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Production of Uniform Cloth and Military Uniforms in Russia (1698–1762)

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This article studies a corpus of state decrees aimed at regulating production of uniform cloth and military uniforms in Russia in the period between the reign of Peter I (1682–1725) and Peter III (1762). It discusses developments and challenges faced by this nascent textile industry and their wider social and cultural implications.

Military modernisation became of paramount importance to Peter I (1682–1725) after the unsuccessful first Azov campaign against the Ottoman Empire in 1695 and the defeat by the Swedish forces at Narva at the beginning of the Northern War (1700–1721). To create a regular, professional army, in 1705 Peter I introduced compulsory military service for the nobility and recruitment of one soldier from every twenty non-noble households in urban and rural regions. From now on, military conscription meant life-long service. According to A. M. Nikolaieff, 167,895 men were recruited in the period between 1705 and 1709, 'and fully supplied the needs of the army for the campaign of these years'.[1] As observed by Galina Ul'ianova, in the early 1720s, '300,000 people were registered in the army out of 13 mln of the [entire] population'.[2]

The formation of regular forces developed concurrently with the emergence of the cloth industry and production of new uniforms. The establishment of this textile branch became particularly important during the Northern War, engendered by the demands of the new warfare and Peter's efficiency-driven approach to army organisation. In 1699, he introduced shorter, more comfortable uniforms — at first Hungarian and then in 1700, Saxon — for an expanding army.[3] The decree justifying new designs by their suitability for military tasks was issued on 20 August 1700, one day after the formal war proclamation.[4] Peter's ideas of modern warfare, as Evgenii Anisimov has observed, refocused from capturing fortresses to defeating the opponent 'in direct, fast-moving contact — battle engagement'.[5] The new more practical and economical uniforms enabled greater mobility. They consisted of coats reaching just below the knees — as opposed to ankle-length coats of *strel'tsy* worn by pre-Petrine semi-regular forces — knee-length breeches, sleeveless cloaks, woollen stockings and hats.[6] The army needed supplies of 'mainly woollen uniforms', while the tricorne hats were usually made from fleece obtained 'from the first lamb shearing'.[7] One aim of Peter's reform was to create a new image for his military that would allow it to be perceived as an equal partner in European military and

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diplomatic affairs. But the introduction of European-style uniforms also had critical importance beyond military history. Soldiers dressed in new garments publicised Peter's urban dress reform among the population in Russia.

While clothing military bodies in European-style uniforms, Peter and his successors wished to see them dressed in domestic cloth and kersey (*karazeia* from Polish *karazja*, 'coarse, loose weave woollen cloth').[8] The goal of the state to become self-sufficient in the production of these textiles was driven by domestic economic interests. Such protectionist policies were common in many countries during this period.[9] As Roze Hentschell has demonstrated, domestic wool cloth was the fabric through which early modern Britain, for instance, negotiated questions of selfhood and otherness.[10] These questions were equally important in eighteenth-century Russia, particularly in the context of the Petrine modernisation reforms. Peter's ambition to make uniforms from local cloth was articulated in the decree of 1718 and the Admiralty regulations of 1722 and became a guiding policy for the Russian Crown.[11] Among eighteenth-century Russian textile policies, decrees focused on the production of cloth occupy the largest place. Peter I planned to rely exclusively on domestic cloth production by 1720.[12] This goal led to the establishment of several cloth mills at the beginning of the century and eventually transformed the Russian cloth industry. Similarly to other industries, particularly those directed at the modernisation of military forces, the state actively subsidised this branch. It also tried to enforce strict quality control over the textiles through various institutions: the Manufactures Chancellery, the War Commissariat and the War College. Both uniform cloth and kersey were subject to quality control with regard to their texture, durability, colour and width, although poor technological capabilities often made quality requirements impossible to fulfil.

In what follows, I will examine a corpus of governmental decrees aimed at regulating production of uniform cloth and uniforms in the period from the beginning of the eighteenth century until the end of Peter III's reign in 1762. I will discuss major developments and challenges faced by this industry and their wider social and cultural implications. The cloth industry continued to be important and underwent significant changes, particularly with regard to the ownership of the mills and workforce, in the later part of the eighteenth century, but the scope of this article will not allow me to engage with the later period.

The Cloth Industry: Import, Production and Protectionist Policies

The Russian Crown's protectionist impulses and policies were triggered in part by the dominant role played by imported cloth in the production of military uniforms and led to its efforts to develop this small and inefficient sector of the Russian economy. According to Nikolai Petrukhintsev, in the first forty years of the eighteenth century, Britain competed with Prussia for the Russian cloth market, becoming its main source of imported textiles by 1710. Petrukhintsev goes as far as to say that the Russian army won the Northern War in uniforms made of English cloth. From 1726, however, Prussia became Russia's main supplier of cloth.[13] At the end of 1729, Prussia persuaded the court to purchase about 187,500 yards (171,450 metres) of its cloth, while the court signed a contract with an English merchant for

delivery of only 'about 75,000 yards' (68,580 metres) of English cloth in 1729.[14] According to Igor' Kurukin, at the beginning of Anna Ioannovna's reign (1730–1740), the country still experienced a major deficit in domestic cloth, with local manufacturers being able to deliver only 124,000 *arshins* (88,188.8 metres) of cloth to the War College of approximately 400,000 *arshins* (284,480 metres) required for military needs.[15]

In 1732, Claudius Rondeau, the English resident at the Russian court, convinced the College of Commerce to purchase 'four hundred thousands yards [365,760 metres] of English soldiers cloth', hoping that 'measures will be taken as may wholly exclude the prussians and secure this valuable branch of the trade entirely to the british nation [*sic*]'.[16] In 1732, the College of Admiralty contracted Sheffner and Wolff to supply 'between eighty and a hundred thousand yards' (between 73,152 and 91,440 metres) of English soldiers' cloth each year for three years.[17] English soldiers' cloth was better quality but fifteen to twenty per cent more expensive than the Prussian cloth, and Britain did not produce substantial quantities of coarse cloth for soldiers' uniforms.[18] Hence, the Crown offered a more favourable tariff for the import of coarse cloth from Silesia and Hamburg.[19] But in 1734, Russia finally 'agreed to abate one third of the duties on four of the most considerable species' of English wool products.[20] According to Petrukhintsev, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1736–1739, half of the Russian army was dressed in uniforms made from English and Prussian cloth, with Britain becoming the main supplier of cloth again by 1738.[21] According to decree No. 6984 issued on 10 June 1736, the amount of English cloth — 152,764 *arshins* (108,645.76 metres) — supplied by Sheffner and Wolff for military needs increased in comparison with their earlier provisions, while the Prussian company delivered 80,000 *arshins* (56,896 metres) of cloth.[22] During the reign of both Anna Ioannovna and Elizabeth, in 1731 and 1757 respectively, the Crown released cloth from some (in the first case) and all (in the second) customs duties to encourage its import, continuing tax policies similar to those established by Peter in 1723.[23] Nevertheless, due to the development of the domestic cloth industry, the number of uniforms made from imported cloth gradually decreased from seventy per cent during Peter's reign to fifty per cent during Anna Ioannovna's.[24] Cloth imports, however, did not guarantee high-quality products. In 1735, for instance, English, Prussian and domestic cloths did not meet standard quality requirements.[25]

Prior to the eighteenth century, textile manufacturing in Russia existed mainly in the form of small handicraft production by artisans and peasants, textile workshops established by foreign manufacturers, and court textile manufactures.[26] During Peter's reign, the state played a crucial role in the development of the cloth-making industry, emphasising its importance for military modernisation. After the tsar's journeys to Europe in 1697–1698 and 1716–1717, both state and private enterprises producing wool and linen cloths and other textiles as well as haberdashery products started to emerge in Russia. The first cloth mill was founded in 1698 in Moscow by merchant Feodor Serikov and produced a coat for Peter I in 1705.[27] In 1704, the government established the first cloth mills in Tavrov in the Voronezh region (south-western Russia), and in 1705, the year Peter introduced compulsory military service, the 'Great Cloth Court' (*Bol'shoi sukonnyi dvor*) opened in Moscow. Mills that produced

cloth from both domestic and imported wool were also founded in Kazan' and Lipetsk, and from 1710 sheep breeding developed in the southern regions.[28] The cloth industry gradually expanded from over ten mills by the end of Peter I's reign to over forty mills by the end of Catherine II's reign (1762–1796), with at least eleven mills being opened in the period between 1713 and 1724.[29]

