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Competing Risks Survival Analysis of Ruptured Gas Pipelines: A Nonparametric Predictive Approach

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Abstract

Risk analysis based on historical failure data can form an integral part of the integrity management of oil and gas pipelines. The scarcity and lack of consistency in the information provided by major incident databases leads to non-specific results of the risk status of pipes under consideration. In order to evaluate pipeline failure rates, the rate of occurrence of failures is commonly adopted. This study aims to derive inductive inferences from the 179 reported ruptures of a set of onshore gas transmission pipelines, reported in the PHMSA database for the period from 2002-2014. Failure causes are grouped in an integrated manner and the impact of each group in the probability of rupture is examined. Towards this, nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) is employed for competing risks survival analysis. This method provides interval probabilities, also known as imprecise reliability, in that probabilities and survival functions are quantified via upper and lower bounds. The focus is on a future pipe component (segment) that ruptures due to a specific failure cause among a range of competing risks. The results can be used to examine and implement optimal maintenance strategies based on relative risk prioritization.

Keywords: gas pipelines, historical failure data, nonparametric predictive inference, competing risks, rupture.

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1. Introduction

Pipelines are the safest and most economic means of transporting crude oil and gas, either onshore or offshore. However, similarly to other engineering systems, pipe failure is considered an integral part of their operating lifetime (Fang et al, 2014; Khemis et al, 2016; Zhang et al, 2016; Benammar and Tee, 2019). More than half of the operating energy pipelines globally have been in place for more than 45 years (Kiefner and Rosenfeld, 2012). A sudden breakdown can lead to loss of productivity or severe accident with large environmental, economic and social implications (Frangopol and Soliman, 2016; Khan and Tee, 2015). As a result, comprehensive maintenance and rehabilitation plans should be at hand, as part of a structured integrity management program (Kishawy and Gabbar, 2010; Tee et al, 2018; Zhang and Tee, 2019). According to statistical analysis and incident data from literature, external corrosion has been identified as the most predominant gradual deterioration process (EGIG, 2015; CONCAWE, 2015; UKOPA, 2014; AER, 2013). However, other factors such as third-party activity, material or construction imperfections, geotechnical hazards, incorrect operation, inadequate design and many others can lead to ultimate failure modes like leaks and ruptures (Caleyo et al. 2008).

The implementation of probabilistic risk models and subsequent mitigation strategies can be considerably assisted by pipeline incident and mileage data available at different databases from around the world (Pesinis and Tee, 2018). One of the most distinguished is the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) within the United States Department of Transportation (DOT), which collects information on incidents that occurred on gas and liquid pipelines. Golub et al. (1996) analysed the PHMSA incident data on gas transmission pipelines between 1970 and 1993 and later on Kiefner et al. (2001) also analysed the incidents on gas transmission and gathering pipelines from 1985 to 1997 as reported in the PHMSA database. Similar analyses have been conducted in the past from data derived from other relevant databases as the United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association (UKOPA) or the European Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG) (UKOPA, 2014; EGIG, 2015; CONCAWE, 2015). Lam and Zhou (2016) analysed the PHMSA database in an effort to derive inferences about the condition of gas transmission pipelines in the US and to develop relevant failure frequencies for assessing the risk of onshore gas transmission pipelines.

1.1 Statistical analysis on pipelines

When it comes to statistical analyses of failures, pipelines are examined as repairable systems in literature. This means that upon failure, the system is restored to operation by repairing or even replacing some parts of the system, instead of replacing the entire system. In addition, the failure rate that previous studies estimate refers to a sequence of failure times within a time interval as opposed to a single time to failure distribution. In this study, the times to failure of gas transmission pipelines that ruptured are grouped and a non-repairable systems approach is implemented. It is assumed that ruptured pipes are non-repairable components (segments) functioning within a repairable system, which is the entire pipeline network. This is thought to be a reasonable assumption since a pipe component upon rupture is discarded and replaced by a new one. The lifetime of the component is a random variable described by a single time to failure (Athmani et al, 2019; Ebenuwa and Tee, 2019). For a group of identical segments, the lifetimes can be assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The lifetimes of ruptured segments can be sorted by magnitude and their order of occurrence in time can be neglected (Harold et al., 1984; Leemis, 1995). Then, their reliability against rupture, for a range of possible and competing failure causes, can be investigated.

Towards this, a statistical approach called nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) which can deal with competing risks is proposed (Coolen et al., 2002; Maturi et al., 2010). This method can provide insights into the reliability of the pipelines under consideration when few information is available and also when several failure causes exist. NPI enables statistical inference on future observations based on past observations and assuming that failure causes are independent. The method is based on Hill's assumption (Hill 1988; 1993) which gives a direct conditional probability for a future observable random quantity, and conditioned on observed values of related random quantities. The method provides interval probabilities, which is also referred in literature as imprecise probabilities. In other words, this means that uncertainty is quantified via lower and upper probabilities. Thus, survival functions are also estimated in bounds along with any potential application of maintenance strategies.

