



Deportability, humanitarianism and development: neoliberal deportation and the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants program

Corey Robinson

To cite this article: Corey Robinson (2022) Deportability, humanitarianism and development: neoliberal deportation and the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants program, Third World Quarterly, 43:4, 879-897, DOI: [10.1080/01436597.2022.2038128](https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2038128)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2038128>



© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.



Published online: 26 Feb 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 781



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Deportability, humanitarianism and development: neoliberal deportation and the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants program

Corey Robinson

School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK

ABSTRACT

Offering return assistance and financial inducements to migrants and asylum-seekers, assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes are critical to the management of migration. While AVRR programmes have emerged as an area of study in their own right, little attention has been paid to the role of these schemes in the transnational politics of anti-smuggling policy. Building on insights from border studies, migration studies and security studies, this article examines the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants (GAIM) programme. The GAIM programme is an AVRR programme funded by the Canadian government and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which targeted Sri Lankan nationals stranded following the disruption of smuggling ventures in West Africa. This article examines how the GAIM programme framed, rationalised and obscured the practice of neoliberal deportation as a humanitarian gesture in the interests of migrants themselves. It documents and conceptualises the humanitarian claims, narratives and representations mobilised by Canada and the IOM to explain and justify the return of stranded asylum-seekers. It argues that the GAIM programme can be analysed as a form of humanitarian securitisation, which obscures the politics of anti-smuggling policy, masks the violence of deportation and legitimises the return of stranded asylum-seekers.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 16 June 2021

Accepted 27 January 2022

KEYWORDS

Deportation
assisted voluntary return
and reintegration
International Organization
for Migration
migrant smuggling
humanitarianism
securitisation

Introduction

On 17 October 2009, the *Ocean Lady* arrived off the Pacific coast of Canada. Each of the 76 passengers, all men of the Tamil minority from Sri Lanka, sought refugee protection under Canada's asylum system. Less than a year later, on 12 August 2010, another ship entered Canadian waters in a similar location, off the coast of Vancouver Island, British Columbia. A Thai cargo ship with 492 Tamil asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka on board, the *Sun Sea* reached Canada after nearly three months at sea on a gruelling voyage from Thailand. After the arrival, all 380 men, 63 women and 49 children claimed refugee status (Canadian Council for Refugees 2015). The passengers cited fear of persecution in Sri Lanka by government security forces in the aftermath of the civil war.

CONTACT Corey Robinson  corey.j.r.robinson@gmail.com

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

The narrative surrounding the *Sun Sea* was one of fear and unease. News media broadcast images of naval, military and police forces escorting the *Sun Sea* into Canadian waters. Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews briefed members of the national media at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt, where he asserted that the ship's passengers included 'human smugglers and terrorists' intent on 'abusing Canada's refugee system' (quoted in Hainsworth 2010). Toews declared that members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were onboard and that while Canada is 'very welcoming' to refugees, 'the government must ensure that our refugee system is not hijacked by criminals or terrorists' (quoted in CBC News 2010). Canadian government officials claimed the arrivals intended to 'test' Canada's relatively generous refugee system; 'there was a certain amount of information floating around that there were additional boats, and that those were in fact test vessels' (Interview #6).

In the wake of the arrival, the Conservative federal government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper wanted to send a clear message that Canada would not tolerate 'abuse' of its refugee system by criminal networks that profit from migrant smuggling (Quan 2020). To prevent future vessels from coming to Canada, the Harper government introduced the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, a new anti-smuggling policy with an international scope. Coordinated by the Office of the Special Advisor on Human Smuggling and Illegal Migration, a small team housed in the Privy Council Office, Harper appointed former Canadian Security Intelligence Service director Ward Elcock as Special Advisor, who reported to the National Security Advisor in the Prime Minister's Office (IRCC 2015, 3).

According to the Canadian government, the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy was 'not intended to punish asylum-seekers' (IRCC A201521196, 8). Rather, it aimed to 'deter human smugglers, dissuade migrants from taking part in dangerous voyages and ensure that border authorities have sufficient time to establish the identity and admissibility of individuals before they are admitted to the country' (IRCC A201521196, 8). With the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, the Harper government sought to reduce the appeal of Canada as 'a destination for smugglers' while simultaneously cooperating with 'transit countries so as to prevent the launch of migrant smuggling ventures' before they depart for Canada (GAC A201101931, 295). Internal documents describe the strategy as a coordinated transnational effort 'across law enforcement, intelligence, border protection and diplomatic spheres to deter and prevent migrant smuggling ventures before they materialize overseas' (IRCC A201521196, 15).

Under the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, the Harper government developed capacity-building programmes with affected governments and inter-governmental organisations (IOs). These programmes aimed to deter and disrupt migrant smuggling throughout Southeast Asia and West Africa and return stranded asylum-seekers to their countries of origin under 'assisted voluntary return and reintegration' (AVRR) schemes. This article examines one specific programme in the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy: the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants programme (GAIM), under the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP)'s Human Smuggling Envelope. Funded by the Canadian government, the GAIM programme is an AVRR programme implemented in West Africa by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It provides return assistance, medical aid and financial inducements to migrants stranded in West Africa following the interdiction of smuggling ventures.

In the ensuing analysis, the first section briefly reviews the relevant literature on securitisation, humanitarianism and development. The second section outlines the methods and data used in this study. The third section discusses the ACCBP and its Human Smuggling Envelope. The fourth section examines the GAIM programme. According to the Canadian government, the disruption of smuggling networks revealed a major gap in the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy: the *consequences* of interceptions, which left stranded asylum-seekers vulnerable to human rights abuses in countries that lacked an institutional infrastructure for refugee protection. Despite these apparent humanitarian concerns, the use of financial inducements to incentivise return combines development and deportation in a humanitarian framing that depoliticises the return of asylum-seekers and obscures efforts by the Canadian government to externalise its international protection obligations.

