Dangerous Contenders: Election Monitors, Islamic Opposition Parties and Terrorism*

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Abstract

How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challengers, especially when Islamic movements are perceived as a threat to political stability. In support of our hypothesis, we find that outside monitors are more likely to endorse an election in countries with an Islamic opposition party and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Furthermore, we find that the effect is driven by Western monitoring organizations and becomes stronger after the September 11 attacks. Our findings provide a simple yet powerful insight: the calculus of outside observers depends not only on who they wish to see in power, but also who they want to keep from power.

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Democracy promotion has become one of the key elements of Western foreign policy since the Cold War ended, but Western states have not consistently pushed autocratic governments towards liberalization. This variation in Western pressure had important consequences for the spread of democracy: where consistent pressure was applied the chances of democratization were greatest and where democracy promotion was sidelined by other concerns the chances of democratization were much lower.[1]

So, how do outside actors, especially those from the West, decide between promoting democracy and condoning authoritarianism in a country? Scholars have posited that Western states face a trade-off between their desire to promote democracy and their own national interests.[2] Previous research has shown that in economically and politically important countries the West has been more willing to overlook repression.[3] Likewise, incumbents who have made preliminary moves toward democracy and those who have maintained good relations with the West have felt less pressure to liberalize.[4] In other words, the West promotes democracy less consistently when the state in question is important and the incumbent is someone the West wants to keep in power.

In this paper we bring opposition parties into the study of democracy promotion. We argue that the calculus of outside actors depends not on their absolute bias towards the incumbent regime, but their *relative bias* toward the incumbent regime and its challengers.[5] That is, the decision to promote political liberalization depends on who is likely to replace the incumbent. If the most likely challenger to replace the incumbent harbours suspicious attitudes toward democracy and international cooperation, then outsiders will be more likely to turn a blind eye to the incumbent's electoral manipulation. We propose that in the post-Cold War period the most "dangerous" challengers from the West's perspective have been Islamic political parties, by which we mean parties seeking to increase the role of Islam

[1] Levitsky and Way 2005
[2] e.g., Kelley 2009
[3] Levitsky and Way 2005
[4] Kelley 2009
[5] See also Bubeck and Marinov 2017.

in political life.[6] Islamic parties often contest elections in the geostrategically important Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and have proved electorally viable in several countries, including Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia.[7] The Islamic parties' hawkish views on Israel and the USA, combined with doubts about these parties' commitment to democracy have made them threatening to outsiders.[8] A crucial factor exacerbating this problem is Islamist terrorist attacks. In countries targeted by violent Islamist groups both domestic and international actors will have greater doubts about Islamic parties' willingness and ability to restrain radicals. Therefore, we expect that international observers will tolerate electoral manipulation more when facing the combination of an Islamic opposition party and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign.[9]

As illustration consider the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections in Tanzania. The two elections are similar in that the main opposition party was the *Civic Union Front* (CUF), which primarily represents Muslims and faces accusations by the incumbent party *Chaca Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) of religious extremism.[10] In both elections the ruling party won and the CUF claimed fraud.[11] Moreover, respected international monitors also considered both elections as flawed.[12] Yet, whereas none of the international monitors endorsed the 1995 election, in 2000 two of the four monitors announced that they considered election quality acceptable. The key difference, we argue, was the 1998 Al-Qaeda attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 200 people and brought Al-Qaeda to the attention of the US government. The attacks highlighted the threat of religious fundamentalism in Africa and led to counter terrorism cooperation between Tanzania and the

[6]Most scholars of Islam and politics distinguish between "Islamic" and "Islamist" actors. We follow convention using the broader term "Islamic" to refer to the set of parties in our analysis (which includes moderates and radicals) and "Islamist" to refer to individuals and movements, including terrorists, seeking to implement Islamic government.

[7]Cammett and Luong 2014, 188

[8]Jamal 2012

[9]We assume that incumbents' engage in fraud, following Bubeck and Marinov 2017, 537.

[10]Brents and Mshigeni 2004, 67

[11]Ibid., 61

[12]See the election monitoring dataset (DIEM) introduced in Kelley 2012.

US.[13] In short, by 2000 Tanzania was a country where an Islamic opposition party contested elections and Islamist terrorists were active. This paper explores whether in other countries under similar circumstances international election monitors display an anti-Islamic bias in their evaluations.

We test this hypothesis in the context of election monitoring, a core component of democracy promotion. We find that, conditional on the extent of electoral irregularities, international monitors are more likely to endorse an outcome if the incumbent regime faces *both* an Islamic challenger and an ongoing Islamist terror campaign. If a country is not suffering from any terrorism, or existing terrorist groups are non-Islamist, then we do not observe any bias against Islamic opposition parties. We further present evidence that this pattern of behavior is displayed only by Western monitors and is absent for non-Western monitoring organizations. Lastly, we show that the bias existed prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, but becomes stronger after 9/11, when the War on Terror began and stopping radical Islam became a priority for the West. In sum, our findings support the idea that Islamist terrorism makes Islamic parties suspect in the eyes of Western observers and leads them to overlook electoral fraud committed against Islamic challengers.

The paper contributes to the literature on foreign interventions in domestic affairs and the literature on election observer bias. Domestic sovereignty is a frequently violated norm. For instance, during the Cold War the US and the Soviet Union used their economic and military power to destabilize each other's allies and prop up their own.[14] After the Cold War direct military interventions became less common and elections have become the legitimate method of changing governments. In this context foreign powers could help their allies remain in power by giving funding to their favored candidate, making promises of aid conditional on their ally's victory, or ignoring electoral abuses committed by their ally.[15] We contribute to this important literature by examining how violent groups can influence

[13]Haynes 2005, 1326,1331 and Ploch 2010, 57
[14]Gaddis 2006
[15]Robinson 1996; Corstange and Marinov 2012; Bubeck and Marinov 2017

outsiders' perceptions of political candidates (e.g. Islamic opposition parties) and impact international actors' incentives to endorse or reject fraudulent elections.

With regard to the literature on election observer bias, we build on Kelley's work.[16] Like Kelley, we argue that whether international monitors endorse an election or not does not solely depend on its quality, but also on the interests of their member states, donors[17], or other tangential organizational norms.[18] We expand Kelley's work by looking at a previously ignored election-specific factor in this literature – i.e., the type of electoral challenger.[19]

Election Monitor Bias, Islamic Opposition and Islamist Terrorism

We first theorize which factors can influence an election monitor's decision to endorse or reject an election outcome. We then argue that in the post-Cold War era distrust toward Islamic parties has made election monitors more likely to endorse fraudulent elections in which Islamic opposition parties challenge the incumbent. Lastly, we argue that the threat perception of Islamic parties is heightened by domestic and international Islamist terrorism.

The Trade-Off Between Stability and Democracy Promotion

The basic premise of our argument is that election quality is not the only factor international monitors take into consideration when deciding whether to endorse or oppose an election outcome. Election monitors also consider the interests of member states or major donors.[20] In particular, we argue that election monitors face a trade-off between democracy promotion and international stability in the post Cold War period. Whereas stable countries present

[16]Kelley 2009

[17]By "donors" we refer to (state and non-state) actors that may have influence over a monitoring organization due to their control over funding or personnel management. For examples of donor pressure on election monitors in past elections, see Kew 1999 and McIntire and Gettleman 2009.

[18]Kelley 2009

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

more opportunities for cooperation, democratization brings new groups into politics and can be turbulent.[21] Although fears of communist takeovers have disappeared with the end of the Cold War, decision-makers continue to recognize the tension between stability and democratization,[22] as negative evaluations may destabilize a regime in the aftermath of elections.[23][24]

A monitor's preference for stability depends essentially on it's bias toward the incumbent *relative to* alternatives. The choice between endorsing a problematic election and rejecting it is equivalent to a choice between continuing relations with the incumbent versus supporting an alternative and establishing a new relationship. So, the better the relations with the incumbent, the more concerned a monitor's key donors might be about upsetting political and economic relations, and the more likely the monitor is to endorse an election.[25] However, outsiders' fondness for the incumbent is not the only relevant factor here. Their views toward the challengers also matter.[26] If challengers include parties with unfriendly ideologies and militant wings, combined with a significant chance of gaining power, then the importance of maintaining stability increases. A monitor may support an authoritarian regime not because the incumbent provides any real benefits, but because destabilizing him/her may bring to power an even worse actor – from the perspective of key members or donors.[27] In short, the calculus of monitors inevitably includes who the opposition parties are and whether they have a significant chance of gaining power through elections.

[21] Huntington 1968

[22] Carothers 1997

[23] Hyde and Marinov 2014; Bush and Prather 2017a

[24] Non-democracies are selective about which outside groups to allow into the country and non-governmental organizations adapt their policies to avoid expulsion. Bush 2015 In the robustness section we explicitly address this selection issue.

[25] Kelley 2009

[26] Bubeck and Marinov 2017

[27] The following quote by President Kennedy during the Cold War illustrates this: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third." Smith 2012, 226

Islamic Parties' Political Goals and Credibility Problem

In the post-Cold War era many scholars see Islamic opposition parties as a threat to political stability because they are popular and espouse potentially disruptive political goals. There are several explanations on why Islamic movements are better than other groups at gaining popularity.[28][29] First, Islamic parties' strong emphasis on honesty and fairness appeals especially to people who live in poor and often corrupt societies.[30] Secondly, Islamic political parties are usually related to grassroots organizations that provide local public goods, which in turn lend them a good reputation.[31] Thirdly, Islamic parties have often been allowed to exist while other forms of non-state groups were repressed.[32] Hence, their ideological appeal, grassroots service, and reputation for good governance make Islamic parties electorally viable and dangerous to unpopular incumbents.

In addition to their popularity, Islamic parties' domestic and foreign policy goals also raise concerns. In foreign policy, potential problems are that most Islamic parties have mentioned *jihad* in their party platforms and opposed Israel, a close ally of the West and the US in particular.[33] Coupled with Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" thesis,[34] these party platforms have raised the suspicion that if Islamic parties come to power they may pursue aggressive policies toward the West and its allies, much like post-revolution Iran has done.[35] In domestic politics, some have suspected that Islamic parties pretend to be democratic and compete in elections until they achieve the power to use more forceful methods.[36][37] If

[28] Cammett and Luong 2014

[29] Even if Islamic parties have not been very strong in most elections they participated in, the general view is that they are a formidable electoral force. Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Hamid 2011

[30] Wickham 2002

[31] Masoud 2013

[32] Brumberg 2002

[33] Gerges 1999; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010

[34] Huntington 1996

[35] Gerges 1999; Masoud 2008

[36] Masoud 2008

[37] Although Islamic parties may try to signal their commitment to democracy and moderate policies, credibility problems limit their ability to convince the skeptics. Verbal commitments to pluralism can be dismissed as cheap talk and divisions between moderate and hardliner factions make it difficult for Islamic parties to give a unified message of moderation. Kalyvas 2000

true, this could have severe negative consequences for international actors, especially in the MENA region, which is geostrategically important for the West.

This does not mean that Islamic political parties are seen as a dire threat to democracy at all times and places. Our main point is that there has been mistrust toward Islamic movements that is difficult to dispel. Whether this mistrust creates bias in election monitors' evaluations is influenced by other contextual factors, most importantly, Islamist terrorism.

Islamist Terrorism and Heightened Threat Perception

We expect Islamic parties' credibility problem and outsiders' bias toward them to be more severe in countries where Islamist terrorist groups operate. Islamist terrorism can have this effect by magnifying the perceived threat of Islamic parties' electoral participation.