Since Moscow had a well-developed textile infrastructure prior to the eighteenth century, a significant number of cloth-making mills founded in the first quarter of the eighteenth century concentrated around this urban area. Mills were also established close to the areas of wool production to minimise transportation costs and in places with a high concentration of military forces to enable cost-effective delivery of fabrics. Several mills, which produced cloth, kersey, hats and stockings, opened in the Voronezh region whose importance as a centre of cloth-making and shipbuilding industries grew during the campaigns against Poland in 1733–1735 and the Ottoman Empire in 1735–1739. The region was located on strategically important routes to Poland and the Black and Caspian Seas, and was an important sheep-breeding centre.[30] Moreover, many runaway serfs from Russia and Ukraine settled in the south, which had a warm climate and fertile soil.[31] The availability of workforce, raw materials and high demand for uniforms made production of cloth cost-efficient in Voronezh.

Likewise, the government quickly realised the advantages of establishing private mills over state-owned ones. It benefited from 'a transfer of capital from commerce' and later also from agriculture 'into industrial production' and the sharing with entrepreneurs of both the capital and responsibilities for the development of industries. This was particularly advantageous when various resources were depleted by the prolonged Northern War.[32] A decree issued in 1715 encouraged merchants to establish private enterprises, and from at least 1719 the government started to hand over state cloth-making mills to private individuals, most of whom were initially from the merchant class and were able to found their manufactures thanks to the Crown's economic concessions. The concessions, many of which were also granted to other industries, included interest-free loans and exemptions from certain forms of taxation and state service, assignment of state serfs to the mills, gifts of land and buildings for their enterprises, protectionist policies such as import restrictions or introduction of high import duties to support local production, advance payments for wool and kersey and other benefits.[33] From the reign of Peter I, the Crown also prohibited the export of sheep, sheepskin and wool as part of its protectionist policies. This export ban was still in force during Elizabeth's reign.[34] The assignment of serfs to mills helped the owners from non-noble estates who otherwise would have struggled to find workmen for their enterprises, unlike nobles who owned serfs. In the eighteenth century, little free labour existed in Russia, and Peter I significantly restricted the mobility of serfs, who constituted the majority of the population, to enforce taxation. Moreover, there was a shortage of skilled workers. As a result, state serfs comprised the main workforce at the first mills. They were attached to these mills, which ensured the availability of permanent labour, and could be taught required specialised skills.

In 1719, as part of the move towards the establishment of private enterprises in the cloth-making industry, the government handed over ownership of the Great

Cloth Market in Moscow and its workers to the merchant Vladimir Shchegolin and his partners and granted them a three-year interest-free loan of 30,000 roubles. These manufacturers had to produce kersey and *stammet* (a type of kersey) for the Chancellery of Uniforms and baize for the Admiralty.[35] Likewise, in 1725, several noblemen and merchants took ownership of the state mill in the Voronezh region on condition that they would more than double cloth production thanks to their capital and equipment investments.[36] At first Shchegolin drew on foreign expertise, as Peter I encouraged manufacturers in new industries to employ foreign specialists and engage in knowledge transfer. According to Tugan-Baranovsky, however, foreign experts found it challenging to adapt to Russian conditions and, despite earning high salaries, often returned home, a situation that occurred at this cloth mill.[37]

In the 1730s when Russia was involved in several military campaigns, and Count von Münnich (1683–1767), who was in charge of the military reform, significantly expanded the army, the Crown's support of cloth and uniform production became of paramount importance. The decree of 12 March 1734 encouraged members of various estates (with the exception of serfs) as well as foreign manufacturers to set up cloth- and ammunition-producing mills and to ask the Senate and the Treasury for as much financial support and concessions as the manufacturers needed.[38] To encourage the development of these industries, the Crown introduced a system of forward contracts and advance payments that guaranteed stability of income. Thus, an edict of 8 March 1735 gave Ivan Poluiaroslavtsev an advance payment (one third of the costs) for the production of uniform cloth and kersey. The Crown supported his mills in Moscow and Putivl' (north-eastern Ukraine) and released the serfs working at the Putivl' mill from poll taxes to engage them almost exclusively in cloth production. Also, the College of Commerce gave Poluiaroslavtsev a sheep wool factory for his mills.[39] The cloth-making industry continued to grow, with five mills being established in Voronezh by nobles and merchants in 1736.[40]

Likewise, when Andrei Eremeev and his partners founded a cloth-making mill in Moscow in 1736, they received a three-year interest-free loan of 10,000 roubles. They had to reimburse this sum either by textiles or cash, and initially invested 30,000 roubles in their enterprise. The government gave them a number of buildings and a land lot, permission to obtain additional land and buildings and a ten-year exemption from any rent payments. After this initial period, the merchants had to pay a small rent by supplying fifty roubles' worth of cloth annually to the Treasury. In addition, they had ten-year exemptions from purchase and import duties for wool, equipment and other materials bought domestically and abroad, and from payment of duties for the sale of cloth, kersey and wool brocades that remained after military supplies. These measures aimed to make this industry more financially attractive to their owners. While in the first two years Eremeev's mill had to supply textiles exclusively for the military, in subsequent years it had to produce 25,000 *arshins* (17,780 metres) of uniform cloth but could sell the remaining textiles to civilians. Also, the merchants' extended families and their assistants who shared living quarters with them were exempt from state duties.[41] The mill owned by Eremeev and other merchants became a leading eighteenth-century producer of cloth and kersey.

In the 1730s, the government exercised more robust oversight of the mills and manufacturing process, but the cooperation between the mills also expanded. The delivery quotas for kersey were established in agreement with the mills, while the College of Commerce and later the College of Manufactures checked the quality of cloth and kersey twice a year. As part of the knowledge transfer policy, the owners of well-established mills had to send two skilled craftsmen from each mill to teach workers at Eremeev's plant for a period of one year.[42]

The Crown continued to extend economic concessions to the manufacturers during Elizabeth's reign (1741–1762) and confiscated low productivity mills. In 1743, for instance, Postovalov received Lipskaia mill confiscated from the manufacturer Ariolt, additional spaces for cloth and paper production in Voronezh and workmen and equipment from mills previously owned by Petr Sakharov and Mark Plotnikov, with the task of improving the mills' productivity. Postovalov made his first successful investment of 40,000 roubles in a cloth-making mill in 1739 without taking any loans from the Crown. He was allowed to purchase a village with up to fifty households and received a ten-year taxation exemption on the import of materials and equipment and sale of his products. He was allowed to use nearby forests for construction, and to have six retired soldiers guard his enterprises and perform other small tasks. He and his heirs could remain in possession of the mills as long as they produced a sufficient amount of cloth and kersey for military needs — 30,000 units of uniform fabrics in the first years, increasing in subsequent years.[43] Cloth manufacturing continued to develop in the second part of the eighteenth century thanks to economic concessions and incentives offered by the Crown, but the mills' productivity and quality of textiles continued to be an area of concern.