1.2 Aim and application

The aim of the study is to apply the competing risks theory by means of the NPI on the dataset of rupture incidents, in order to obtain realistic probabilities of rupture broken down

by specific causes. This kind of information is considered vital for fully understanding of risks and their time-dependent implications. It is illustrated how the NPI method can be applied in the above-described PHMSA database in order to derive an evaluation of the survival function of onshore gas transmission pipelines against rupture failures. The applied method regards only a population of ruptured components and not the entire pipeline network. As a result, inferences concern a future segment that will rupture due to a specific failure cause and lower and upper probabilities for this event are obtained. The survival functions obtained represent the complementary probability of rupture for this future segment at a given time instant.

Competing risks arise when a failure can result from one of several causes and one cause precludes the others. As a result, the occurrence of one failure affects the probability of failure of another and should be taken into account in reliability studies. This theory has been applied before in certain fields like medical science, with applications in reliability, public health and demography among others (Lau et al., 2009; Andersen et al., 2012; Hinchliffe and Lambert, 2013). According to authors' knowledge, no such work has been found in the literature on survival analysis of pipeline systems using NPI. The overall contribution from this work is the application of the theory of competing risks on energy pipelines historical failure data. The use of the NPI is calibrated to the specifications of energy pipelines survival analysis and 'real world' inferences for a complete pipeline lifecycle are derived, based on historical failure records.

The contents of this study are structured as follows. The methodology for the gathering and analysis of the rupture incident data from the PHMSA database is presented in Section 2. The basics of the NPI for different failure causes are discussed in Section 3. The discussion and results of the developed methodology are presented in Section 4. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 5 on the basis of outcomes from this study.

2. PHMSA rupture incidents from 2002-2014

2.1 Data classification

The PHMSA database is updated on an annual basis. At the time of this study, the PHMSA database for onshore gas transmission pipelines included the incident data from 1970 to present and the mileage data from 1970 to 2014. In brief, pipeline incident report (DOT-

PHMSA) based on a standard form, which has changed significantly in 1984 and 2002. The present study made use of the incident data from 2002 to the end of 2014. The pre-2002 data were excluded from the study because the information included in the data is much less detailed and in addition to that, the description of many data fields has changed significantly compared to the post-2002 ones. Therefore, it is very difficult to combine the data in these two periods together for analysis. Furthermore, the incident data between 2002 and until 2014 is considered reasonably representative of the current state of onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US and the up-to-date inspection and maintenance techniques and applications. The history of in-line inspection tools shows that these were not fully developed and applied in practice prior to 1980. In addition, high-resolution tools were used after 1990. This is important information when analysing failure rates, in that the aim is to obtain consistent results, which will allow for improvement of current practices and reduction of incidents.

Lam and Zhou (2016) carried out analyses of the PHMSA database and developed relevant failure statistics in an effort to derive baseline failure probabilities for carrying out systemwide risk assessment of pipelines. The causes of the incident and the failure modes of the pipeline failure were considered. It should be noted that the format of the incident data before 2010 is different from that afterwards; therefore, the data from the two periods needed to be aggregated. The present study employed a similar aggregation methodology. The main and secondary failure causes, for the periods of 2002-2009 and 2010-2014 are presented in Table 1.

It should be noted that incidents in the PHMSA database are classified as either pipe-related or non-pipe related. Pipe-related incidents include those occurring on the body of pipe and pipe seam, whereas non-pipe related incidents include those occurring on compressors, valves, meters, hot tap equipment, filters and so on. Only pipe-related incidents were analysed in this study. The failure data used in this report are associated with the onshore (as opposed to offshore) gas transmission (as opposed to gathering) pipelines, which account for the vast majority of gas pipelines in the US.

2.2 Assumption and previous research

The PHMSA database covers thousands of miles of onshore gas transmission pipelines and thus, differences exist in materials, diameters, installation year and many other attributes. To

take into consideration all these differences and derive separate inferences for pipelines with the exact same characteristics would be rather impossible, since the information in the database is not as detailed as necessary to make inferences on the entire pipeline network. The main assumption of the methodology in this study is the exchangeability that is inherent in the NPI approach and regards a future unit and the number of units for which failure data are available.

Kiefner et al. (2001) and Lam and Zhou (2016) further highlighted the lack of exhaustive information in PHMSA database, as they could not evaluate incident rates considering more than one pipeline attribute and they suggested the revision of the PHMSA reporting format of the pipeline mileage data. Lam and Zhou (2016) also summarised some of the major attributes of the operating onshore gas transmission pipeline network for the years 2002-2013 obtained from the PHMSA mileage data. In brief, steel is the predominant pipe material since it accounts for over 99% of the total pipeline length between 2002 and 2013. About 97-98% of the steel pipelines are cathodically protected and coated and 80% of them belong to the socalled class 1 areas (low-population-density areas). Regarding diameters, 40-50% of the network is between 10-28 inches while around 25% is over 28 inches. Finally, it should be noted that during the design phase the wall thickness of a steel gas transmission pipeline in USA is estimated as a function of the diameter, design pressure, specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) and a safety factor depending on the location class. The wall thickness of a higher location class pipeline is therefore greater than that of a lower location class pipeline to afford more protections for the pipeline as well as its surrounding population (Lam and Zhou, 2016). However, due to the exchangeability property of the NPI method considered in this study, all failed pipeline segments are assumed to have the same attributes and all of them are only examined as 'onshore gas transmission pipeline segments'.

