

Abstract

Our research examines the role of followers in unethical leadership. Drawing on a social-cognitive approach to leadership and recent research in the field of behavioral ethics, we focus on how leader behavior and follower information processing interact to produce unethical outcomes. In two studies and using an experimental design simulating an in-basket exercise, we examine to what extent individual implicit assumptions regarding the follower role (i.e., implicit followership theories, IFTs) relate to employees' tendency to comply with unethical suggestions made by a leader. In Study 1, controlling for possible alternative explanations such as personal need for structure, romance of leadership, and moral disengagement, we found that the IFT Good Citizen increased and the IFT Insubordination decreased followers' tendencies to contribute to unethical leadership. In Study 2, we varied the unethical leader's suggestions to further investigate the conditions under which these effects occur and included authoritarianism as an additional control variable. Overall, our findings suggest that IFTs make a unique contribution to our understanding of the role of followers in unethical leadership, and that this contribution depends on the way leaders frame their unethical request. Interaction effects suggest that follower characteristics need to be considered as they are embedded in specific situational settings rather than as isolated traits.

How the influence of unethical leaders on followers is affected by their implicit followership theories

Unethical developments in organizations are often attributed to bad leaders or leaders' failure to implement moral standards. While this approach can be useful to explain unethical acts directly conducted by leaders (e.g., Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007; Schyns & Schilling, 2013; Tepper, 2007), unethical leadership transcends beyond the leaders' own behavior (Brown & Mitchell, 2010). When trying to explain cases in which leaders fulfil their unethical intentions through the acts of followers (Krasikova, Green, & LeBreton, 2013), focusing on the leader alone might not suffice (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). As leaders influence organizational outcomes indirectly through their followers' behavior (Lord & Dinh, 2014; Shamir, 2007), some forms of (unethical) leadership only take effect when employees internalize the follower role (DeRue & Ashford, 2010) and embody this role in a way that contributes to (unethical) leadership (Carsten, & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Morrison, 1994).

Employees use roles such as leader and follower as cues to structure their expectations about the adequate behavior of people who occupy these positions (Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Ilgen & Hollenbeck, 1991). Social-cognitive approaches to leadership (Lord & Maher, 1991) showed that when constructing these roles, employees draw upon their cognitive structures and schemas regarding traits and behaviors of leaders and followers, that is, implicit leadership and followership theories (ILTs and IFTs; Shondrick & Lord, 2010; Sy, 2010) as an interpretative frame. More recently, conceptual papers (Epitropaki, Sy, Martin, Tram-Quon, & Topakas, 2013; van Gils, van Quaquebeke, & van Knippenberg, 2010) suggested that ILTs and IFTs also influence how people interpret their own roles. What followers (implicitly) associate with their role should thus influence the nature of their contribution to a broad range of organizational outcomes, including (un)ethical leadership (Carsten, & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Parker, 2007).

Considering employees' implicit theories seems to be particularly promising in order to understand when and why employees contribute to unethical leadership in ambiguous situations (Moore & Gino, 2013; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Particularly in the business context, individuals are faced with sometimes contradicting demands tempting them to prefer the interest of the organization over external effects (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010). Unethical leaders may take advantage of this ambiguity by linking unethical behavior to valued organizational outcomes. As we will explain in more detail in the theory section, behavioral ethics research (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006) suggests that, in such situations, not only employees with clearly negative characteristics may engage in unethical behavior. Consequently, besides identifying the 'bad apples' who conduct clearly illegal behaviors such as theft and fraud (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010), we need to understand unethical behavior when those who exert it a) may not have the characteristics of people typically seen as unethical, b) may not realize that they contribute to unethical acts, and c) might even think that they contribute to the good of the company (Moore & Gino, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2010).

Applying behavioral ethics and social-cognitive approaches to leadership and followership, our research extends the current knowledge in three ways. First, we provide evidence for followers' contributions to unethical leadership. As we will review in the beginning of the article, this has been acknowledged as important but has not been in the focus of prior research. Second, we examine how followers' implicit role construction – defined as the extent to which individuals possess particular IFTs – interacts with unethical leader behavior to co-produce unethical outcomes. We approach this aim by linking behavioural ethics research and IFTs. Notably, we introduce IFTs as an indicator of followers' implicit role orientation, therefore complementing the currently dominant approach of examining leader-rated IFTs and how they influence leader behavior (Junker &

van Dick, 2014). Third, we add to the growing field of IFTs research by examining the consequences of IFTs with respect to unethical behavior and unethical leadership. We approach these three contributions with two studies in which we manipulate unethical requests made by a leader and examine how followers' IFTs influence their compliance. To examine the extent to which IFTs have a unique effect, we control for followers' individual differences that have been previously linked to followers' compliance with unethical leaders.

Theoretical Background

The role of followers in unethical leadership

Unethical leadership comprises "behaviors conducted and decisions made by organizational leaders that are illegal and/or violate moral standards, and those that impose processes and structures that promote unethical conduct by followers" (Brown & Mitchell, 2010, p. 588). While a leader can conduct unethical acts such as fraud and theft independently, leadership requires that one person (e.g., a manager) claims the leader role and at least one other person grants the leader role and accepts the follower role (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). Thus, some forms of leadership only occur when unethical leaders' influence attempts are met by followers whose characteristics make them susceptible to such attempts (Krasikova et al., 2013; Lipman-Blumen, 2004; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007).

Attempts to identify the characteristics of followers that contribute to unethical forms of leadership (for reviews, see Thoroughgood, Padilla, Hunter, & Tate, 2012; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) resulted in follower classifications such as bystanders and authoritarians. These follower types contribute to unethical leadership due to their inability to resist unethical influence attempts or their pursuit of personal gain through association with unethical leaders. However, evidence suggests that, at times, individuals engage in unethical behaviors even though they lack negative traits or selfish intentions (Moore & Gino, 2013). Employees sometimes engage in unethical behaviors due to prioritizing organizational goals over other

concerns (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Dietz, Reizenstein, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000) or because they aim at benefitting their organization (Umphress & Bingham, 2010). Indeed, classical social psychological studies and descriptions of historic events (e.g., Bauman, 1989; Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012) showed that good intentions and unethical acts are not necessarily contradictory. To give an example, in Milgram's (1974) studies, participants explained why they gave apparently deadly shocks citing the aim of contributing to the improvement of learning strategies and to help the experiment(er) to be successful.

These findings suggest that, to understand the many ways through which followers contribute to unethical leadership, we need to consider a broad range of employee characteristics and their specific interaction with context conditions (Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009) complementing the current focus on negative traits and deficits. Moreover, recent research in the field of behavioral ethics (Bazerman & Gino, 2012) revealed that (un)ethical behavior is only partly determined by deliberate choice; to a considerable extent, it is based on reflexive, automatic, and intuitive processes (Haidt, 2001; Moore & Gino, 2013; Reynolds, 2006). Linking social-cognitive approaches to leadership and followership (Shondrick & Lord, 2010) and recent research in behavioral ethics, we propose that the way employees implicitly construct their follower role is a neglected reason for their susceptibility to unethical leaders.

