, laquelle vous revelera de tres haultz sacremens et mysteres horrificques, tant en ce que concerne nostre religion, que aussi l'estat politicq et vie oeconomique.

> Have you ever cracked open any bottles? Dawg! Recall to mind your countenance then. But have you ever seen a dog encountering a marrow-bone? It is (as Plato says in Book 2 of *The Republic*) the most philosophical beast in the world. If you have ever seen one, you were able to notice with what dedication it observes it; with what solicitude it guards it; with what fervour it takes hold of it; with what sagacity it cracks it; with what passion it breaks it open, and with what care it sucks it. What induces it to do so? What does it hope for from its assiduity? What good is it aiming at? Nothing more than a bit of marrow. True it is that that *bit* is more delicious than the *ample* of all the rest, since marrow is a nutriment elaborated to its natural perfection (as Galen says *On the Natural Faculties*, Book 3, and *On the Use of Parts of the Body*, Book 11).
>
> Following that example it behoves you to be wise in order to sniff and smell out and appreciate these beautiful books of high fat, to be swift in pursuit and bold in the attack, and then, by careful reading and frequent meditation, to crack open the bone and suck out the substantificial marrow--that is to say, what I mean by such Pythagorean symbols--sure in the hope that you will be made witty and wise by that reading; for you will discover therein a very different savour and a more hidden instruction which will reveal to you the highest hidden truths and the most awesome mysteries touching upon our religion as well as upon matters of state and family life.[7]

The *Gargantua* prologue has been extensively analysed, especially in the context of debate in the 1980s between literary critics inspired by poststructuralism and those advocating more traditional approaches. That debate centred on whether we were

supposed to infer from the prologue that a "substantificial marrow" of "higher" meaning could be derived from Rabelais's fictions, or whether the promise of such a marrow was illusory since meaning was incessantly deferred by the dazzling play of language. However, the passage which evokes the elusive "substantificial marrow" focuses, as much as on the apparent goal of the marrow, on actions which that end goal inspires. It is preceded by the appeal to readers not to be content with the "literal meaning" ("sens literal") but rather to seek a higher meaning ("à plus hault sens interpreter," 6), and followed by the observation that Homer and Ovid were unaware of the meanings which readers would find in their texts (7); however, the passage itself switches to a strong focus on actions demonstrating to readers how they should approach Rabelais's book. Where post-structuralist literary theoretical approaches lent themselves to debating the finality of meaning, a kinesic methodology offers the possibility of analysing in fresh ways Rabelais's emphasis on action.

Critics have noted that the passage insistently represents reading as a bodily activity, comparable for example to gnawing a bone. In contrast, using an approach informed by kinesic intelligence, I shall focus not on the passage's *representation* of reading as embodied but rather on its probable *effects* on the embodied cognition of its readers. Nonetheless, I shall return later to explore the fact that Rabelais invites the cognitive responses under scrutiny precisely when cognition is also the theme of his discussion.

Novel and "Revitalised" Embodied Meanings

The very first word of this passage, *crochetastes*, does not make obvious sense in relation to bottles. It is not clear what action the verb describes. The seventeenth-century English

translators of the passage, Sir Thomas Urquhart and Pierre Le Motteux, decided that what Rabelais had in mind was picking a lock then stealing a bottle, whereas the twentieth-century translator Michael Screech plumped for "cracking open a bottle."[8] Another possibility might be opening bottles with one's teeth. To work out what might be meant, the reader needs to model different candidate movements prompted by the verb *crocheter* (to open with a hook, or hang on a hook, or open a lock with a hook).[9] Readers might also explore actions suggested by the verb *taster,* in particular tasting wine.[10] In other words, in the context of bottles, the verb seems likely to make considerable calls on our kinesic intelligence.

This suggestion is supported by a growing body of research indicating that motor responses--or the degree to which they are activated--are context-dependent rather than automatic. Importantly for my interests here, the degree of familiarity or novelty of the action-related language seems to play a crucial role. Experiments carried out by Rutvik H. Desai and colleagues strengthen the view that to understand relatively unfamiliar action-related language we use a relatively detailed simulation, whereas, as conventionalisation increases, our reliance on sensorimotor systems is reduced.[11] These findings contribute to a "graded view of conceptual embodiment," according to which conceptual representation consists of multiple levels of abstraction from sensory, motor and affective inputs. The top level contains schematic representations that are highly abstracted from detailed representations in the primary perceptual-motor system; these are sufficient for adequate and rapid processing in highly familiar contexts. By contrast, in novel contexts, or when the task requires deeper processing, sensory-motor-affective systems make a greater contribution.[12] In this case, given the range of possibilities

offered by *crocheter* in this context, it seems likely that readers' responses will constitute not only pre-conscious simulation but also a series of more deliberate rehearsals of the various options. Thus the first line of the extract appeals particularly strongly to our kinesic intelligence.

Then, after this implicit invitation to model the action(s) evoked by *crochetaster*, Rabelais explicitly instructs us to retrieve a simulation of such an action, or to "bring back to memory" our bodily posture when we carried out the action: "Reduisez à memoire la contenance qu'aviez."[13] Thus Rabelais not only invites us to return to bodily experiences, to utilise our bodily cognition, but he is also quite explicit that that is what he is doing. While embodied cognition comes into play without our conscious volition, the instruction to employ it is likely to heighten its effects, and furthermore may prompt some readers to reflect (as Rabelais does) on the fact that they are employing embodied knowledge.

In addition, a secondary meaning of *contenance*--volume or contents, for example of a bottle of wine--may invite us to run a further simulation, given that Rabelais has just asked his readers about an action involving bottles.[14] There are attested examples from before the sixteenth century of *contenance* meaning "volume" or "contents,"[15] and the Latin *contineo* could have hinted at such a sense. So Rabelais may be playing on the polysemy of *contenance,* inviting us to recall not only the various actions suggested by *crochetastes* but also that of consuming the contents of the bottle. In other words, the polysemy of *contenance* offers a further action to recall and to simulate, rendering still more complex the potential use of our kinesic intelligence here. Moreover, since the bottle apparently represents Rabelais's book, its "contents" are, we might assume,

precisely what we are aiming to get at through the tricky action(s) denoted by *crochetaster*: the word *contenance* indicates both the supposed goal of our action and also the action or posture itself. In other words, there is perhaps a suggestion that the bodily posture is in some sense the goal and so, on this level too, there is an emphasis on the importance of bodily cognition.