Given the reporting criteria associated with PHMSA incident data and severity of a typical rupture incident, it can be assumed that most, if not all, of the ruptures were reported to PHMSA. On the other hand, the real number of leaks or punctures that did not meet the reporting criteria may be significant compared to the number of reported leaks and punctures. Therefore, the rupture rate evaluated using the PHMSA database is believed to be representative of the actual rupture rate. Second, the consequences associated with ruptures are far more severe than those associated with leaks and punctures. This is evident if one considers that most leaks (about 97%) and punctures (about 90%) did not result in ignition and that the majority of fatalities and injuries (75% and 83%, respectively) were due to

ruptures. Therefore, the rupture incidents are much more relevant from the risk perspective than the leak and puncture rates (Lam and Zhou, 2016). Only ruptures (as opposed to leaks, punctures or others) are considered in the present study.

3. NPI for competing failure causes

Competing risks theory constitutes a credible way of obtaining 'real world' probabilities, where a pipe segment is not only at risk of rupturing from a specific failure cause but also from any other causes of rupture (Hinchliffe and Lambert, 2013). Competing risks theory allows for breaking down probabilities of failure to provide operators a clearer indication of the risks that they face with each decision that they make. This decision-making can be about which maintenance plan to assign to a pipeline, how to optimally allocate resources and for understanding the longer-term outcomes of failure mechanisms. In this section, an overview of nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) for competing risks is provided.

3.1 General

Nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) is a statistical method based on Hill's assumption $A_{(n)}$, which can be interpreted as a post-data assumption related to exchangeability (Coolen et al., 2002; Maturi et al., 2010). Inferences based on $A_{(n)}$ are predictive and nonparametric and are appropriate if there is no additional information to the data or one does not want to use such information, for example, to study effects of additional assumptions underlying other statistical methods. Such inferences are exactly calibrated by Lawless and Fredette (2005), which strongly justifies their use from frequentist statistical perspective. $A_{(n)}$ does not provide precise probabilities for many events of interest, but bounds for probabilities with strong consistency properties in the theory of interval probability (Walley, 1991; Weichselberger, 2000).

According to Hill (1988), $A_{(n)}$ can be considered to constitute the fundamental solution to the problem of induction. Let $X_1, ..., X_n, X_{n+1}$ be continuous and exchangeable random quantities. The values $X_1, ..., X_n$ are assumed to be observed and the corresponding ordered values are denoted by $-\infty < x_1 < ... < x_n < \infty$ ($x_0 = -\infty$ and $x_{n+1} = \infty$). It is assumed that no ties occur among the observed values and if they do, it is assumed that tied observations differ by

trivial amounts (Maturi et al., 2010). For X_{n+1} which represents a future observable random quantity conditional on *n* observations the $A_{(n)}$ is (Hill, 1988)

$$P(X_{n+1} \in (x_{i-1}, x_i)) = \frac{1}{n+1}, i = 1, \dots, n+1$$
(1)

Coolen and Yan (2004) generalised $A_{(n)}$ called 'right-censoring $A_{(n)}$ ' or rc- $A_{(n)}$ to take into account the effect of right-censoring for data on event times that it is only known that the event has not yet taken place at a specific time. The rc- $A_{(n)}$ uses the additional assumption that the residual lifetime of a right-censored unit is exchangeable with the residual lifetimes of all other units that have not yet failed or been censored, at the time of censoring. The assumption 'right-censoring $A_{(n)}$ ' or rc- $A_{(n)}$ partially specifies the NPI-based probability distribution for a nonnegative random quantity X_{n+1} , based on u event times, $x_1 < x_2 < \cdots < x_{-}u$, and v right censoring times, $c_1 < c_2 < \cdots < c_{-}v$, is partially specified by the following M-functions (i = 0, ..., u; $k = 1, ..., l_i$; with $x_0 = 0$ and $x_{u+1} = \infty$)

$$M_{X_{n+1}}(x_i, x_{i+1}) = \frac{1}{n+1} \prod_{\{r:c_r < x_i\}} \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_r} + 1}{\tilde{n}_{c_r}}$$
(2)

$$M_{X_{n+1}}(c_k^i, x_{i+1}) = \frac{1}{(n+1)\tilde{n}_{c_k^i}} \prod_{\{r:c_r < c_k^i\}} \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_r} + 1}{\tilde{n}_{c_r}}$$
(3)

where l_i is the number of censored observations in the interval (x_i, x_{i+1}) and c_k^i refers to the *k*th censored observation in interval (x_i, x_{i+1}) . The product terms are defined as one, if the product is taken over an empty set.