AVRR and the merging of security, humanitarianism and development

Anti-smuggling policies and other measures to manage irregular migration are often understood as part of the securitisation of migration. The role of security discourse in the legitimisation of emergency measures towards migrants and refugees is well documented (Bourbeau 2011; Robinson 2017). Although the strategic demonisation of people on the move has been critically analysed, more recent scholarship in border studies, migration studies and security studies have started to investigate the shift towards humanitarianism in border security (Perkowski 2018; Walters 2011). The rise of humanitarianism in anti-smuggling policy, which portrays migrants as victims and smugglers as perpetrators, is closely associated with the ascendance of migration management as a neoliberal rationality of governance (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). The protection and control duality of migration management (Hastie 2010) is distinct from the 'no-holds-barred' actions associated with securitisation, exceptionalism and existential survival (Corry 2012). The neoliberalisation of border control, the biopolitical emphasis on the well-being of irregular migrants and the merging of security, humanitarian and development logics (Duffield 2011; Pallister-Wilkins 2017; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017) have ambivalent ethical and political effects on migration governance (Vaughan-Williams 2015).

AVRR programmes, which aim to promote 'humane' and 'dignified' return, reveal the Janus-faced character of migration management. In this ambivalent moral and political universe, the imperatives of protection and control are difficult to distinguish from one another. Critics argue the idea of AVRR is ambiguous in principle and contradictory in practice. Voluntariness is often achieved coercively through the spectre of deportation (Dünnwald 2013). While a growing literature has called into question their pretence to voluntariness (Webber 2011) and reconceptualised AVRR schemes as a continuation of the deportation regime (De Genova 2010), little attention has been paid to their role in the transnational politics of anti-smuggling policy.

Scholars have examined the moral economy of 'humanitarian reason' (Fassin 2011) and the political manipulation of humanitarianism in security discourse (Watson 2011). However, empirical analysis of the merging of security, humanitarian and development logics in anti-smuggling policy, the externalisation of asylum and AVRR programmes remains relatively scarce (cf. Crane 2020; Frowd 2018). Drawing on the critical literature on humanitarian border security and the neoliberalisation of migration control, the ensuing examination of the GAIM programme remedies this gap in the scholarship by analysing a 'model' AVRR programme.

Critical analysis of the GAIM programme offers a window into understanding the ambiguities of contemporary migration governance. Indeed, it shows how powerful destination states work with the IOM to reassert their sovereignty, navigate the competing exigencies of protection and control and respond to the constraints of international legal obligations. As the ensuing analysis demonstrates, paradoxically, the GAIM programme frames and rationalises the ‘assisted’ return of stranded individuals to places where they face persecution as a humanitarian gesture in the interests of migrants themselves.

Methods and data

The following analysis triangulates semi-structured interviews with discourse analysis (Fairclough 2013) of access to information requests and public policy documents. This ‘live archive’ (Walby and Larsen 2011) of anti-smuggling discourse offers a way to analyse how governmental actors frame and rationalise the GAIM programme. My analysis of the live archive examines the GAIM programme from the perspective of federal agencies of migration management: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the Office of the Special Advisor on Human Smuggling and Illegal Migration and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

The empirical research for this study occurred between February 2016 and April 2017 and entailed principally two research methods: (i) semi-structured, expert interviews, conducted both on-site and remotely; and (ii) online archival research. After I received approval from York University’s Ethics Review Board (Certificate #STU 2015-125), in 2016–2017, I conducted interviews with 40 individuals, current and former senior public servants from the most significant federal agencies involved in migration management. In my research, I examined grey literature from these federal agencies obtained through access to information requests. I refer to these documents within the text by their access to information and privacy request code, which includes the abbreviation of the agency from which I requested the information (see the [Appendix](#)).

The Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program and the Human Smuggling Envelope

In 2011, after the arrival of the *Ocean Lady* and the *Sun Sea*, the Harper government introduced a Human Smuggling Envelope under GAC’s ACCBP. Because the *Sun Sea* departed from Thailand, at first, the Human Smuggling Envelope focused on the country. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2013, 45), Thailand is a transit country for Sri Lankan asylum-seekers waiting to be smuggled to Canada by sea. However, the Harper government extended the policy to Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, they expanded the multilateral programming to West Africa, where several smuggling ventures were disrupted. In its diplomatic engagement in Southeast Asia, the Special Advisor participated in multilateral forums in the region, such as the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Special Advisor sought to learn from the experience of countries such as Australia and Indonesia in ‘combatting irregular marine migration’, establish political relations and

persuade affected governments through a combination of diplomatic engagement and foreign aid (GAC A201101931, 4).

The ACCBP targeted transit countries in Southeast Asia and West Africa in which Sri Lankan nationals waited to be smuggled to Canada. Programmes under the Human Smuggling Envelope are said to help affected governments address migrant smuggling networks and 'shortcomings in immigration and border management', by enhancing their institutional capacity (CBSA A201313161, 15). Through the provision of technical assistance, the identification of 'capacity gaps' and the improvement of institutional awareness about migrant smuggling, projects implemented under the Human Smuggling Envelope seek to 'prevent further mass arrivals of migrant vessels' and to 'identify and take early action against human smuggling organizers' based in the region (RCMP A201501244, 120).

Internal documents highlight the perceived success of engagement with transit countries. Indonesian authorities prevented the *Alicia* from departing, which carried 87 Tamil asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka destined for Canada (Bureau and Robillard 2019). Indonesian authorities intercepted the *Alicia* on 9 July 2011, after the ship developed mechanical difficulties. According to the UNODC (2013, 45), 87 passengers (76 men, six women, and five children) refused to leave the ship until they received assurances about access to refugee protection. The Harper government asserted that such extraterritorial measures to 'push the border out' (Raj 2011) were part of a global battle against unscrupulous smugglers. However, the composition of the passengers and their pleas for protection suggest that the Canadian government and its delegates were knowingly obstructing the refugee claims of families, women and children under the pretext of disrupting smuggling ventures. After the disruption of the *Alicia*, the passengers were stuck in limbo in transit countries, where some of the passengers endured harsh conditions and abuse while stranded for over a year (UNODC 2013, 45). Specific details surrounding the *Alicia* and the plight of the passengers on disrupted journeys are difficult to corroborate. However, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney stated that Canada's multilateral efforts had prevented 'three or four' smuggling ventures from departing for Canada; he asserted that 'many would-be customers of smuggling syndicates' who have made down payments are waiting in transit for long periods 'for the call to be boarded to come to Canada' (quoted in Canadian Press 2011).