Shortage of Skilled Workers and Competent Managers

Since only the Crown and nobles had serfs, the development of industries in Petrine Russia was at first limited to state enterprises and a small number of mills founded by nobles and non-nobles with capital. The shortage of workforce led manufacturers in different industries to hire runaway serfs and seasonal workers who came to towns to earn *obrok* (quit rent). Employment of both categories of workmen, however, caused fluctuations in the workforce and led to disruptions in production and poor-quality final products, particularly since the production process required specialised knowledge. To help manufacturers address these problems, the decree issued on 18 July 1722 allowed them to keep apprentices and skilled craftsmen at the mills until the tsar's return from the Persian campaign of 1722–1723 if their return to the owners led to disruptions in manufacturing.[44] Moreover, to encourage non-nobles to found new factories in different industries, the decrees of 18 January 1721 and 3 December 1723 allowed merchants to purchase villages with serfs for their mills on the condition that these serfs would remain permanently attached to the mills. In cases when potential manufacturers abused this regulation to purchase serfs for personal needs, the Crown exercised a right to take the serfs into its custody and to impose fines on their buyers.[45] While this regulation opened a window of opportunities for non-nobles, in reality, as Arcadius Kahan has observed, only a few potential manufacturers had sufficient capital to purchase serfs.[46]

Moreover, the regulation did not solve the problems arising from the employment of runaway serfs and seasonal workers whose numbers, according to A. Maksimov, increased in the period between 1724 and 1736 because of poor harvests. Such employment led to a conflict of interests between manufacturers and serf owners. The largest cloth manufacturers submitted a petition to the authorities, and a decree was published on 7 January 1736, which 'eternally' bound skilled workers who received professional training at different mills, together with their families, to these enterprises.[47] In return, the manufacturers had to pay fees to their previous owners. The decree legally institutionalised the Petrine regulations of 1722 that allowed manufacturers in different industries to keep fugitive serfs at the mills until further instructions. From now on, manufacturers were allowed to hire new workers only with passports, that is, seasonal workers who were lawfully absent from their owners. *Voevodes* (local officials/governors) had to return to the manufacturers fugitive serfs bound to the mills.[48] While trying to regularise the relationships between mill owners and serfs, these decrees further restricted serfs' mobility. According to Elizaveta Zaozerskaia, as a result of this decree, over 8,000 workers were enserfed in the cloth industry between the 1730s and 1740s.[49]

In addition, the regulation of 1736 limited Peter's concessions by allowing manufacturers to purchase serfs only for their enterprises without land, which robbed serfs of the opportunity to engage in agricultural labour for sustenance purposes and made it more difficult for merchants to keep them attached to the mills because of high maintenance costs.[50] This regulation defended privileges of the nobles, the only class allowed to own serfs, but also responded to the system's abuses, as merchants sometimes 'founded' mills with the single purpose of purchasing serfs and avoiding payment of poll taxes. According to Ivan Polosin, the state was wary of such scheming, and confiscated mills for this and other violations, as happened in 1741 with Poluiaroslavtsev's mill in Putivl'.[51] The government justified this measure by citing the poor quality of the cloth produced, ineffective use of resources and deceitful receipt of state money in addition to the fact that Poluiaroslavtsev 'wronged and financially ruined people and peasants' at the mill.[52]

Because of the shortage of workers, manufacturers tried to engage various social groups in cloth production. In the Voronezh region, they hired *odnodvortsy* and land militia soldiers until the decree of 5 November 1740 prohibited this, ordering them to send *odnodvortsy* home and militia soldiers to their regiments.[53] The shortage of militia soldiers to protect the area after the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1735–1739 may have been responsible for this decision. Manufacturers who violated this regulation and officers responsible for its implementation were fined and the latter could also undergo corporal punishment, if their actions hindered the production process.[54] In this way, the Crown tried to ensure mill operation was not interrupted. The availability of labour was a decisive factor when choosing a location for the mills. Nobles usually set up their enterprises in rural areas where they had their estates and serfs, while merchants established their mills in towns.[55]

By 1752 many concessions granted to non-nobles, such as the reinstatement of Peter's decree in 1744 allowing merchants to purchase serfs, were curtailed.[56] The decree issued on 12 March 1752 limited the number of serfs merchants were allowed to purchase to forty-two workers for one cloth-making loom, and fifteen

workers for a kersey-making loom. Serfs had to move to the mills together with their families. These regulations did not affect nobles who could buy unlimited serfs for their enterprises.[57] Finally, the decree signed by Peter III on 21 March 1762 prohibited manufacturers purchasing serfs with or without land for their enterprises.[58] This increase in restrictions paralleled the upsurge in production of domestic cloth. Similarly to the regulation issued in 1752, the new policy protected the rights and privileges of nobles and led to a further increase in their ownership of mills. According to Zaozerskaia, in the period between 1762 and 1775, sixteen members of the gentry and only five merchants were in charge of cloth-making mills.[59] Cloth manufacturing became a popular enterprise among nobles because it gave them a stable income with the possibility of receiving forward contracts, advance payments and taxation exemptions. Kahan also lists as incentives the availability of workers and raw materials, the stability and security of the Crown's demand for cloth and the absence of competition.[60]

Similarly, the Crown experienced a shortage of qualified and capable manufacturers in this nascent industry. The government tried to tackle the problems of low productivity and poor quality by hiring competent managers to improve the efficiency of the mills. In 1741, Stepan Bolotin and Johann Kas[h]per Schmitt were recognised as the best managers of cloth manufactures. Bolotin was appointed to supervise the work of all cloth-making mills in Moscow, and Schmitt to supervise the production of cloth in Voronezh. As a foreign specialist, Schmitt received a salary of 500 roubles for his services while Bolotin did not receive any remuneration for this work. As the Crown considered manufacturing a form of state service, it relieved manufacturers from other state obligations and taxation and rewarded competent managers with ranks. Both Bolotin and Schmitt received the rank of collegiate assessors, which gave them the status of hereditary nobility.[61] Elizabeth's regulations of 1752, however, curtailed these privileges, sending a message that merchant manufacturers were not equal to nobles.[62]

Quality Control

The Crown developed various mechanisms for quality control in response to the poor quality of cloth and kersey. Edicts issued on 13 April 1722 and 11 and 13 April 1723 instructed city and town councils to employ three merchants and three tradesmen annually, with expertise in all textiles, for the Admiralty, the Commissioner's Office and other colleges and chancelleries involved in quality assessment. This regulation was confirmed several times in the eighteenth century.[63] Despite these efforts the quality of the soldiers' uniforms remained poor in 1728. According to Claudius Rondeau's report, 'the Russian soldiers' cloathes are in such a ragged condition that they were ashamed to show them' during military exercises.[64] The quality issue raised particularly serious concerns in the 1730s when Russia was continuously involved in military campaigns.[65] In 1736, the Crown advised hiring ad hoc quality assessors (freelance skilled workers and traders) in addition to cloth being checked by appointed officers who often did not have the required competence.[66]

One reason for poor quality was the fact that mills were not cost-effective because of low state prices for cloth and kersey. To address this problem and to make these enterprises potentially more attractive to their owners, in 1734 the Crown granted manufacturers permission to sell remaining cloth freely at the local market.[67] This suggests the Crown had reached a level of production and import of uniform cloth to meet its needs, but also needed to stimulate the local industry. The uniform cloth, however, was not a popular commodity among civilians at least until the 1780s, as they relied either on small-scale producers of cheap wool cloth or foreign manufacturers of fine cloth.[68] To further stimulate the industry, the Crown asked the War and Commerce Colleges and the Main War Commissariat to supervise the cloth-making process, prioritise purchases of domestic cloth of acceptable quality and ensure that manufacturers received payments without delays.[69]

Yet, the low fixed price of 54 kopecks per *arshin* of cloth the government paid between the 1730s and 1740s did not resolve the issue of cost-sufficiency.[70] In addition, the authorities tried to enhance proper collection of taxes. The decree issued on 13 March 1744 asked manufacturers to embroider or stamp information about the mills, including their address, on velvets and other textiles for taxation purposes, to distinguish them from imported products. Sellers had to deliver fabrics to the merchant stalls for taxation if the products were not tax exempt or were sold outside of their production areas.[71]

To ensure that cloth products met quality requirements, the authorities approved standard samples of fabrics, uniforms and ammunition. In 1735 and 1736, for instance, the government used cloth samples produced by Jan van Akker from Leiden for this purpose. According to Petrukhintsev, the state also asked van Akker to make samples at Poluiaroslavtsev's mill in Putivl' and to explain the reasons for poor quality of cloth there. Van Akker believed that Poluiaroslavtsev's mill did not comply with 'the wool processing technology'. The quality of both local and imported wool, which was used to make uniform cloth, was poor as well.[72] The authorities instructed manufacturers to make compatible cloths, encouraging them to make at least ten per cent that surpassed the quality of van Akker's samples.[73]