This implicitly assumes non-informative censoring, as a post-data assumption related to exchangeability, at any time *t*, of all items known to be at risk at *t*. If there are no censorings then rc- $A_{(n)}$ is identical to $A_{(n)}$ (Coolen et al., 2002; Coolen and Yan 2004; Maturi et al., 2010). The terms \tilde{n}_{c_r} and $\tilde{n}_{c_k^i}$ describe the number of units in the risk set prior to time c_r and c_k^i respectively. The definition $\tilde{n}_0 = n + 1$ is used throughout this paper. Summing up all *M*-function values assigned to intervals of this form, which have positive *M*-function values, and this sum up to one over all these intervals having the same x_{i+1} as right endpoint, gives the probability as follows

$$P(X_{n+1} \in (x_i, x_{i+1})) = \frac{1}{n+1} \prod_{\{r:c_r < x_{i+1}\}} \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_r} + 1}{\tilde{n}_{c_r}}$$
(4)

where x_i, x_{i+1} are two sequential failure times.

3.2 NPI probabilities for competing risks

This study examines the situation where a number of k distinct failure causes (competing risks) can make a unit or segment to fail. The unit is assumed to be failing due to the first occurrence of a failure cause and then withdrawn from further use and observation. It is assumed that such failure observations are obtained for n units and that the failure cause leading to a failure is known with certainty. For each unit, k random quantities are considered and T_j is then defined for j = 1, ..., k, where T_j represents the unit's time to failure under the condition that failure occurs due to failure cause j. These T_j are considered to be independent continuous random quantities, which in other words means that the failure causes are assumed to occur independently, and the failure time of the unit is the minimum of the k. As mentioned before, T_j is assumed to be unique and known with certainty for each unit and for the T_i corresponding to the other failure causes, which did not cause the failure of the unit, the unit's observed failure time is a right-censoring time. The competing risk data per failure cause consists of a number of observed failure times for the specific failure cause considered and right-censoring times for failures caused by other failure causes. Consequently, rc- $A_{(n)}$ can be applied per failure cause j, for inference on a future unit $X_{j, n+1}$ (where X_{n+1} corresponds to an observation *T* for unit n+1 and $X_{j, n+1}$ to T_j , as defined above).

The NPI lower and upper probabilities, for the event that a single future unit n+1 fails due to a specific failure cause l, for each l=1, ..., k and assuming that the future unit undergoes the same process as the n units, is as follows.

$$\underline{P}^{(l)} = \underline{P}\left(X_{l,n+1} = \min_{1 \le j \le k} X_{j,n+1}\right) = \underline{P}\left(X_{l,n+1} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} X_{j,n+1}\right)$$
(5)

$$\overline{P}^{(l)} = \overline{P} \left(X_{l,n+1} = \min_{1 \le j \le k} X_{j,n+1} \right) = \overline{P} \left(X_{l,n+1} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} X_{j,n+1} \right)$$
(6)

Derivations and definitions of the above equations are given in the appendix.

3.3 Survival functions for competing risks

The survival function, which is also known as the reliability function, represents the probability for a unit of surviving past a certain moment of time. As mentioned before, this method does not produce precise probabilities and thus precise values for the survival function, but the aim is to derive maximum and minimum upper bounds, which are consistent with the probability assessment according to $A_{(n)}$. The formulae for these NPI lower and upper survival functions $\underline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t)$ and $\overline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t)$ are considered useful and applicable in many ways in reliability and survival analysis (Coolen et al., 2002). These NPI lower and upper survival functions were first introduced by Coolen et al. (2002), but Maturi et al. (2010) introduced the simple closed-form formulae for these survival functions $\underline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t)$ and $\overline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t)$ as presented in Eqs. 7 and 8. Assuming that $t_{s_i+1}^i = t_0^{i+1} = x_{i+1}$ for i = 0, 1, ..., u - 1. The NPI lower survival function can be expressed as follows, for $t \in [t_a^i, t_{a+1}^i]$ with i = 0, 1, ..., u and $a = 0, 1, ..., s_i$

$$\underline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t) = \frac{1}{(n+1)} \, \tilde{n}_{t_a^i} \, \prod_{\{r:c_r < t_a^i\}} \, \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_r} + 1}{\tilde{n}_{c_r}} \tag{7}$$

and the corresponding NPI upper survival function for $t \in [x_i, x_{i+1})$ with i = 0, 1, ..., u

$$\overline{S}_{X_{n+1}}(t) = \frac{1}{(n+1)} \, \widetilde{n}_{x_i} \, \prod_{\{r:c_r < x_i\}} \, \frac{\widetilde{n}_{c_r} + 1}{\widetilde{n}_{c_r}} \tag{8}$$

For further discussion of the above formulae reader is referred to Maturi et al. (2010).