Firstly, terrorism discredits moderates, which is one of the primary goals of violent extremists and they are more likely to succeed when outsiders do not have much trust toward the moderates to begin with.[38] Note that these effects do not require the terrorist group to be very large or the violent campaign to be sustained for long. Even a small group of terrorists can have a considerable impact, because cognitive mechanisms, such as availability bias, lead people to overreact to threats.[39]

Moreover, incumbents have often used Islamist terrorist attacks as an opportunity to repress and weaken a powerful challenger under the guise of counter-terrorism.[40] In Tanzania, following the controversial 2000 election mentioned in the introduction, government security forces used force to suppress demonstrations against electoral fraud resulting in at least 30 people killed and hundreds injured. Tanzanian officials claimed that their response was justified, because "protests had been encouraged by Islamist fundamentalists with ties to Osama bin Laden ... [and they were] an attempted coup d'etat", but a Human Rights Watch report contradicts this account.[41] Outside observers may be receptive to such government

[38] Kydd and Walter 2002
[39] Mueller 2006; Sunstein and Zeckhauser 2011
[40] Wegner 2011
[41] Human Rights Watch 2002, 42

claims, because Islamic opposition parties often have ties to violent Islamist groups[42] and outsiders lack the intelligence capabilities and mandate to conduct independent investigations in these countries.

In short, Islamic opposition parties, especially in combination with Islamist terrorism, may be perceived by the West to present a greater threat to stability than most other challengers. As foreign governments care more about keeping Islamists out of power, they can also push election monitors to be more tolerant to incumbents who electorally suppress Islamic parties. Combining these arguments leads to our main prediction: if an election monitoring organization values stability over democratization, then it will be more tolerant toward fraud in elections involving an Islamic challenger and Islamist terrorism than those without Islamic opposition or non-Islamist terror. As we argue that the West is more likely to value stability over democratization, we expect Western monitors to be significantly more lenient towards fraud committed against Islamic opposition parties than non-Western observers.

So far we have discussed the role of domestic terrorism, but transnational Islamist terrorism can also heighten threat perceptions. The primary example of transnational Islamist terrorism are the 9/11 attacks, which changed the course of US foreign policy. The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated terrorists' ability to inflict large-scale attacks in Western countries[43] and "reinforced the apprehensions of the US foreign policy establishment about all Islamists".[44] After 9/11, an Islamic party with ties to radicals is not only a threat to its own country's stability, but also a potential supporter to global terrorism. Given these new risks, in the post-9/11 era we expect the relative importance of stability to increase and election monitors to become more tolerant toward fraud committed against Islamic opposition parties, especially when the country in question has an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign.

[42] Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger 2008
[43] Walt 2001
[44] Gerges 2013, 415

Research Design

Data

Our unit of analysis is an organization-election between 1990 and 2004; that is an election judged by a monitoring organization from January 1991 to December 2004. We limit our analysis to the post-Cold War period, as geopolitical concerns of the West during the Cold War overshadowed the stability-democracy tradeoff crucial to our argument and election monitoring became an international norm during that time period.[45][46] Monitoring organizations include intergovernmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that publish their reports within three months of an election, based on collected information from in-country observers before, during, and after a poll. Below we distinguish between Western and non-Western organizations based on their membership (for IGOs) or the location of their head office (for NGOs).[47]

Our outcome measure denotes whether an organization endorses the election outcome or not. This dichotomous variable, *Acceptable*, reflects an organization's summary assessment. It is a dichotomous version of the three-level *Election Quality* variable in the Dataset on International Election Monitoring (DIEM).[48] *Acceptable* takes the value of 1 only if the monitor's report explicitly endorses the outcome and 0 if the report was either ambiguous about the quality of an election or deemed it unacceptable.[49]

Our measure of electoral irregularities is the *Problems* variable from the DIEM[50], which ranges from 0 ("no problems") to 3 ("major problems"). This variable is comprehensive in scope, including problems in the country's legal framework, problems in the pre-election period, and the election day itself. By including this variable we are able to estimate the

[45] Hyde 2011

[46] The results remain qualitatively similar when extending the time period to include all organization-elections between 1984 and 1990, as shown in Appendix Table A.18.

[47] For the list of Western and non-Western election monitors in our dataset see Appendix Table A.2.

[48] Kelley 2012

[49] Our results are robust to using the three-level *Election Quality* as the dependent variable. See Appendix Table A.5.

[50] Kelley 2012

effect of Islamic opposition parties, Islamist terror, and their interaction on an organization's endorsement of an election, conditional on the extent of electoral problems an organization identified. If monitors made their decision to endorse or reject an election exclusively on the extent of electoral problems, then the coefficient estimates of all other variables should be close to zero and statistically insignificant.

Data on Islamic opposition parties is based on a list of all Islamic parties between 1968-2008, where an Islamic party is defined as a party that "seeks to increase the role of Islam in political life".[51] To arrive at our *Islamic Opposition Party* variable, we identified all Islamic parties out of government on Kurzman and Naqvi's list.[52][53] This dichotomous variable is coded 1 if there is an Islamic opposition party in the country and 0 otherwise.[54]

Our terrorism measures are based on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents[55], which compiles data on terrorism from around the world for the entire period we study. Following Jones and Libicki, we distinguish between Islamist and non-Islamist organizations in this database and calculate, for each election, the number of killings committed by Islamist and non-Islamist groups in that country in the preceding year.[56] These numbers, *Islamist Terrorism* and *Non-Islamist Terrorism*, are our primary measures of terrorist activity.[57]

Although our hypothesis is about the interaction of *Islamic Opposition* and *Islamist Terrorism* we also control for *Non-Islamist Terrorism* and its interaction with *Islamic Opposition*. This is necessary to ensure that our *Islamist Terrorism* variable does not simply capture a country's overall political instability.

[51] Kurzman and Naqvi 2010, 51

[52] Ibid.

[53] In Appendix Table A.19 we show that we get similar results using an alternative measure based on the Database of Political Institutions.Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016

[54] We include observations where an Islamic opposition party was banned from or boycotted an election, because these bans and boycotts are also often instances of election irregularities. Our results are robust to coding those case as 0.

[55] RAND 2015

[56] Jones and Libicki 2008

[57] Analyses that measure terrorism based on the number of attacks in a year or the number of killings in the preceding five years yield similar results.

As controls we include a number of country- and election-specific variables. We include the percentage of a country's *Muslim Population*[58] to capture cultural factors that may be correlated both with the level of electoral fraud and the rise of Islamic challengers. We control for a country's overall level of democracy using the *Polity2* variable from the Polity IV dataset[59] to isolate the effect of electoral fraud on monitors' endorsements. We also include indicators for *First Multiparty*, *Transitional*, *Post-Conflict*, and *Post-Coup* elections from the DIEM.[60] Kelley has shown that monitors are more likely to endorse such elections and Islamic challengers are more likely to emerge in these settings.[61] By a similar logic we also control for the *Change in Democracy* in the last year.[62] We include *Infant Mortality Rate*[63] as a measure of a country's well-being, which may again be correlated with both fraud and the presence of Islamic parties. We also control for *Pre-Election Violence* as reported in the DIEM, which may be correlated with terrorist campaigns and electoral misconduct[64]. Our *Legislative Election* variable[65] distinguishes between different types of elections, because those may differ in terms of opposition groups' participation and electoral fraud.

Lastly, we include four measures of donor interest. The first is the logged value of a country's *Oil Production*, because oil is a strategically valuable commodity and its production is correlated with both Islamic party presence and electoral fraud.[66] We also use a country's (logged) *Total Trade* and *Total GDP*, which captures a country's importance for global trade and market size.[67] Our fourth measure is *Former Colony*, which is coded 1 for former colonies of France and the UK, 0 otherwise.[68] Overall, our sample includes elections from 93 countries and 21 organizations over 14 years. Of the 511 organization-elections an Islamic opposition

[58]Barro and McCleary 2003
[59]Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002
[60]Kelley 2012
[61]Kelley 2009
[62]Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002
[63]World Bank 2017
[64]Kelley 2012
[65]Ibid.
[66]Ross 2013
[67]Kelley 2009
[68]Appendix Tables A.11 and A.12 report additional tests regarding the incumbent's value for international actors.

was present in 38 (i.e., 7%).

Statistical Model

We estimate linear regression models, which are as good as nonlinear models at estimating marginal effects[69] and, importantly, allows us to include country fixed effects to control for time-invariant country-specific factors without sacrificing sample size.[70] We estimate the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{Acceptable} = \beta_0 \; &+ \; \beta_1 \textit{Problems} \\
&+ \; \beta_2 \textit{Islamic Opposition} + \beta_3 \textit{Islamist Terrorism} + \beta_4 \textit{Non-Islamist Terrorism} \\
&+ \; \beta_5 \textit{Islamist Terrorism} \times \textit{Islamic Opposition} \\
&+ \; \beta_6 \textit{Non-Islamist Terrorism} \times \textit{Islamic Opposition} \\
&+ \; \boldsymbol{X\beta} + \epsilon.
\end{aligned}
$$

Our argument predicts β_5 to be positive and statistically significant.

Results

Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 show the estimates for monitors' election evaluations (pooled and with country-fixed effects). In models 3 and 4 we separate the sample into non-Western and Western monitors to show that the effects are driven mainly by Western monitors. In models 5 and 6 we show that the effects are stronger after the September 11 attacks. All models include the full list of country- and election-specific controls. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.

[69] Angrist and Pischke 2008; Beck 2015

[70] Our results are similar if we use a pooled Logit estimator instead.

Table 1: Impact of Islamist Terrorism on Election Monitors' Islamic Opposition Bias

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11 Era	Post-9/11 Era
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.273**	−0.225**	−0.354**	−0.312**	−0.341**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.096	−0.179	−0.215**	−0.138	−0.056	0.070
	(0.083)	(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.320)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.031	−0.037	−0.047*	−0.016	−0.049
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.009	0.013	0.020	0.042	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.182**	0.173*	−0.309	0.289**	0.151**	0.684**
	(0.065)	(0.098)	(0.466)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.135**	−0.140	0.178	−0.154*	−0.121	−0.476**
	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.285)	(0.089)	(0.126)	(0.223)
N	511	511	140	371	354	157
R^2	0.402	0.239	0.356	0.444	0.418	0.431

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, and post-coup election indicator.

Consistent with our theory, the interaction between *Islamic Opposition* and *Islamist Terrorism* has a positive effect on monitors' evaluations in both models 1 and 2. This indicates that in countries with an Islamic opposition party, election monitors become more likely to endorse an election as the level of Islamic terrorism increases. Since our models take the underlying level of irregularities into account, this evidence suggests that monitors display greater bias against Islamic movements in countries with Islamist terrorist groups. Note that the coefficient sizes do not differ greatly between models 1 and 2, even though in the latter we include country fixed-effects to absorb all time-invariant country-specific differences, such as culture and colonial history. The stability of the coefficient suggests that our finding is quiet robust and that the estimated effect in model 1 is predominately due to within- rather than between-country variation.

To get a better sense of size we calculate marginal effects based on model 1. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation for different levels of Islamist terrorism on the probability of endorsement by international monitors with 95% confidence

intervals. The histogram in the bottom shows the distribution of *Islamist Terrorism* in our sample.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Islamist Terrorism and Islamic Opposition Participation



Figure shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation (and the 95% confidence interval around it) on the probability of election monitors endorsing an election outcome given different levels of Islamist terrorist killings.

Note that the presence of an Islamic opposition party does not seem to matter much if there is no Islamist terrorism. The marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation is about negative 10 percentage points if there is no ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign, but the confidence interval for this estimate includes zero. We observe the most dramatic effect when Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorists are jointly present. In a country that suffered ten casualties to Islamist terrorism in the preceding year the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation is about 30 percentage points. As the number of Islamist terrorist killings reach about fifty the marginal effect of Islamic opposition reaches 70 percentage points, making an endorsement virtually certain.