Implicit influences on followers' (un)ethical behavior

Normative approaches to ethics focus on how people ought to act (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984). Consequently, when a leader instructs a follower to conduct an unethical act, the follower will deliberately weigh benefits and costs of either complying or resisting the leader's unethical request. Behavioral ethics research, in contrast, focuses on how people *actually behave* when facing a moral issue (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crow, 2008). They emphasize that implicit processes such as habits, schemas, and intuitions drive a great deal of

human behavior (Bargh, 1997), and that this also applies to (un)ethical behaviors. Implicit information processing and responding to moral stimuli means that "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience" (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 15) influence both perceptions and evaluations made in current situations. These processes are, in turn, influenced by contextual cues and individual differences. To give an example, when participants held the implicit assumption that business is inherently moral and contextual cues framed the situation as competitive, they showed more immoral behavior in business-related tasks (Reynolds et al., 2010).

Interactionist versions of implicit approaches to ethical behavior (Reynolds et al., 2010) seem particularly relevant for explaining follower contributions to unethical leadership. As leadership is an interactive process including leaders and followers, a leader's unethical request functions as a contextual cue. Followers deal with this cue based on their prior experiences which are stored in long-term memory in the form of knowledge structures. These knowledge structures comprise idiosyncratic memories and schemas, but also existing expectations of how people who occupy specific roles should behave (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Followers' ideas and beliefs about their role (Morrison, 1994; Neale & Griffin, 2006) result in differing assumptions regarding "what types and breadth of tasks, goals, and problems they see within their set of responsibilities, and how they believe they should approach those tasks, goals, and problems" (Parker, 2007, p.404). To what extent these potentially multifarious role constructions include contributing to unethical acts is the focus of the current research.

Implicit followership theories and unethical leadership

Implicit leadership and followership theories (ILTs and IFTs; for reviews, see Epitropaki et al., 2013; Shondrick & Lord, 2010) are cognitive structures and schemas about traits and behaviors of followers and leaders that, in contrast to scientific theories, represent

social constructions. ILTs and IFTs are developed through processes of socialization and prior experiences with relevant stimuli. They are stored in memory and activated whenever individuals interact with (potential) representatives of the categories leader and follower (Eden & Leviatan, 1975; Kenney, Schwartz-Kenney, & Blascovich, 1996).

In a first approach to conceptualize content, structure, and consequences of IFTs, Sy (2010) differentiated six dimensions of followership: Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen as well as Conformity, Insubordination, and Incompetence. These dimensions form two second order factors: a Followership Prototype and a Followership Antiprototype, respectively. Their inherent positive and negative connotation stems from the assumption that the followership prototype is positively and the antiprototype is negatively related to followership effectiveness. Follower characteristics that signify effectiveness, however, may not necessarily imply ethicality. As we discussed above, well-meaning followers contribute to unethical outcomes at times (e.g., Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2010). Against this background, we need to consider how the different IFTs may relate to (un)ethical behavior. In the following, we start this endeavor by developing hypotheses regarding the question which IFTs may make it more or less likely that followers contribute to unethical leadership by complying with a leader's unethical advice.

IFTs that might facilitate followers' contribution to unethical leadership

Conformity has been associated with followership in the organizational behavior literature (Oc & Bashshur, 2013), in analyses of historical situations of unethical follower compliance (e.g., crimes of obedience; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), and in the literature on susceptible followers in the context of unethical and, more generally, destructive leadership (Padilla et al., 2007; Thoroughgood et al., 2012). In Carsten et al.'s (2010) exploratory study, just over one-third of the participating employees had a passive construction of the follower role emphasizing lack of responsibility, following orders, and deferring to the leader's

knowledge and expertise. Sy's (2010) assessment of "Conformity" as an IFT comprises the items Easily Influenced, Follows Trends, and Soft Spoken. We expect that employees who associate the follower role with these attributes are more likely to comply with a leader's advice, even if they are unethical, than those who do not do so.

The IFTs *Industry* and *Enthusiasm* comprise the items Hardworking, Productive, and Goes above and beyond for Industry as well as Excited, Outgoing, and Happy for Enthusiasm. Those attributes are associated with strong in-role performance and affiliative forms of extra-role behavior. However, they are not necessarily related to critical thinking and challenging forms of extra-role behavior (Carsten et al., 2010; van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean Parks, 1995). People who are dedicated to achieving a specific goal (as reflected in "Industry") might be blind to any side-effects of their behavior; followers who associate their role with enthusiasm, in turn, might be less attentive to negative outcomes when executing a leader's advice (Barbuta, 2000; Darley & Batson, 1973; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014). Thus, we expect followers who associate their role with industry and enthusiasm to follow a leader's advice more readily.

Our expectations regarding the influence of the IFT *Good Citizen* are mixed. On the one hand, Epitropaki et al. (2013) suggested that Good Citizen might be the only IFT that is related to being ethical. On the other hand, this suggestion might be problematic given that IFTs are not independent of the specific context and as such are tied to obligations to specific relational others (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). Taking into account that Sy (2010) defines this dimension using the items Loyal, Reliable, and Team Player, associating the follower role with being a Good Citizen might have a flipside. That is, when followers receive a leader's advice that is linked to a possible benefit for the organization although the consequences might be unethical, then followers who associate their role with being a Good Citizen might behave unethically. This possibility is in line with

the above-mentioned research and theory that employees sometimes engage in unethical acts with the intent to benefit their organization, its members, or both (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2010; Umphress & Bingham, 2010).

In sum, we propose that associating the follower role with conformity, industry, enthusiasm, and being a good citizen might make employees susceptible to comply with a leader's unethical request and thus contribute to unethical leadership. We expect:

Hypothesis 1: IFTs Conformity, Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen moderate the relationship between a leader's unethical advice and follower compliance. Employees who hold these IFTs are more likely to contribute to unethical leadership if advised to do so by a supervisor.

IFTs that might inhibit followers' contribution to unethical leadership

We expect that employees who hold the IFT *Insubordination* should be less likely to accept a leader's advice. Employees who associate the follower role with items such as Arrogant, Rude, and Bad Tempered, are not likely to accept authority at all and thus refuse to grant leadership to others (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). As leaders' influence is indirect through followers (Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014), unethical leadership will not unfold in cases where employees refuse to accept leadership claims. Thus, ironically, the negatively connoted IFT *Insubordination* might prevent the organization from harm when followers with this IFT disrupt an unethical leaders' agenda. We do not have particular expectations regarding the IFT *Incompetence*, as the respective items *Uneducated*, *Slow*, and *Inexperienced* are not related to either ethical or unethical behavior. Consequently, we expect:

Hypothesis 2: IFT *Insubordination* moderates the relationship between a leader's unethical advice and compliance. Employees who hold this IFT are less likely to contribute to unethical leadership if advised to do so by a superior.