From 2012 to 2016, the Canadian government implemented 55 projects under the Human Smuggling Envelope throughout Southeast Asia and West Africa. Using a pre-emptive approach, this multilateral programming targeted 'countries that were, or were likely to become, transit points' for migrant smuggling operations destined for Canada (GAC 2016, 12, 18). Through capacity-building programmes, the Harper government aimed to disrupt migrant smuggling operations *before* they departed for Canada, by enrolling affected governments into the task of anti-smuggling policy (CBSA A201102325, 15). In brief, the goal of such pre-emptive measures is to insulate the state from its legal obligations to asylum-seekers while enhancing its capacity to control irregular migration through intermediaries. Such 'consensual' containment strategies appeal to the self-interest of affected governments, which appear to embrace the enhanced legitimacy that their support garners from the Canadian government and the international community (Interview #6).

Under the Harper government, preventing migrant smuggling vessels from 'reaching the shores of Canada' was a 'top foreign policy priority' (GAC A201302709, 16). The priority granted to migrant smuggling is evidenced by the relatively significant financial resources allocated to address the problem following the *Sun Sea*. In consultation with the Office of

the Special Advisor on Human Smuggling and Illegal Migration, the Harper government allocated more than \$23 million from 2011 to 2015 for capacity-building projects in Southeast Asia and West Africa, implemented by GAC, CBSA, IRCC and the RCMP, and delivered in partnership with the IOM, the UNODC and other relevant IOs (IRCC A201521196, 15–16). These efforts intensified under the current Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. From 2015 to 2018, the Trudeau government invested an additional \$45.5 million. These funds supported a coordinated effort to deter and prevent migrant smuggling and the threats associated with it, such as terrorism and transnational organised crime, ‘from reaching Canada’ (IRCC A201521196, 15–17). During this time, the Office of the Special Advisor coordinated the whole-of-government strategy and engaged with international partners to ‘promote cooperation’ in affected transit countries (IRCC A201521196, 17).

Internal evaluations mobilise the Canadian state, along with the IOM, as providers of protection. In these accounts, multilateral programming under the ACCBP did not account for the consequences of these actions and their implications for Canada’s international protection obligations. To remedy this gap in the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, federal agencies introduced the GAIM programme, which complemented the ACCBP activities in the West African region. It provided ‘assurance to transit states’ where ‘resources are scarce and governance is weak’ to ‘cooperate in the detection and interception of irregular migrants’, because ‘they will not be solely responsible for the cost of assisting stranded migrants’ (IRCC 2015, 7).

The reality is that if you’re working with countries to try and stop human smugglers, at the end of the day, if they stop a venture, they can find themselves in a situation where they are faced with X number of people who have no place to go and can’t afford to go home. If they’ve crossed the Pacific and paid somewhere in the region of 30 to 40 thousand dollars, they may not have a whole lot of money left at that time. So it’s good to have the ability to go to the IOM and say if these people are prepared to go home, we’ll pay some money and you can undertake it, oversee it and do follow-ups on those who return – if they volunteer to go back. (Interview #6)

Here, AVRR is rationalised according to the epistemological criteria of migration management (Geiger and Pécoud 2010): in terms of the socio-economic implications, efficiency and sustainability of such measures for all actors involved.

The Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants programme

A humanitarian ‘solution’ to the plight of stranded asylum-seekers

Innovation in migration management is driven by the search for new tools to surmount constraints to effective control. The *commercialisation* and *toolisation* of migration politics, in which the IOM offers tailored services to states, enables the Canadian government not only to ‘upload’ migration management to IOs, but also to ‘spatially shift’ controversial policy tasks to other jurisdictions and remotely control migration in regions of origin (Geiger 2016, 266). Conducted under the banner of humanitarianism, these externalisation measures function to shift burdens and avoid obligations to refugees. They frustrate, rather than facilitate, access to international protection through multilateral cooperation, as envisioned by the international refugee regime and the Global Compact on Refugees (UNHCR 2021). Indeed, the following analysis suggests that the GAIM

programme is not a humane alternative to deportation. Rather, it is part of the broader neoliberalisation and transformation of deportation (Fine and Walters 2021). Underneath its humanitarian sheen, the GAIM programme is an act of deportation, which seeks to terminate the relationship between the state and the asylum-seeker by forcing them into a geopolitical space beyond the state's responsibility (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2013).

According to a Canadian official, the GAIM programme 'came out of the experience we had with trying to disrupt offshore migrant smuggling into Canada' (Interview #18). As the passage below suggests, the constitutive force of Canada's obligations to refugees shaped the Harper government's response to migrant smuggling. It facilitated the development of new anti-smuggling programmes, which were framed as a humanitarian 'solution' to the plight of asylum-seekers stranded after the disrupting of smuggling ventures.

You can't ignore that at the end of the day they are stuck with foreign nationals in their territory. They can't deal with them all by themselves. It was realised in the federal government that nobody had the right tools to deal with the consequences of successful disruptions. You had a population of people without legal status in a third country who need to be dealt with in a way that respects international law – refugee law – but that also provides them with a solution.

We were trying to figure out what is the right tool kit. The GAIM came out of those conversations where we created regulatory authority to do this, to create a programme with terms and conditions, to fund partners and offer people a solution – but one that had to respect the rights of people to seek asylum, to be protected from refoulement. It allowed us to find third parties to make sure people had immediate material needs met when they are waiting for return, to successfully return and reintegrate if they chose to go back, or if they weren't successful in a refugee claim ... the GAIM programme is part of the toolkit the federal government has. (Interview #18)

Another Canadian official expressed similar views about the 'genesis' of the GAIM programme as a 'tool' in the toolbox of migration management. This 'tool' allowed the Canadian government to respond in a 'humane way'.