During Anna Leopol'dovna's regency (1740–1741), the Crown appointed a special Commission to investigate cases of poor-quality cloth production and fine manufacturers whose products did not meet standard requirements in texture, size and colour. When compared with van Akker's samples, textiles made at several mills in Moscow satisfied the requirements. Bolotin's mill was recognised as the best cloth-making enterprise in Moscow, and standard samples of both cloth and kersey produced at Bolotin's and Poluiaroslavtsev's mills and the mills owned by the German[?] manufacturers Johan van Akker[?], Ferdinand Henrich Zurnieden and Kas[h]per Funderlich[?] in Moscow were used for quality control.[74] These samples were made from sheep and camel wool brought from Tambov, Cherkassy (Ukraine), Danzig (Gdansk) and other areas. The government encouraged manufacturers to have reserves of wool, dyes, equipment and other materials necessary for half a year's production of cloth and kersey and to keep in good order annual records of their income and expenditures. Non-compliance with the quality requirements was a state offence, subject to fines.[75]

The authorities approved new standard samples in 1743. Cloth made at Eremeev's, Serikov's and Tret'iakov's mills did not compare well with these samples. Cloth produced at Bolotin's mill was of a better quality, but still not as soft as imported fabrics. After this inspection, the War College decided to accept cloths in the three basic colours for the current year if they matched Bolotin's samples in quality.[76] A further decree of 5 March 1744 threatened the reduction of prices for cloth made at these three mills if the quality did not improve. When Eremeev's promise to deliver 60,000 *arshins* (42,672 metres) of cloth to the Commissariat in 1744 remained unfulfilled, the College of Manufactures stepped in to oversee cloth production at his mill. At the same time the Senate petitioned to prohibit the owners of the mill engaging in any side business such as commerce, in order to focus exclusively on cloth production.[77] The decree of 2 July 1744 introduced further penalties for manufacturers including payment of all expenses incurred by the authorities for the purchase of imported fabrics instead of locally produced ones.[78] The edicts issued on 11 December 1742 and 23 November 1744 instructed officials to return to the mills for additional dyeing and felting cloth of which the colour and nap could be improved.[79] Moreover, in 1745, the Senate reprimanded the College of Manufactures for insufficient enforcement of the quality regulations, and promised the College and manufacturers severe fines for poor supervision of the mills and failing to make cloth of the approved quality.[80]

Despite the government's expectation in 1759 that soldiers would be able to wear uniforms made from kersey for four years, the fabric often started to deteriorate after five or six months, with holes appearing after a year of use. In 1760, Major General Ivan Glebov suggested to the Senate to replace kersey with soft wool fabrics for garrison and land militia regiments, as they were more durable than kersey. As a result, manufacturers were advised to make hospital blankets from uniform kersey.[81]

Low fixed prices for uniform cloth (54 kopecks for one *arshin* of cloth in the 1730s and 1740s, 56½ kopecks for white and 64½ kopecks for green, blue and red cloth in 1761), which the government was reluctant to increase, and the absence of a free market contributed to the low quality of fabrics.[82] To reduce the cost of wool for cloth production, the government encouraged peasants to establish sheep-raising enterprises in Tambov, Penza, Simbirsk and Ukraine and planned to incentivise them by monetary rewards for delivery of large quantities of wool. By increasing the production and sale of wool to the state, the authorities hoped to improve its quality by offering competitive products, and decrease its cost, which in 1741 amounted to two roubles and above per *pood* (16.38 kilograms). To meet these goals, the Crown also planned to import high-quality sheep from abroad and produce cloth from a combination of sheep and camel wool. Inexpensive camel wool, which was particularly well suited for cloaks because of its durability, was sold in Asia and Ukraine.[83] While the prices for wool increased in the early 1760s, the government was reluctant to increase the prices for cloth.[84] One reason for this was Russia's involvement in the Seven Years War (1756–1763), which drained the country's resources and workforce. The Crown continued to import substantial amounts of cloth and to exempt

both wool and cloth from import duties since local manufacturers could not satisfy military needs in both cloth quantity and quality.[85]

Investigations into Cloth and Uniform Production and Policy Changes

During the reign of Anna Ioannovna and the regency of Anna Leopol'dovna, the Crown carried out several large-scale investigations of cloth and uniform production with the aim of bringing systematic policy changes and improving both production and working conditions at the mills. One of the first investigations took place in 1739 when the General Field-Marshal, Count von Münnich, sent to Anna Ioannovna one of the military coats that was completely unsuitable for wear after the Russo-Turkish campaign.[86] General Lieutenant Stepan Ignat'ev was appointed to investigate and to discuss with manufacturers and first-guild merchants in Moscow the poor quality of uniform cloth. He was to find the manufacturer of the wool fabric used for the coat, confiscate cloths of unsatisfactory quality at the Moscow mills and fine their producers. At the same time, the War and Commerce Colleges collected information in Moscow and Kazan' about the costs of materials and cloth production and made to the empress suggestions for improvements.[87]

Following this earlier inquiry, in 1741 a special commission investigated the low productivity and poor quality of cloth. The commission listed poor working conditions, a shortage of skilled workmen and an uneven quality of wool among the reasons. New regulations issued in 1741 under the guidance of Count von Münnich proposed policy changes that would optimise the production process. These changes, while primarily responding to cloth manufacturing challenges, were nevertheless relatively progressive in several areas and meant to tackle workers' discontent. Thus, the government instructed the owners of the mills to hire inspectors to supervise all production stages and to contribute 10 kopecks from each piece of woven cloth and kersey to cover the salaries and expenses of the manufacturers, inspectors and skilled workers. Foreign inspectors and skilled craftsmen had to take a loyalty oath before beginning employment and share their knowledge and skills with local workers. Such knowledge transfer had been practised in different industries since Peter's times. The authorities stipulated fines for cloth and kersey of poor quality or of unacceptable size and instructed manufacturers not to make cloth from wool of unsatisfactory quality. Violators of this regulation were fined three roubles for a standard piece of fabric, double for a second violation, and faulty products were confiscated in cases of a third violation in addition to the double fine.[88] These were substantial amounts of money in the eighteenth century.

When inspecting the mills, the Commission registered non-observance of basic working conditions. The new regulations, however, drew attention to instances of negligence that led to the damage of fabrics, rather than showing genuine concern for the workers. Yet, since the quality of products depended on the working conditions, the regulations specified acceptable conditions. These included sufficient light and distance between the looms to make spaces accessible for product inspection, solid roofs, cleanliness of spaces and equipment, provision of materials and equipment for a period of one-and-a-half years, and availability of uniforms for workers. In addition, the document identified various hygienic requirements. Workers had to have clean and dry working clothes,

and their workplaces had to be cleaned three times a week. In reality, however, many workers hardly had one decent shirt. If they were unable to do their jobs because of the shortage of materials, manufacturers were advised to continue paying their wages. Workers, however, had to pay fines for breaking equipment.[89]

The regulations specified standard working hours. An average working day lasted fourteen hours. On Saturdays, a working day was several hours longer, and manufacturers had to give their workers three fourths of their earnings for a week. The remaining amount had to be paid at the end of the month. The authorities asked managers to adhere to this schedule to avoid workers' discontent. Workers were fined for being late, making faulty fabrics, drinking, gambling and skipping work without legitimate reasons. They could also undergo corporal punishment for skipping work. The government, however, advised manufacturers to reward workers for high-quality work with money received from the collection of fines and to use this money for welfare projects such as funding hospitals.[90] To ensure manufacturers hired competent workers, the government required job seekers to bring to the mills a certificate, either from the College of Commerce or from cloth inspectors, testifying to their skills.[91] This regulation suggests that hired labour became a more common practice in the 1740s.