Having thus made strong appeals to our kinesic intelligence, Rabelais then proceeds to a longer description of a set of actions. He begins by inviting us to remember watching a dog eating a bone, rather as he instructed us to retrieve the simulations involving bottles. This prompt to sensorimotor imagining differs insofar as the reader is invited to recall an action he has perceived rather than one he has enacted, yet research suggests that perceiving an action activates our own motor system, even if the action observed (such as chewing a bone as a dog would) is not identical to any action we have ever carried out.[16] The invitation to remember watching a dog eating a bone is followed by a detailed description of what we might have observed. Rabelais uses a wide range of verbs--cracking and sniffing and breaking and sucking and pursuing and attacking. He also describes how each action is carried out, noting that the dog observes the bone with dedication, guards it with care, takes hold of it with fervour, cracks it with affection, sucks it with diligence: “vous avez peu noter de quelle devotion il le guette: de quel soing il le guarde: de quel ferveur il le tient, de quelle prudence il l’entomme: de quelle affection il le brise: et de quelle diligence il le sugce.” Michel Jeanneret has observed that this series of verbs referring to canine actions serves, in burlesque fashion, to represent reading as a bodily and physical activity.[17] But, putting the passage’s cognitive theme to one side, what about its cognitive effects on its reader? Does the long description of the

dog's actions mean that simulating the dog's actions will be an important component of our cognitive response?

None of the verbs employed in the discussion of the dog are as surprising as *crochetaster*. Furthermore, since the dog turns out to be an "example" for the reader, it is clear that Rabelais was calling on the familiar proverbial knowledge according to which extracting marrow meant seeking knowledge (as well as on more general conventional equivalences between eating and knowing[18]). Experiments suggest that, generally speaking, familiar idioms elicit less sensorimotor response than do novel metaphors, which may in turn be less powerful than literal actions: for example Desai and colleagues observed a "trend of increasing sensory-motor activation from abstract to idiomatic to metaphoric to literal sentences," noting that "when metaphors are very highly conventionalized, as is the case for idioms, engagement of sensory-motor systems is minimized or very brief."[19] However, arguably Rabelais's description of a dog engaging in the multiple actions entailed by pursuing the marrow means that these actions do not lend themselves to being understood in solely abstracted--rather than bodily--ways. In other words, the context in which Rabelais presents the idiomatic marrow estranges the proverb by putting the emphasis back onto bodily experience. In addition, the regular patterning of the long sentence in which the actions are described (the multiple repetition of "de quel(le) [noun] il le [verb]") means that the sentence itself gathers a kind of momentum, a kind of kinaesthetic energy.[20]

To get a sharper sense of the impact of this focus on action in Rabelais's description, we can contrast it with the commentary on a set of related proverbs

composed by Rabelais's near-contemporary Charles de Bovelles and published a few years before *Gargantua*:

> Mandere ad usque ossa,
> Manger jusques aulx os.
> Ossa infringere,
> Rompre les os.
> Eruere medullam,
> Tirer la mouelle des os.
> Quadrant haec ad plurima. Cum primis ad discumbentium inhonestatem nihil in mensa residui faci[e]ntium pręter ossa, et escam canum. deinde ad principum tyrannidem erodentium plębem. Postremo ad subtiliorem pastum refectionemve esurientis animi. Animus enim rebus in arduis haud literali contentus sensu, nec satis sibi esse ducens solid[a] duntaxat palpare, et erodere ossium substantiam subtili ingenii acumine, ipsa etiam ossium adyta et interiores cryptas adit. Quinimmo ossa refringens latentioris intelligentiae medullam inde eruit, qua esuriem temperet suam, Et inclyte siti medeatur occulta, et arcana quaeque noscendi.
>
> To eat to the bones
> To break the bones
> To extract the marrow from the bones
> These things allow of several readings. In the first place they refer to the disgraceful behaviour of people at a meal who leave nothing on the table except bones and food for dogs; then to the tyranny of rulers devouring the people; and finally to the more refined food and refreshment for the hungry mind. For the mind, faced with difficult things, is not content with the literal meaning, and concluding that it is not enough for it just to handle material things, and to gnaw the substance of bones with the sharp edge of the intellect, also enters right into the secret chambers and innermost recesses of the bones. And so breaking open the bones it extracts thence the marrow of the more hidden meaning, by which to satisfy its hunger, and to quench in brilliant fashion its thirst for hidden and secret knowledge. [21]

As Michael Screech noted, Bovelles interprets the proverbs with the sense which Rabelais also gives them.[22] And one might observe that Bovelles and Rabelais exploit the same metaphor and also the same basic underlying metaphor (that identified by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson as IDEAS ARE FOOD)[23]. However, Bovelles puts much less emphasis on action or movement than Rabelais does. Instead, he sets up a series of parallels: "marrow" means "hidden intelligence," and "tempering hunger" of the mind equates to "finding hidden things." So any activation of embodied knowledge is slight. The passage instead stimulates more strongly an abstracted form of knowledge which replaces marrow with intelligence and eating with finding hidden things. Bovelles decodes the marrow and the eating, making it easier than Rabelais does to understand "extracting marrow" in ways more abstract than bodily. By contrast, Rabelais's focus on

describing the dog's multiple actions renews the embodied content underlying the proverbial wisdom, thereby inviting us to think with our bodies.

Furthermore, of course the very fact that the actions are carried out by a dog means that they are not easily understood in purely abstract terms. In addition, the dog's actions appear to offer a gloss or a new perspective on the actions implied by *crochetaster* and *contenance*, especially since references to the two sets of actions are interlaced thanks to the pre-figuring or priming of the dog in the interjection "caisgne" ("bitch"). This complexity makes any easy abstraction of the dog's actions less likely, I think. Readers might instead run and re-run simulations involving both dogs and bottles, so that each set of actions gives a new sense of how the other set is carried out. In short, to use the terms of Jeffrey R. Binder and Desai outlined earlier,[24] Bovelles's commentary invites us to employ schematic representations abstracted from the sensorimotor system, whereas Rabelais elicits a response in which the sensorimotor plays a greater role. Rabelais's renewal of embodied content constitutes a surprising shift, not only from the less embodied discussion which immediately preceded this section of his prologue, but also from what we might have expected "marrow" to mean in such a context.