Study Overview

Our aim to examine the influence of implicit processes on followers' tendency to contribute to unethical leadership required a rather subtle strategy. Hence, we designed a situation in which employees were confronted with a superior's advice to carry out an unethical act within the scope of an extensive in-basket exercise (for similar approaches, see Brief et al., 2000; Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008). In-basket exercises are typical components of assessment centers and are thus supposed to have considerable external validity (Bartol & Martin, 1990). That is why we preferred in-basket exercises over scenarios which also have been used in research on unethical behavior before (e.g., Carsten et al., 2010). In two studies, we adopted Brief et al.'s (2000, see also Petersen & Dietz, 2008) design to examine whether (and which) IFTs increase or decrease followers' tendency to comply with a leader's advice and thus contribute to unethical leadership. Furthermore, we varied the leader's unethical advice in the two studies to specify the conditions under which these contributions occur.

Study 1

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 187 individuals (80% female) with a mean age of 32.1 years ($SD = 8.5$). Of the participants, 116 were employed, 23 were self-employed, and 48 were not employed at the time of the study. Participants were enrolled in a distance education psychology programme (MBA equivalent) at a German university and took part in this study in partial fulfillments of course requirements. Thirty-four per cent of the employees worked in small organizations (up to 20 employees), 32% worked in middle-size organizations (21-500 employees), 18% worked in bigger organizations (501-10000 employees), and 16% worked in large organizations (more than 10000 employees). Seventy-five per cent held entry-level positions, 13% were in lower management, and 12% were in middle or higher

management. Different industries were represented in the sample, most of which were social and health care (21%), education (13%), sales and distribution (9%), manufacturing (9%), public administration (5%), and other services (23%). Half of the participants worked part-time (less than 30 h/week). As 12 participants had a nationality other than German, we included nationality as control variable in the analyses.

Procedure

In the first part of the in-basket exercise, participants were asked to adopt the role of Mr. Riedel, a middle-manager in a German fast-food chain. They received information about the structure of the company and the responsibilities of Mr. Riedel. Participants then worked on a series of tasks, for example, they decided on salaries for new employees, the organization of training programs, and applications for annual leave. In the second part of the in-basket exercise, participants were asked by the CEO to screen the applications of eight candidates in order to suggest three who would be invited for a job interview. Four candidates were native Germans and four were immigrants as was apparent on the candidates' CV: they were either both raised and educated in European Mediterranean countries and had a foreign name or raised and educated in Germany and had a German name. Participants were instructed to respect two criteria when selecting candidates: the candidates should have experience in the food industry and in sales. Two German and two immigrant candidates fulfilled both criteria and were therefore equally qualified for the job in question. The other two German and two immigrant candidates met only one of the two criteria and thus were not qualified.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the control condition, instructions were merely to select the best candidates. In the experimental condition, the CEO's instruction included a statement indicating that immigrants might not be appropriate for the position in question. The wording of the statement was: "While reading

the applications, I observed that there are foreigners among the applicants. When selecting an applicant, it is important to keep in mind that our staff in the headquarters consists almost exclusively of Germans. In the past, homogeneity of the human resources team has contributed very strongly to good teamwork and company success. Because of this the new head of the human resources team must be a guarantor of a ‘good chemistry’ in that team.”

As it constitutes discrimination (Dietz & Kleinlogel, 2015), complying with the instructions of this superior represents a follower’s contribution to unethical leadership as defined above (see Brown & Mitchell, 2010). We aimed at examining an ambiguous situation, because in such situations, individual differences are more influential than in strong situations (Knoll, Lord, Petersen, & Weigelt, 2016; Mischel, 1977). Behavioral ethics research also revealed that employees may be particularly susceptible to engage in unethical behaviors if good intentions and unethical behaviors are entangled. That is why in our study, the discrimination was veiled as a positive act, in that the CEO suggested discriminating to keep a work-force homogeneous. Note that following the leader's advice may facilitate cohesion and thus potentially benefit the organization, discrimination remains an unethical act.

Controlling for Alternative Explanations

When confronted with a leader's advice to act unethical (here: to discriminate in a personnel selection task), followers could reconstruct the advice so that it is not viewed as immoral (because it is to the benefit of the organization), reduce their sense of agency by minimizing their role in the situation (as they just followed orders), or fail to see the consequences of their action (e.g., do not think about the consequences for the applicant that is not invited). Bandura (1999) suggested that individuals are more likely to engage in unethical acts if they apply a number of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., moral justification, palliative comparison, ignoring or misconstruing the consequences) to convert immoral acts

so that they do not deviate from their moral standards. As such mechanisms of moral disengagement might facilitate followers' tendency to contribute to unethical organizational practices and thus question the relevance of IFTs, we include a measure of *propensity for moral disengagement* (Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012) as a control variable.

Another potential alternative explanation for the hypothesized effects is that followers may tend to displace responsibility for the unethical act to their leader (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Milgram, 1974). *Romance of leadership* (ROL; Meindl, 1995) describes the tendency to make leaders responsible for the success and/or failure of an organization. Research has shown that ROL is not only related to the perception of leaders, but also to decision making (Felfe & Petersen, 2007). Thus, ROL could be related to the decision to comply with a leader's advice as followers high in ROL might have a stronger tendency to delegate responsibility for decision making to the leader (Bligh & Schyns, 2007).

Furthermore, it is possible that a more basic cognitive process might explain the expected findings and thus render IFTs redundant. Cognitive rigidity, for example, has been linked to unethical behavior (Reynolds, 2006) and social conformity (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jugert, Cohrs, & Duckitt, 2009). *Personal Need for Structure* (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989) describes the degree to which individuals prefer to process environmental information in a way that offers structure and allows them to feel in control. Individuals high in PNS feel uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear and thus arrange their social interactions in ways that enable them to avoid complexity and retain their simple structures. Individuals low in PNS, in contrast, are more open to divergent information and thus should be more likely to consider broader consequences. If a leader provides meaning for an event or frames advice in a way that seems appropriate for the follower (e.g., because the suggested option is in the best interest of the organization), followers high in PNS might be more willing to act in line with

this advice whereas people low in PNS may consider the broader consequences. To show that IFTs have a unique effect above and beyond this alternative explanation, we control for PNS in our study.

Measures

Contribution to unethical leadership was operationalized as the extent to which the participants followed a leader's advice to discriminate in personnel selection, as described in more detail in the procedure section. Drawing on previous research (Brief et al., 2000), discrimination was measured as the number of foreign applicants selected to be invited to a job interview. The range was from 0 (no foreign applicants selected) to 3 points (three foreign applicants selected), with lower numbers indicating more discrimination.