Returning to Table 1, in models 3 to 6 we explore variation between election monitors and

across time.[71] Models 3 and 4 show that this anti-Islamic bias is absent in judgments of non-Western election monitors but displayed by Western observers. For non-Western monitors the main coefficient of interest, *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition*, switches signs and is imprecisely estimated. In contrast, the regression coefficients for western monitors are similar to those in models 1 and 2: in particular, *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* has a large positive impact on Western monitors' endorsements. These results support our argument that Western organizations are especially concerned about the danger Islamic movements pose to stability and that these concerns, when compounded by Islamist terrorism, will influence their evaluations of election quality.

Lastly, models 5 and 6 show that this bias gets stronger after 2001, when the 9/11 attacks on the US magnified the threat posed by radical Islam. While the estimate for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is consistently positive, the coefficient in model 6 is almost five times as large, indicating that the impact of the combination of Islamic opposition and terrorism on electoral endorsement is significantly larger in the post-9/11 era. Interestingly, all other coefficients related to terrorism in model 6, except for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* are negative, suggesting that outside observers do not become more tolerant to fraud by incumbents fighting terrorism in general; they only become more likely to endorse elections where Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorism are jointly present.[72]

Robustness

Our findings are quite robust. Table 1 reports linear probability models, but given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable some might consider a Logit estimator a more appropriate choice. Model 7 in Table 2 shows that the Logit estimator produces

[71] To ease interpretation we show split-sample regressions here. In Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 we also present regressions with 3-way interactions to show that the difference in coefficients across samples discussed are statistically significant.

[72] If we split the sample of Western monitors into pre- and post-9/11 eras, we again find that the effect of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is positive in both eras, but stronger after 9/11.

Table 2: Robustness of Monitors' Islamic Opposition Bias

	Logit Estimator (7)	Alternative Problem Definition (8)	Terrorism in Last 5 Years (9)
Problems	−2.525**	−0.137**	−0.337**
	(0.261)	(0.050)	(0.029)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.737	−0.179*	−0.065
	(0.539)	(0.107)	(0.119
Islamist Terrorism	−0.245	−0.024	−0.01
	(0.221)	(0.043)	(0.020
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.096	−0.002	−0.02
	(0.105)	(0.018)	(0.018
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.451**	0.170**	0.076**
	(0.489)	(0.085)	(0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−1.077**	−0.121*	−0.045*
	(0.372)	(0.066)	(0.025)
N	511	428	472
Log-Likelihood	−203.336		
R^2		0.241	0.415

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the full set of control variables listed in the notes of Table 1.

qualitatively similar effects.[73] Logit analyses on the differences between Western and non-Western monitors and pre- and post-9/11 eras are provided in Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7. The appendix also includes tests using a three-category version of our dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator (see Appendix Table A.5). Our results hold in every case.

Next, we assess the implications of incumbents strategically choosing the level of fraud. An incumbent favoured by outsiders may commit more fraud in order to take advantage of their bias. Our model accounts for this by controlling for a monitor's own assessment (*Problems*). However, it is possible that election monitors adjust their reporting of irregularities in order to justify their summary evaluation. For this reason, we re-estimate our model using a measure of electoral irregularities obtained from a different source, the National Elections

[73]Since Logit is a nonlinear estimator we plotted the marginal effects to confirm that our interpretation of this interaction term is correct; see Appendix Figure A.1.

in Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) dataset.[74] For maximum coverage we focus on two indicators of electoral fairness: whether opposition leaders were prevented from running and whether the government harassed the opposition. Adding these two variables gives us a three-level index on the extent of electoral irregularities. Model 8 in Table 2 show that our main finding is robust to replacing monitors' *Problems* measure with this alternative, which suggests that strategic reporting of underlying irregularities is not biasing our findings.

So far we have measured terrorist activity by counting the number of killings in the year before elections. A one-year window may be shorter than what observers use to assess the threat of radical Islam in a country. All of our results are robust to counting the number of killings in the last 5 years (model 9 of Table 2). We also look at the number of attacks as a measure of terrorist activity. Although our estimates on the full sample remain similar, differences between subsamples are no longer statistically significant. From this discrepancy we infer that outsiders pay more attention to the deadliness of terrorist activity than its frequency.

Despite controlling for potential confounders, we cannot rule out the possibility that unobservable factors lead us to mistakenly identify a significant association between our key variables. In order to assess the likelihood that our observed effect is solely due to selection bias, we follow a procedure proposed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber and adapted to linear regressions by Bellows and Miguel.[75][76] We calculate the absolute ratio of the coefficient estimated in a full model with all controls to the difference between the coefficient of the full model and the one obtained from a restricted model, controlling only for *Problems*. The result indicates how much greater the effect of potential unobservables would need to be relative to the included observables in order for the coefficient estimate to be zero. Table 3 presents the ratios on the main interaction of interest for the four main models in Table 1. None of the six ratios presented in Table 3 are smaller than 1 and they range from 1.89

[74] Hyde and Marinov 2012

[75] Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005; Bellows and Miguel 2009

[76] We compute this ratio based on the linear probability models reported in Table 1.

Table 3: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables (Table 1)

	All Countries (1)	Country Fixed-Effects (2)	Western Monitors (3)	Post-9/11 (4)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.89	591.98	1.94	1.99

to 591.98, with a median ratio of 1.965. Hence, the selection effect of any unobservables would have to be at least 1.89 times greater than selection on observables and, across all four models, almost two times greater. This makes it unlikely that the estimated effect of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* can be fully attributed to omitted variable bias.

We conducted several additional robustness checks that we summarize here; details provided in the appendix. First, we show in Appendix Figures A.2-A.5 that our findings are not driven by a specific election or country: re-running our analyses while excluding one election or country at-a-time does not change our findings. Likewise, omitting from the sample the following types of observations do not weaken our results: countries with a small Muslim population (and therefore without a realistic chance of Islamic parties emerging) (see Appendix Table A.8); elections that are non-competitive (and therefore without a need for outsiders to worry about opposition victory) (see Appendix Table A.9); countries that experienced very high levels of Islamist terrorism recently (see Appendix Table A.10); countries where the incumbent has hostile relations with donor countries (and therefore outsiders' concern for stability is low) (see Appendix Table A.11). Including additional measures of donor preference (e.g., similarity of UN voting profiles) for the incumbent does not change our findings either (see Appendix Table A.12).

Second, we conduct a series of tests related to how monitor organizations select which elections to observe. To test whether differences in organizations that attend elections with and without Islamic parties are driving our findings, we include monitor fixed effects to purge "between-observer" variation; our results shown in Appendix Table A.13 continue to hold based purely on "within-observer" variation. By a similar logic, might our result be due to strategic monitoring decisions? If observers avoid problematic elections in friendly

regimes so that they will not have to write a critical report, then that would make it harder for us to find a discrepancy between their summary judgement and their list of observed irregularities.[77] Nevertheless, we run a Heckman selection model, which separately estimates the probability of an organization observing an election (selection stage) and, if the election is observed, the evaluation of its quality (outcome stage).[78] To satisfy the identification requirement we include in the first stage *Global Election Count*, which is the annual number of elections held in countries that are not full democracies. The rationale for this variable is that an organization is less likely to observe a particular election in a more crowded year, because monitoring missions are costly and observer organizations have limited resources. As shown in Appendix Table A.15 our main variable, *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition*, continues to raise the likelihood of endorsement, but it does not seem to have an effect at the selection stage.

Third, it is possible that monitoring organizations are reluctant to contradict each other. We conduct two analyses to check whether this kind of "bandwagoning" behavior drives our results. Firstly, we cluster standard errors by election to account for correlation at the election level. Secondly, we design a test based on the assumption that bandwagoning is more likely within clusters of Western and non-Western organizations than across them. For each election we randomly select one Western and one non-Western organization that observed that election and run our analysis on this subsample.[79] The threat of bandwagoning inflating our estimates should be smaller in this subsample. Our findings shown in Appendix Tables A.16 and A.17 continue to hold in both tests.

Fourth, Kelley's DIEM starts in 1984.[80] Although our theory applies primarily to the post-Cold War period when donors' concern for democracy is relatively higher, we check and show that our findings are similar if we extend the analysis to 1984 (see Appendix

[77] We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to us.

[78] Heckman 1979

[79] If monitors from only one group (e.g. Western) observed an election, than our subsample includes only one organization for that election.

[80] Kelley 2012

Table A.18).

Fifth, the results are robust to using an alternative measure of *Islamic Opposition Party* based on the Database of Political Institutions.[81] This is a more restricted measure, because it codes the religious identity of only the largest opposition party in a country and excludes political parties that are banned. Nevertheless, we continue to find similar patterns using this alternative measure (see Appendix Table A.19).

Sixth, we check that there is a linear interaction effect, that is, the effect of Islamic opposition parties is greater for higher levels of Islamist terrorism as hypothesized. We show in Appendix Tables A.20-A.22 that the interaction effect is stronger for high levels of Islamist terrorism compared to low and zero Islamist terrorism.

Finally, we test whether IGOs and NGOs evaluate elections with Islamic parties differently, but we do not find significant differences. NGO's are often more independent than IGO's, but still have close ties to donor states through funding and leadership.[82] Consequently, it is not surprising that NGO and IGO monitors share similar concerns regarding stability and democracy in elections (see Appendix Table A.23).

Conclusion

In this paper we investigate which factors determine outside observers' decision to endorse or reject an election's outcome. We provide empirical evidence that election observers in the post-Cold War period are more likely to accept problematic elections in which Islamic opposition parties participate while an Islamist terrorist campaign is ongoing. We show that this conditional bias is particularly strong for Western observers. We also show that the effect has become stronger after 2001, when the USA began its War on Terror.

Together these findings provide important clues about the powerful political forces that influence even seemingly-independent observers of democratic processes. In countries mired

[81] Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016
[82] Kelley 2010; Robinson 1996

by violent Islamist terrorist campaigns, many Western observers saw Islamic opposition parties as a risk to stability and this led observers to endorse elections that they would otherwise reject. This observation resembles the trade-offs Western countries perceived between promoting democracy and maintaining friendly regimes during the Cold War. The broad lesson is that when "taking sides in other people's elections"[83], outsiders' calculus is based not only on their relations with the incumbent, but their *relative bias* toward the incumbent and the challengers.

Our work has important policy implications in light of recent work on what makes voters believe election monitors. Bush and Prather present evidence that voters are less likely to believe the assessment of monitors that are seen as biased.[84] If voters recognize that international monitors have a bias against Islamic opposition parties, this recognition will undermine monitors' credibility and reduce their ability to inform voters about election quality. Regardless of the validity of suspicions about Islamic parties, outsiders should consider separating election monitoring and combating extremism to avoid unwanted outcomes.

With regard to future research, it will be interesting to see if our theory applies to other forms of outside interventions in elections.[85] For instance, Kersting and Kilby show that World Bank lending responds to upcoming elections in borrowing countries.[86] A testable implication of our theory is that World Bank lending should be quicker and more generous in countries with an Islamic challenger and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Second, our research raises the question of how non-Western powers such as Russia and China perceive different types of challengers as these powers intervene in elections in other countries. Third, our research highlights the important effect terrorist groups can have when an ideologically related party is participating in elections. It will be fruitful to explore when political parties disown ideologically related violent groups and what strategies they use to signal their credibility to domestic and international audiences.

[83]Corstange and Marinov 2012, 655
[84]Bush and Prather 2017b
[85]Corstange and Marinov 2012
[86]Kersting and Kilby 2016

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Appendix to "Dangerous Contenders"

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Overview of Appendix

The appendix includes summary statistics, robustness checks, additional figures and other information that were not included in the main text due to space constraints. Specifically, we present the following:

- Omitting one election or one country at-a-time does not weaken our results.
- Our results are robust to using the 3-level *Election Quality* as the dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.
- Differences in the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* between Western and non-Western organizations are statistically significant.
- Differences in the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* between pre- and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant.
- Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the population is Muslim.
- Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to elections that are at least minimally competitive.
- Our results are robust to omitting observations with very high levels of Islamic terrorism.
- Our results are robust to additional tests of ensuring that donors care about stability in a country.
- Our results are robust to the inclusion of monitoring organization fixed effects.
- Our results are robust to omitting SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth from the sample.
- Our results are robust to using a Heckman model to account for selective monitoring by election observers.
- Our results are robust to clustering errors at the election level.
- Our results are robust in a smaller sample where, for each election, we randomly choose one Western and one non-Western monitoring organization and discard the other organizations that observed that election. This is a test to mitigate bias introduced by bandwagoning behavior among monitors.