The genesis for it was a series of events in West Africa and the recognition that we didn't have all the right tools in our toolbox. One of those tools was a programme that became the GAIM programme – an AVR, which is a collection of tools many other countries have had for decades. Certainly the primary international body with expertise on AVR programmes is the IOM. IOM is the expert on these issues. It came to our attention in West Africa that there was a collection of migrants which were clearly not West African. They were primarily Sri Lankan and were collecting in a couple different places in West Africa. Based on the intelligence obtained, they were being collected there in order to board a ship or series of ships to travel across the Atlantic, as the others and the *Sun Sea* had done on the Pacific. The Government of Canada wanted to disrupt that particular attempt on the part of people smugglers to bring in people across the Atlantic. Once the conversations started, it became apparent that the local governments didn't have tools or capacity to respond in a humane way, making sure individuals involved had an opportunity for asylum processes, and likewise, a way of looking after them in the short term and assisting them in returning them to Sri Lanka in the medium term (Interview #13, emphasis added).

In December 2011, Togolese authorities intercepted a smuggling venture of over 200 Sri Lankan asylum-seekers in transit to Canada (IRCC 2015, 22). After the disruption of the migrant smuggling venture, Togolese authorities detained the group in a stadium in the capital of Lomé, in poor conditions. In early January 2012, in response to 'this urgent situation',

GAC established a temporary AVRR for Sri Lankan migrants stranded in West Africa (IRCC 2015, 22).

According to IRCC evaluations, the stranded individuals lacked 'appropriate food, water and shelter' and other basic necessities. This moment revealed a major 'capacity gap' in the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy: the disruption of smuggling operations destined for Canada left smuggled migrants 'vulnerable to human rights abuses in these countries while stranded in transit' (IOM 2018, 2). Internal assessments conducted by IOM evaluators describe the living conditions of Sri Lankan nationals stranded in West Africa en route to Canada as 'generally unpleasant, at best':

'Most migrants were housed in overcrowded conditions, often under virtual house arrest with inadequate sanitary facilities and insufficient food. Those who dared to complain endured threats. There were also reports of beatings' (IRCC A201532096, 5).

Another disrupted smuggling venture highlighted the failure of the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy to account for the protection needs of stranded asylum-seekers. In May 2012, the government of Ghana received intelligence information from the Canadian government about Sri Lankan asylum-seekers transiting through the country as part of a smuggling venture (Ghana Web 2012). After Canadian intelligence officials tipped off the Ghanaian government, immigration enforcement authorities monitored local ports and subsequently arrested six Sri Lankan men, allegedly crew members. Shortly thereafter, the Ghanaian government arrested 12 additional individuals, who awaited departure at the port of Tema, where smugglers docked the *Ruvuma*, a 30-metre-long fishing vessel. Before the vessel intended to depart for Canada's east coast, the *Ruvuma* was reportedly destined for Togo and Benin, where over 200 additional Sri Lankan asylum-seekers waited in transit (Humphreys 2012). In response to the disruption of the smuggling venture, the then Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, used the event to rationalise anti-smuggling measures throughout the region. He described the event as 'another example' that further substantiated why Canadian authorities 'must remain vigilant' in the 'crackdown' on migrant smuggling networks across the world (Ghana Web 2012).

In 2013, the disruption of additional migrant smuggling operations left more Sri Lankan asylum-seekers stranded throughout West African countries on their way to Canada. To address this situation, in coordination with the IOM, the Canadian government developed the GAIM programme. While the programme is central to the Canadian government's broader attempt to minimise its obligations to refugees, the GAIM programme's stated objective is framed in humanitarian terms: to 'protect smuggled migrants stranded in transit countries' following the disruption of smuggling ventures (IOM 2018, 52). Apparently neutral claims about 'smuggled migrants in transit countries' were part of the Harper government's effort to frame, rationalise and obscure attempts to prevent the arrival of asylum-seekers, without naming them as such.

The GAIM programme extended the temporary AVRR programme initially established in 2012 in response to the disruption of a smuggling venture in Togo. According to an internal evaluation, the Canadian government's ad hoc response brought into sharp relief 'the need for a more permanent approach to managing the consequences of disrupting the smuggling of irregular migrants believed to be destined for Canada' (IRCC 2015, 1). 'There is an ongoing need for a global voluntary return and reintegration program in order to support Canada's strategy to combat human smuggling', address 'the consequences of interceptions in transit

states' and maintain 'transit state cooperation', according to an IRCC evaluation (IRCC 2015, 7, 22). The objectives of the GAIM programme are part of a new pre-emptive and cooperative approach to migrant smuggling, premised on the 'managed migration of people to Canada' and the prevention of inadmissible people 'at the earliest point possible' (IRCC 2015, 23).

The IOM plays a major role in this new approach. According to official evaluations, when the Office of the Special Advisor informs IRCC of a 'planned human smuggling event' and requests that IRCC's Deputy Minister implement the programme, the GAIM programme issues transfer payments to the IOM for the delivery of basic services – food, medical assessments, translation services and shelter – to support 'the return and reintegration of irregular migrants believed to be destined for Canada and stranded in a transit country following the disruption of a human smuggling venture' (IRCC 2015, iii). The GAIM programme also provides transfer payments to the IOM for 'outreach and awareness activities in order to better manage the consequences of illegal migration' (IRCC 2015, iii). According to an IOM performance report conducted for IRCC, since 2013, the IOM has returned Sri Lankan asylum-seekers destined for Canada from 11 West African countries: Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone (IRCC A201532096, 20). The GAIM programme is officially designed to, *inter alia*, meet the basic needs of stranded asylum-seekers and assist them with return and reintegration; implement outreach programmes and raise awareness around the dangers of migrant smuggling; when appropriate, screen, register, assess and refer stranded individuals to refugee status determination systems; with assistance from the IOM, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and/or national refugee agencies, to determine 'the status, condition and any protection concerns of the stranded migrants' (IRCC A201532096, 3), and; if they are deemed ineligible for refugee protection, to assist them through return and reintegration programmes (IRCC 2015, iii–iv). 'For all migrants who did not fall under UNHCR's mandate and who expressed their willingness to return to their country of origin, IOM then offered a variety of services designed to address their basic emergency needs (food, medical support, hygiene items and sometimes accommodation) until their departure', according to the IRCC (IRCC A201532096, 5).