While the Commission suggested that workers' wives and daughters should contribute to the work at the mills, the authorities adopted more flexible regulations that allowed women to decide whether to work at these enterprises or restrict themselves to domestic chores and home crafts. Women who worked at the mills, particularly those producing silk textiles and sails, were supposed to receive the same wages as their husbands.[92] However, additional research is needed to determine whether manufacturers observed these instructions. It was the manufacturers' decision whether to employ the wives of serfs.[93]

The regulations specified safety requirements including construction of living quarters for workers close to the mills, hospitals to prevent epidemics, use of bells for fire alarms and to announce the commencement and cessation of work, and availability of night guards to protect mills from robberies and fires. Different spaces had to be allocated for different kinds of work depending on the conditions necessary for specific tasks, for instance, dry or moist air. The authorities promised to send retired soldiers to the mills as a safety precaution.[94] The government invited manufacturers who received substantial capital gains from the Crown's incentives to provide for the welfare of the urban population (craftsmen and traders).[95] While scholars question the extent to which these regulations remained a legal fiction, several suggest workers used them to defend their rights.[96] For instance, workers at Bolotin's cloth mill in 1741 and at Ivan Osokin's mill in Kazan' at the beginning of the nineteenth century appealed to these regulations when defending women's right to choose whether to work at the mills or not.[97]

Specialisations, Productivity Norms and Wages

To control and improve cloth and kersey production at the mills, in the regulations of 1741 the Crown defined work specialisations, established norms of productivity and wages for workers, and ensured the production process was well supervised. Cloth and kersey production required the cooperation of some eight or nine skilled

craftsmen, and the Crown established their wages and norms of productivity based on the required skills and time needed for completion of their work. Hence, those who washed wool earned nearly half the wages of those who sorted it — 8 kopecks for each *pood* (16.38 kilograms) of washed and dried wool versus 15 kopecks for the same amount of sorted wool. Within a twenty-four-hour period, one worker had to spin 1½ pounds (0.68 kilograms) of warp yarn and 4 pounds (1.81 kilograms) of weft yarn. Two weavers together had to make at least 4 *arshins* (2.84 metres) of cloth per day and received 4 kopecks per *arshin* (71.12 centimetres). Kersey production required less time. The daily norm was at least 10 *arshins* (7.11 metres) for one weaver who received 55 kopecks per 60 *arshins* (42.67 metres) of kersey. Cloth weavers received money for candles, but kersey weavers paid for candles themselves.[98]

These norms of productivity and supervision over the production process helped the authorities ensure work efficiency and a degree of quality control. Several inspectors oversaw different stages of the production process in 1752. Two inspectors, whose annual salary was 36 roubles, oversaw the wool preparation. If they failed to report the poor quality of wool before it went into production, they could face fines equal to two or three monthly salaries. A cloth master and an apprentice supervised the weaving process, and were to receive 50 and 36 roubles per year respectively. The authorities rewarded supervisors for vigilance and punished for negligence. Those inspecting the end products could have been deprived easily of their annual wages for negligence. Wages of workers engaged in kersey production and those of their inspectors were, on average, lower. According to the regulations, workers were instructed not to accept any poor-quality materials from their supervisors and inspectors, but this regulation was likely difficult to implement, with workers often unable to exercise their rights at the mills.[99]

The main fabrics produced for the army in the late 1730s–early 1740s were green, blue and red cloth, and green, blue, red and white kersey. Green cloth, the main colour of the Russian army, was the most cost-effective. Dyers received 6 kopecks per piece of green cloth, 7½ kopecks for red and blue cloth, and 5 kopecks per piece of red or blue kersey.[100] The general tendency among military forces was toward the introduction of less conspicuous colours. The edict of 21 May 1743, for instance, decreed the colour of cloaks for field dragoons be changed from red to blue.[101]

The government tried to find a solution to the shortage of skilled dyers in 1741 by asking manufacturers to organise public dye-houses in towns, as was common in Europe. In the meantime, owners of small mills in Moscow had to send their undyed fabrics to larger mills with professional dyers. The Crown also encouraged manufacturers to hire dyers abroad and use domestic dyes, soap and other materials for the production of coloured fabrics.[102] Since poor-quality dyeing remained a serious problem throughout the century, the authorities tried to reach compromises with the manufacturers on this issue. For instance, Elizabeth's decree of 11 December 1742 allowed the Main Commissariat to accept cloth that slightly differed in colour.[103]

Arguments between Administration and Workers

Unsatisfactory working conditions and power abuses led to arguments between administrators and workers that, when not resolved, resulted in social unrest. In 1745, for instance, assessor Mezheninov submitted a formal complaint to the Senate stating that the Commissariat Office forced quality control merchants to describe fabrics as defective, likely in order to purchase them at reduced prices. The assessor was suspended from his duties for the duration of the Senate's investigation.[104]

The majority of arguments between administrators and workers, however, were settled at the mills. Theoretically, workers had a right to complain to the College of Commerce, Chancellery or a local court, but only verbally, so it is hard to establish how many workers took advantage of their right.[105] Yet, there were instances of workers' disobedience, and the government was fearful of the workers' unrest. The Commission of 1741 suggested various forms of physical and financial punishment for disobedience based on the nature and number of offences. For a first disobedience or an oral offence against supervisors, physical punishment by scourges was advised for both workers and inspectors. For a second offence, the Commission suggested flogging and income deprivation for three months. In the case of a physical offence, it advised knout beating and several years' or permanent hard labour. The authorities, however, chose less severe punishment, annulling knout beating and hard labour. Their decisions, however, were driven by pragmatic considerations rather than empathy. One reason for their reluctance to send workmen for hard labour was unwillingness to lose skilled workers. For physical aggression, however, the management was allowed to beat workers with a cat-o'-nine-tails and put them on bread and water for half a year. Managers used fines and flogging, including at the town courts, for a variety of misdemeanours such as theft. In some cases, fines were substituted for corporal punishment, the amount dependent on the severity of the crimes. Manufacturers had to read these regulations to workers during three consecutive Saturdays and repeat readings once a month as a precautionary measure.[106]

In 1746, 1749 and 1758/1762(?) unsatisfactory working conditions led to social unrest at the cloth-making mill managed by Vasilii Surovshchikov.[107] In February of 1762(?), workers submitted a complaint to the Main Commissariat about frequent underpayment of wages and being forced to work with cotton wool of unsatisfactory quality. The petition was brought to the attention of the Commissariat after the arrest of Feodor Andreev, an instigator of the unrest. His incriminating statements were deemed false and Prince Meshcherskii, with two soldiers, took Andreev to the mill on 22 February for public punishment. Andreev's physical resistance led to the resistance of apprentices (soldiers' children) who forced Prince Meshcherskii to retreat to the office and beat supervising soldiers. After this incident, the apprentices began to disobey their supervisors and leave their jobs without permission. They also started rumours, based on their beliefs in social justice, that the mutineers responsible for the 1749 unrest had returned from their exile and, upon their petition, the authorities arrested their manager Surovshchikov. This rumour initiated further unrest. Surovshchikov was fearful for his own and employees' lives and

worried that this discontent would lead to the embezzlement of the company's capital and delays in cloth production. The Main Commissariat, the War College and the College of Manufactures each sent one representative to the mill to deal with the crisis. The representatives examined wool, but admitted no violations. The Senate edict of 23 April 1762 issued in the aftermath of this unrest decreed corporal punishment for the instigators and young offenders as well as exile to Rogervik, a port on the Baltic Sea, for several offenders. The authorities warned the workers of severe punishment for further disturbances. The police searched for fugitive workers and threatened to fine Moscow residents for hiding offenders.[108] In Siberia, some offenders, particularly those who repented, often worked at cloth-making plants, as was the case during Paul's reign (1796–1801) in Nerchinsk and Irkutsk.[109] The example of unrest that took place at Surovshchikov's mill shows that revolts, even when not planned, were not chance occurrences. They were caused by poor working conditions, systematic inequalities and abuses of power, with some mills having histories of subversive activities and the larger population supporting workers' disobedience. The revolts were likely affected by the workers' familiarity with the work regulations, which on the one hand, aimed to improve the efficiency and quality of work, but on the other, responded to or tried to pre-empt unrest.