While the extract as a whole makes a surprising shift to the embodied, on the micro-level of the text, too, there are striking switches between language that is very clearly embodied and language that is less so. These switches are similarly dependent to a large degree on the renewal of the embodied substratum of particular linguistic items. This practice is particularly pronounced in the statement to the reader that "vous convient estre saiges pour fleurer, sentir, et estimer ces beaulx livres de haulte gresse." Readers should be "wise" ("saiges") in order to "sniff" ("fleurer"): the verb "fleurer" clashes with

"saiges," making one revisit "saiges" to give it a broader meaning more like that of *sagax*, the Latin term which, in the sixteenth century, was imagined to be its etymon.[25] As Robert Estienne's 1552 *Dictionarium latinogallicum* explains, *sagax* meant having a good sense of smell, and, by extension, being mentally perspicacious, and was associated in particular with the sharp sense of smell in dogs.[26] Thus the shadow of *sagax* behind *saiges* increases the sense that the reader should be sniffing like a dog, engaging in a thoroughly embodied pursuit of "marrow." As on the level of the extract as a whole, as we progress from "saiges" to "fleurer" switches between the more embodied and the less embodied make motor content surprising.

Next, Rabelais lists verbs progressing from *fleurer* through *sentir* to *estimer*. *Fleurer* meant to "smell" or to "sniff."[27] *Sentir* also meant primarily to "smell" or "scent," as well as "to taste,"[28] however, its Latin etymon, *sentire*, which Nicot's 1606 dictionary uses to translate it, meant not only "to discern by the senses" and "to feel, perceive, observe, notice" but also "to think, deem, judge, opine,"[29] meanings which had occasionally appeared in usage of the French verb.[30] The meanings of *estimer*, on the other hand, like those of its Latin etymon *aestimare*, are intellectual rather than sensory.[31] Since it follows *fleurer*, the meanings of *sentir* which would initially come to the fore are its primary sensory meanings; however, the inclusion of *estimer* retrospectively shifts the likely meaning of *sentir*. In short, as the list progresses, it becomes more and more possible to return to a more abstract mode of cognition, to think less of "sniffing" than of something like "judging." However, this is then undercut again when the "livres de haultes" are followed by a physicalized noun, *gresse*, rather than by the abstract noun such as "truth" which the expression would lead us to expect, so that the reader is

surprised to find herself sniffing for delicious fat, before then being invited to be "swift in pursuit and bold in attack," rather like a hunting dog. So, within this one sentence, there are striking shifts between the more or less embodied, thanks especially to the renewal of supposed embodied content in *saiges*.

Such switches between embodied and abstract emphasis are omnipresent and striking in Rabelais's writing, often occurring thanks to the revival of the embodied meanings either of Latin etymons like *sagax* or alternatively of French words ("metaphors") which were usually understood with an abstract meaning more than with their previous bodily one. While some of these shifts occur in passing, others generate long passages or even whole episodes, notably that of the frozen words in the *Quart Livre*. Crucially, this is especially the case in passages which explicitly treat questions of knowledge and knowing, such as the one under consideration here. I have focused on the calls the passage makes on the reader's bodily cognition, yet reading is also the theme of the passage. In other words, the practice of shifting in surprising ways between eliciting more abstract or more embodied cognition occurs precisely in concert with the explicit exploration of cognition. Rabelais himself seems to associate the practice with questions about cognition. So, what is at stake cognitively in this practice? What kind of thinking does it elicit and reflect? To offer an answer to this question, I shall begin by turning to Dolet's *Commentaries on the Latin Language*, because, as we shall see, they too foreground moves between the more or less embodied.

Etienne Dolet's *Commentaries* and the Humanist "Language Turn"

Each of Dolet's dictionary entries progresses from the "proper" signification of a word to derived ones, from *proprietas* to *translatio*, or *significatio propria* to *significatio translata*, to use Dolet's terms. This reflects Dolet's interest in derived senses: he asserts that the quality of any language lies less in the proper meanings of its words (*proprietas vocum*) than in the "transferral" of words to other uses or meanings (*translatae dictiones*; *translatio vocum*).[32] In some cases, following the practice outlined in the introduction to his first volume, Dolet gives the *significatio propria* (proper meaning), then the *significatio translata* ("transferred" or derived meaning), then examples of the words used with their proper meaning, then examples of the words used with their derived meaning.[33] Sometimes further distinctions are made so that citations are listed under "proprietatis exempla" ("examples of the proper meaning"), then "translata exempla" (examples of "transferred" or derived meanings), then, for instance, "minus translata exempla" (examples of less "transferred" meanings) and "paulo magis translata exempla" (examples of somewhat more "transferred" meanings)[34] In other entries, Dolet omits such headings, and omits any definitions of derived senses, instead pointing to them only through the quotations listed as examples. Either way, Dolet progresses, more or less gradually, and more or less explicitly, from the proper to the derived. Crucially for my interests here, because of the typical etymological development of Indo-European languages, this often means progressing from the more bodily to the more abstract.[35]

Indeed, while I suggested in my Introduction that the period term *metaphor* (or *translatio*) fails to capture Rabelais's practice, the related period term *translatus* is a closer fit insofar as it is used by Dolet to express an interest in the *more* or *less* derived or *translatus*. Whereas, for Quintilian, there were several kinds of *proprietas*, one of which

was opposed to "metaphor" and another to derived meanings,[36] Dolet does not distinguish between metaphor and derived meanings, but rather classifies all meanings which are not *proprius* as *translatus*, and suggests that this status as *translatus* is a matter of degree. Thus, he points to degrees of distance from "proper" meanings to various derived ones, which often implicitly map onto the more or less embodied or abstract. Thus, like Rabelais in his fiction, Dolet in his dictionary entries shifts between the more or less embodied, and draws attention to how abstracted senses have been derived from embodied ones.