IRCC asserts that the GAIM programme functions to fulfil Canada's obligations to asylum-seekers. However, the ulterior purpose of these 'preventive protection' measures is 'to prevent states from having to bear the legal obligations and costs of asylum' (Hyndman 2000, xxv). While bureaucratically sterilised in the humanitarian terminology of 'assisted return', such technocratic lip service to refugee protection belies the fact that it may be difficult for asylum-seekers in transit countries to receive an adequate and impartial assessment of their protection needs and entitlements, especially in places that may lack the institutional infrastructure to assess refugee claims (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015). Consequently, a sizeable population of would-be refugees is left in limbo in the interstices between states, having fled their country of origin, without finding a solution in another.

Humanitarian securitisation

Deportability, humanitarianism and development

Canada's relationship with the IOM has been described as a 'marriage of convenience' that benefits the self-interest of both actors (Geiger 2018). Indeed, the catalogue of services

provided by the IOM is useful for states that seek to offshore and outsource border enforcement.

The IOM is a very operational body, quite unlike most inter-governmental organisations. It's very decentralised, which is a good thing. As a result, it's incredibly responsive. The GAIM programme gives us capacity when needed to turn on a switch. The switch is an existing relationship and set of protocols with IOM. It's highly related to our intelligence networks – there is a lot of blackboxing going on. When it comes to the government's attention, not unlike the West Africa events, communication happens at a senior level in government. There is a signal to turn on the GAIM switch and deal with the IOM. (Interview #18)

The IOM's expanding toolkit of 'remote' migration management services, Geiger argues, reveals the IOM's self-interest in its perception of particular 'risky' and 'beneficiary' populations (2016, 268). This perception, as studies of migration governance note, is shaped by the vested interests of donors, the need to secure a market for its services and position itself strategically as the new United Nations (UN) migration agency (Robinson 2018, 2020). Despite its growing logistical function in migration governance, the IOM is not a mere service provider to states. It also plays a critical role in shaping perceptions, producing narratives and constructing what Fine and Walters (2021) call the 'political imaginary of deportation'. By rebranding AVRR as a humanitarian alternative to forced deportation, the IOM presents the GAIM programme as a 'security solution for the north and development solution for the south' – a two-pronged solution premised on an 'implicit politics of immobility' for much of the global population (Fine and Walters 2021, 11).

The Canada–IOM partnership profile uncritically celebrates their longstanding relationship using the well-established narratives of migration management. It reaffirms the mantra that 'orderly and humane migration is of benefit to all' (IOM 2015, 24). AVRR programmes like the GAIM programme, which bring destination, source and transit governments together with the IOM, constitute a 'core activity' of the services and tools it provides – part of what it calls a 'comprehensive approach to migration management' promoted worldwide (IOM Ghana 2013). While the IOM casts the GAIM programme in a positive light, the return of asylum-seekers, conducted under the innocent-sounding moniker of AVRR, does not represent a humanitarian 'solution'. Instead, it is an attempt to repackage the status quo of global immobility and rebrand the act of deportation in managerial language. The language of 'solution' is prominent throughout; however, the GAIM does little to address protracted situations of forced displacement and the responsibility of wealthier destination states in the reproduction of geopolitical conditions that fuel irregular migration. In the technocratic rendering of the GAIM programme, the IOM asserts that assisted return promotes the 'dignified, orderly and humane return of migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin' (IOM Ghana 2013).

For migrants who need to return home but lack the means to do so, AVRRs are often the solution to their immediate plight:

'The consequences of not returning such migrants in a safe and speedy way can be grave for the migrants, and place heavy socio-economic burdens on destination and transit countries' asylum and social welfare systems' (IOM Ghana 2013).

The GAIM programme can be analysed as a process of humanitarian securitisation. Internal accounts frame deportation as a humanitarian gesture, identify a series of threats

to migrants and host states and seek to legitimise extraordinary measures against asylum-seekers. Yet this process of humanitarian securitisation does not occur through a dramatised framing of existential threat. Rather, this excerpt provides an exemplary account of how the GAIM programme mobilises a securitising discourse concerning the well-being of and the socio-economic burdens posed by asylum-seekers. Securitisation, Bigo (2002) argues, operates through everyday bureaucratic practices, which are *continuous*, rather than *exceptional*. Such routine procedures operate through a politics of unease (Bigo 2002, 73). The politics of unease, which emphasises the 'technocratic, ordinary and less existential nature' of insecurities, constructs a continuum of threats by linking together concerns about the safety of migrants with anxieties about their socio-economic liabilities for asylum and welfare systems (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008, 767). In this process of identifying threats and framing insecurities, humanitarian concerns occupy a central position. In this regard, as Watson (2011) explains, humanitarianism is not diametrically opposed to securitisation. Rather, due to their essential ambiguity, humanitarian claims are easily manipulated. Reconceptualised in this manner, humanitarianism can be understood as a process of securitisation in which human life/dignity is the referent object of securitising attempts and the justification for restrictive measures (Watson 2011). Discourses concerning the human rights of asylum-seekers are part of the securitisation process because they distinguish between 'genuine' and 'bogus' asylum-seekers and serve to justify draconian border controls (Bigo 2002, 79).