4. Numerical example

4.1 General

The purpose of this example is to apply the NPI for competing risks in the aforementioned PHMSA dataset and then derive lower and upper probabilities as well as survival functions for different failure causes (competing risks) for a future onshore gas transmission pipe segment that fails due to rupture. Only ruptured pipes are of interest in this study. Given that only a tiny fraction of the overall number of pipes fail in the entire US gas transmission pipeline system, applying the competing risks theory on the entire network would be unfruitful, since the impact of incidents is trivial and the same results are produced, either realistic competing risks probabilities or net probabilities. A net survival probability is for instance one that describes the probability of surviving from external corrosion in the hypothetical world where a pipeline cannot rupture from any other causes. Relative survival

and cause-specific survival attempt to estimate this, under specific assumptions. The reader is referred to Pesinis and Tee (2017) for such an analysis that takes into account the entire US gas transmission pipeline network. The focus thus is on analysing the rupture incidents, so that realistic marginal expectations of the correlations among failure causes are derived and the cumulative rupture function of pipe segment ruptures is described in an accurate and complete way.

The main assumption of the methodology is that the future pipe segment undergoes the same process and conditions as the pipeline components that have reportedly failed thus far. Taking into consideration that only a very specific category of pipelines, i.e. onshore gas transmission, is examined it is quite reasonable to assume that similar behaviour is expected from this type of pipelines. Besides, as described in Section 2, there are certain attributes that are common for the majority of onshore gas transmission pipelines that operated from 2002-2014 (class location 1, carbon steel material of construction and cathodic and coating protection). The future pipe segment that is examined against rupture is assumed to be a typical 12m long newly-built pipeline segment. For the sake of exchangeability, which is inherent in the NPI approach, each one of the 179 reported ruptures is assumed to originate from one or a number of defects confined to the 12m pipe segment, irrespective of the propagation length once the pipe segment has ruptured. The rupture lengths reported by pipeline operators in the database were found to be on average around 10m, which corroborates this assumption.

Next, from the different types of failure that stem from different (thus competing) failure causes, only rupture is examined. In the period 2002-2014, 189 pipe-related rupture incidents were found in the database. The time to failure is of interest in the methodology of this study and as a result the installation dates of the pipelines that failed due to rupture were listed. However, 10 rupture incidents concerned pipelines of which the installation dates were unknown (were not reported when submitted to PHMSA). These 10 rupture incidents were not taken into consideration, without significantly disturbing the approach to reality. In Tables 2 and 3, the breakdowns of the numbers and percentages of the different failure causes for the 189 and the 179 rupture cases are presented. It can be observed that ignoring the incidents with unknown installation dates (and thus time to failure) does not significantly impact the representation of the rupture frequencies due to different failure causes. The time to failure is estimated by subtracting the year of installation from the year of failure for each rupture incident.

4.2 Results and Discussion

The NPI for competing risks method assumes that there are no ties among the data to avoid notational difficulties (Maturi et al., 2010). However, among the 179 rupture incidents there are many tied observations. The time to failure for each one of them was initially expressed in years. To deal with ties though, the years were converted in weeks (1 year was assumed to equal 52 weeks) and then a trivial difference of one week was assumed among tied observations. This difference is considered to be sufficiently low, in that it does not affect the ordering of observations of units in other (failure cause) groups. Ties among different groups were also found a lot in the current example and they were treated differently for upper and lower bounds. They were dealt with in such a way that the upper and lower probabilities became maximal and minimal respectively, over the possible ways of breaking such ties without affecting the ordering of the rest of the observations (Maturi, 2010).

A failure time observation caused by one failure cause is at the same time a right-censored observation for all other failure causes. When an observation is considered right-censored for two or more failure causes, then this is also dealt with by assuming that the right censoring observations occurred fractionally later for one of the failure causes compared to the other. Again, different possible orderings of the un-tied right-censoring times are considered that aim to maximise and minimise the upper and lower bounds respectively (Maturi, 2010). Next, Eqs. 5 and 6 are used to obtain the NPI upper and lower probabilities and compare different failure causes with respect to rupture of the future pipeline component.

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 (a future pipeline component) will rupture due to external corrosion (EC) or due to other failure modes (OFC) are [0.38, 0.34] and [0.66, 0.62], respectively. In the above, OFC refers to all the failure causes except EC. These are all grouped together in one group named OFC and are jointly considered as a single failure cause and then compared with EC. OFC grouping is done in a similar way in the following, for different cases examined.

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 (a future pipeline component) will rupture due to material failure (MF) or due to other failure causes (OFC) are [0.21, 0.18] and [0.82, 0.79], respectively.

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 (a future pipeline component) will rupture due to external damage (ED) or due to other failure causes (OFC) are [0.18, 0.15] and [0.85, 0.82], respectively.

It is observed that for every one of the above three pairs of failure causes (EC and OFC, MF and OFC and ED and OFC) examined, the lower and upper probabilities satisfy the conjugacy property (Coolen, 1996). This is due to the fact that, implicit in this method is the assumption that the future segment eventually ruptures, and this is assumed to happen with certainty. When comparing one failure cause group with another group (or more than one groups as shown next) the resulting NPI upper and lower probabilities can provide either a weak or a strong indication about the future unit's failure (Maturi et al. 2010). For example, the NPI lower and upper probabilities presented above contain a strong indication that the future segment will rupture due to 'other failure causes' with all the other failure causes grouped together, instead of the EC, MF and ED failure causes individually. This can be claimed as the upper probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to external corrosion (EC) is less than the lower probability for that event due to other failure cause, that is 0.34< 0.66. Similar argument can be applied to MF and ED.