- Our results are generally robust to extending our analysis to the pre-1990 period.
- Our results are robust to using an alternative measure of *Islamic Opposition*.
- The effect of the interaction term is linear; it gets stronger as the level of Islamist terrorism increases.
- IGO and NGO monitors do not seem to differ in terms of their evaluations of elections where Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorism are jointly present.
- Our results continue to hold if we extend our analysis to 2012 using alternative data sources.
- The last two tables show the full versions of Tables 1 and 2 in the paper including the control variables.

Summary Statistics

Table A.1: This table reports summary statistics for the observations used in Table 1.

List of Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations

Table A.2: We provide a list of Western and non-Western monitoring organizations. We distinguish between Western and non-Western organizations based on their membership (for IGOs) or the location of their headquarters (NGOs).

List of Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terrorism and Islamic Opposition but no Islamic Terrorism

Table A.3 lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party and Islamist terrorism. **Table A.4** lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party but no Islamist terrorism.

Marginal Effects Based on Logit Model

Figure A.1: This figure plots the marginal effect of Islamic opposition parties on election observer endorsements. The calculations are based on the Logit estimates in Table 2 model 7. We also provide 95% confidence intervals around estimates. We create this plot by varying *Islamic Opposition*, *Islamist Terrorism* and *Islamist Terrorism* $\times$ *Islamic Opposition*; all other variables are held at their observed values. This figure shows that both Islamic opposition and Islamist terrorist campaigns must be present for monitors to overlook election fraud. Elections that include Islamic opposition parties without an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign are not more likely to be endorsed by international monitors. However, as the level of Islamist terrorism increases, so does the marginal effect Islamic opposition parties. The substantive effects are comparable to those based on the OLS model. In a country that suffered 10 killings by Islamist terrorists, the marginal effect of an Islamist party in elections is about 20 percentage points.

Omitting One Country/Election at-a-time From the Analysis

Figures A.2 and A.3: To test whether a few observations (elections or countries) are driving our results we conduct the following sensitivity analyses. We focus on how much the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* changes across these analyses. First, we re-run our analyses omitting one election at a time (255 regressions) and then one country at a time (93 regressions). We display the findings graphically. Figure A.2 shows the distribution of coefficients when we exclude one election at a time. Figure A.3 shows the distribution of coefficients when we exclude one country at a time.

The coefficient of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is 0.18 in the original analysis. Figures A.2 and A.3 show that omitting particular elections or countries does not make the coefficient much smaller. In other words, the estimated effect size is not sensitive to omitting particular observations.

Figures A.4 and A.5: In these figures we display how much the t-values of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* changes when we omit from the sample one election or one country at a time. These figures show that the t-values do not fall below 2.4, which is further evidence that the estimated effect is not sensitive to omitting particular observations.

Using Alternative Dependent Variable: 3-level *Election Quality*

Table A.5: Our main dependent variable, *Acceptable*, is a dichotomous version of the three-level *Election Quality* variable in the Dataset on International Election Monitoring.[1] This table shows that our results in Table 1 are robust to using the three-level *Election Quality* as the dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.

Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors

Table A.6: In Table 1 we present split-sample analyses to highlight differences between Western and non-Western monitors. Although the coefficients for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* differ quite substantively between subsamples, we still need to show that the differences are statistically significant.[2] For this purpose we now show estimates from a model where we interact our main variables with a *Western* indicator, which is coded 1 for Western monitors and 0 otherwise. We analyze this model using OLS, Logit and Ordered Logit estimators. Our claim is that Western monitors, relative to non-Western monitors, are more likely to express an anti-Islamist bias captured by our *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* variable. Our data support this claim; the interaction of *Western* and *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* (which is in bold in Table A.6) is always positive and statistically significant in Logit and Ordered Logit estimates.

[1] Kelley 2012

[2] Gelman and Stern 2006

Differences Between Pre- and Post-9/11 Eras

Table A.7: This table, similar to Table A.6, aims to show that the split-sample comparisons we report in Table 1 between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant. Here we show estimates from a model where we interact our main variables with a *Post-9/11 Era* indicator, which is coded 1 for elections after 2001 and 0 otherwise. We analyze this model using OLS, Logit and Ordered Logit estimators. Our claim is that anti-Islamic bias (captured by our *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* variable) is stronger after the 9/11 attacks. Our data support this claim; the interaction of *Post-9/11 Era* and *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* (which is in bold in Table A.7) is always positive and statistically significant in OLS and Ordered Logit estimates.

Restrict Sample to Countries where Muslim Population > 30%

Table A.8: Here we limit our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the population is Muslim. We choose the 30% threshold, because the smallest Muslim population percentage of a country with an Islamic opposition party is 31%. When we analyze this sample with the terrorism variables measured in the 1-year window we have problems: OLS results are positive but not significant and Logit and Ordered Logit cannot estimate this coefficient due to multicollinearity. When we use the terrorism variables with the 5-year window, which were introduced in Table 2, we find that *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all three estimators.

Restrict Sample to Minimally Competitive Elections

Table A.9: Here we limit our analysis to elections that are at least somewhat competitive or the result was not decided before the election. We conduct this robustness check, because our theory says that election monitors tolerate fraud against Islamic parties to prevent a more preferable incumbent's fall from power. If an incumbent does not even pretend to run a fair contest then the public is already sure about the quality of elections and whether monitors endorse an election will not influence the public's decision to protest or not. If a monitor's announcement cannot influence the public's decision to protest, then the monitor does not have an incentive to lie to protect the incumbent. For this reason, our findings should be robust in an analysis that includes only those elections that are at least minimally competitive. According to Hyde and Marinov we can consider an election (minimally) competitive if (a) opposition was allowed, and (b) more than one party was legal, and (c) there was a choice of candidates on the ballot.[3] Using their NELDA dataset[4] we code which countries ran competitive elections for the years in our dataset and then re-run our analysis in the subsample of those countries. Table A.9 shows that our finding is robust regardless of which estimator we use.

[3]Hyde and Marinov 2012

[4]Ibid.

Omit Observations with Extreme Levels of Islamist Terrorism

Table A.10: Here we test whether observations with high levels of Islamist terrorism are driving our findings. We first drop the observation with the highest number of killings by Islamists in the preceding year (model 1) and then we omit the three observations that suffered more than 100 killings by Islamists in the preceding year (model 2). In both cases our main results are robust, which raises our confidence that observations with particularly high levels of Islamist terrorism are not driving our results.

Additional Tests Regarding Donor Preference for Stability

Table A.11: Our theory assumes that international actors see Islamic opposition groups, especially in the context of an ongoing Islamic terrorist campaign, as a threat to stability. However, if outsiders' relations with an incumbent are sufficiently bad, then outsiders may prefer even an Islamic group to the current government and refuse to overlook electoral irregularities.[5] So far we have included four measures (*Oil Production, Colony Indicator, Total Trade* and *Total GDP*) that aim to capture the importance of stability in a country for the outside world. Here we follow a different strategy and exclude from our sample countries that have poor relations with international monitors' donors. It is difficult to determine the influential donors for most non-Western monitoring organizations and especially larger ones such as the United Nations. However, for Western monitors we can assume that a good measure of relations between their sponsors and an incumbent in an election is the relations between the incumbent and the US. We run two tests in which we analyze the evaluations of Western monitors but exclude from the sample countries that have poor relations with the US. First, we exclude countries that are under security-related economic sanctions by the US. Second, we exclude countries whose UN voting similarity to the US is below the sample average (-0.2). In both tests our estimates are similar to our baseline estimate in Table 1 model 4, which increases our confidence that our findings are driven by cases in which donors actually value the stability they enjoy under an incumbent.

Table A.12: Here we include additional measures of donor interest in a country. As further robustness checks we focus on the verdicts of Western monitoring organizations and add to our analysis two more time-varying indicators of Western alignment. These indicators are UN Voting Similarity with the USA and Aid per Capita Given by OECD Donors (logged, constant USD). Our results remain robust after controlling for these factors.

Monitoring Organization Fixed Effects

Table A.13: In this table we show what happens if we include monitoring organization dummies to our model. The purpose of this test is to control for "between-organization" variation and rely only on "within-organization" variation to estimate our model. The coefficient of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is statistically significant and quite similar to its estimate in Table 1 Model 1, which implies that our results are not due to different types of organizations visiting different types of countries.

[5] Bubeck and Marinov 2017

Exclude Monitoring Organizations that Generally Endorse Election Outcomes

Table A.14: Here we show that our results are robust to excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Commonwealth, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from our sample. These organizations are sometimes considered particularly tolerant to problematic elections. Excluding these organizations from the sample individually or jointly does not change our findings.

Heckman Selection Models

Table A.15: Here we investigate whether selective monitoring by observers can explain our findings. As explained in the main text, one possibility is observers prefer to skip problematic elections in friendly regimes in order to avoid criticizing a favored incumbent. This kind of selective monitoring would make it more difficult for us to find a pattern of discrepancy between observers' summary evaluations and the longer list of irregularities in their full report.

Nevertheless, observers may be unable to select which elections to monitor because of strategic or logistical reasons. Since there are no reports for observer missions that did not take place, analysis based on this nonrandom sample may be misleading. We deal with this problem by running a Heckman selection model, which separately estimates the probability of an organization observing an election (selection stage) and, if the election is observed, the evaluation of its quality (outcome equation).[6] To satisfy the identification requirement of the estimator, we include in the first stage, in addition to our standard set of independent variables, a *Global Election Count* variable that is the number of elections held in countries that are not full democracies in a given year.[7] Since election monitoring is costly in terms of money and time and observer organizations have limited resources, we expect an organization to be less likely to observe a particular election in a more crowded year. Therefore we expect, controlling for other factors, this variable to have a negative effect at the selection stage.

In addition to running this analysis on the whole sample (columns 1 and 2), we explore differences between non-Western (columns 3 and 4) and Western organizations (columns 5 and 6). We cannot explore differences between the pre- and post-9/11 periods, because the model does not converge on the post-9/11 sample. Results from the Heckman model confirm our expectation and show that the selection and outcome stages are significantly related. *Global Election Count* is negative and significant at the selection stage in all three analyses.

Turning to our main variable, *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* does not seem to have an effect at the selection stage in any of the three samples (columns 2, 4 and 6). It increases the likelihood of endorsement in the whole sample, which supports our main prediction (column 1). We also find support for our prediction regarding the difference between Western and non-Western organizations. *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* increases the likelihood of endorsement by Western organizations, but not non-Western organizations.

[6] Heckman 1979

[7] We follow convention and categorize countries that have a *Polity2* score of greater than 6 as full democracies.

Clustering Standard Errors at Election Level

Table A.16: Here we cluster standard errors at the election level and find that our results do not change. The goal of this test is to take into account possible bandwagoning among monitoring organizations, which would violate the assumption that election observer verdicts from an election are independent.

Restrict Sample to One Western and Non-Western Observer Per Election

Table A.17: Here we conduct another test against the possibility that election monitors bandwagon and take into account other monitors' verdicts before announcing their own. If monitoring organizations bandwagon, we expect Western organizations and Non-Western organizations to be influenced primarily among themselves. Based on this intuition, we take a subset of our sample that includes, for each election, only 1 monitoring organization from each bloc (Western and non-Western). If there are multiple organizations from one bloc in a given election, then we randomly pick one of them. If there were no monitors from a given bloc, then our subset includes only one organization for that election and this organization comes from the other bloc. This procedure reduces our sample size from 511 to 324. We then re-run our analysis on this subset. Since this subset includes only 1 organization from each bloc, tendency to bandwagon should not bias our results. Since we select these organizations randomly within each bloc, we do not believe we are introducing other biases into the analysis. Results from this test are generally similar to our original ones, which suggests that bandwagoning between organizations is not the main driver of our findings.