The GAIM programme was designed in principle to align with IRCC's priorities on 'managed migration' and 'the roles and responsibilities of the federal government' as a signatory to international legal frameworks (IRCC 2015, 21). It aimed to fulfil IRCC's objective of 'global migration management' (IRCC A201535452, 3). This includes a responsibility to cooperate with states and IOs to manage migration for 'the benefit of all' – an objective that 'continues to be an expression of Canadian foreign policy' (IRCC A201535452, 8).

The GAIM programme sought to induce certain types of behaviour by persuading would-be refugees about the dangers of migrant smuggling. This process of humanitarian securitisation interpellated stranded asylum-seekers as rational and entrepreneurial agents of socio-economic development. In this view, irregular migration is not the outcome of global inequality and unequal configurations of power and privilege. It is an individual-level problem of decision-making, caused by the absence of reliable information, which limits the capacity of migrants to make informed decisions.

In today's complex migration landscape, decision-making about migration takes place not only at the beginning of a journey, but also along the way to a final destination. In some cases, migrants may realize during the journey that they wish to return home, but that they may not have the means to do so, or fear social stigma of returning without a job or additional resources.

IOM, with support from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, is addressing this phenomenon through the implementation of a programme to help Sri Lankan migrants who become stranded in West Africa to return home in a safe and dignified manner. These irregular migrants had intended to reach Canada, but ended up stranded in a very precarious situation in West Africa, often at the hands of smugglers who had deceived them. Since 2012, the programme has supported 618 of these very vulnerable Sri Lankan nationals to return home with livelihood support to start a small business. The results of the programme are positive, with over 90 per cent of returnees reporting that they are satisfied with their businesses and are optimistic about their future. (IOM 2015, 28)

Internal accounts of the programme obscure the refugee protection concerns raised by AVRR programmes. The deployment of humanitarian narratives externalises culpability for the risks of irregular migration to smugglers. This humanitarian framing not only absolves wealthier destination states for their role in making asylum-seeking more dangerous. What is more, it depoliticises the interception of smuggling networks through the use of humanitarian claims about refugee protection. Here, the Canadian state, along with its delegates, the IOM, are mobilised as humanitarian actors, acting in the name of human rights and development.

For instance, internal documents note that, between January 2012 and March 2013, the programme provided return and reintegration assistance to over 600 Sri Lankan asylum-seekers stranded in various countries in West Africa (IRCC A201532096, 3). According to the IOM, returnees to Sri Lanka were provided with return, arrival and reintegration assistance. One month following their return, IOM staff provided a three-day orientation, which emphasised 'safe and legal migration practices' and the 'risks and realities of irregular migration', such as migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons. The IOM orientation was followed by business development training, which provided returnees with assistance to create a small to medium-sized business plan. IOM staff reviewed the proposed business plan with each returnee and once the proposal received final IOM approval, he or she received US\$3300 to purchase materials, receive on-the-job training or enrol in educational programmes (IRCC A201532096, 6). In providing this service to states, the IOM argues, the GAIM programme addresses the 'root causes' of irregular migration and migrant smuggling. These include the absence of economic opportunities in source countries (IRCC A201532096, 7). Internal documents promulgate the misleading claim that the 'root causes' of irregular migration can be addressed through development projects, rather than through policies that seek to respect the human rights of refugees (Crawley and Blitz 2019, 2263). By narrating this idealised or 'imagined migration world' (Walters 2010), internal documents reproduce the perspective of the receiving state. This 'internalist explanation' of forced displacement (Chimni 1998, 360) identifies emigration as a problem endemic to the Global South, which stems from socio-economic conditions of 'underdevelopment'.

Migration management employs a range of tools, from coercion to persuasion (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). One significant tool in the GAIM programme is information campaigns to raise awareness about safe migration. Information campaigns play a critical role in the new political imaginary of deportation, which shifts our attention from the violence of border controls to the act of migration 'as a source of violence' (Fine and Walters 2021, 12). The campaign delivered more than 4 million text messages to approximately 37 million people throughout Sri Lanka and placed 7400 calls (IRCC A201532096, 3). The IOM held 'sensitisation training' in various parts of the country, in 'major migrant communities', to 5399 persons; provided career guidance and safe migration training sessions for youth (1357 persons); hosted theatre forum sessions on safe migration (5074 persons); distributed safe migration materials and T-shirts as part of outreach to schools and colleges, along with career guidance and a 'train-the-trainers' programme on safe migration for community leaders and government officials; hosted community awareness sessions; and targeted information outreach for fishermen and sensitisation training for boat owners (IRCC A201532096, 7–9). According to the IOM, the safe migration campaign in the GAIM programme enabled Sri Lankans to make 'more informed decisions about any travel and/or solicitation from predatory "agents"' and helped to raise 'awareness on the risks involved in irregular migration in key

migrant-sending areas in Sri Lanka' (IRCC A201532096, 18, 2). While internal assessments are replete with humanitarian claims, within the internal evaluations, there is no mention of the potential dangers of returning Tamil asylum-seekers to Sri Lanka, where they could face persecution.

Information campaigns are presented as preventive measures to deter people from embarking on dangerous journeys. However, prevention is narrowly construed in a victimising focus on the dangers of migrant smuggling, instead of the broader context of restrictive policies in which people are forced to enlist smugglers (Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). While information campaigns often construct migrants as ignorant victims, this victimising approach contrasts sharply with the other aspects of the GAIM programme, which characterise migrants as entrepreneurial actors with agency. This moral and political ambivalence in the GAIM programme reflects the ambiguity at the heart of migration management, in which wealthier destination states work with the IOM to externalise international protection obligations.

In marshalling the state as the provider of protection, the Canadian government rationalised these programmes through the lens of migration management – as a humanitarian and development-focussed intervention in the interests of migrants themselves. Take the example of the 'Migrant Success Story'. The passage below details the experience of a young returnee. It provides a paradigmatic rendition of the IOM's depoliticising rationalisation, what Collyer (2018) calls 'deportability-as-development'.

At 21, she left Colombo with her brother on the false promise of an opportunity to study in Canada. However, after being left stranded in West Africa in a dire situation, she returned home through the GAIM program.