Next, a different grouping of the same time to failure data is illustrated. In specific, groups with three failure causes are considered each time and inferences in the form of weak and strong indications are derived in a similar sense as when two groups are considered. Below, 3 main cases are considered, and the methodology presented in Section 3.2 is used to calculate the corresponding upper and lower probabilities.

Case A: considering EC, MF and OFC

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to EC, due to MF or due to OFC are [0.38, 0.33], [0.21, 0.17], and [0.48, 0.44] respectively. The fact that the upper probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to MF is less than the lower probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to EC, that is 0.21<0.33, provides a strong indication that EC is more likely to cause a rupture to the future segment than MF, with all other failure causes grouped into OFC.

Case B: considering EC, ED and OFC

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to EC, due to excavation damage (ED) or due to OFC are [0.38, 0.33], [0.18, 0.14] and [0.51, 0.47], respectively.

Case C: considering MF, ED and OFC

The NPI upper and lower probabilities for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to MF, due to ED or due to OFC are [0.21, 0.17], [0.18, 0.14] and [0.68, 0.63], respectively.

In the same sense, these NPI lower and upper probabilities can also provide weak indications for the event that the future segment ruptures due to a specific failure cause. For example, the event that future segment will rupture due to ED is a bit less likely compared to failing due to MF, with all the other failure causes grouped together (OFC). This is because the upper (lower) probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to ED is less than the upper (lower) probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to MF, that is 0.18 < 0.21 (0.14 < 0.17). However, the upper probability for the event that unit 180 will rupture due to MF, that is 0.18 < 0.21 that is 0.18 > 0.17, meaning that there is not a strong indication for this event.

It should be noted that, for all the cases illustrated above there is a strong indication that the future segment will rupture due to 'another failure cause', instead of the EC, MF and ED failure causes, similarly to the result obtained when only two groups of failure causes were considered. All the above results are considered to be in line with the basic underlying theory of statistics using imprecise probabilities. Thus, when three separate groups of failure causes are considered instead of two, which means that data is represented in more detail, the upper and lower probabilities entail more imprecision. For instance, the upper and lower probabilities of rupture due to EC is [0.34, 0.38] for two groups and [0.33, 038] for three groups. According to Maturi et al. (2010), this can be thought to be in line with a fundamental principle of NPI in the context of multinomial data.

Another inference that can be derived from the above upper and lower probabilities is that relatively early failures compared to later ones, do not impact the final result. While for example, ED and MF have more early failures than EC, that does not affect the final result which is something expected since the data are competing risks data on the same segments

and not completely independent failure times per group. However, this method is considered to enable inferences with regard to actual failure time, as opposed to other basic statistical methods that measure only the frequency of failures. Finally, it can be observed that the upper probability for the event that the future segment will rupture due to EC or MF or ED is the same no matter if two or three groups are considered. The reason for this is discussed in more detail in Coolen et al. (2002) and Maturi et al. (2010). In this example, when it comes to EC for instance, the upper probability is realised with the extreme assignments of probability masses in the intervals created by the data in accordance to the lower survival function for EC and the upper survival function for the other failure causes. Since, all failure causes are assumed independent, the upper survival function for the other failure causes is the same regardless of the number of separate groups considered.

There is no reference time period being considered for the estimated upper and lower probabilities presented so far. For insight into when the failure may occur, one just uses the upper and lower survival functions presented next, where one can look at these for a specific failure cause and for all combined causes. The survival function directly relates to the probability of failure of a future pipe segment, without including any knowledge about underlying distributions and by using only the observed data (Coolen-Schrijner and Coolen, 2004; Barone and Frangopol, 2014). The survival functions illustrated in Fig. 1 result from totally neglecting the information on different failure causes and also from the situations with two and three groups of failure causes respectively. The lower survival function $\underline{S}_{180}^{2CR}$ corresponds to the situation with two groups of failure causes, lower survival functions. The lower survival function $\underline{S}_{180}^{3CR}$ is derived in the respective way for three groups of failure causes. As indicated in Maturi et al. (2010), these lower and upper survival functions present the expected nested structure, according to the level of detail of the data representation, on the same basis discussed above for lower and upper probabilities.

Then, in Fig. 2 the NPI lower and upper survival functions corresponding to two separate failure causes (EC and MF) are presented. For example, the lower survival function \underline{S}_{180}^{EC} is obtained by considering the 64 ruptures caused by EC as actual failure time observations and the other 115 observations in the data set as right-censored data. The same procedure was employed for MF in this figure (Fig. 2) and for the rest of the failure causes considered in this study in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The inferences that can be derived from these figures, can be relevant to the nature and magnitude of ruptures caused by each failure cause. For instance,

the fact that EC does not cause a lot of early failures compared to MF, IC, ED, OTHER, EM is illustrated in the figures. Also, it can be noticed that the fewer the total failures due to any failure cause, the higher the imprecision (difference between corresponding upper and lower survival functions) at larger service lifetimes. Finally, the fact that in all figures, the lower survival function is always equal to zero beyond the largest observation, while the upper survival function remains positive is something inherent in the NPI approach as discussed in Coolen and Yan (2004) and Maturi et al. (2010). The survival functions can be used to examine and implement optimal maintenance strategies. Maintenance strategies can be presented in the form of upper and lower bounds or from a robust inference point of view one could use only the lower survival function.