Implicit followership theories were measured using Sy's (2010) 18-item measure. As described in the theory section, the six dimensions of the IFTs are represented by three items each. Participants rate how typical each item (e.g., "Loyal") is for a follower.

Moral disengagement was measured using Moore et al.'s (2012) Propensity to Morally Disengage scale. The scale assesses eight forms of moral disengagement with one item each. For example, diffusion of responsibility is measured with the item "People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too." Moore et al. suggest aggregating the scores on the eight items to form a comprehensive score.

Romance of Leadership (ROL) was measured using nine items that represented the core factor of the original ROL Scale (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1988; Schyns, Meindl, & Croon, 2007). In our study, we used the nine items (e.g., "When it comes right down to it, the quality of leadership is the single most important influence in the functioning of an organization") that showed highest loadings on this core factor in the four samples of Schyns et al.'s validation study.

Personal Need for Structure (PNS) was measured using the German version

(Machunsky & Meiser, 2006) of the 11-item scale that Neuberg and Newsom (1993) developed on basis of Thompson et al.'s (1989) PNS scale (sample item: "I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are unclear").

Results

Preliminary analyses

On average, the participants selected 1.23 ($SD = .62$) immigrant applicants. Participants of the control group selected 1.34 immigrants as job candidates while participants of the experimental group selected 1.13 immigrants. A one-way ANOVA showed that the difference between control group and experimental group was significant, $F(186) = 5.69, p = .02$. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for all study variables.

-----Please insert Table 1 about here -----

Hypotheses testing

After controlling for Personal Need for Structure (PNS), Moral Disengagement (MD), and Romance of Leadership (ROL), we expected that participants' tendency to contribute to unethical leadership when confronted with a relevant advice given by a leader would be higher for the IFTs Conformity, Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen (Hypothesis 1) and lower for the IFT Insubordination (Hypothesis 2). To test this moderation effect, we conducted seven regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). As shown in Table 2, in a first step (model 0), we included age, gender, nationality and the control variables PNS, ROL, and MD in the regression. In a second step (models 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a), we included the z-standardized scores for condition and one of the IFTs per regression. In a third step (models 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b), we included the interaction term of condition and the relevant IFT dimension.

-----Please insert Table 2 about here -----

Table 2 shows that including the interaction between condition and the IFT Good Citizen increased explained variance by 3% ($\beta = -.16, p = .02$). As can be seen in Figure 1, simple slopes show that for employees high in the IFT Good Citizen, the suggestion to discriminate decreases the number of selected immigrants, $t(176) = -3.34, p < .01$, indicating that followers high in the IFT Good Citizen contribute to unethical leadership more readily than those low in this IFT dimension. Regression analyses did not reveal significant contributions (all $\Delta R^2 \leq .01$) for interaction terms including condition and the IFT dimensions Conformity ($\beta = .02, p = .76$), Industry ($\beta = -.05, p = .55$), or Enthusiasm ($\beta = .01, p = .95$). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported for the IFT Good Citizen only.

-----Please insert Figure 1 about here -----

Table 2 also shows that including the interaction between condition and the IFT dimension Insubordination increased the explained variance by 3% ($\beta = .14, p = .05$), thus supporting Hypothesis 2. As shown in Figure 2, simple slopes show that for employees low in Insubordination, the suggestion to discriminate decreases the number of selected immigrants ($t(176) = -3.26, p < .01$). Thus, followers who associate the follower role with insubordination are less likely to behave in line with the unethical advice. The interaction term comprising condition and the IFT Incompetence was non-significant ($\Delta R^2 = .00, \beta = .03, p = .71$).

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Discussion

In this study, we examined the degree to which followers contribute to unethical leadership depending on their IFTs. Our experimental study showed that, as expected, participants holding the IFT Good Citizen complied more strongly with a leader's advice to discriminate in a personnel selection task, and participants high in the IFT dimension Insubordination were less willing to discriminate when the leader suggested doing so. Thus,

employees who are more inclined to think of followers as loyal and team players can actually become part of a process that is unethical, although their image of followers might be considered to be positive. We did not find this effect for the other positively connoted IFTs Industry and Enthusiasm, and also not for Conformity. In Study 2, we refine our experimental design to further investigate why these effects were so specific for the IFT Good Citizen.

Study 2

In this study, we aim to replicate and specify our most important Study 1 finding – the possibility that associating the follower role with being a good citizen might have detrimental effects. To specify the conditions under which employees high in the IFT Good Citizen contribute to unethical leadership, we extended our experimental design to differentiate the type of advices the leader gives.

When developing Hypothesis 1, we proposed that employees who implicitly associate the follower role with being a good citizen contribute to unethical leadership, because they aim at benefitting the organization. In line with this assumption, results from Study 1 showed that employees high in the IFT Good Citizen contributed to unethical leadership when the leader linked his advice to discriminate to a positive outcome for the organization (i.e., advantages of a more homogeneous group constitution). Without this link, the IFT Good Citizen was not related to discrimination. Based on Study 1, we cannot be sure whether individuals high in the IFT Good Citizen wanted to benefit the organization or simply followed the unethical leader's advice to comply with the leader. This is an important distinction as it specifies the conditions under which followers will contribute to unethical leadership.

The basic idea behind Organ's (1988) concept of organizational citizenship behavior and Sy's (2010) IFT Good Citizen is that a good citizen is motivated to contribute to the greater good of a defined community. Therefore, followers who associate the follower role

with being a good citizen differ from conformists who merely follow instructions and colluders who support unethical leaders due to selfish interests (Thoroughgood et al., 2012). We assume that individuals high in the IFT Good Citizen contribute to unethical leadership only when it is linked to positive outcomes for the community they belong to (here: the organization). This effect should, consequently, not manifest in situations in which a leader advises his or her followers to contribute to unethical leadership but does not link the behavior to the good of the organization. Therefore, we expect:

Hypothesis 3: IFT Good Citizen moderates the relationship between a leader's advice to contribute to unethical leadership and compliance only when the leader links his or her advice to positive organizational outcomes.

Method

Participants

The sample was comprised of 165 employees (55% female) with a mean age of 39.66 ($SD = 12.39$) years. Sixty-eight per cent of the employees held entry-level positions, 15% were in lower management, and 16% were in middle or higher management. Thirty-seven per cent worked in small organizations of up to 20 employees, 35% worked in medium-sized organizations of 21-500 employees, and 27% worked in bigger organizations of more than 500 employees. Different industries were represented in the sample, most of which were social and health care (25%), education (17%), industry and production (14%), and sales (9%). In contrast to Study 1, which was an online-study, participants were contacted by students from the third authors' university and received printed versions of the in-basket exercise in Study 2. We distributed an equal number of questionnaires for all three conditions. Resulting differences in participants assigned to the conditions are random.