Extend Analysis to Pre-1990 Observations

Table A.18: Here we extend our analysis to the pre-1990 period. Our theory mainly applies to the Post-Cold War era when the importance of major power rivalry and stability declined and Western governments began to promote democracy. Nevertheless since Kelley's dataset[8] starts from 1984 we explore what happens if we include the pre-1990 observations in our sample. Expanding our sample does not change the results if we measure terrorist activity by the number of attacks. Our results are also robust when we measure terrorist activity by the number of killings conditional on omitting one observation, the October 1990 legislative election in Pakistan monitored by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), from the sample. As explained below, we believe that dropping the October 1990 election in Pakistan is justified and our results continue to hold if we extend the analysis to the period before 1990.

The NDI endorsed the election results despite moderate problems in election quality. The outcome in this observation is not predicted well by our statistical model, because there was an Islamic opposition party, but no recent attacks by Islamist terrorist groups. In addition, the election is not coded as a first multiparty election, a transitional election, or a post-conflict election by Kelley. In short, neither we, nor Kelley expect election monitors to

[8]Kelley 2012

tolerate electoral irregularities in this case. We read the NDI's report on the 1990 election to understand how it justified its decision to endorse the election outcome. Firstly, the NDI argues that "notwithstanding serious irregularities in certain constituencies ... the results in most constituencies reflect the will of the electorate" (NDI, v). Secondly, the NDI highlights in the executive summary section that the 1990 election occurred "less than two years after elections in 1988, which were viewed at the time as signifying an important step in Pakistans transition to democracy" (NDI, iv). The NDI considered Pakistan as an "emerging democracy", which faces "enormous political and economic challenges" (NDI, ix). In its report, the NDI urged the international community to "contribute, where appropriate, to strengthen democratic processes and political pluralism in Pakistan." (NDI, ix). Our impression is that the NDI's favorable report reflects the logic explained by Kelley in her 2009 *International Organization* article, that international organizations sometimes may endorse an election despite its flaws in order to reward relative progress and not cause democratic gains to unravel. However, the quantitative indicators we borrow from Kelley (transitional election, post-conflict election, first MP election) do not capture the NDI's concerns in the case of Pakistan in 1990.

Alternative Measure of *Islamic Opposition*

Table A.19: Here we use an alternative measure of *Islamic Opposition* based on the Database of Political Institutions.[9] This database includes a variable named *OPP1REL*, which reports whether religious issues are a key component of the largest opposition party in a country and, if so, which specific religion (Christian, Catholic, Muslim or Hindu) this party promotes. Our alternative *Islamic Opposition* is coded 1 for any country-year for which *OPP1REL* is "Muslim", and 0 otherwise. This variable is more restricted than our original variable, because the Database of Political Institutions does not take into account banned political parties and, among existing parties, it codes the religious ideology of only the largest opposition party. Nevertheless, our main variable *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* remains positive and statistically significant.

Linear Effect of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition*

Tables A.20, A.21 and A.22: According to our theory outsiders' bias against Islamic opposition parties will increase with the level of Islamist terrorism in a country. Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu show that even if the interaction term is positive, the effect may not be linear.[10] Their diagnostic tools are not suitable for our analysis, because we have a binary dependent variable. To check the linearity assumption we create a categorical version of our *Islamist Terrorism* variable and use that in our model.[11] This new variable has three categories: 0-"none", 1-"low" and 2-"high". It is coded 0 if there is no Islamist terrorism in a given country-year; 1 if the level of Islamist killings is greater than 0 and less than 25, which is the mean for countries struck by Islamist terrorism; 2 if the level of Islamist killings is greater than 25. Results confirm that the interaction effect gets stronger as the level of

[9] Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016

[10] Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2018

[11] We do the same for the *Non-Islamist Terrorism*.

Islamist terrorism goes from none to low to high.[12] A second advantage of this test is to show that our model has enough observations even at high levels of terrorism.[13]

Comparison of IGO and NGO Monitors

Table A.23: Here we explore whether IGO and NGO monitors evaluate elections with Islamist parties differently. We first split the sample and run separate regressions on IGO monitors (model 1) and NGO monitors (model 2). *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is positive and significant at the 10% level in the IGO sample whereas in the NGO sample the coefficent estimate is three times larger but statistically insignificant. The lack of significance may be due to the smaller sample of NGO monitors. In model 3 we explore the difference between IGO and NGO monitors by interacting our main variables with an *IGO* indicator variable that is coded 1 for IGO monitors and 0 otherwise. *IGO* × *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* is positive but the coefficient is much smaller than the standard error, which tells us that there is not a meaningful difference between IGO and NGOs. Finally, in model 4, we re-run this model only for Western monitors and we again fail to find any significant differences. We conclude that there is not any evidence that IGO and NGO monitors differ in their evaluations.

Extend Analysis to 2012

Table A.24: We wanted to see if our findings hold beyond 2004, which is when the detailed dataset on election monitors (DIEM) compiled by Kelley ends.[14] For this purpose we conduct the following analysis, which uses a dataset reaching up to 2012. Importantly, extending the analysis to this period requires us to accept some data limitations (explained below). As a result, we see this additional analysis as a plausibility test rather than a strict test of our hypotheses. Despite these limitations, we find that our main result continues to hold in this extended dataset.

To conduct this analysis we use the NELDA dataset[15], which includes elections held between 1945-2012. The NELDA dataset differs from DIEM in three important aspects relevant to our analysis. First, DIEM provides information on the endorsements and criticisms of both Western and non-Western election observers, but NELDA has information on only criticisms made by Western organizations. From NELDA we can find out whether non-Western observers were present at an election, but we do not know if they critized election quality or endorsed the outcome. Second, DIEM is an observer-election level dataset, while NELDA is an election-level dataset. When multiple organizations monitor an election, DIEM provides information about their evaluations separately, whereas in NELDA there is one variable coding whether there were allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western observers present.

[12] According to Wald tests the coefficient of "high" is significantly greater at the 5% level relative to "low" when we use Logit (p-value = 0.03) but not when we use OLS (p-value = 0.14).

[13] When calculating the marginal effects in Table A.22, other variables are held at their observed values in the sample.

[14] Kelley 2012

[15] Hyde and Marinov 2012

Third, DIEM provides information about an observer organization's summary statement (endorsement decision) and list of electoral irregularities separately. NELDA, on the other hand, only provides the aforementioned variable about the existence of fraud allegations (by any Western observer group).

While we are lucky to have the NELDA dataset and expand our analysis to a more recent period, these differences between DIEM and NELDA require a few changes to our analysis. First, because NELDA provides information on criticisms by Western observers only, we cannot test for differences between Western and non-Western observers. Second, because NELDA is an election-level dataset and codes criticisms by "any" Western observers, we cannot observe cases where multiple Western observers were present and some of them did not criticize the election quality. As a result, we have fewer observations (one) per election even though we have more observations in total because more elections take place in the longer time period. Third, because NELDA does not separately code Western observers' endorsement of election outcome and list of election irregularities, we need to construct these variables ourselves. As an indicator of non-endorsement, we use "significant vote-fraud allegations". As a measure of general election quality, we use information on government harassment against the opposition in general and opposition leaders more specifically. This substitute is appropriate since we already used it as a robustness check in our main analysis.

Our dependent variable is whether there were significant vote-fraud allegations by any Western observers present at an election. Since this is the opposite of an endorsement, we expect the joint presence of Islamic opposition parties and terrorists to lower the likelihood of fraud allegations by Western observers. Our main control variable (*Problems*) is a sum of two binary indicators of election fraud: whether the government harassed the opposition and whether the government prevented opposition candidates from running. These two variables are good indicators of election irregularity and they are non-missing for most observations in NELDA. This variable varies between 0 and 2.[16]

Our main explanatory variables, *Islamic Opposition* and *Islamist Terrorism*, are measured as follows. Data sources used in our original analysis do not reach 2012 and for that reason we use two new sources. We measure the presence of Islamic opposition using the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).[17] We also used this variable as a robustness check on our original measure of Islamic opposition. Its main drawback is that it codes only whether the biggest opposition party in a country is Islamic or not.[18]

To measure Islamist (and non-Islamist) terrorism until 2012 we to turn to the Global Ter-

[16]Observations where both variables are missing we code as 0. Coding these observations as 2 does not change our results.

[17]Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016

[18]When we extend our time frame there are more Islamic incumbents in the data. Our theory does not make a clear prediction about the effect of having an Islamic incumbent, because whether they raise concerns in the eyes of foreign observers will be influenced by their policies in office. Islamic incumbents are outside the scope of our analysis and we exclude those cases from the sample.

rorism Database (GTD)[19], which covers a more recent period than our original our data source, the RAND database.[20] Its main drawback is that, unlike RAND, GTD does not code the ideology (Islamist or not) of the terrorist group. There are 1461 terrorist groups in the GTD database between 1985 and 2017, so coding their ideologies by hand is not feasible. We overcome this limitation in the following way. First, we create a list of word-stems that differentiate the names of Islamist terrorist groups from others. These words are "islam, jihad, jama(at), sharia, mojah(hid), muja(hid), muslim, allah, qaida, salafi". We code terrorist groups that have these word stems in their name as Islamist.[21] Next, we look at a list of "highly deadly" groups in the GTD (defined as groups that killed more than 100 people in total) and we add to our list of Islamist terrorists any highly deadly Islamist groups that were not captured with the word-stem method.[22] In total we code 236 groups as Islamist and 1225 groups as non-Islamist. Using this classification we create measures of the (logged) number of people killed by Islamist and non-Islamist groups in every country-year. As a quality check we compare these new measures of Islamist and non-Islamist terrorism with the numbers we got from the RAND database and they are highly correlated.[23] As in our original analysis we measure terrorism in the last 1 year, and alternatively, in the last 5 years.

Our list of controls is the same as in the original analysis. Information on Muslim population percentage, level of democracy, change in democracy, infant mortality rate, former colony status, oil production, total trade and total GDP comes from the sources cited in the main text. Of the control variables we took from DIEM, information on election violence, the type of election (legislative or not) and whether this is the first multi-party election is found in NELDA. NELDA does not code information on transitional election, post-civil war and post-coup elections. We create new measures of post-civil war and post-coup elections using data from Powell and Thyne and Themnér and Wallensteen.[24] If the country holding the election experienced a civil war in the last 5 years, we code it as a post-civil war election; otherwise that variable is coded 0. The post-coup variable is created in a similar way. We do not have an indicator of transitional elections here, but we do not believe this is an important omission, because this variable is rarely estimated to have a significant effect in our original analysis.

Our estimator, as in the original analysis, is the OLS. We also report regressions with country-fixed effects. In all models standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.24 presents the results. In Models 1 and 2, where we measure terrorism by the number of killings in the last 1 year, the results are not very stable. Model 1, where control variables are not included, shows a negative effect of *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror*

[19]START 2018

[20]RAND 2015

[21]We also check that groups coded as Islamist this way do not include non-Islamist groups.

[22]These groups are Al-Shaabab, Taliban, Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Abu Sayyaf Group, and Allied Democratic Forces.

[23]The correlation of "Islamist terrorism" measures is about 0.8 and the correlation of "non-Islamist terrorism" measures is about 0.7.