To take an example relevant to Rabelais's sagaciously sniffing dog, let us examine the entry for *odorare*:

ODORARI:
vel, Odorare.
ODORARE, et odorari dicimus, et est ex odore aliquid deprehendere, ut odora canum vis: qui ferarum ingressus olfacientes, eas tandem inveniunt.

Cic. Ad Att. IIII. Tu velim ut Fabium, si quem habes aditum, odorere, istum convivam tuum degustes, et ad me de istis rebus, et omnibus quotidie scribas.

Ibidem: Soles enim tu haec festivè odorari.

Idem ad Att. VI. Tu sagacius odorabere.

Idem: Tu tamen, si quid potes, odorare.

Idem: Cupio enim antequam Romam venio, odorari diligentius, quid futurum sit.

Idem: Haec vero eius erat ars, malitia miranda, quod acutissime tota provincia, quidcunque esset necesse, indagare, et odorari solebat.

Idem: Quò postea quàm venerunt, mirandum in modum canes venaticos diceres, ita odorabantur, et pervestigabant, ut ubi quicquid esset, aliqua ratione invenirent.

Idem: Odorare tamen Antonii *διὰθεσιν.* quem quidem ego epularum magis arbitror rationem habere, quàm quicquam mali cogitare.

Idem de Orat. II. Ut odorer quàm sagacissime possim, quid sentiant, quid existiment, quid expectent.[37]

The entry defines *odorare* as "apprehending something through scent, as do hunting dogs who find wild beasts by smell." It then lists nine quotations from Cicero which use the verb in more derived senses. In all the quotations, *odorare* refers to an activity other than literal sniffing of actual scents, yet the degree to which the embodied is to the fore varies. The first citation perhaps increases the salience of sensory pursuit in the verb *odorare* by

using it together with *degustare*, which similarly has an embodied meaning, *to taste*, as well as a more abstract one. Other citations, such as the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth, in themselves do little or nothing to remind us of the embodied sense of *odorare*. The sixth citation uses the verb as a synonym for *indagare*, which seems more abstract and so may decrease any salience of the embodied and the canine, although perhaps less than we might expect since Dolet's own dictionary entry for *indagare* just a page earlier began by linking that verb to hunting.[38] Then, in stark contrast to some of the earlier citations, as well as to the following one, the seventh uses *odorare* together with *pervestigare*, which--formed on the basis of *vestigium* (*footprint* or *track*)--similarly has a primary sense relating to hunting dogs. Thus Cicero states that those under discussion "scented out" and "tracked" everything. He then adds "you might have thought they were hounds of the chase," thereby strongly underlining the embodied and canine meanings of the two verbs. The ninth and final citation recalls Rabelais's sagaciously sniffing dog since Cicero claims to "sniff out" as "sagaciously" as possible ("sagacissime") the feelings and opinions of jurors;[39] similarly, *sagacius* is used with *odorare* in the third citation. This use of words related to *sagax*--another word with a sensory meaning as well as a more abstract one--probably makes the embodied meaning of *odorare* rather more salient. In short, because all these citations are placed after the embodied and canine definition of *odorare*, and because they recall that definition to varying degrees (especially in the seventh citation), in Dolet's dictionary the verb is presented within its continuum from embodied to abstract senses.

Ann Moss has observed that this method of following the various shades of meaning of an individual word is part of a broader practice on Dolet's part of tracing

semantic continua.[40] As well as moving between the *proprius* and the *translatus* within each individual dictionary entry, Dolet traces semantic continua across the sequence of dictionary entries, which he organises not alphabetically but rather in groups of cognate terms and terms with similar meanings.[41] For example, *odorari* is found within the following sequence: […] *quaerere*, *explorare*, *expiscari*, *contari*, *scitari*, *sciscitari*, *indagare*, *investigare*, *odorari* or *odorare*, *olfacere*, *scrutari*, *elicere* […].[42] The sequence moves between words with primarily embodied meanings and words with primarily abstract ones; and, while Dolet often begins these entries with embodied meanings (for example ones involving hunting in the series *indagare*, *investigare*, *odorari*), in other cases, such as *scitari*, the meanings given are more abstract.

Moss shows that Dolet's tracing of semantic continua between and within his dictionary entries is part of a broader shift in humanist lexicography: whereas the best known scholastic dictionary (the fifth part of the *Catholicon*, which had no serious rival until the early sixteenth century) was concerned with the semantic boundaries of words, humanist lexicographers (particularly more sophisticated ones, such as Valla, Erasmus, and Dolet) followed associations between words, creating an "interlocking web" of words.[43] Moreover, Moss argues convincingly that this new attention to semantic continuities was part of a Latin "language turn," a broader humanist change in the use of language which had profound cognitive implications. Dolet himself, to quote Moss, "does not discuss cognitive process" yet "almost, but perhaps not quite, gives to metaphor a creative potential that reaches beyond language to thought"; other humanists were more explicit about the implications of their "webs" of language for thought.[44]

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Rabelais probably met Dolet in autumn 1534, when Dolet moved to Lyon. Certainly, from that date they formed a close friendship.[45] By the middle of 1535, Dolet had completed the first volume of his *Commentary*, was seeking royal permission to publish, and had commenced printing.[46] Rabelais's *Gargantua* was probably published in 1535.[47] So, when Rabelais was about to publish *Gargantua*, Dolet was busy with the final stages of producing his dictionary. It is therefore plausible that when Rabelais was still writing *Gargantua* he may have discussed with Dolet the latter's innovative method for compiling a dictionary and the attitude to language which underlay it. But, whether such matters were the explicit topic of conversation between the two friends, it seems likely that the humanist interest in the "seamless web" of language would have made Rabelais conscious of, and interested in, the relationship between proper and derived senses of words, and thus between embodied and abstract ones.