Procedure

We used the same in-basket exercise as in Study 1, however, Study 2 consisted of the

control condition (no advice to discriminate against immigrants) and two experimental conditions. In the first experimental condition, the CEO merely gave the advice to discriminate against immigrants without justification. In the second experimental condition, the CEO linked his advice to discriminate against immigrants to the benefit of the organization similar to Study 1. This extended design allows examining whether followers with high values in specific IFTs contribute to unethical leadership merely to comply with an unethical leader (Experimental Condition 1) or to benefit the company (Experimental Condition 2).

Controlling for Alternative Explanations

We controlled for the influence of individual differences variables that were linked to followers' contributions to unethical behaviors in the past. Besides moral disengagement and need for structure that were already included in Study 1, we included authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) instead of ROL in Study 2. While ROL describes individual's tendencies to assign influence to a leader, authoritarianism is more about follower conformity.

The concept of authoritarianism has its roots in the authoritarian personality research that was introduced after World War II as an explanation for why people fell to the influence of unethical authorities (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Altemeyer (1996) revised the rather descriptive previous conceptualizations and introduced a conceptualization of authoritarianism comprising of three dimensions, namely submissiveness to authorities, aggressiveness against norm deviants, and adherence to conventional norms. Subsequent research suggested that focusing on the specific dimensions may be more promising than considering authoritarianism as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Funke, 2005). In order to understand followers' tendency to contribute to unethical acts that are suggested by a leader, authoritarian submission and conservatism seem most relevant as compared to aggressiveness (see also Feldman, 2003). Individuals with a tendency to be

submissive towards authorities are willing to subordinate individual autonomy to authority figures. High conventionalism is associated with a tendency to follow and support existing practices. Followers who score high on both dimensions are expected to have a rather low tendency to question suggestions made by authority figures.

Measures

We used the same measures for the IFTs with the exception of the IFT Conformity. As one item from this scale, "soft spoken", had very low item-total correlations and thus was lowering the alpha reliability of the scale, we discussed alternative translations and changed the wording into "docile".

To assess contributions to unethical leadership, we created two scores. One score was identical to the one used in Study 1 and accounted for the total number of immigrants selected. A second score adjusted the selection score due to the order of preference. As participants were asked to bring the three recommended applicants in an order with the most recommended applicant on top, the position that foreign applicants were assigned to may provide additional evidence for discrimination. A participant may, for example, fulfil expectations of social desirability or reassure herself by including a foreign applicant in the list, however, assign him or her to a position that makes it less likely that this applicant is considered. In the adjusted score, an individual who selected an immigrant on position 1 was assigned 3 points; for selecting an immigrant on position 2, we assigned 2 points, and for selecting an immigrant on position 3, we assigned 1 point. Thus, values for the adjusted second score ranged from 0 (no foreign applicants selected) to 6 points (three foreign applicants selected), lower numbers indicating more discrimination.

We assessed control variables moral disengagement and need for structure using the same scales as in Study 1. Authoritarian submission and conventionalism were measured with the respective three-item subscales of a German version (Beierlein, Asbrock, Kauff, &

Schmidt, 2014) of Altemeyer's authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1996). Example items were "We should be grateful for having leaders who tell us exactly what we should do" for submission and "Established practices should not be questioned" for conventionalism.

Results

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations among the variables. As can be seen, on average, participants selected 1.32 ($SD = 0.56$) immigrants. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the difference between the groups representing the three conditions of the experiment was significant, $F(2, 162) = 15.66, p < .01$. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the total number of selected immigrants was lower in the second experimental group ($M = 1.02, SD = 0.45$) compared to the control group ($M = 1.55, SD = 0.54; p < .01$) and the first experimental group ($M = 1.37, SD = 0.56; p < .01$). There was no statistically significant difference between the control condition and the first experimental condition ($p = .17$) in which the superior's advice (i.e., discrimination) was not linked to the good of the organization.

-----Please insert Table 3 about here -----

As the total number of selected immigrants masks whether immigrants were selected as first, second, or third choice, we created an additional, more specific measure as a second criterion. More specifically, we assigned more points to higher rankings. As expected and mirroring the effects for the total number of selected immigrants, the score for the second experimental group ($M = 1.88, SD = 1.13$) was lower than the score for the control group ($M = 3.29, SD = 1.24$) and the first experimental group ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.38$). A one-way ANOVA showed that this difference was significant, $F(2, 162) = 18.43, p < .01$. Notably, for the adjusted score, there was also a statistically significant difference between the control condition and the first experimental condition ($p = .03$). Thus, both scores indicate that participants who received the advice from their superior not to select immigrants as potential

job candidates choose fewer immigrants, and this tendency was particularly low if the leader linked his unethical advice to the good of the organization. To replicate findings from Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses including the z-standardized scores of the IFTs and condition (which included the two conditions we had in Study 1, namely Control condition and Experimental Condition 2 in Step 1 along with the control variables. In the second step, we included the interaction of Condition and the respective IFTs. Similar to Study 1, there was no interaction effect for the IFTs Conformity, Enthusiasm, and Industry. As it has been shown in Study 1 and (again) supporting Hypothesis 1, including the interaction between Condition and the IFT Good Citizen increased the explained variance, by 3% ($\beta = -.17, p = .05$). Using the adjusted score as dependent variable revealed the same results, $\Delta R^2 = .03\%$, $\beta = -.17, p = .04$.

As our Study 2 design included a multicategorical predictor variable, we used the PROCESS version 2.15 macro Model 1 as described in Hayes and Montoya (2016) to test Hypothesis 3. In this model, the type of condition was entered as predictor, the IFT Good citizen as the moderator, and number of immigrants selected as the outcome variable. Gender, age, moral disengagement, need for structure, and the two authoritarianism dimensions were included as control variables. We used the condition with no advice given by the superior as control condition; and PROCESS created two condition dummy variables: D_1 coding the first experimental condition (i.e., the condition in which the superior's advice was not linked to the good of the organization was coded 1, and the other two conditions were coded 0), and D_2 coding the second experimental condition (i.e., the condition in which the superior linked his unethical advice to the good of the organization was coded 1, and the other two conditions were coded 0). Results are shown in Table 4.