[24]Powell and Thyne 2011; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011

on Western criticism ($p = 0.103$), which is consistent with our main hypothesis. However, this effect becomes (statistically and substantively) insignificant when we include controls. The results are much more robust in Models 3 to 6, where we measure terrorism by the number of killings in the last 5 years. In models 3 to 5 we find that the joint presence of *Islamist Terrorism* and *Islamic Opposition* makes Western criticism less likely. Model 3 is the sparse model; in Models 4 and 5 we include the control variables and country-fixed effects. These results show that our main finding regarding the effect of Islamic movements and Western election monitoring continues to hold when we extend the analysis to 2012. In model 6 we test whether this effect becomes stronger after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Model 6, which interacts our key independent variables with a post-2001 indicators, shows that the negative effect of *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror* on Western observer criticism is stronger in the post-9/11 era. Interestingly, in Model 6, the variable *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror* becomes insignificant, but given the limitations in data, this divergence from the original results is not surprising.

Figure A.6 shows the estimated effect of joint presence of Islamic opposition participation and Islamist terrorism, based on Model 3. Note that in this figure we see that these two factors *lower* the probability of criticism by Western observers and in figure 1 we see that these two factors *increase* the probability of observers endorsing an election outcome; therefore these two graphs show similar effects. Moreover, the graphs indicate similar effect sizes. As we move from zero Islamist killings to the 90th percentile in our sample, the probability of Western observers criticizing the election falls about 70%.

To summarize, in this section we reported a plausibility test on whether our main result, that the joint presence of Islamic opposition groups and terrorists makes Western observers less likely to criticize election outcomes, holds in a sample extending to 2012. We find that the results are broadly similar to our analysis in the main text. This consistency raises our confidence in our main findings.

Full Versions of Tables 1 and 2

Table A.25: Table 1 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.

Table A.26: Table 2 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Acceptable	0.648	0.478	0	1
Problems	1.521	0.716	0	3
Islamic Opposition	0.074	0.263	0	1
Islamist Terrorism (logged)	0.161	0.698	0	5.257
Non-Islamist Terrorism (logged)	0.570	1.223	0	6.275
Muslim Population %	0.179	0.266	0	0.989
Level of Democracy	4.145	4.823	-9	10
Change in Democracy	1.037	3.251	-14	15
Infant Mortality Rate (logged)	3.506	0.769	1.411	5.047
First Multiparty Election	0.157	0.364	0	1
Transitional Election	0.092	0.289	0	1
Post-Conflict Election	0.104	0.305	0	1
Post-Coup Election	0.023	0.152	0	1
Pre-Election Violence	1.215	1.170	0	3
Legislative Election	0.773	0.419	0	1
Oil Production (logged)	4.039	3.964	0	12.420
Total Trade (logged)	8.283	2.343	0	13.387
Total GDP (logged)	23.106	1.652	19.450	27.941
Former Colony	0.286	0.452	0	1

N =511

Table A.2: Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations

Western	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Parliament, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, the Council of Europe, the European Union (Commission), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Carter Center, and the International Human Rights Law Group
Non-Western	The United Nations, the South African Development Community, the Electoral Institute of South Africa, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Asian Network for Free Elections, and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Table A.3: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terrorism

Country	Year	Monitoring Organization	Election Type	Islamic Opposition Party
Algeria	1997	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya
				Harakat Mujtama' al-Salim
Uzbekistan	1999	OSCE	Legislative	Shura-i-Islam (banned)
				Shura-i-Ulema (banned)
Pakistan	1997	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	Jamaat-e-Islami
				Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
Pakistan	2002	The European Union	Legislative	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
Pakistan	2002	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	see above
Pakistan	2002	The European Parliament	Legislative	see above
Pakistan	2002	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The European Parliament	Legislative	Partai Amanat Nasional
				Partai Bintang Reformasi
				Partai Bulan Bintang
				Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
				Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
				Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
				Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	2004	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The European Union	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The Carter Center	Executive	Hamzah Haz, Leader of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	2004	The European Union	Executive	see above
Indonesia	2004	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Executive	see above

Table A.4: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties but No Islamist Terrorism

Country	Year	Monitoring Organization	Election Type	Islamic Opposition Party
Mali	2002	The Carter Center	Executive	Islamic parties banned
Senegal	1993	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Islamic parties banned
Tanzania	1995	The Commonwealth Secretariat	General	Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania	1995	IFES	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	South African Development Community	General	Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania	2000	The Commonwealth Secretariat	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	IFES	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	Electoral Commission Forum of SADC	General	see above
Morocco	1993	IFES	Legislative	Proto-PJD was denied participation
Turkey	2002	Norwegian Helsinki Center	Legislative	Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Turkey	2002	OSCE	Legislative	Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Yemen	1993	The International Republican Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Yemen	1997	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Yemen	2003	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Tajikistan	2000	OSCE	Legislative	Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
Uzbekistan	1994	OSCE	Legislative	Islamic groups banned by regime
Pakistan	1993	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	Islamic Jamhoori Mahaz
				Jamaat-e-Islami
				Mutahida Deeni Mahaz
Pakistan	1993	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	see above
Bangladesh	1991	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Islami Oikkya Jote
				Jamaat-e-Islami
Bangladesh	1991	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	see above
Malaysia	1999	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
Indonesia	1999	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	Partai Amanat Nasional
				Partai Bulan Bintang
				Partai Keadilan
				Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
				Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
				Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	1999	The European Union	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	1999	IFES	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	1999	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	see above

Figure A.1: Marginal Effect of Islamic Opposition Participation on Endorsement Probability from Logit Model (Table 2 Model 7)



Figure shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation (and the 95% confidence interval around it) on the probability of election monitors endorsing an election outcome given different levels of Islamist terrorist killings. We use the estimates from the Logit model (Table 2 Model 7). Other variables are held at their observed values in the sample.

Figure A.2: Distribution of **Coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Elections One at a Time



Figure shows the distribution of **coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed) marks 0.182, which is the estimate for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* in the main model.

Figure A.3: Distribution of **Coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Countries One at a Time



Figure shows the distribution of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed) marks 0.182, which is the estimate for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* in the main model.

Figure A.4: Distribution of ***t*-values** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Elections One at a Time



Figure shows the distribution of *t*-values for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions).

Figure A.5: Distribution of ***t*-values** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Countries One at a Time



Figure shows the distribution of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions).

Figure A.6: Marginal Effects of Islamic Opposition Participation on Western Criticism



Figure shows the change in the probability of Western observers making allegation of significant vote-fraud (with 95% CI's) as a result of Islamic opposition party participation, conditional on different levels of Islamist terrorism. Results are based on Model 3 in Table A.24.

Table A.5: Ordered Logit Analysis of Three-Category Dependent Variable

	All Countries	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.491	−1.469*	−0.486	−0.119	−1.265
	(0.527)	(0.877)	(0.536)	(0.690)	(2.625)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.179	−0.468	−0.152	−0.102	−0.338*
	(0.161)	(0.324)	(0.171)	(0.486)	(0.187)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.113	0.335	0.102	0.296	−0.079
	(0.107)	(0.209)	(0.099)	(0.282)	(0.181)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.062**	−4.048*	1.497**	0.856	6.307**
	(0.437)	(2.099)	(0.595)	(0.682)	(2.352)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.859**	2.409	−0.886**	−1.318	−4.214*
	(0.343)	(1.501)	(0.398)	(0.992)	(2.157)
Problems	−2.859**	−2.950**	−3.096**	−2.807**	−3.331**
	(0.242)	(0.467)	(0.314)	(0.308)	(0.564)
Muslim Population %	1.079	2.714	1.959**	0.448	5.542**
	(0.672)	(2.076)	(0.788)	(0.702)	(2.148)
Level of Democracy	0.127**	0.254**	0.124**	0.124**	0.301**
	(0.035)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.104)
Change in Democracy	0.074*	−0.140	0.126**	0.074*	0.045
	(0.041)	(0.126)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.154)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.441	0.881	−0.906**	−0.850**	0.697
	(0.356)	(0.668)	(0.336)	(0.296)	(0.838)
First Multiparty Election	0.445	1.775	0.585	0.671*	0.680
	(0.400)	(1.118)	(0.486)	(0.389)	(2.156)
Transitional Election	−0.024	0.385	−0.064	0.223	−3.760**
	(0.492)	(1.129)	(0.421)	(0.597)	(1.805)
Post-Conflict Election	0.239	−0.463	0.746	−0.007	−0.056
	(0.455)	(0.916)	(0.574)	(0.556)	(1.184)
Pre-Election Violence	0.048	−0.200	0.123	0.134	−0.042
	(0.125)	(0.424)	(0.115)	(0.164)	(0.243)
Oil Production	−0.097	−0.136	−0.153*	−0.133	−0.019
	(0.078)	(0.148)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.174)
Total Trade	0.004	0.255*	0.036	0.008	−0.002
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.180)	(0.191)
Former Colony	0.732	1.194	0.319	0.811	0.905
	(0.478)	(1.013)	(0.502)	(0.498)	(1.041)
Post-Coup Election	0.530	1.811	−0.546	0.501	−3.234
	(0.907)	(1.169)	(0.911)	(1.179)	(3.217)
Total GDP	0.160	−0.146	0.271	0.136	0.575
	(0.209)	(0.333)	(0.241)	(0.249)	(0.567)
Legislative Election	0.535*	0.869	0.350	0.447	0.328
	(0.304)	(0.956)	(0.311)	(0.424)	(0.442)
Cut 1	−4.008	−4.672	−3.220	−6.200	9.908
	(4.649)	(8.304)	(5.162)	(5.252)	(13.806)
Cut 2	−2.062	−2.330	−1.145	−4.105	11.973
	(4.651)	(8.330)	(5.158)	(5.269)	(13.864)
N	511	140	371	354	157
Log-Likelihood	−291.163	−52.161	−218.125	−183.928	−94.507

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.6: Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors are Statistically Significant

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.192	−1.675*	−1.608
	(0.125)	(1.006)	(1.272)
× Western Monitors	0.086	0.707	1.113
	(0.149)	(1.135)	(1.314)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041	−0.534	−0.426
	(0.059)	(0.437)	(0.422)
× Western Monitors	0.002	0.320	0.266
	(0.060)	(0.438)	(0.414)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	−0.017	−0.119	−0.139
	(0.019)	(0.140)	(0.140)
× Western Monitors	0.041**	0.234*	0.275**
	(0.018)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.124	−1.167	−1.395
	(0.267)	(1.115)	(1.359)
× **Western Monitors**	0.345	2.854**	2.666*
	(0.297)	(1.249)	(1.478)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.095	1.034	1.084
	(0.131)	(0.672)	(0.911)
× Western Monitors	−0.239*	−2.191**	−1.981**
	(0.122)	(0.740)	(0.909)
Problems	−0.316**	−2.482**	−2.842**
	(0.030)	(0.262)	(0.239)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	511	511
R^2	0.416		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.7: Differences Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Eras are Statistically Significant

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.117	−0.864	−0.582
	(0.094)	(0.691)	(0.711)
× Post-9/11 Era	0.360	1.629	2.117
	(0.259)	(1.568)	(1.335)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.029	−0.236	−0.173
	(0.037)	(0.425)	(0.408)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.017	−0.080	−0.012
	(0.047)	(0.503)	(0.436)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.050	0.285	0.280
	(0.032)	(0.278)	(0.275)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.058	−0.300	−0.223
	(0.040)	(0.299)	(0.279)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.161**	1.303**	0.792
	(0.070)	(0.602)	(0.628)
× **Post-9/11 Era**	0.291*	1.547	1.950*
	(0.163)	(1.108)	(1.036)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.138	−1.023	−1.278
	(0.124)	(1.573)	(1.111)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.237	−1.235	−1.166
	(0.212)	(1.878)	(1.406)
Problems	−0.331**	−2.473**	−2.812**
	(0.028)	(0.259)	(0.243)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	511	511
R^2	0.410		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.8: Sample of Countries Where Muslim Population > 30%