5. Conclusion

This study employs the established NPI approach in order to derive inductive inferences from the 179 reported ruptures of a set of onshore gas transmission pipelines reported in the PHMSA database, for the period 2002-2014. The NPI enables statistical inference on future observations based on past observations, when few information is available and also when failure, which is rupture in the context of this study, is caused by several competing risks. This approach is applied in a dataset from the PHMSA database, regarding rupture incidents of onshore gas transmission pipelines for the period 2002-2014. The NPI method attempts to analyse the rupture incidents reported in PHMSA, from a non-repairable systems perspective, based on the time to failure of the ruptured pipe segments. The analysis shows that NPI is a useful technique to derive inferences for a future pipe segment that will rupture due to a specific failure cause, by providing imprecise probabilities and survival functions for this event based on historical failure data. The results, among others, indicate external corrosion as the predominant rupture cause for the aforementioned period under consideration in the USA, with ruptures taking place mainly after 30 years. The predicted imprecise probabilities and survival functions, can be used to examine and implement optimal maintenance strategies based on relative risk prioritization.

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Critica Contraction

Appendix: NPI probabilities for competing risks

It is assumed that the number of failures caused by failure cause *j* is u_j , $x_{j,1} < x_{j,2} < \cdots < x_{j,u_j}$, and $v_j = (n - u_j)$ is the number of the right-censored observations with $c_{j,1} < c_{j,2} < \cdots < c_{j,v_j}$, corresponding to failure cause *j*. It is further assumed that there are s_{j,i_j} right-censored observations in the interval $(x_{j,i_j}, x_{j,i_j}+1)$ denoted by $c_{j,1}^{i_j} < c_{j,2}^{i_j} < \ldots < c_{j,s_{j,i_j}}^{i_j}$, so that $\sum_{i_j=0}^{u_j} s_{j,i_j} = v_j$. The random quantity representing the failure time of the next unit, with all *k* failure causes considered, is $X_{n+1} = \min_{1 \le j \le k} X_{j,n+1}$. It should be noted it is assumed that $x_{j,0} = 0$ and $x_{j,u_{j+1}} = \infty$ for notational convenience (Maturi et al., 2010).

The NPI *M*-functions for $X_{j,n+1}$ (j = 1, ..., k), are

$$M^{j}(t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}},x_{j,i_{j}+1}) = M_{X_{j,n_{j}+1}}(t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}},x_{j,i_{j}+1}) = \frac{1}{(n+1)}(\tilde{n}_{t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}}}) \int_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{\delta_{i_{j}^{*}-1}^{i_{j}}} \prod_{\substack{\{r:c_{j,r} < t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}}\}} \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_{j,r}}+1}{\tilde{n}_{c_{j,r}}}$$
(A1)

where $i_j = 0, 1, ..., u_j, i_j^* = 0, 1, ..., s_{j,i_j}$ and

$$\delta_{i_{j}^{i_{j}}}^{i_{j}} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } i_{j}^{*} = 0 \\ 0 \text{ if } i_{j}^{*} = 1, \dots, s_{j,i_{j}} \end{cases}$$

i.e. $t_{j,0}^{i_{j}} = x_{j,i_{j}}$ and $t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}} = c_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}}$ for failure time or time 0 and for censoring time respectively.
The numbers of units in the risk set just prior to times c_{r} and $t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}}$ are $\tilde{n}_{c_{r}}$ and $\tilde{n}_{t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}}^{i_{j}}$ respectively. The corresponding NPI probabilities are

$$P^{j}(x_{j,i_{j}}, x_{j,i_{j}+1}) = P(X_{j,n_{j}+1} \in (x_{j,i_{j}}, x_{j,i_{j}+1})) = \frac{1}{(n+1)} \prod_{\{r:c_{j,r} < x_{j,i_{j}+1}\}} \frac{\tilde{n}_{c_{j,r}} + 1}{\tilde{n}_{c_{j,r}}}$$
(A2)

where x_{j,i_j} and $x_{j,i_{j+1}}$ are two consecutive observed failure times triggered by failure cause *j*. The notation for the NPI lower and upper probabilities, for the event that a single future unit n+1 fails due to a specific failure cause *l*, for each l=1, ..., k and assuming that the future unit undergoes the same process as the *n* units, is as follows.

$$\underline{P}^{(l)} = \underline{P}\left(X_{l,n+1} = \min_{1 \le j \le k} X_{j,n+1}\right) = \underline{P}\left(X_{l,n+1} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} X_{j,n+1}\right)$$
(A3)

$$\overline{P}^{(l)} = \overline{P} \left(X_{l,n+1} = \min_{1 \le j \le k} X_{j,n+1} \right) = \overline{P} \left(X_{l,n+1} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} X_{j,n+1} \right)$$
(A4)