She is currently enrolled at a higher education institution in Colombo, studying for a degree in Information Technology specializing in graphic design and accounting as there is currently a great demand for these skills in the Sri Lankan job market. IOM's reintegration assistance included enrolment support and a basic office package. She attended IOM's business development training and says she gained sufficient knowledge in business start-up, how to use capital, how to plan a business, bookkeeping, etc. She is very grateful to IOM for helping her restart her education, and says she is currently searching for a job opportunity to utilise her new skills. (IRCC A201532096, 24)

Yet not all accounts of development-focussed reintegration paint such a rosy picture. A study by the DRC (2009), focussed on 48 returnees to Sri Lanka, found that 44 returnees started a business, but most of them closed and only four generated incomes above subsistence levels (cited in Webber 2011). It further noted that 29 Tamils experienced racial harassment from law enforcement since their return and four suffered serious human rights abuses. While the entrepreneurial image of migrants is commonplace in the global policy discourse of migration management, AVRR programmes gloss over the fact that the agency of returnees may be constrained in places where they face discrimination (DRC 2009, 3).

Passengers from the *Sun Sea* have expressed fear of return, and at least one asylum-seeker was tortured and killed after being deported to Sri Lanka (Bell 2014). With the GAIM programme, the risk of refoulement should not be underestimated. Although the GAIM programming contained explicit references to non-refoulement, the 'voluntary' return of individuals from the Tamil minority to Sri Lanka could put lives at risk. Despite the formal end of the civil war in 2009, the 'emigration of Tamils will continue, encouraged by political stagnation, a lack of rights and rule by fear' (Weiss 2012, 661). Not surprisingly, because of

the dire situation in Sri Lanka for Tamil people, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board, which adjudicates refugee claims, continues to accept the majority of refugee claims by Sri Lankans (Rehaag 2010).

The risk of *refoulement* is by no means unique to the GAIM programme. In practice, interdicted asylum-seekers are often returned without a serious assessment of their protection needs (Koch 2014). Although they supposedly decide to return, inevitably such a 'choice' is a highly constrained decision. What Andrijasevic and Walters (2010, 994) describe as the 'regulated choice' of 'neoliberal deportation', the development component of these 'pay-to-go' schemes masks the coercive violence of deportation to make forced return both legally ambiguous and less visible. Of course, such 'voluntary' schemes would not be possible without the looming threat of deportation weighing on the minds of returnees. AVRR programmes, as Collyer (2018) argues, use development to justify deportation. They combine deportability with 'development focused reintegration' (Collyer 2018, 106) in ways that depoliticise return and increase the public legitimacy of such schemes, which in many instances appear to contravene norms of refugee protection. In effect, access to asylum is blocked by proactive measures designed to contain asylum-seekers within a geopolitical space outside of legal norms, which leads to *neo-refoulement* – the return of asylum-seekers to regions of origin before they access sovereign territory and make a refugee claim (Hyndman and Mountz 2008, 250).

On its face, the GAIM programme may appear to offer a humane alternative to deportation. Indeed, it claims to promote a rights-based approach, which integrates humanitarian and development concerns raised by forced displacement. Yet it would be naïve to endorse the depoliticised understanding of forced migration promoted by AVRR programmes, which conceal the objectives and interests behind their development. AVRR programmes that utilise the language of humanitarianism and development embody the neoliberal rationality of migration management, which seeks to convey an impression of being politically neutral, self-evident and 'above politics'. Through a form of apparently non-coercive, 'structured consent', affected populations 'learn' about the risks of irregular migration and thereby internalise the norms of migration management in a process of self-disciplining (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 984, 994). AVRR programmes, seminars, safe migration and information campaigns govern indirectly through the deployment of knowledge. In the GAIM programme, affected populations are 'empowered' with training and financial inducements to improve their capacity (understood in neoliberal terms of human capital development). Instead of adopting outwardly coercive practices of forced removal, the GAIM programme experiments with different methods of 'enlisting the cooperation of migrants in their own expulsion' through the deployment of knowledge and financial assistance (ibid, 994).

The ambivalence of the GAIM programme reflects the rationality of migration management. It is rooted in an imperative of control that is not explicitly identified as such. The productive power of these AVRR programmes is evident in their ability to obscure the politics of anti-smuggling policy. AVRR narratives recast deportation in a positive light and distract attention away from the role of destination states in contributing to conditions under which asylum-seekers are forced to enlist smugglers. Obfuscated by the language of voluntary return, the repatriation of stranded asylum-seekers to their countries of origin is ultimately aimed at the containment of the world's surplus population to the Global South. Through the GAIM programme, the exceptional figure of the international order (Nyers 2006) – the asylum-seeker – is returned to their country of origin. This act reaffirms the centrality of the

state-based order and the international frameworks that benefit wealthier destination states in the Global North. Far from being a simple administrative function of the state, deportation, as Nyers (2018) explains, is integral to the performance of sovereign power, which is founded on the exclusion of non-citizens and other acts that reaffirm the political trinity of citizenship, sovereignty and the interstate system.

The GAIM programme frames and rationalises deportation in humanitarian terms of protecting people from deadly journeys and unscrupulous smugglers. However, the humanitarian claims behind Canada's extraterritorial interventions have come under fire in recent years. In its multilateral programming in the region, the Canadian government engaged in what François Crépeau, former Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, called 'distasteful alliances' with affected governments in West Africa (Bureau and Robillard 2019). A former federal government employee stated that the Canadian government partnered with Colonel Moussa Tiégboro Camara to disrupt migrant smuggling networks in Guinea (Bureau and Robillard 2019). Camara was charged in 2012 for allegedly participating in a massacre in Conakry, Guinea's capital, on 28 September 2009. Over 150 people were killed and hundreds were raped and tortured during a peaceful protest at a stadium, actions identified by a UN inquiry as a crime against humanity (Bureau and Robillard 2019). However, Camara's name was scrubbed from federal reports because of negative optics. While the Canadian government asserts the Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy is implemented in accordance with its international protection obligations, the claims of former government officials raise serious concerns about Canada's dependence on affected governments to do the 'dirty work' of anti-smuggling policy.