Indeed, as we have seen, Rabelais's fictions--and not least his sagely sniffing dog--demonstrate that he was interested in continuities between the embodied and the abstract. Like Dolet, Rabelais explored these continuities on the level of both the individual word and sequences of related words. Rabelais endows the word *saige* with the embodied-abstract continuum of its supposed etymon *sagax*, and associates it, like *sagax*, with the sensory action of hunting dogs. And his series of verbs, "fleurer, sentir, estimer," moves between the more embodied and the more abstract, not unlike Dolet's sequence of entries which moves from *quaerere* through *expiscari* through *scitari* through *odorare*. Moreover, as I noted above, Rabelais's play with more or less embodied or abstract modes of cognition often coincides with explicit discussion of cognition, as in the passage under consideration in this essay. This suggests that it was prompted by an

interest not simply in the humanist web of language but also in its cognitive implications: in other words, Rabelais's surprising shifts between the embodied and the abstract explore their possible effects upon thinking. Thus, like some lexicography, Rabelais's fiction constitutes in part a humanist reflection on the cognitive implications of semantic continua.

Thinking with Fiction: Rabelais's "Modality Switches"

This is not to say that Rabelais's French fiction provided the same cognitive affordances--the same tools for thinking--as Dolet's Latin dictionary.[48] Rabelais's text does something different, because it is French and because it is literature. The crux of the matter is that in Rabelais's text the switches to embodied meanings are more striking. For example, the embodied meaning brought to the fore in "saiges," unlike that in the Latin *sagax*, is surprising, as is the embodiedness of "extracting marrow" by cracking and sniffing and sucking. It seems to me that this element of surprise increases the bodily impact on the reader, the effect on the reader's sensorimotor cognition. What support is there for this? Bolens has suggested that the unpredictability of some sensorimotor configurations in literature is key to the power of literary kinesis.[49] But what about, more specifically, the practice I have described?

It is suggestive that, as Ana Raposo and colleagues have shown, action verbs cause more activation in motor regions of the brain if they are encountered in isolation rather than within literal action sentences.[50] Also, as demonstrated by Nicole Speer and colleagues, when comprehending stories, brain regions involved in processing actions increase in activation at points in the narrative when a new goal-focused action is

initiated.[51] In other words, at least on the level of pre-conscious cognition, *shifts towards* kinesic content cause greater sensorimotor activation than *sustained* kinesic content does.

Moreover, Anežka Kuzmičová has recently suggested that new motor content is likely to push embodied cognition into conscious experience. Building on Marie-Laure Ryan's research into fictional immersion, Kuzmičová suggests that the transition from non-movement to movement--which she terms a "sudden modality switch"--is likely to bring motor responses to literary texts over the "threshold of consciousness."[52] Kuzmičová, like Speer, is discussing literal movement--shifts from stasis to motion in descriptive passages. However, given the sensorimotor effects of novel metaphors, I would hypothesise that shifts to the embodied from the level of the abstracted etymon or the so-called "dead metaphor" similarly constitute "sudden modality switches" likely to increase sensorimotor response. One wonders if, given insights from Rabelais or other texts, scientists might wish to design an experiment to see if neuroimaging captures any trace of cognitive response to such shifts from the abstracted etymon or "dead metaphor" to the embodied. In any event, reviving the embodied content of metaphors and etymons as Rabelais does certainly seems to cause more surprise than many switches between literal stasis and movement; therefore readers are especially likely to be aware of a sensorimotor response and perhaps to reflect upon the surprising shift which caused it.

In Rabelais's case, it is particularly likely that at least some of his readers would be aware of the shifting calls on their cognition because the passage under consideration (like others in which "modality switches" occur) is explicitly about cognition: while the "modality switches" from embodied to abstract engage our cognition in shifting ways, at the same time Rabelais explicitly invites us to reflect on what reading involves, even

flagging up explicitly that we are to use our memory of bodily actions ("Reduisez à memoire" et cetera). Thus the exploration of cognition is multifaceted: explicit discussion of cognition interacts with an engaging of our cognition in surprising ways which may elicit our reflection. In addition, a key role in Rabelais's "modality switches" is played by humour: for example, the apparent incongruity of our more embodied re-interpretation of *saiges* with the topic of pursuing knowledge makes us laugh. This humour may prompt kinesic intelligence of a reflective kind: it is likely to make at least some readers reflect on the source of the humour, and thus perhaps bring embodied cognition to conscious awareness and thought.

Rabelais's readers may also have had their kinesic intelligence differently attuned from ours insofar as they were bilingual in Latin. Not much knowledge of Latin is required to recognise the shadow of *sagax* behind Rabelais's use of *saiges*, and perhaps also the trace of the various Latin verbs meaning sniffing and investigating. Moreover, Renaissance readers were more familiar than we are with not only Latin but also the recourse to etymology in definitions of words, used in not only dictionaries but also a range of other discourses.[53] Indeed it is for this reason that Rabelais himself got so much mileage out of the comic etymologies he included in his fictions. In addition, in this particular case, we are dealing with a semantic continuum--from tasting to knowing--which had long been of interest. Mary Carruthers has recently highlighted the wealth of links made between taste and knowing in both Graeco-Latin and biblical traditions, including the long-standing trope of meditating upon religious texts as "chewing"; indeed, one twelfth-century writer even elaborated on this so that "reading is within the outer skin, meditation in the fat," an image not unlike Rabelais's readerly chewing to get

to the fatty marrow. Such links were not understood only as "metaphorical": they stemmed in part from meditation and liturgical practices, as well as the doctrine of the Eucharist itself. And some medieval writers highlighted the double meanings of terms like *sapere*, both *to taste* and *to know*.[54] Moreover, in the Renaissance, in the vernacular as well as Latin, the tasting-knowing continuum came to the fore in new ways, for example in imitation theory's commonplace images of reading as digestion. In short, then, sixteenth-century readers were more likely to be aware of and to reflect on the relationships between both French and Latin terms for "eating" and "knowing."

Moreover, humanist approaches to language brought renewed and more sustained attention to the relationship between embodied and abstract senses of not only those Latin terms for tasting and knowing but also Latin words in general. Many readers would have been aware of the typical etymological development of words with embodied and abstract senses to ones with only or primarily the latter. So some of Rabelais's readers might have reflected that the bodily actions they are invited to imagine were present in Latin words, which prompted stronger bodily knowing than their French counterparts (and thus, perhaps, gave to bodily knowing something of the venerable status of Latin). Finally, some readers, more aware than others of humanism's "language turn," might have been particularly likely to reflect on the cognitive implications of the semantic continua with which Rabelais presented them.