	Terrorism in Last 1 Year	Terrorism in Last 5 Years		
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	Logit (3)	Ord. Logit (4)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.009	−0.000	−0.588	1.540
	(0.122)	(0.129)	(1.189)	(1.196)
Islamist Terrorism	0.109	−0.025	−0.718**	−0.671**
	(0.070)	(0.039)	(0.352)	(0.335)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.008	−0.032	−0.127	1.020**
	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.295)	(0.472)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.041	0.122**	2.261**	1.704**
	(0.124)	(0.053)	(0.703)	(0.625)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.193*	−0.132**	−1.835**	−2.353**
	(0.097)	(0.035)	(0.573)	(0.567)
Problems	−0.338**	−0.344**	−2.979**	−3.802**
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.814)	(1.034)
Muslim Population %	0.113	0.496**	6.298**	2.281
	(0.191)	(0.221)	(2.466)	(2.801)
Level of Democracy	0.021*	0.039**	0.382**	0.372**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.104)	(0.099)
Change in Democracy	0.016	0.006	0.295*	0.149
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.160)	(0.138)
Infant Mortality Rate	0.097	0.180	2.614**	3.238**
	(0.148)	(0.155)	(1.047)	(1.301)
First Multiparty Election	−0.175	−0.118	−0.946	−1.885**
	(0.176)	(0.098)	(1.117)	(0.629)
Transitional Election	−0.071	−0.319*	−5.295**	−3.393**
	(0.187)	(0.160)	(1.291)	(1.374)
Post-Conflict Election	0.187	0.314*	0.039	0.053
	(0.160)	(0.154)	(1.060)	(1.117)
Pre-Election Violence	0.015	0.044	−0.578	−0.720
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.490)	(0.493)
Oil Production	−0.034**	−0.015	0.146	0.282
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.148)	(0.182)
Total Trade	0.109	0.191*	0.455	0.111
	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.972)	(0.858)
Former Colony	−0.184	−0.279	−1.160	−1.039
	(0.129)	(0.180)	(0.996)	(1.006)
Post-Coup Election	0.437	0.490**	1.583	2.030
	(0.265)	(0.196)	(1.631)	(1.377)
Total GDP	−0.047	−0.095	0.498	0.081
	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.938)	(0.826)
Legislative Election	−0.085	0.015	0.221	0.530
	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.337)	(0.345)
Constant	1.102	0.862	−22.523	
	(1.124)	(1.522)	(15.876)	
Cut 1				8.756
				(13.807)
Cut 2				11.049
				(13.785)
N	108	99	99	99
Log-Likelihood			−34.941	−57.038
R^2	0.444	0.495		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.9: Sample of Competitive Elections

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.084	−0.780	−0.750
	(0.094)	(0.598)	(0.676)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041	−0.284	−0.219
	(0.026)	(0.218)	(0.153)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.026*	0.188**	0.203**
	(0.014)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.208**	1.366**	1.401**
	(0.077)	(0.693)	(0.632)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.170**	−1.196**	−1.242**
	(0.067)	(0.543)	(0.532)
Problems	−0.347**	−2.719**	−3.039**
	(0.028)	(0.275)	(0.260)
Muslim Population %	0.128	1.318*	1.172*
	(0.101)	(0.758)	(0.684)
Level of Democracy	0.015**	0.098**	0.095**
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Change in Democracy	0.011*	0.096*	0.084**
	(0.006)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.025	−0.239	−0.298
	(0.048)	(0.378)	(0.369)
First Multiparty Election	0.056	0.536	0.315
	(0.055)	(0.423)	(0.395)
Transitional Election	−0.009	−0.015	0.133
	(0.062)	(0.556)	(0.524)
Post-Conflict Election	0.005	0.012	0.022
	(0.075)	(0.516)	(0.482)
Pre-Election Violence	0.007	0.033	−0.001
	(0.017)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Oil Production	−0.018*	−0.161*	−0.148*
	(0.010)	(0.083)	(0.088)
Total Trade	−0.003	−0.035	−0.046
	(0.010)	(0.179)	(0.175)
Former Colony	0.063	0.536	0.597
	(0.079)	(0.577)	(0.565)
Post-Coup Election	0.119	1.123*	1.131*
	(0.083)	(0.632)	(0.659)
Total GDP	0.028	0.323	0.333
	(0.028)	(0.262)	(0.258)
Legislative Election	0.092**	0.645*	0.501*
	(0.046)	(0.330)	(0.296)
Constant	0.499	−1.950	
	(0.660)	(5.615)	
Cut 1			−0.707
			(5.475)
Cut 2			1.209
			(5.489)
N	486	486	486
R^2	0.406		
Log-Likelihood		−188.757	−271.669

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.10: Exclude Extreme Values of Terrorism

	Drop observation with max killing by Islamists (1)	Drop observations with 100+ killings by Islamists (2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.095	−0.080
	(0.083)	(0.082)
Islamic Terrorism	−0.030	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.029)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.013	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.174**	0.138**
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.134**	−0.134**
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Problems	−0.337**	−0.334**
	(0.028)	(0.029)
N	510	508
R^2	0.401	0.400

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.11: Excluding Incumbents Hostile to the US from Analysis of Western Monitors

	Excl. targets of US sanctions	Excl. countries that vote unlike US at UN
	OLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.349**	−0.154
	(0.115)	(0.252)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041	−0.097**
	(0.036)	(0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.003	0.042**
	(0.026)	(0.020)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.245**	0.191**
	(0.075)	(0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.046	−0.228
	(0.073)	(0.183)
Problems	−0.369**	−0.323**
	(0.045)	(0.044)
Muslim Population %	0.419**	0.274
	(0.130)	(0.240)
Level of Democracy	0.016**	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.010)
Change in Democracy	0.026**	0.028**
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.085	−0.165**
	(0.057)	(0.053)
First Multiparty Election	0.120*	0.168**
	(0.065)	(0.067)
Transitional Election	0.041	0.060
	(0.073)	(0.101)
Post-Conflict Election	0.102	0.351**
	(0.108)	(0.118)
Pre-Election Violence	0.011	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Oil Production	−0.024*	−0.036**
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Total Trade	0.008	0.038
	(0.017)	(0.024)
Former Colony	0.049	0.140
	(0.095)	(0.123)
Post-Coup Election	−0.531**	–
	(0.151)	
Total GDP	0.038	0.025
	(0.038)	(0.044)
Legislative Election	0.068	0.018
	(0.061)	(0.077)
Constant	0.374	0.709
	(0.902)	(0.957)
N	280	194
R^2	0.427	0.482

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

In model 2 *Post-Coup Election* drops due to collinearity.

Table A.12: Additional Indicators of Western Donor Interest: Aid from OECD DAC and Voting Similarity with the US at the UNGA

	Only Western Monitors			
	Whole Period (1)	Pre-9/11 (2)	Post-9/11 (3)	Interaction (4)
Problems	−0.357**	−0.319**	−0.422**	−0.349**
	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.039)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.225**	−0.207	−0.030	−0.299**
	(0.110)	(0.134)	(0.337)	(0.116)
× Post-9/11 Era				0.752**
				(0.193)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.046	−0.006	−0.076*	−0.042
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)
× Post-9/11 Era				0.002
				(0.044)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.011	0.046	−0.031	0.050
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)
× Post-9/11 Era				−0.078**
				(0.039)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.281**	0.210*	0.746**	0.287**
	(0.081)	(0.110)	(0.321)	(0.110)
× Post-9/11 Era				0.379**
				(0.167)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.150**	−0.137	−0.502**	−0.103
	(0.073)	(0.118)	(0.205)	(0.099)
× Post-9/11 Era				−0.460**
				(0.143)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	361	254	107	361
R^2	0.451	0.499	0.525	0.467

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and voting similarity with the US at the UN General Assembly.

Table A.13: Include Monitor Fixed Effects

	OLS (1)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.114
	(0.087)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.033
	(0.026)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015
	(0.013)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.158**
	(0.068)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.123**
	(0.057)
Problems	−0.323**
	(0.034)
Muslim Population %	0.266**
	(0.108)
Level of Democracy	0.017**
	(0.005)
Change in Democracy	0.014**
	(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.112**
	(0.049)
First Multiparty Election	0.090
	(0.059)
Transitional Election	0.032
	(0.054)
Post-Conflict Election	0.083
	(0.075)
Pre-Election Violence	0.014
	(0.016)
Oil Production	−0.013
	(0.009)
Total Trade	0.010
	(0.012)
Former Colony	0.020
	(0.073)
Post-Coup Election	0.047
	(0.091)
Total GDP	0.004
	(0.023)
Legislative Election	0.084*
	(0.045)
Constant	1.061*
	(0.557)
N	511
R^2	0.454

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.14: Exclude SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth

	Exclude SADC missions (1)	Exclude Commonwealth missions (2)	Exclude CIS missions (3)	Exclude missions w/ any of the 3 (4)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.343**	−0.336**	−0.343**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.136	−0.016	−0.087	−0.051
	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.099)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.039	−0.037	−0.039	−0.038
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.185**	0.176**	0.184**	0.182**
	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.127**	−0.174**	−0.138**	−0.170**
	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.059)
N	501	470	497	446
R^2	0.405	0.406	0.403	0.410

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

In column 4, any mission sent by SADC, CIS or the Commonwealth is excluded from the sample.

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, and post-coup election indicator.

Table A.15: Heckman Analyses

	All Monitors		Non-Western Org's		Western Org's	
	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.083	0.152	−0.141	0.539*	−0.142	0.048
	(0.088)	(0.191)	(0.120)	(0.304)	(0.107)	(0.181)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.032	0.033	−0.032	0.013	−0.040	0.044
	(0.034)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.033)	(0.059)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.018	0.025	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.056)	(0.016)	(0.054)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.209**	0.176	−0.263	0.240	0.312**	0.151
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.435)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.131)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.136**	−0.027	0.166	−0.032	−0.159*	−0.045
	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.266)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.105)
Problems	−0.336**	–	−0.226**	–	−0.352**	–
	(0.028)		(0.043)		(0.035)	
Muslim Population %	0.062	−0.496**	0.167	−1.251**	0.246**	−0.223
	(0.109)	(0.237)	(0.152)	(0.329)	(0.117)	(0.261)
Oil Production	−0.010	0.021	−0.008	0.001	−0.019*	0.028
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Level of Democracy	0.020**	0.001	0.025**	0.007	0.018**	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Change in Democracy	0.015**	0.026**	−0.010	0.029**	0.026**	0.029**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Infant Mortality	−0.032	0.151**	0.100	0.396**	−0.098**	0.074
	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.050)	(0.071)
First Multiparty Election	0.056	0.019	0.101	−0.367**	0.122*	0.131
	(0.056)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.069)	(0.128)
Transitional Election	−0.018	−0.041	−0.049	−0.112	0.009	0.033
	(0.057)	(0.167)	(0.061)	(0.169)	(0.062)	(0.194)
Post-Conflict Election	0.060	0.127	−0.012	0.134	0.139	0.146
	(0.072)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.127)
Pre-Election Violence	0.027	0.090**	0.001	0.068	0.030	0.101**
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.036)
Total Trade	0.000	−0.003	0.007	−0.047**	0.019	0.044
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.039)
Colony Indicator	0.022	−0.399**	0.053	−0.004	−0.044	−0.617**
	(0.082)	(0.104)	(0.068)	(0.136)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Post-Coup Election	0.038	−0.202	0.133*	0.235	−0.358	−0.501**
	(0.102)	(0.164)	(0.078)	(0.235)	(0.261)	(0.234)
Total GDP	0.001	−0.066	−0.022	0.028	0.008	−0.128**
	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.054)
Legislative Election	0.108**	0.074	0.168*	0.185*	0.075	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.071)
Global Election Count		−0.014**		−0.013**		−0.014**
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Constant	0.664	−0.265	0.529	−3.221**	0.622	1.118
	(0.662)	(1.065)	(0.829)	(1.387)	(0.698)	(1.220)
ρ	0.485**		0.536**		0.454	
	(0.205)		(0.228)		(0.315)	
N	12276		5018		7258	
Log-Likelihood	-2230.961		-605.824		-1515.490	