Production of Military Uniforms

The Crown together with the War Commissariat and chancelleries of uniforms tried to develop effective mechanisms for production of military uniforms both centrally and on sites, during military campaigns and peacetime. It also looked for ways to improve the uniforms' quality, functionality and cost-effectiveness. At first, production was the responsibility of the chancelleries of uniforms, and while the government was keen to transfer this responsibility to regimental tailors from at least 18 March 1718, when it ordered the chancelleries to send uniform cloth directly to the regiments, the Northern War impeded prompt implementation of this regulation.[110] On the advice of General Field Marshal Adam Weide, from 8 July 1718 the chancelleries had to continue to produce and deliver uniforms to cavalry and infantry regiments during 1718 and 1719.[111] During the reign of Catherine I (1725–1727), the Chancellery of Uniforms in Moscow and the War Commissariat in St Petersburg supervised the process of cloth and uniform production, as regiments were unable to meet their needs for uniforms locally.[112]

When Russia was heavily involved in military campaigns in the 1730s, a number of independent contractors (merchants and craftsmen) contributed to the production and sale of uniforms and ammunition. This diversification of production resources increased variability in quality. The decree of 30 June 1732 addressed the issue of the quality of cloth, uniform accessories and ammunition made by the manufacturers and independent contractors and provided several purchasing options for the regiments. From now on, contractors had to prepare standard samples of their products annually for certification by regional authorities and cloth specialists. The information about the quantities and prices of goods produced by independent contractors was then sent centrally to regimental officers for direct orders.[113] This decree slightly relaxed the control mechanism over the production of uniforms.

Previously, the Main War Commissariat employed soldiers (cutters and tailors) from garrison regiments as well as independent tailors, both local and foreign, to make uniforms during military campaigns while regimental tailors made uniforms during peacetime from cloth supplied by the Commissariat. In 1735 the Crown tried to stabilise the industries that made cloth and other products for military needs by introducing longer-term, six-year contracts for local and foreign manufacturers and traders.[114] The decree issued in 1758, during the Seven Years War, further specified payments to regimental and independent tailors and cutters for their work and materials (wax, chalk, thread and scissors).[115] The contracts between the authorities and independent producers introduced a degree of diversification in both production and sale.

Local and foreign tailors did not always voluntarily engage in the production of uniforms. In 1738, for instance, several foreign tailors submitted a complaint to the authorities about being forced to make uniforms, insufficient payments for their products and losses incurred for hiring apprentices and renting apartments. The fires of 1736 in St Petersburg only exacerbated this situation. Taking into account these circumstances and the fact that the demand for uniforms in 1738 was fully satisfied, a decree of 16 March 1739 released these tailors from the production of uniforms.[116]

The Crown gradually imposed stricter regulations on uniform styles. In January 1758, it standardised uniform sewing patterns in three sizes (tall, medium and small), and on 1 September 1759 introduced heavy fines equal to one third of the violators' wages for making modifications to uniforms. At the same time, the authorities allowed the cuffs and collars of uniforms to be made smaller, likely responding to existing practices.[117] Furthermore, Empress Elizabeth approved the changes proposed by Major General Glebov in 1760 and 1761 aimed at improving the quality, functionality and cost-effectiveness of uniforms. These included substitution of coarse fabrics with softer, more durable and cost-efficient ones such as felt and provision of more versatile designs. Glebov's new design for a cloak was deemed to give better protection from cold and windy weather. The collar was adjustable to function as a hood and the wearer could button the cloak's flaps when handling weapons. The calculated state profit from improvements in the fabrics and uniforms amounted to 10,055 roubles and 74 kopecks annually based on contractual prices or 13,295 roubles and 15 kopecks based on state prices.[118] Thus, the Crown tried to balance standardisation, diversification and introduction of changes in the quality of textiles, designs and production of uniforms to improve their quality and make this textile industry more cost-efficient for the state.

Conclusion

Despite the introduction of significant economic incentives and concessions that aimed to stimulate and improve domestic cloth production, the goal that Peter I set for the mills — to produce a sufficient amount of cloth for military needs — was not accomplished during or after his reign.[119] Based on annual loom productivity, Pazhitnov estimates that the amount of locally produced cloth hardly could have exceeded 250,000 *arshins* (177,800 metres) in 1727.[120] According to the more

modest calculations of the College of Manufactures, Russian mills could produce only 81,500 *arshins* (57,962.8 metres) of cloth in 1724.[121] Nevertheless, significant progress was made in the production of domestic cloth and uniforms in the first half of the century, with the cloth-manufacturing industry becoming more efficient, viable and able to support local needs.

Durability of products, versatility of designs and efficiency were among the governing factors in the production of cloth and uniforms. The necessity of providing uniforms of satisfactory quality gradually imposed standardised production and quality requirements on cloth and military uniform manufacturers and independent contractors, a system of fines for poor quality products and various state intervention mechanisms in cases of inefficient mill operation. In the early 1740s, the Crown also looked for technological and administrative ways to bring positive changes to the industry by introducing new policies regulating working conditions. The extent of their implementation, however, would require further study; yet, it is clear that the policies were still used by women to defend their rights as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. The concessions granted by Peter I to the non-noble manufacturers at the beginning of the eighteenth century were gradually curtailed, which suggests the industry significantly developed to meet local needs and became more attractive for nobles because of economic incentives and stable state demands for cloth. The quality of both local and imported cloth, however, remained poor and the needs for domestic cloth were not fully met even at the end of the century. Nevertheless, through the intervention of the state in the economy following the formation of the standing army, both the cloth industry and production of military uniforms were considerably transformed in Russia.

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[2] G. Ul'ianova, 'Dvorianki — vladelitsy fabrik i zavodov v Rossiiskoi imperii v kontse XVIII — pervoi polovine XIX veka', *Rossiia XXI*, no. 3 (2020), p. 69.

[3] According to Keep, the authorities deducted approximately half the monthly pay (about 5 roubles) for uniforms and ammunition between 1699 and 1719. Infrantrymen's pay was 10.98 roubles, and cavalrymen received 12 roubles. The cost and life expectancy of uniforms and ammunition were provided in military tables. A waistcoat was supposed to last for two years, and a coat for four. See J. L. H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 110–11.

In the remainder of this article, the name Peter without its succession number refers to Peter I.

[4] N. G. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikago* (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II-go Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1858–1863), vol. 3, p. 350.

[5] The coats introduced in 1699, as Sergei Shamenkov has observed, could have been longer than the ones introduced a year later for the urban population. See S. I. Shamenkov, 'Vengerskoe plat'e pekhotnykh polkov armii Petra Velikogo', *Istoriia voennogo dela: issledovaniia i istochniki*, no. 1 (2012), pp. 421–22, http://CyberLeninka.ru/article/n/vengerskoe-platie-pehotnyh-polkov-armii-petra-velikogo (accessed 5 November 2021);

E. V. Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress Through Coercion in Russia*, trans. with an introduction by J. T. Alexander (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 63.

[6] For a discussion of the Petrine reform of uniforms, see V. Ivleva, 'From Catherine II's Coup to Alexander Pushkin's *The Captain's Daughter*: A Reflection on Sartorial and Spiritual Searching in Russian Culture', *Vivliofika: E-Journal of Eighteenth-Century Russian Studies*, no. 8 (2020), pp. 98–104.

[7] Ul'ianova, 'Dvorianki — vladelitsy', pp. 69–70.

[8] Iu. S. Sorokin et al., *Slovar' russkogo iazyka XVIII veka* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1997), vol. 9, p. 252, http://feb-web.ru/feb/sl18/slov-abc/11/sl925210.htm (accessed 25 January 2022). Kersey was a cheaper grade of woollen cloth, which was at first used for soldiers' uniforms and later for lining.

[9] For a discussion of protectionist/mercantilist policies introduced during Peter's reign and comparison with European policies, see A. Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 62–96; Gerschenkron, 'The Economic Policies of a Modern Autocrat', in *Peter the Great Changes Russia*, ed. with an introduction by M. Raeff (Lexington, MA and Toronto: D. C. Heath & Co., 1972), pp. 82–102. Also, see A. Kahan, *The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), for instance, pp. 3–4; R. Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia, 1600–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); C. Ruane, *The Empire's New Clothes: A History of the Russian Fashion Industry, 1700–1917* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 23–24, 70.