Conclusion

I have sought in this essay to cast new light on what Moreau and others have termed Rabelais's shifts between the "metaphorical" and the "literal," or what I have described

as “modality switches” between the abstract and the embodied, which often work by renewing the bodily content of linguistic items usually understood in a way more abstract than embodied. I have focused attention on readers’ probable cognitive responses to this, suggesting that Rabelais shifts between language prompting sensorimotor response to greater or lesser degrees, and that this is likely to enhance kinesic intelligence and, to varying extents, shift it to a conscious and even reflective level. Understanding the relationship between what happens on a pre-conscious level (as measured by neuroimaging) and conscious experience is an extremely thorny problem; however, literature may be especially good at inviting us to become conscious of a continuum between the pre-reflective and the reflective, and at suggesting some ways in which pre-conscious sensorimotor cognition might be pushed to the level of consciousness and even explicit reflection.

Writers in any time and place might play with lexicalised “metaphors” in a way which enhances sensorimotor response and perhaps pushes it over the threshold to consciousness. However, in the early sixteenth century the common human cognitive toolkit was shaped by Renaissance humanism. I have suggested that Rabelais’s striking “modality switches” between embodied and abstract were prompted by an interest in the humanist “web” of language and its cognitive implications. Similarly, his readers may have had their kinesic intelligence differently attuned from ours insofar as they were bilingual in Latin, and all the more so insofar as they were aware of humanism’s “language turn.” The cognitive responses of Rabelais’s readers were probably also sharpened by his humour and his foregrounding of the theme of cognition.

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The sagaciously sniffing dog and the humanist web of language are, for me, one entry point into a broader exploration of Rabelaisian kinesis in general as well as embodied-abstract shifts more specifically. To explore the latter further, the frozen words episode in the *Quart Livre* is particularly interesting because, as well as engaging in practices like those described in this essay, it also re-embodies precisely *translatio,* turning "metaphor" back into "movement." Such shifts also shed light on the cognitive impact of many of Rabelais's famous lists. But these are questions I hope to address elsewhere. Similar matters might be investigated in other sixteenth-century writers too, since Rabelais was not the only one to re-embody abstract terms, although he did it in his own distinctive way. For example, Montaigne's writing is, as Richard Scholar puts it, "remarkable for the physicality with which it describes abstract processes, an effect it achieves by restoring, to the metaphors it uses, their literal sense."[55] I hope this essay has demonstrated that it is worth examining such practices through the dual lenses of renaissance history and contemporary science.

NOTES

This essay has been a long time in the making and has incurred a number of debts. I am deeply grateful to Terence Cave, who invited me to be a Research Lecturer in his project "Thinking with Literature," leading me to present research on "kinesic Rabelais" and the *Gargantua* prologue in Durham in 2012 and Oslo in 2013. I am indebted to Ann Moss and to Marc Schachter, who both commented insightfully on drafts of this essay. Finally, thanks are due to participants at our 2014 Kinesis workshop, especially Guillemette Bolens, Neil Kenny and Raphael Lyne.

[1] A different take on kinesis in Rabelais, in particular on friendship, is provided by Michel Jeanneret, another participant in the "Thinking with Literature" project and the Kinesis workshop. "Quand le sens passe par les sens: Rabelais et l'intelligence des corps," *Poétique* 178 (2015): 147-62. See also Timothy Chesters, "Social Cognition: A Literary Perspective," *Paragraph* 37 (2014): 63-71.

[2] The expression "seamless web" is borrowed from Ann Moss, *Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49. The notion of a "web" of language is recurrent in Part I ("Words") of Moss's book.