-----Please insert Table 4 about here -----

PROCESS outputs showed a R^2 for the unconstrained model of $R^2 = .24, F(11, 150) =$

4.52, $p < .01$. Test of moderation shows a change in R^2 resulting from adding both product terms of $\Delta R^2 = .02$, $F(2,150) = 2.48$, $p = .09$. Supporting Hypothesis 3, the product term of D_2 by IFT Good Citizen was significant ($b = -.22$, $SE = .10$, $p = .03$) whereas the product term of D_1 by IFT Good Citizen was not ($b = -.03$, $SE = .16$, $p = .85$). When using the adjusted score, the results were similar with slightly stronger effects: R^2 for the unconstrained model was .28, $F(11, 150) = 6.02$, $p < .01$. Test of moderation showed a change in R^2 resulting from adding both product terms of $\Delta R^2 = .03$, $F(2,150) = 2.65$, $p = .07$. Supporting Hypothesis 3, the product term of D_2 by IFT Good Citizen was significant ($b = -.57$, $SE = .26$, $p = .03$) whereas the product term of D_1 by IFT Good Citizen was not ($b = -.07$, $SE = .34$, $p = .84$). To visualize the differences in the interaction effects, we plotted the slopes for the control condition and the two experimental conditions in Figure 3.

-----Please insert Figure 3 about here -----

Simple slope analysis revealed that when it was linked to the good of the company, a superior's advice to discriminate decreased the number of selected immigrants for employees low in IFT Good Citizen (-1SD, $b = -.39$, $SE = .15$, $t = -2.63$, $p < .01$) and high in IFT Good Citizen (+1 SD, $b = -.78$, $SE = .12$, $t = -6.35$, $p < .001$). When the superior's advice was not linked to the good of the company (Experimental Condition 1) it did neither decrease the number of selected immigrants for employees' low in IFT Good Citizen (-1SD, $b = -.17$, $SE = .18$, $t = -0.94$, $p = .35$) nor high in IFT Good Citizen (+1 SD, $b = -.22$, $SE = .18$, $t = -1.26$, $p = .21$).

Discussion

Study 2 results replicate findings from Study 1 for the IFT Good Citizen with a different control variable and an additional adjusted score for the dependent variable. To address potential method and sample effects, we used a more mature sample and conducted the in-basket-exercise as a paper-and-pencil version instead of online assessment. More

importantly, the extended experimental design specifies the conditions under which the IFT Good Citizen relates to unethical leadership. The pattern of results shown in Figure 3 suggest that higher values in the IFT Good Citizen increase followers' tendency to contribute to unethical leadership only if the leader links unethical requests to the good of the company.

General Discussion

In two studies, we examined to what degree employees' implicit assumptions regarding the follower role as measured by their IFTs influence their tendency to contribute to unethical leadership. In Study 1, we found that employees who score high on the IFT Good Citizen were more likely and those scoring high on the IFT Insubordination were less likely to comply with a leader's advice to discriminate in a personnel selection decision. In Study 2, we could replicate the findings for the IFT Good Citizen. Study 2 results furthermore showed that employees who scored high on the IFT Good Citizen only comply when the leader linked his unethical advice to the benefit of the organization. When the leader merely advised to conduct unethical behavior, the IFT Good Citizen was not related to follower compliance. The pattern of results indicates that employees who associate the follower role with being a good citizen may contribute to unethical leadership when it is linked to the benefit of the organization.

In sum, our research suggests that considering followers' implicit theories enriches our understanding of followers' involvement in unethical organizational practices. Note that the proposed unique effect of the IFT Good Citizen held when controlling for a number of alternative explanations, that are individual differences in 1) the tendency to displace responsibility to a leader (Romance of Leadership), 2) the preference for social conformity (Authoritarianism), 3) the tendency to mentally reframe the situation so that it appears as less immoral (Moral Disengagement), and 4) cognitive rigidity (Personal Need for Structure). The specific findings with regard to the way the IFT Good Citizen was linked to the experimental

conditions furthermore suggest considering IFTs as a variable whose meaning emerges within context. This may include that employees construct the follower role not merely in reference to the leader but also in reference to the organization they want to benefit.

Implications for the understanding of (followers' contribution to) unethical leadership

Our findings provide evidence for the argument (e.g., Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Padilla et al., 2007) that followers' role in unethical leadership is not restricted to being a victim or a passive bystander, but that they actively contribute to unethical outcomes. Notably, followers who contributed to unethical leadership were not the ones high in negatively connoted characteristics as it has been suggested by prior research (e.g., Thoroughgood et al., 2012), but those who associated the follower role with a positive value (i.e., the good citizen image). This finding supports and extends prior research and theory that suggested a potential downside of positive employee characteristics (Judge et al., 2009; Umphress & Bingham, 2010). The meaning of follower characteristics seem to reveal itself when considered in interaction with situational demands.

In addition to showing that followers' susceptibility to unethical leadership does not always require embracing negative traits or motives, our findings indicate that followers' involvement in unethical leadership is not necessarily the result of a conscious decision to contribute to a negative process (e.g., to avoid negative consequences for oneself and/or approach personal gains; Padilla et al., 2007). In line with recent developments in the field of behavioral ethics (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds et al., 2010), our findings suggest that the elaboration-based view on (un)ethical behavior needs to be complemented by considering more automatic information processes involved in peoples' decision making and behavior. By showing the influence of implicit theories (here: IFTs) in the unfolding of unethical acts (here: discrimination), our findings suggest that subtle and insidious facilitators (Bargh, 1997, Detert & Edmondson, 2011) may also increase followers' susceptibility to unethical

leadership.

Implications for research on implicit followership theories

Our results enrich the existing knowledge about IFTs as we provided evidence that IFTs do not only influence how followers are perceived by leaders as shown in prior research (e.g., Whiteley, Sy, & Johnson, 2012), but also influence how followers behave. Our research also emphasizes that it might be useful to rethink whether the IFTs as suggested by Sy (2010) are exhaustive. For example, Sy's IFT dimensions do not cover attributes associated with courageous followership and constructive dissent (Chaleff, 1995; Riggio, Chaleff, & Lipman-Blumen, 2008; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007). As a consequence, only the IFT Insubordination emerged as a predictor of employees' refusal to follow an unethical leader's suggestion in Study 1. However, associating followership with being "arrogant" and "rude" is hardly something one would recommend organizations to encourage among their workforce. Hence, a more comprehensive approach to followership theories should include forms of challenging the status quo that are more compatible with reasonable organizational practice. Notably, indicators of such a facet did occur in Sy's pre-studies but the respective items were omitted during the scale development process. Besides considering these items, further attempts could draw upon Carsten et al.'s (2010) findings that followers construct their role not only along the dimensions of passive and active, but also as proactive. This is indicated by categories such as integrity, expressing opinions, and taking ownership. Finally, an extended spectrum of IFTs could cover more controversial facets of follower characteristics and behaviors without labeling them as negative (see Collinson, 2006, for a discussion on a broader spectrum of possible follower identities).

Our attempts to specify the conditions under which followers comply with a leader's unethical advice contribute to the debate on whether to view followers as part of a hierarchical relationship (i.e., the leader-follower dyad) or as co-creators of a leadership

process (Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). The finding that followers who scored high on the IFT Good Citizen only complied with the leader's unethical advice when it was linked to benefitting the organization suggests that followers construct their role not merely in reference to the leader but as part of the organizational context. This implies that context may not only function as moderating the relationship between follower characteristics and outcomes but to co-define how followers construct their role (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2012).