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.16: Cluster Standard Errors by Election

	All Countries	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11 Era	Post-9/11 Era
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.225**	−0.354**	−0.312**	−0.341**
	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.096	−0.215	−0.138	−0.056	0.070
	(0.105)	(0.205)	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.299)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.037	−0.047	−0.016	−0.049
	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.013	0.020	0.042*	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.182**	−0.309	0.289**	0.151*	0.684**
	(0.066)	(0.480)	(0.101)	(0.077)	(0.234)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.135**	0.178	−0.154*	−0.121	−0.476**
	(0.052)	(0.348)	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.200)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	140	371	354	157
R^2	0.402	0.356	0.444	0.418	0.431

Election-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.17: Randomly Select 1 Western and 1 Non-Western Observer per Election

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Problems	−0.317**	−0.286**	−0.225**	−0.355**	−0.311**	−0.306**
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.166*	−0.099	−0.230	−0.163	−0.147	0.330
	(0.087)	(0.127)	(0.147)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.236)
Islamic Terrorism	−0.034	−0.032	−0.031	−0.046**	−0.035	−0.034
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	−0.001	0.047**	0.008	−0.003	0.034	−0.026
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.230**	0.196*	−0.160	0.316**	0.182**	1.076**
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.503)	(0.151)	(0.090)	(0.259)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.200**	−0.269**	−0.003	−0.167	−0.146	−0.933**
	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.330)	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.205)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	324	324	116	208	230	94
R^2	0.426	0.313	0.363	0.484	0.435	0.494

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.18: All Observations Post-1984 (Except Pakistan 1990)

	Whole Sample (1)	Non-Western Monitors (2)	Western Monitors (3)	Pre-9/11 Era (4)	Post-9/11 Era (5)
Problems	−0.326**	−0.226**	−0.337**	−0.299**	−0.341**
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.083	−0.183**	−0.117	−0.050	0.070
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.320)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.035	−0.045	−0.017	−0.049
	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.017	0.014	0.022	0.047	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.109*	−0.297	0.186**	0.124**	0.684**
	(0.058)	(0.429)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.078*	0.159	−0.088*	−0.054	−0.476**
	(0.042)	(0.258)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.223)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	541	145	396	384	157
R^2	0.402	0.355	0.436	0.419	0.431

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.19: Alternative Measure of *Islamic Opposition* from the Database of Political Institutions

	OLS (1)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.190
	(0.152)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.036
	(0.023)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.011
	(0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.131**
	(0.057)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.061
	(0.095)
Problems	−0.336**
	(0.029)
Muslim Population %	0.066
	(0.097)
Level of Democracy	0.019**
	(0.006)
Change in Democracy	0.011*
	(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.051
	(0.049)
First Multiparty Election	0.062
	(0.056)
Transitional Election	−0.024
	(0.057)
Post-Conflict Election	0.037
	(0.072)
Pre-Election Violence	0.017
	(0.017)
Oil Production	−0.010
	(0.010)
Total Trade	−0.001
	(0.010)
Former Colony	0.080
	(0.073)
Post-Coup Election	0.071
	(0.100)
Total GDP	0.006
	(0.026)
Legislative Election	0.092*
	(0.047)
Constant	1.017
	(0.616)
N	511
R^2	0.398

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.20: Test of the Linear Interaction Effect Assumption

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.091	−0.572
	(0.095)	(0.651)
Islamist Terrorism (Low)	−0.035	−0.418
	(0.067)	(0.621)
Islamist Terrorism (High)	−0.487**	−4.206**
	(0.075)	(0.962)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low)	−0.008	−0.173
	(0.050)	(0.340)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High)	0.139*	1.045**
	(0.074)	(0.506)
Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition	0.354**	2.955**
	(0.126)	(1.203)
Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition	0.621**	6.644**
	(0.196)	(2.164)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition	−0.128	−0.970
	(0.189)	(1.316)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition	−0.430**	−4.021**
	(0.149)	(1.145)
Problems	−0.335**	−2.563**
	(0.029)	(0.267)
Controls	Yes	Yes
N	511	511
R^2	0.407	
Log-Likelihood		-201.466

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.21: Marginal Effect of *Islamic Opposition* Based on Table A.20 Model 1 (OLS)

Level of Islamist Terrorism	Marginal Effect	90% Confidence Interval
None	-0.09	[-0.25, 0.07]
Low	0.29	[0.05, 0.47]
High	0.52	[0.16, 0.90]

Table A.22: Marginal Effect of *Islamic Opposition* Based on Table A.20 Model 2 (Logit)

Level of Islamist Terrorism	Marginal Effect	90% Confidence Interval
None	-0.07	[-0.22, 0.07]
Low	0.25	[0.09, 0.42]
High	0.71	[0.44, 0.98]

Table A.23: Studying Differences Between IGO and NGO Monitors

	Only IGO Monitors (1)	Only NGO Monitors (2)	IGO Interaction (3)	Western Monitors (4)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.164*	−0.039	0.018	−0.038
	(0.088)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.152)
Islamist Terrorism	0.004	−0.065	−0.045	−0.066**
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.033
	(0.017)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.156*	0.237	0.094	0.545*
	(0.082)	(0.268)	(0.297)	(0.324)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.084	−0.235	−0.134	−0.262
	(0.067)	(0.201)	(0.228)	(0.277)
IGO Indicator			0.107**	0.059
			(0.048)	(0.051)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism			0.034	0.047
			(0.052)	(0.059)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism			0.001	−0.014
			(0.063)	(0.048)
IGO × Islamic Opposition			−0.236*	−0.340*
			(0.125)	(0.203)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition			0.102	−0.291
			(0.348)	(0.389)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition			0.025	0.176
			(0.262)	(0.318)
Problems	−0.343**	−0.292**	−0.328**	−0.351**
	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	340	171	511	371
R^2	0.428	0.407	0.415	0.452

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.24: Extend Analysis to 2012 Using NELDA, GTD and DPI datasets

	Terrorism in Last 1 Year		Terrorism in Last 5 Years			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS-FE (5)	OLS-FE (6)
Islamic Opposition=1	−0.0597	−0.283	−0.173**	−0.495*	−0.645**	−0.724**
	(0.119)	(0.211)	(0.0728)	(0.265)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Islamist Terror	0.0265	−0.00547	0.0303*	0.00596	−0.0422	−0.0123
	(0.0277)	(0.0358)	(0.0179)	(0.0197)	(0.0296)	(0.0401)
Non-Islamist Terror	0.0403**	0.0257	0.0288**	0.0315**	0.0288**	0.0193
	(0.0152)	(0.0179)	(0.0104)	(0.0109)	(0.0137)	(0.0140)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Islamist Terror	−0.0658	−0.0111	−0.145**	−0.133*	−0.0970*	0.0740
	(0.0427)	(0.0447)	(0.0440)	(0.0731)	(0.0495)	(0.328)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Non-Islamist Terror	0.0401	0.0356	0.102**	0.146	0.189**	0.120
	(0.0537)	(0.0883)	(0.0501)	(0.105)	(0.0510)	(0.166)
Post-9/11						−0.0402
						(0.0440)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11						−2.471**
						(0.431)
Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror						−0.0548
						(0.0349)
Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror						0.0253
						(0.0187)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror						−2.518**
						(0.561)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror						2.946**
						(0.500)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
N	827	693	782	693	693	693
R^2	0.03	0.38	0.05	0.39	0.15	0.16

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Controls include the Problems Index, Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.25: Table 1 with All Controls Displayed

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.273**	−0.225**	−0.354**	−0.312**	−0.341**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.096	−0.179	−0.215**	−0.138	−0.056	0.070
	(0.083)	(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.320)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.031	−0.037	−0.047*	−0.016	−0.049
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.009	0.013	0.020	0.042	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.182**	0.173*	−0.309	0.289**	0.151**	0.684**
	(0.065)	(0.098)	(0.466)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.135**	−0.140	0.178	−0.154*	−0.121	−0.476**
	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.285)	(0.089)	(0.126)	(0.223)
Muslim Population %	0.129	–	0.362**	0.261**	0.030	0.392
	(0.101)		(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.256)
Level of Democracy	0.019**	0.017**	0.024**	0.017**	0.020**	0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Change in Democracy	0.011*	0.012*	−0.015*	0.021**	0.009	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.052	0.277	0.044	−0.106**	−0.088**	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.240)	(0.070)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.120)
First Multiparty Election	0.058	0.007	0.172	0.104	0.083	−0.365
	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.256)
Transitional Election	−0.007	0.065	−0.039	0.009	−0.012	−0.245
	(0.064)	(0.110)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.226)
Post-Conflict Election	0.045	0.125	−0.029	0.120	0.017	0.097
	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.124)
Pre-Election Violence	0.015	0.044*	−0.008	0.018	0.028	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.038)
Oil Production	−0.013	−0.009	−0.008	−0.022*	−0.014	−0.011
	(0.010)	(0.048)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.022)
Total Trade	0.000	−0.001	0.014	0.010	0.006	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Former Colony	0.079	–	0.049	0.040	0.109	0.004
	(0.074)		(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.072)	(0.166)
Post-Coup Election	0.076	0.149	0.098	−0.275	0.103	−0.306
	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.086)	(0.257)	(0.119)	(0.404)
Total GDP	0.012	0.254	−0.025	0.028	0.006	0.035
	(0.026)	(0.222)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.075)
Legislative Election	0.095**	0.020	0.140	0.066	0.064	0.106
	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.110)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.085)
Constant	0.872	−5.905	1.147	0.622	1.086	0.080
	(0.627)	(5.836)	(0.771)	(0.694)	(0.655)	(1.908)
N	511	511	140	371	354	157
R^2	0.402	0.239	0.356	0.444	0.418	0.431

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.26: Table 2 with All Controls Displayed

	Logit Estimator (7)	Alternative Problem Definition (8)	Terrorism in Last 5 Years (9)
Problems	−2.525**	−0.137**	−0.337**
	(0.261)	(0.050)	(0.029)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.737	−0.179*	−0.065
	(0.539)	(0.107)	(0.119
Islamist Terrorism	−0.245	−0.024	−0.01
	(0.221)	(0.043)	(0.020
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.096	−0.002	−0.02
	(0.105)	(0.018)	(0.018
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.451**	0.170**	0.076**
	(0.489)	(0.085)	(0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−1.077**	−0.121*	−0.045*
	(0.372)	(0.066)	(0.025)
Muslim Population %	1.288*	0.169	0.136
	(0.738)	(0.129)	(0.110)
Level of Democracy	0.131**	0.028**	0.021**
	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Change in Democracy	0.086*	0.009	0.010
	(0.050)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.407	−0.014	−0.066
	(0.369)	(0.054)	(0.055)
First Multiparty Election	0.561	0.046	0.099
	(0.407)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Transitional Election	−0.051	−0.073	−0.054
	(0.540)	(0.098)	(0.074)
Post-Conflict Election	0.291	−0.001	0.090
	(0.492)	(0.095)	(0.067)
Pre-Election Violence	0.091	−0.031	0.017
	(0.133)	(0.027)	(0.019)
Oil Production	−0.121	−0.021	−0.004
	(0.076)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Total Trade	0.014	−0.001	0.001
	(0.137)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Former Colony	0.611	0.015	0.092
	(0.508)	(0.083)	(0.075)
Post-Coup Election	0.486	0.230*	0.104
	(0.869)	(0.128)	(0.100)
Total GDP	0.172	0.062**	0.007
	(0.215)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Legislative Election	0.697**	0.151**	0.112**
	(0.326)	(0.063)	(0.047)
Constant	0.943	−0.852	1.011
	(4.836)	(0.818)	(0.680)
N	511	428	472
Log-Likelihood	−203.336		
R^2		0.241	0.415

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05