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[3] Two vols, Lyon: Sebastian Gryphius, 1536 and 1538.
[4] *Les Images dans l'œuvre de Rabelais*. Vol 3: *Un Aspect de l'Imagination créatrice chez Rabelais: l'emploi des images* (Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1982), 143-48.
[5] "What is most important here for a more general consideration of how literature constructs nationhood are the curious slippages from metaphorical to literal language." For example "[t]hese metaphors may be dead metaphors, but Rabelais brings them to life again, for they are the terms that generate the narrative […] Panurge's metaphorical description of the Turks as 'treacherous dogs' is neatly literalized." *Literature and Nation in the Sixteenth Century: Inventing Renaissance France* (Ithaca, N. Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 25, 51. Cf Neil Kenny's suggestion that the Turkish episode discussed by Hampton brings together lambish leanness and other meanings of *curiosus*, demonstrating interestingly that embodied and abstract meanings may be associated because of not only the etymological or metaphorical derivation of abstract meanings from embodied ones but also the gathering together of disparate items under commonplace headings such as *curiosus*. "Plautus, Panurge, and 'les aventures des gens curieux'," in *(Re)Inventing the Past: Essays in honour of Ann Moss*, ed. Gary Ferguson and Catherine Hampton (Durham: University of Durham, 2003), 51-68. Movement between the figurative and the literal in Rabelais has also featured in my own previous research. "'I speak like John about the Apocalypse': Rabelais, Prophecy and Fiction," *Literature and Theology* 26 (2012): 417-438. "Apocalypse and Literature in the Sixteenth Century: The Case of Rabelais and the Frozen Words," in *Visions of Apocalypse: Representations of the End in French Literature and Culture*, ed. Leona Archer and Alex Stuart (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), 83-98.
[6] According to Aristotle's seminal definition, "metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else." *Poetics*, 1457b. See also Cicero, *De Oratore*, book III 155-169; Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, book VIII, ch. 6: 1-18. Furthermore, for Aristotle and the rhetoricians, metaphorical status was determined on the level of the individual word, whereas in Rabelais's writing it is on the level of a broader context--a sentence or sequence of sentences--that the degree of prominence of the embodied content is determined.
[7] Rabelais, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Mireille Huchon (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 6-7. My translation, based on that of M. A. Screech, *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (London: Penguin, 2006), 207.
[8] Screech, transl., *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, 207. Urquhart and Motteux, transl., *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, ed. Terence Cave (London: David Campbell, 1994), 20.
[9] Randle Cotgrave's 1611 English-French dictionary gives "to open, picke open, with a hooke, &c; also, to hang on a hooke," while Jean Nicot's 1606 *Thresor de la langue française* offers "resignare, Unco aperire" and, for "crocheter une serrure," "Unco seram aperire." Rabelais himself uses it in *Pantagruel* to denote the picking of locks: Panurge carries in one of his many pockets "un daviet, un pellican, un crochet et quelques aultres ferremens dont il n'y avoit porte ny coffre qu'il ne crochetast" (p. 276).
[10] For *taster*, Cotgrave offers "to tast; or take an eßay of; also, to handle, feele, touch, or grope for," while for *taster, tastonner*, Nicot gives "attrectare, contrectare" but also translates some set expressions (*taster du vin*, and *taster et gouster petit à petit)* in which *taster* refers to tasting, particularly in the context of wine.
[11] "These results support a gradual abstraction process whereby the reliance on sensory-motor systems is reduced as the abstractness of meaning as well as conventionalization is increased, highlighting the context sensitive nature of semantic processing." Rutvik H. Desai et al, "A piece of the action: Modulation of sensory-motor regions by action idioms and metaphors," *NeuroImage* 83 (2013): 862. On simulation more generally, see the Introduction to this volume.
[12] Desai et al, 868. For a fuller account of this view, see Jeffrey R. Binder and Rutvik H. Desai, "The neurobiology of semantic memory," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 15 (2011): 527-536.
[13] The French word *contenance* referred, then as now, to the bearing of the body as a whole (rather than primarily to facial expression, as its English cognate does). See, for example, the *Dictionnaire du moyen français*, http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/contenance. Cotgrave's translation of *contenance* (presumably under the influence of English) emphasises the face but also makes clear that the word can mean the bearing or movement of the body: "the countenance, looke, cheere, visage, favor; gesture, posture, behaviour, carriage; presence, or composition of the whole bodie."
[14] Thanks are due to Marc Schachter for this observation.
[15] http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/contenance.
[16] See Introduction to this volume, pp. ?
[17] *Des Mets et des mots: banquets et propos de table à la Renaissance* (Paris: José Corti, 1987), 119-123.
[18] See the later section in this essay, "Thinking with Fiction: Rabelais's 'Modality Switches'."
[19] "A piece of the action," 862, 867-8. See also Rutvik H. Desai et al, "The Neural Career of Sensory-motor Metaphors," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 23 (2011): 2376-2386.
[20] On syntax and kinesis, see Terence Cave's essay in this volume.
[21] Bovelles, Charles de, *Proverbiorum Vulgarium Libri tres* ([Paris]: M.P. Vidouaeo, 1531), vol. II, f. lxxiii^{v}. In transcribing Latin quotations I have, where relevant, changed *ā* to *an* or to *am*; *æ* to *ae*; *ĕ* to *em*; *i* to *j*; *ī* to *in*; *j* to *i*; *q* to *que*; *ß* to *ss*; *u* to *v*; *ŭ* to *um*; & to *et*. In the case of this quotation I have also corrected *faciuntum* to *facientium*, and *solidam* to *solida*. All translations from Latin are my own.
[22] *Rabelais* (London: Duckworth, 1979), 129.

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[23] *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).
[24] Binder and Desai, "The neurobiology of semantic memory."
[25] "Sage, *Sapiens*. Semble qu'il vienne de Sagax" (Nicot, 1606). The etymon of *sage* is now thought to be *sapidus.* Oscar Bloch and Walther von Wartburg, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), first published in 1932, 568.
[26] "Sagax, sagacis, Cic. Qui ha grand flairement. Et per translationem, Qui conjecture et prevoit bien les choses advenir, Sage, Prudent, Bien advisé.[…] Sagaces canes. Cic. Qui sentent incontinent la trace de la beste, comme font les chiens qu'on appelle espagnols, et autres appelez pendants." Lewis and Short's modern dictionary also notes that the primary meaning of *sagax,* "of quick perception, whose senses are acute, sagacious," is "chiefly of the acute sense of smelling in dogs." The notion that the reader would actually be *sagax* like the dog, rather than merely *saige,* may possibly also be suggested by the presentation of the dog as an "example" rather than a simile, however Erasmus employed "example" with a broad Aristotelian sense which encompassed similitudes, analogies, and so on. Cf for Quintilian, example was the figure of comparison in which the things compared were most similar, hence example was unlike simile when simile compared animals to people (*Institutio Oratoria,* bk 5, ch. 11.22), and sixteenth-century poetic theorists usually gave *example* a limited sense, attributing to it the function of providing models of conduct or models for writing. John D. Lyons, *Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 6-20.
[27] The *Dictionnaire du moyen français* gives A. "Répandre une odeur agréable" ; B. "Répandre une odeur désagréable, puer" ; C. "Percevoir, sentir une odeur." http://www.atilf.fr/dmf.
[28] Cotgrave gives "to feele; also, to sent, smell, vent, wind; also, to tast or savor; also, to heere; also, to yeeld a sent, savor, or tast; or to sent, savor, or tast, of; to have a smacke, touch, or spice, of."
[29] Lewis and Short.
[30] http://www.atilf.fr/dmf
[31] Cotgrave gives "to esteeme; think, deeme, trowe, suppose, repute, hold; weigh, consider; judge; prise, value; regard, respect, hold deere, set by, make much account of."
[32] I do not render "translatus" or "translatio" using terms such as "figurative" or "metaphor" because--as I will discuss--Dolet considers the *translatus* as a matter of degree. "LOCIS multis (id quod tamen maximè in tertio Tomo nostro demonstrabimus, cùm de phrasi Linguae Latinae scribemus) tum in hoc, tum in primo Tomo nostro à nobis traditum est, linguae cuiusvis et usum, et venustatem non in vocum tantùm proprietate, sed in translatis potissimum dictionibus consistere (id quod, inquam, quanta maxima fieri poterit diligentia, et judicio, tertio Tomo nostro docebimus) dignitatemque praecipuam ex vocum translatione linguas omnes nancisci." ("In many places both in this volume and in my first volume (and most of all I will show this in my third volume, when I write about expressions of the Latin language) I have passed on that the use and charm of any language consists not only in the proper meaning of words but most of all in transferred uses of words (that which, I say, I will show in my third volume with the greatest care which is possible, and judgement) and that all languages acquire their particular value from the 'transferral' of words"). (Lyon: Sebastian Gryphius, 1538), vol. II, col. 883.
[33] "COMMENTARIORUM meorum ratio tibi ut liquidius, faciliusque constet, quo in his utar ordine, scire te quidem velim. Principio propositae vocis significationem tum propriam, tum translatam ostendimus. Deinde usus varietatem distinguimus. Postremo exempla cumulamus: sed ea separatim. Nempe ut sua proprietati assignentur: translationi deinceps sua. Quod verò ad usus varietatem pertinet, sic nos quoque exempla secernimus, ut statim post dictionis proprietatem, translationemque (si quam fortè translationem habet) quanta possum diligentia, diligenter ostensam simplicia exempla sine intervallo sequantur." ("So that you may more clearly and easily understand the method in my Commentaries, I want you to know the arrangement that I am using in them. First of all I show the meaning of the word under discussion, both its proper and transferred meaning. Then I distinguish its variety of uses. Last of all I pile up examples, but each of these things separately. So that examples are assigned to the proper meaning and then to the transferred meaning. But in setting forth the variety of uses, I also divide the examples in such a way that immediately after I have carefully shown with as much care as I am able the proper meaning and the transferred meaning of the word (if it has a transferred meaning), simple examples follow without a pause.") "De Commentariorum ratione, et ordine" (Lyon: Sebastian Gryphius, 1536), vol. I, prefatory material, unpaginated.
[34] Vol. II, cols 884-5.
[35] Meaning more usually moves from concrete to abstract than the reverse. For a discussion of this in relation to Indo-European perception verbs, see Eve Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics: metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 23-48.
[36] *Institutio oratoria,* book VIII, ch. 2.
[37] Vol. I, col. 171.
[38] "INDAGARE est venatorum more inquirere, qui loca, ubi ferae latibula habent, investigant: dicimus autem indago rem, vel, de re" (Vol. I, col. 170).
[39] The verbs immediately following *odoror* in this citation--"sentiant […] existiment"--also mean that it bears an interesting similarity to Rabelais's sequence "fleurer, sentir, estimer," although the latter two verbs are not presented as synonyms or equivalents for *odoror* in the Cicero citation and one would not wish to draw firm conclusions from this (almost certainly coincidental) similarity.
[40] *Renaissance Truth,* 27-28.