Limitations and directions for future research

Our findings indicate that followers' positive associations with the follower role may lead to negative outcomes. However, we only examined one form of unethical behavior (i.e., discrimination) and one way in which followers contribute to unethical leadership (i.e., by following a leader's advice not to select immigrants). Although situations in which followers actively contribute to unethical leadership are more dangerous compared to acts of omission, it is not clear which IFTs might be relevant in the latter. For example, conformity, which did not relate to participants' discriminating behavior in our study, might contribute to more passive forms of unethical followership such as remaining silent when observing a leader's unethical behavior (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2012). We furthermore focused on an ambivalent situation which allowed the participants to view the unethical act in a positive light (i.e., as it was proposed to benefit the company). Note that we did not create a situation to trap participants, but to highlight the susceptibility of well-meaning followers in moral grey zones, "situations that are morally ambiguous and in which leaders and followers together engage in practices that are likely to harm others, yet might benefit the organization, the follower, or the leader" (Knoll et al., 2016, p. 66; see also Anteby, 2008). Future research could examine whether the results differ when followers are asked to contribute to clearly unethical acts such as theft or bullying.

We are aware that our methodological approach using an experimental design to

examine the interaction between an unethical leader's advice and follower IFTs might raise questions regarding the external validity of our findings (Gorman, Clover, & Doherty, 1978) and to what extent our results may be explained by demand effects (Orne, 2009; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2009). Demand effects would suggest that, in the treatment condition, participants were doing simply what they were told to do as a function of what makes sense for the organization in a hypothetical situation. However, the differentiated results somewhat question this possibility. Note that we found the effects for the IFT Good Citizen only (and not for the IFT Industry, for example) and only in one of the two experimental conditions. We cannot say whether participants might act differently when they receive instructions from an actual superior. However, in a simulation, participants could quite easily refuse to comply with an unethical leader whereas at their workplace, when they have a psychologically significant relationship with their supervisor and a rejection may result in negative consequences, their behavior might be even more compliant. As discussed in more detail by Petersen and Krings (2009), in simulations, the tendency to follow authorities might be under- rather than overestimated. Thus, although evidence exists that the paradigm we used (i.e., in-basket exercise) can realistically simulate the actual decision making environments of managers (Bartol & Martin, 1990) and has been used in research on unethical behavior before (e.g., Brief et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2010), our findings are just a first step in establishing the role of IFTs as influencing unethical work behavior. The next steps will include further replications, ideally implemented in the work context.

Finally, our research is a first attempt to show that IFTs, in our case, the IFT Good Citizen, can have detrimental effects as they influenced followers' into contributing to unethical leadership, if their leader framed his request in a way that it supposedly benefits the organization. At this stage, we only know that IFTs affect employees' decisions; future research needs to specify at which stage of the decision-making process (Rest, 1986) this

impact occurs. For example, did participants with high values in IFT Good Citizen notice that discriminating against immigrants was an unethical act but complied with the leader's request anyway, or did their IFTs bias their perception of the situation in a way that they did not think an ethical issue was given (Moore & Gino, 2013; Reynolds, 2006). Even more subtle, their IFTs could bias participants' perception of applicants' qualification for the job. Although we cannot do this based on our data, future research could extend our paradigm to examine the stages in the (un)ethical decision-making process in more detail. Awareness of an ethical issue, for example, could be assessed by including a section in which participants rate whether they view preferring domestic applicants over better qualified immigrants as unethical (see Knoll et al., 2016 for a similar procedure). Potentially biased perception of applicants' qualifications could be assessed by including a section in which participants rate the qualification of each applicant (see Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008).

Conclusion

Interpretations of classical social psychological studies and historical cases of unethical leadership (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Arendt, 1963; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1974) suggest that merely accepting the follower role and being confronted with a leader's advice triggers obedience. However, not everyone contributed to unethical outcomes in the same way, neither in historical situations nor in psychological experiments (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Moreover, historians and sociologists (e.g., Bauman, 1989; Browning, 1992; Hilberg, 1992) question the common-sense assumption that only bad people do bad things emphasizing the need to understand how and why 'ordinary men' contribute to unethical practices in general and unethical leadership in particular. In this paper, we combined research into unethical behavior and into followership to examine further which characteristics of followers (in this case, their IFTs) make them susceptible to unethical leadership. We examined employees' contribution to unethical

leadership as the result of a sense-making process that depends on followers' active (but not necessarily conscious) construction of the follower role. We showed that, as this construction involves the interaction of person characteristics and contextual variables, the meaning of follower characteristics and their consequences may change depending on the configuration of context and situation.

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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for Study 1 variables

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 Age	32.06	8.53	-											
2 Gender ^a	1.80	0.40	-.05	-										
3 Need for structure	4.30	0.76	-.13	.03	<i>.84</i>									
4 Romance of Leadership	4.85	0.82	.18*	-.03	.16*	<i>.85</i>								
5 Moral Disengagement	2.47	0.81	-.19*	-.14	.15*	.02	<i>.72</i>							
6 IFT ^b Industry	4.88	0.87	-.04	.03	.18*	.08	.00	<i>.76</i>						
7 IFT Enthusiasm	3.95	0.73	-.09	.08	.14	.12	-.04	<i>.55**</i>	<i>.60</i>					
8 IFT Good Citizen	4.76	0.88	.10	-.04	.15*	-.05	.02	<i>.61**</i>	<i>.38**</i>	<i>.75</i>				
9 IFT Conformity	4.17	0.83	.06	.01	.02	-.03	-.09	-.03	<i>-.19**</i>	.14	<i>.56</i>			
10 IFT Incompetence	2.90	0.84	.02	-.13	-.13	-.04	.06	<i>-.39**</i>	<i>-.20**</i>	<i>-.24**</i>	<i>.38**</i>	<i>.75</i>		
11 IFT Insubordination	3.10	0.93	-.03	-.04	-.03	.03	.09	<i>-.21**</i>	-.03	<i>-.50**</i>	.13	<i>.53**</i>	<i>.76</i>	
12 Immigrants selected	1.23	0.62	-.17*	.02	-.04	-.07	-.02	-.10	-.08	<i>-.19**</i>	-.06	.01	.12	-
13 Condition ^c	0.50	0.50	.04	.07	-.11	-.12	-.04	.03	.02	-.05	.02	-.01	.10	-.17*

Notes. *N* = 187 (control group *n* = 92; experimental group *n* = 95). ^aGender 1 = male, 2 = female. ^bIFT = Implicit Followership Theories. ^cCondition 0 = Control Group, 1 = Experimental Group. Alpha Reliabilities in italics. ** *p* ≤ .01; * *p* ≤ .05.