[10] R. Hentschell, 'A Question of Nation: Foreign Clothes on the English Subject', in *Clothing Culture, 1350–1650*, ed. C. Richardson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 53.

[11] Regulation no. 3937 of 5 April 1722 in *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, s 1649 goda* (hereafter *PSZRI*), ed. M. M. Speranskii, 45 vols (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II-go Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830), vol. 6, p. 528; V. N. Zakharov, *Zapadnoevropeiskie kuptsy v Rossii. Epokha Petra I* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), pp. 235–36.

[12] Decree no. 2876 of 18 January 1715 in *PSZRI*, vol. 5, p. 137.

[13] N. N. Petrukhintsev, 'Diplomatiia angliiskogo sukna', *Rodina*, nos 5–6 (2003), pp. 46–50; decree no. 4487 in *PSZRI*, vol. 7, pp. 273–74; Zakharov, *Zapadnoevropeiskie kuptsy*, pp. 237–38; Appendix to Claudius Rondeau's letter of 7 October 1732 in *Sbornik Imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* (hereafter *SIRIO*) (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1889), vol. 66, p. 516.

[14] Rondeau's letters of 25 August and 15 December 1729 in ibid., pp. 70, 115.

[15] I. Kurukin, *Anna Ioannovna* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2014), p. 307. *Arshin* is an old measurement unit equal to 0.7112 metre.

[16] Rondeau's letter of 1 April 1732 in *SIRIO*, vol. 66, pp. 441–42; Rondeau's appendix to the letter of 7 October 1732 to Lord Harrington, in ibid., p. 517. See also correspondence between Rondeau and Lord Viscount Townshend of 10 February and 27 March 1729 in ibid., pp. 35, 39. For a discussion of plans to recover trade of English wool products in Russia, also see ibid., pp. 43–44, 47–48, 70, 103–04, 115, 262, 422–23, 430–31, 447–48, 455, 463, 507, 514; *SIRIO* (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1891), vol. 75, pp. 77–87.

[17] Letter of 18 November 1732 in ibid., vol. 66, p. 530.

[18] Appendix to Lord Harrington's letter of 27 August 1733 in ibid., vol. 75, pp. 81–82.

[19] Lord Forbes and Rondeau's letter of 2 February 1734 to Lord Harrington, in ibid., pp. 171–72.

[20] Lord Forbes and Rondeau's letter of 4 May 1734 to Lord Harrington, in ibid., p. 214; Kurukin, *Anna Ioannovna*, p. 307.

[21] Petrukhintsev, 'Diplomatiia angliiskogo sukna', pp. 46–50.

[22] *PSZRI*, vol. 9, pp. 853–54.

[23] The Berlin Company sold substantial quantities of uniform cloth to Russia in 1725–33. Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 102; decree no. 10.692 of 21 February 1757 in *PSZRI*, vol. 14, p. 723.

[24] Kurukin, *Anna Ioannovna*, p. 308.

[25] Decree no. 8684 of 11 December 1742 in *PSZRI*, vol. 11, p. 740.

[26] For a discussion of pre-Petrine manufacturing, see P. I. Lyashchenko, 'The National Economy', in *Peter the Great Changes Russia*, pp. 71–72; E. I. Zaozerskaia, *U istokov krupnogo proizvodstva v russkoi promyshlennosti XVI—XVII vekov. K voprosu o genezise kapitalizma v Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), pp. 381–450.

[27] K. A. Pazhitnov, *Ocherki istorii tekstil'noi promyshlennosti dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii. Sherstiannaia promyshlennost'* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1955), p. 10.

[28] Anisimov, *The Reforms*, p. 74.

[29] For information about cloth-making mills, see Pazhitnov, *Ocherki*, p. 11; Lyashchenko, 'The National Economy', p. 81.

[30] For a discussion of development of cloth production and sheep breeding in the Voronezh region, see O. I. Pavlichenko, 'Zarozhdenie i razvitie fabrichno-zavodskogo predprinimatel'stva v Voronezhskom krae (konets XVII–XVIII vv.)', *Vestnik Samarskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 5 (2014), pp. 52–55.

Decree no. 4227 of 20 May 1723 transferred management of the Lipskie mills that produced *stammet*, cloth, stockings and hats to the College of Manufactures, with all products made at the mills being moved to St Petersburg. See *PSZRI*, vol. 7, p. 66.

[31] N. A. Fedotova, 'Glushkovskaia sukonnaia fabrika — krupneishii tsentr tekstil'nogo proizvodstva (po materialam Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Kurskoi oblasti)', *Srednerusskii vestnik obshchestvennykh nauk*, 34, no. 4 (2014), p. 195.

[32] Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 124.

[33] Decrees nos 3309 of 17 February 1719, 3526 of 17 February 1720 and 6706 of 8 March 1735 in *PSZRI*, vol. 5, pp. 667–68; vol. 6, pp. 136–38; vol. 9, pp. 491–92.

[34] Decrees nos 3526 and 9657 of 14 August 1749 in ibid., vol. 6, pp. 136–38; vol. 13, pp. 119–20.

[35] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 667–68. The decree was reissued on 17 February 1720. See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 136–38. A ban was placed on the import of kersey in 1718. See M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory in the 19th Century*, trans. A. Levin and C. Levin under the supervision of G. Grossman (Homewood, IL: Published for the American Economic Association by R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 8. Decree no. 8416 issued on 10 July 1741 emphasized the importance of production of kersey in Moscow for the needs of the War College and Admiralty. See *PSZRI*, vol. 11, p. 456.

[36] Pavlichenko, 'Zarozhdenie i razvitie', p. 52.

[37] Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory*, p. 36.

[38] Decree no. 6551 of 12 March 1734 in *PSZRI*, vol. 9, pp. 281–82.

[39] Decree no. 6706 in ibid., pp. 491–92.

[40] Pavlichenko, 'Zarozhdenie i razvitie', p. 53.

[41] V. I. Buganov, '"Zhalovannaia gramota 1736 g. moskovskim kuptsam". Iz Parizhskoi natsional'noi biblioteki — istochnik po moskovskoi tekstil'noi promyshlennosti Rossii vtoroi chetverti XVIII v.', http://drevlit.ru/docs/russia/XVIII/1720-1740/Anna_I/gram_eremeev_18_09_1736.php (accessed 5 November 2021).

[42] Decree no. 7060 of 18 September 1736 in *PSZRI*, vol. 9, pp. 932–35.

[43] Decree no. 8698 of 5 February 1743 in ibid., vol. 11, pp. 754–57.

[44] Decree no. 4055 in ibid., vol. 6, p. 746.

[45] Decrees nos 3711 and 4378 in ibid., vol. 6, pp. 311–12; vol. 7, p. 171.

[46] Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 138.

[47] A. Maksimov, 'K istorii manufaktur v Rossii', *Istorik-marksist*, nos 8–9 (1935), p. 193.

[48] Decree no. 6858 in *PSZRI*, vol. 9, pp. 707–12. The decree allowed manufacturers to send workers to Siberia and Kamchatka for hard labour. Buganov, 'Zhalovannaia gramota 1736 g.'.

[49] E. I. Zaozerskaia, *Rabochaia sila i klassovaia bor'ba na tekstil'nykh manufakturakh Rossii v 20-60-kh gg. XVIII v.* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1960), pp. 215–16.

[50] *PSZRI*, vol. 9, p. 711.

[51] I. Polosin, 'Promyshlennaia statistika i politika 18 veka', *Arkhiv istorii truda v Rossii*, nos 11–12 (1924), p. 9; Fedotova, 'Glushkovskaia sukonnaia fabrika', p. 196.

[52] Regulation no. 8440 of 2 September, 1741 in *PSZRI*, vol. 11, p. 483.

[53] *Odnodvorets* [lit.: someone who owns a homestead] was a small peasant-proprietor who lived in the border regions and defended Russian borders. In times of peace he engaged in agricultural work and was subject to poll taxation in the same way as serfs. Initially, *odnodvorets* was a free landholding servitor.