[41] As Dolet puts it in the preface to the first volume ("De Commentariorum ratione, et ordine," unpaginated), "Vocabuli verò primò positi proprietate, translatione, usus, constructionisque varietate et verbis nostris, et Ciceronis exemplis satis multis demonstrata, voces alias significationis cognatione superioribus affines actutum subjungo: rem deinde, quantum licet, perpetuo" ("After I have demonstrated both with my own words and with sufficiently many examples from Cicero the proper meaning and transferred meaning and the diversity of use and of arrangement of the word under discussion, I immediately join other words which are connected by kinship to earlier words then I continue this affair for as long as possible"). Dolet draws attention to this practice relatively often, e.g. Vol II. Prefatory "De Secundi tomi ordine," unpaginated; vol. II, cols 1034, 1085, 1583. In the epitomes of the *Commentarii* produced by a Basle publisher (1537, 1539, 1540), the word entries in the first volume were rearranged alphabetically, although the original order was reproduced in tabular form after the lexicon proper; the second volume retained the arrangement by subject groups. The number of examples was also reduced. See Moss, 31-32. Dolet himself was proud of the order of his *Commentarii*, expressing this pride not only on a number of occasions in this work but also in others: see Michel Magnien, "La Philologie selon Dolet," in *La Philologie humaniste et ses représentations dans la théorie et dans la fiction*, ed. Perrine Galand-Hallyn, Fernand Hallyn, and Gilbert Tournoy (Geneva: Droz, 2005), vol II, 449, n. 30.
[42] Vol. I, cols 168-172.
[43] Moss, 28.
[44] Moss, 30.
[45] The sudden rupture in their friendship did not occur until 1542. Mireille Huchon, "Dolet et Rabelais," in *Étienne Dolet 1509-2009*, ed. Michèle Clément (Geneva: Droz, 2012), 345-59. Richard Copley Christie, *Étienne Dolet, The Martyr of the Renaissance 1508-1546: A Biography* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1899), first published in 1880, 371-386.
[46] Copley Christie, 229-240.
[47] *Gargantua* may have been published in 1534 but Huchon speculates that it is most likely to have been in the first third of 1535. *Œuvres completes*, 1054-55.
[48] On literary affordances, see Terence Cave, *Thinking with Literature: Towards a Cognitive Criticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 46-62.
[49] "Literature is powerful because, more than any other type of discourse, it triggers the activation of unpredicted sensorimotor configurations." *The Style of Gestures: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 17.
[50] Ana Raposo et al, "Modulation of motor and premotor cortices by actions, action words and action sentences," *Neuropsychologia* 47 (2009): 388-396.
[51] Nicole K. Speer et al, "Reading Stories Activates Neural Representations of Visual and Motor Experiences," *Psychological Science* 20 (2009): 989-999.
[52] Kuzmičová, "Presence in the reading of literary narrative: a case for motor enactment," *Semiotica* 189 (2012): 23-48. Ryan, *Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
[53] Drawing attention to this, Judith Anderson argues that we should "free Renaissance meaning from narrow, anachronistic lexicalisation." Anderson also observes that Robert Estienne's 1532 *Thesaurus linguae latine* draws attention to the principle of *translatio*. It does so in a less explicit and nuanced way than Dolet's *Commentaries*. "Translating Investments: The Metaphoricity of Language, 2 Henry IV, and Hamlet," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 40 (1998): 231, 235; reproduced in *Translating Investments: Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural Change in Tudor-Stuart England* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 8-35.
[54] Carruthers, *The Experience of Beauty in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 80-134. "Lectio in cortice, meditatio in adipe" (Guigo II, *Scala claustralium*, 3.43-7; cited by Carruthers, 131, n. 49).
[55] *Montaigne and the Art of Free-Thinking* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), 73. See Terence Cave in this volume.

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