Table 2. *Multiple regression analysis predicting discrimination with Condition, Implicit Followership Theories (IFTs), and their Interaction while controlling for Personal Need for Structure (PNS), Romance of Leadership (ROL), and Moral Disengagement (MD), Study 1*

	IFT	Conformity		Industry		Enthusiasm		Good Citizen		Insubordination		Incompetence	
Model	0	1a	1b	2a	2b	3a	3b	4a	4b	5a	5b	6a	6b
Age	.22**	.20**	.20**	.21**	.20**	.22**	.22**	.17**	.16**	.20**	.19**	.21**	.20**
Gender ^a	-.10	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.00	-.01	.01	.01	.00	.01
Nationality	.04	.04	.04	.03	.03	.04	.04	.02	.01	.02	.01	.03	.04
PNS	-.04	-.06	-.06	-.05	-.04	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.01	-.06	-.07	-.06	-.06
ROL	-.03	-.05	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.03	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.06	-.05	-.04
MD	-.08	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.08	-.09	-.08	-.07	-.08	-.09	-.08	-.08	-.08
Condition		-.17*	-.17*	-.16*	-.16*	-.16*	-.16*	-.18*	-.18**	-.18*	-.19**	-.17*	-.17*
IFT		-.08	-.08	-.08	-.09	-.09	-.09	-.19**	-.19**	.12	.14	-.01	.00
IFT x Condition			.02		-.05		.01		-.16*		.14*		.03
ΔR^2		.03 ^{*b}	.00 ^c	.03 ^{*b}	.00 ^c	.03 ^{*b}	.00 ^c	.06 ^{**b}	.03 ^{*c}	.04 ^{*b}	.02 ^{**c}	.03 ^b	.00 ^c
R^2	.05	.08	.08	.08	.09	.08	.08	.14	.17	.09	.11	.08	.08

Notes. *N* = 187. PNS = Personal Need for Structure; ROL = Romance of Leadership; MD = Moral Disengagement; Condition: 0 = control group without suggestion to discriminate, 1 = experimental group with suggestion to discriminate by superior; Dependent variable is number of immigrants selected, negative relations indicate less immigrants selected and therefore more discrimination. ^amale = 1, female = 2. ^bincremental validity compared to model 0; ^cincremental validity compared to the respective models 1a-6a.

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

Table 3. Means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for Study 2 variables

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Age	39.75	12.41	-													
2 Gender ^a	1.55	0.50	-.01	-												
3 Moral Disengagement	2.51	0.88	-.10	-.13	.78											
4 Need for Structure	4.14	0.67	-.07	-.03	.15	.81										
5 Author. Submission	3.77	1.25	-.07	-.13	.28**	.32**	.78									
6 Conventionalism	3.24	1.15	.11	-.00	.28**	.40**	.37**	.75								
7 IFT Industry	4.85	0.87	-.08	.06	-.11	.08	.17*	.25**	.74							
8 IFT Enthusiasm	3.85	0.95	-.11	.06	.07	.20**	.20*	.09	.33**	.75						
9 IFT Good citizen	5.01	0.90	.05	-.09	-.12	.22**	.26**	.27**	.47**	.35**	.81					
10 IFT Conformity	4.07	1.08	-.22*	-.16*	.26**	.08	.17*	.15	.08	.05	-.03	.82				
11 IFT Incompetence	2.69	0.93	-.05	-.05	.29**	-.11	.06	-.07	-.29**	-.10	-.22**	.38**	.71			
12 IFT Insubordination	2.52	1.20	-.17**	-.08	.24**	-.01	-.03	-.07	-.23**	.02	-.33**	.37**	.53**	.91		
13 Immigrants selected ^b	1.32	0.56	.02	-.03	-.10	.04	-.08	-.08	.21**	.20**	.14	-.07	-.03	-.02	-	
14 Immigrants selected adjusted score ^c	2.62	1.38	-.02	.03	-.19*	.03	-.09	-.06	.22**	.25**	.18*	-.06	-.02	-.06	.82**	-
15 Condition ^d	1.99	0.83	.13	-.04	.01	.00	.06	-.13	-.16*	-.24**	-.07	-.05	-.08	-.07	-.40**	-.43**

Notes. *N* = 164 (control group *n* = 57; experimental group 1 *n* = 51; experimental group 2 *n* = 56). ^amale = 1, female = 2. ^bNumber of immigrants selected, immigrants selected indicate more discrimination. ^cAdjusted score for number of immigrants selected in which order of selection is considered. ^dCondition was coded 1 = no advice to discriminate, 2 = leader's advice to discriminate linked to the good of the company, and 3 = leader's advice to discriminate not linked to the good of the company. IFT=Implicit Followership Theories. ** *p* ≤ .01; **p* ≤ .05.

Table 4. *Regressions of type of Condition (no advice to discriminate, advice not linked to the good of the company, advice linked to the good of the company) on number of immigrants selected (lower number indicate discrimination) when employees' Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Good Citizen is the moderator, Study 2*

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>LLCI</i>	<i>ULCI</i>
Constant	1.51	0.46	3.28	.00	0.60	2.42
Gender	-0.04	0.09	-0.44	.66	-0.21	0.13
Age	0.00	0.00	1.13	.26	-0.00	0.01
Moral Disengagement	-0.02	0.05	-0.31	.76	-0.12	0.09
Need for Structure	0.10	0.08	1.19	.24	-0.07	0.26
Authoritar. Submission	-0.02	0.04	-0.34	.73	-0.10	0.07
Conventionalism	-0.11	0.05	-2.49	.02	-0.20	-0.02
IFT Good Citizen	0.16	0.09	1.81	.07	-0.02	0.34
D ₁	-0.20	0.11	-1.74	.08	-0.42	0.03
D ₂	-0.58	0.10	-5.81	.00	-0.78	-0.38
D ₁ xIFT Good Citizen	-0.03	0.16	-0.18	.85	-0.34	0.28
D ₂ xIFT Good Citizen	-0.22	0.10	-2.14	.03	-0.42	-0.02

Note. *b* = unstandardized beta weight, *SE* = standard error, *D*₁= Experimental condition 1 = 1 and Control condition and Experimental condition 2 = 0, *D*₂= Experimental condition 2 = 1 and Control condition and Experimental condition 1 = 0.




Figure 1. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Good Citizen and condition on discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, low scores meaning less immigrants selected)




Figure 2. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Insubordination and condition on discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, low scores meaning less immigrants selected)




Figure 3. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Good Citizen and Experimental conditions (CG = Control Condition, no advice to discriminate; EG1 = Experimental Condition 1, advice to discriminate not linked to the good of the company; EG2 = Experimental Condition 2, advice to discriminate linked to the good of the company) on discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, low scores meaning fewer immigrants selected)