[54] Decree no. 8280 in *PSZRI*, vol. 11, p. 297.

[55] For a discussion of factors influencing the location of the mills, see Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 129.

[56] Decree no. 9004 of 27 July 1744 in *PSZRI*, vol. 12, pp. 181–83.

[57] Decree no. 9954 of 12 March 1752 in ibid., vol. 13, pp. 613–15.

[58] Decree no. 11.490 in ibid., vol. 15, p. 966.

[59] Zaozerskaia, *Rabochaia sila*, pp. 89, 98, 102.

[60] Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 101.

[61] *PSZRI*, vol. 11, pp. 485–86.

[62] Ibid., vol. 13, p. 615.

[63] Decree no. 9141 of 2 April 1745 in ibid., vol. 12, pp. 363–64.

[64] *SIRIO*, vol. 66, p. 19.

[65] See, for instance, instruction for the War Commissariat no. 5904 of 12 December 1731, decrees nos. 6118 of 5 July 1732, 6262 of 18 November 1732, 6934 of 8 April 1736 about uniform and ammunition products, and 6946 of 5 May 1736 in *PSZRI*, vol. 8, pp. 587–600, 878–80, 976–77; vol. 9, pp. 794–97, 805.

[66] Decree no. 6984 of 10 June 1736 in ibid., pp. 853–55.

[67] Ibid., p. 282.

[68] Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 102.

[69] The College of Commerce replaced the College of Manufactures in the period between 1727 and 1742. Both colleges supervised the mills. See Polosin, 'Promyshlennaia statistika', p. 8. Decree no. 7038 of 24 August 1736 in *PSZRI*, vol. 9, pp. 905–06.

[70] Decrees nos. 7038 and 8684 in ibid., pp. 905–06; vol. 11, pp. 740–42.
[71] Decree no. 8895 in ibid., vol. 12, pp. 41–45.
[72] Petrukhintsev, 'Problemy snabzheniia armii v gody russko-turetskoi voiny 1735–1739 godov i pravitel'stvennaia politika v otnoshenii legkoi promyshlennosti', in *Voina i oruzhie: Novye issledovaniia i materialy. Trudy Tret'ei mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii 16–18 maia 2012 g.* (St Petersburg: VIMAIViVS, 2012), vol. 2, p. 574.
[73] *PSZRI*, vol. 11, pp. 740–42.
[74] The regulation probably refers to the same van Akker mentioned earlier although this master is identified as coming from Germany. See ibid., p. 503.
[75] Ibid., pp. 502–03.
[76] Decree no. 8741 of 21 May 1743 in ibid., pp. 814–16.
[77] Decree no. 8885 of 5 March 1744 in ibid., vol. 12, pp. 32–33.
[78] Decree no. 8982 in ibid., pp. 162–63.
[79] Ibid., vol. 11, pp. 740–42. The decree no. 9072 issued on 23 November 1744 confirmed all previous regulations concerning cloth production and sale. See ibid., vol. 12, pp. 271–73.
[80] Decree no. 9168 of 6 June 1745 in ibid., pp. 395–96.
[81] Decree no. 11.351 of 1 November 1761 in ibid., vol. 15, p. 811–13.
[82] Ibid., vol. 11, pp. 740–42; vol. 15, p. 814.
[83] A substantial amount of wool was produced and sold in and around Cherkassy in Ukraine. See ibid., vol. 11, pp. 484–85, 492.
[84] Ibid., vol. 15, pp. 811–15.
[85] Ibid., pp. 811–15; vol. 11, pp. 740–42. According to Kahan, 'on the eve of the Seven Years' War the Russians became self-sufficient in army cloth', but the state decrees indicate the opposite. Russia still depended on the import of cloth at the end of Elizabeth's reign. See Kahan, *The Plow*, p. 102. The Senate's edict of 1756 decreed the exemption of imported wool from customs duties. D. Baburin, *Ocherki po istorii Manufactur kollegii. Trudy istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta* (Moscow: tipografiia imeni Vorovskogo, 1939), vol. 1, p. 141.
[86] On Münnich's army reforms, see Petrukhintsev, *Tsarstvovanie Anny Ioannovny: formirovanie vnutripoliticheskogo kursa i sud'by armii i flota, 1730–1735* (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2001); Brian Davies, *Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century* (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), pp. 170–75, 190. Soldiers and officers were expected to keep their uniforms clean and in good condition. This requirement suggests the poor quality of fabric was to blame for the poor condition of the coat. See decree no. 8505 of 20 January 1742 in *PSZRI*, vol. 11, p. 567.
[87] Decree no. 8220 of 1 September 1740 in ibid., pp. 232–33. Similar complaints about the quality of cloth were voiced with regard to the textile mill in Kursk in 1740. See decree no. 8064 in ibid., pp. 79–80. Despite persistent problems with the quality of cloth, the authorities encouraged regiments to purchase domestic fabrics. See decrees nos. 4408 of 13 January 1724, and 4487 of 28 March 1724 in ibid., vol. 7, pp. 199–200, 273–74.
[88] Ibid., vol. 11, pp. 484, 491–92.
[89] Ibid., pp. 488–90, 494.
[90] Ibid., pp. 493–96.
[91] Ibid., p. 492.
[92] Ibid., pp. 495, 504.
[93] Ibid., p. 504.
[94] Ibid., pp. 488, 490–91.
[95] Ibid., p. 486.
[96] Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory*, p. 23; V. I. Semevskii, *Krest'iane v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II*, 2 vols (St Petersburg: Tipografiia M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1901–1903), vol. 1, p. 547.
[97] K. Pazhitnov, 'O reglamente i rabotnykh regulakh sukonnym i karazeinym fabrikam', in *Trud v Rossii*, no. 1 (1925), pp. 216–17. See also 'Materialy k istorii russkoi fabriki i rabochego klassa v XVIII i XIX st.', in *Doklady Pereslavl'-Zalesskogo nauchno-prosvetitel'skogo obshchestv*a, no. 18, ed. A. Iu. Fomenko (Moscow: Melanag, 2007), pp. 3–6.
[98] *PSZRI*, vol. 11, pp. 497–99, 501–02.
[99] Ibid., pp. 499–502.
[100] Ibid., pp. 499, 501–03.
[101] Ibid., pp. 814–16.
[102] Ibid., pp. 491–92.
[103] Ibid., pp. 740–42.
[104] Decree no. 9168 of 6 July 1745 in ibid., vol. 12, pp. 395–96.
[105] Ibid., vol. 11, p. 495.
[106] Ibid., pp. 496, 504.

[107] Decree no. 11.514 of 23 April 1762 in ibid., vol. 15, pp. 983–85. It is unclear from this document when the last disturbances took place at the mill. The decree refers to the events that happened in February 1762, but states that some of the workers were sent to exile in 1759.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Decrees nos. 18.561 of 25 June 1798 and 18.781 of 11 December 1798 in ibid., vol. 25, pp. 283, 483.
[110] Decree no. 3186 of 18 March 1718 in ibid., vol. 5, pp. 556–57.
[111] Decree no. 3217 in ibid., p. 580.
[112] Decree no. 4874 of 26 April 1726 in ibid., vol. 7, p. 646.
[113] Decree no. 6110 in ibid., vol. 8, p. 871.
[114] Decree no. 6834 of 12 November 1735 in ibid., vol. 9, pp. 601–02.
[115] Regulation no. 10.788 of 9 January 1758 in ibid., vol. 15, p. 134.
[116] Decree no. 7777 in ibid., vol. 10, p. 746.
[117] Decree no. 10.985 in ibid., vol. 15, pp. 370–71; ibid., p. 134.
[118] Decree no. 11.353 of 6 November 1761 in ibid., pp. 816–18.
[119] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 273–74; vol. 8, pp. 976–77; vol. 9, pp. 601–02.
[120] Pazhitnov, *Ocherki*, pp. 12, 17.
[121] *PSZRI*, vol. 7, p. 273.

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