These NPI lower and upper probabilities for the event that the next unit will fail due to failure cause *l* are

$$\underline{P}^{(l)} = \sum_{C_{l}(j,i_{j},i_{j}^{*})} \left[\sum_{i_{l}=0}^{u_{l}} 1(x_{l,i_{l}+1} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} \left\{ t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}} \right\}) P^{l}(x_{l,i_{l}}, x_{l,i_{l}+1}) \right] \times \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \ne l}}^{k} M^{j}(t_{j,i_{j}^{*}}^{i_{j}}, x_{j,i_{j}+1}) \quad (A5)$$

$$\overline{P}^{(l)} = \sum_{C_{l}(j,i_{j})} \left[\sum_{i_{l}=0}^{u_{l}} \sum_{i_{l}^{*}=0}^{s_{l,i_{l}}} 1(t_{l,i_{l}^{*}}^{i_{l}} < \min_{\substack{1 \le j \le k \\ j \ne l}} \left\{ x_{j,i_{j}+1} \right\}) M^{l}(t_{l,i_{l}^{*}}^{i_{l}}, x_{l,i_{l}+1}) \right] \times \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \ne l}}^{k} P^{j}(x_{j,i_{j}}, x_{j,i_{j}+1})$$

$$(A6)$$

where $\sum_{C_l(j,i_j,i_j^*)}$ denotes the sums over all i_j^* from 0 to s_{j,i_j} and over all i_j from 0 to u_j for j=1,...,k but not including j=l. Similarly, $\sum_{C_l(j,i_j)}$ denotes the sums over all i_j from 0 to u_j for j=1,...,k but not including j=l. For detailed derivations and definitions of the above equations the reader is referred to Maturi et al. (2010).

Table 1. Mapping of the failure causes for the period 2002-2014.

Internal corrosion gg Internal corrosion	2002-2009			2010-2014	Failure causes adopted in this study		
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IntegrationIntegratio	out		tsid	Damage by boats, barges, drilling rigs,			
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broken pipe coupling Threaded connection/coupling failure		Threads stripped	-	equipment			
		broken nine counling		Threaded connection/coupling failure			

	Ruptured or leaking				
	seal/pump packing				
			Compressor or compressor-related		
			equipment		
		ıt fa	Non-threaded connection failure		
		nen	Defective or loose tubing or fitting		
		ipn	Failure of equipment body (except		
~		nbį	compressor), vessel plate, or other		
ons		Щ	material		
rati			Other equipment failure		
be			Damage by operator or operator's		
qс			contractor not related to excavation		
an			and not due to motorized		
ent		ų	vehicle/equipment damage		
mc		utio	Underground gas storage, pressure		
liul		era	vessel, or cavern allowed or caused to		
Щ	Incorrect operation	do	overpressure		
	meeneer operation	ect	Valve left or placed in wrong position,		
		orr	but not resulting in an overpressure		
		Inc	Pipeline or equipment over pressured		
			Equipment not installed properly		
			Wrong equipment specified or		
			installed		
			Other incorrect operation		
r	Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous		
the					
0	Unknown		Unknown		
	Heavy rains/floods		Heavy rains/floods		
ses	Temperature	\square	Temperature		
orc	High winds	Z	High winds		
al f	Lightning		Lightning		
tur			Other natural force damage		
Na	Earth movement		Earth movement	Earth movement (EM)	
	V Y				

T 1	NT 1	D 4
Failure	Number	Percentage
cause		%
IC	19	11
EC	64	36
ED	27	15
PDP	9	5
MF	33	18
EM	10	5
0	17	10

Labic 2. 177 Ruptul Clanul Claud With Milowin Mistanation dates	Table 2.	179	Rupture	failure	data	with	known	insta	llation	dates
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Failure	Number	Percentage	
cause	10	<u>%</u>	
	19	10	
EC	04	54 16	
ED DDD	31 10	10	
rdr Me	10 25	ງ 10	
IVIF EM	33 10	19	
	10	5 11	

Failure	Number	Percentage
cause		%
IC	19	10
EC	64	34
ED	31	16
PDP	10	5
MF	35	19
EM	10	5
0	20	11



Fig 1. NPI lower and upper survival functions for a future pipeline segment with t in weeks.

Fig 2. NPI conditional (EC, MF) lower and upper survival functions for a future pipeline segment with t in weeks.



Fig 3. NPI conditional (IC, ED, OTHER) lower and upper survival functions for a future pipeline segment with t in weeks.



Fig 4. NPI conditional (PDP, EM) lower and upper survival functions for a future pipeline segment with t in weeks.



Highlights

- NPI method attempts to analyse the rupture incidents reported in PHMSA
- NPI enables statistical inference when few information is available
- NPI derives inference when failure is caused by several competing risks
- The survival functions are used to examine optimal maintenance strategies