Conclusion: anti-smuggling policy as anti-politics

In the conventional account of the fight against migrant smuggling in terms of a global battle between good and evil, anti-smuggling discourse is a kind of anti-politics. Anti-smuggling policy obfuscates its own positivity (Walters 2008), that is, how it constructs its object of opposition based on oversimplified humanitarian representations. While the security rationale of migration management is often self-evident, the more insidious and apparently 'humanitarian' aspects of the GAIM programme are hidden beneath a claim to protect vulnerable people from dangerous smugglers. In this regard, claims to act in the name of humanitarianism and human rights, to paraphrase Watson (2011), rival security in their capacity to justify the use of exceptional measures towards would-be refugees. Indeed, the GAIM programme shows how anti-smuggling policy employs humanitarianism in the externalisation of asylum to regions of origin.

As this article illustrates, anti-smuggling policy does not operate by violently coercing people into staying in their place. Instead, it functions by disciplining their mobility. These indirect practices, in the depoliticising language of migration management, 'assist' migrants to make 'informed' choices. In this view, 'educating prospective migrants on the risks of smuggling' reduces 'the willingness of such migrants to undertake dangerous and illegal journeys' (RCMP A201501244, 120). Despite these apparent humanitarian concerns on behalf of the Canadian government, the GAIM programme is not a humane alternative to deportation. Rather, the use of financial inducements to incentivise return shifts the focus from the violence of deportation to the risks of migrant smuggling. In this act of political legerdemain, the GAIM programme combines development and deportation in a humanitarian

guise of combatting migrant smuggling and addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration. This humanitarian framing depoliticises the return of asylum-seekers and obscures efforts by the Canadian government to externalise its international protection obligations.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Corey Robinson is Lecturer in international relations at Durham University in the School of Government and International Affairs. Corey's research has appeared in *International Political Sociology*, *Security Dialogue* and *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, and in several scholarly volumes, such as the *Research Handbook on the Law and Politics of Migration*, edited by Catherine Dauvergne (Edward Elgar Publishing) and *The International Organization for Migration: The New 'UN Migration Agency' in Critical Perspective*, edited by Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (Palgrave Macmillan, International Political Economy Series).

Bibliography

- Anderson, B., M. J. Gibney, and E. Paoletti. 2013. *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation*. New York: Springer.
- Andrijasevic, R., and W. Walters. 2010. "The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (6): 977–999. doi:10.1068/d1509.
- Bell, S. 2014. "Known until Now as B-189, the Last of 492 MV Sun Sea Migrants in Custody Faces an Uncertain Fate: This Is His Story." National Post, 14 February. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/sun-sea>
- Bigo, D. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27 (1_suppl): 63–92. doi:10.1177/030437540202705105.
- Bourbeau, P. 2011. *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order*. New York: Taylor and Francis.
- Bureau, B., and S. Robillard. 2019. "'Distasteful Alliances': The Secret Story of Canada's Fight Against Migrants." CBC News, 21 May. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-trudeau-migrants-immigration-human-trafficking-1.5141288>
- Canadian Council for Refugees. 2015. "Sun Sea: Five Years Later." Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/sun-sea-five-years-later.pdf>
- Canadian Press. 2011. "3 or 4 Human Smuggling Efforts Busted, Kenney Says." CBC News, 5 August. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/3-or-4-human-smuggling-efforts-busted-kenney-says-1.1011597>
- CBC News. 2010. "Tamil Migrants to Be Investigated: Toews." CBC News, 13 August. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/tamil-migrants-to-be-investigated-toews-1.898421#:~:text=An%20estimated%20490%20Tamil%20migrants%20who%20arrived%20on%20a%20ship,Minister%20Vic%20Toews%20said%20Friday>
- Chimni, B. S. 1998. "The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11 (4): 350–374. doi:10.1093/jrs/11.4.350-a.

- Collyer, M. 2018. "Paying to Go: Deportability as Development." In *After Deportation: Ethnographic Perspectives*, edited by S. Khosravi, 105–125. New York: Springer.
- Corry, O. 2012. "Securitization and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40 (2): 235–258. doi:10.1177/0305829811419444.
- Crane, A. 2020. "The Politics of Development and Humanitarianism in EU Externalization: Managing Migration in Ukraine." *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 38 (1): 20–39. doi:10.1177/2399654419856908.
- Crawley, H., and B. K. Blitz. 2019. "Common Agenda or Europe's Agenda? International Protection, Human Rights and Migration from the Horn of Africa." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (12): 2258–2274. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1468393.
- De Genova, N. 2010. *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. 2009. "Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR): An Opportunity for Development?" *Briefing No. 20, September 2009*, Migration Development Research Centre, University of Sussex. Accessed January 19, 2022. http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SCMR/drc/publications/briefing_papers/BP20.pdf
- Duffield, M. 2011. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Dünnwald, S. 2013. "Voluntary Return: The Practical Failure of a Benevolent Concept." In *Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People*, edited by M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 228–249. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fairclough, N. 2013. "Critical Discourse Analysis." In *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by J. Gee and M. Handford, 35–46. London: Routledge.
- Fassin, D. 2011. *Humanitarian Reason*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Fine, S., and W. Walters. 2021. "No Place Like Home? The International Organization for Migration and the New Political Imaginary of Deportation." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1–18. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2021.1984218.
- Frowd, P. M. 2018. "Developmental Borderwork and the International Organization for Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (10): 1656–1672. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354046.
- GAC. 2016. "Evaluation of the Anti-crime Capacity-Building program and Counter-terrorism Capacity-Building program." https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/evaluation/2016/eval_accbp_ctcbp-eval_arclcc_arca.aspx?lang=eng&_ga=2.252011017.1608744847.1645195645-771427123.1645195645.
- Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., and J. C. Hathaway. 2015. "Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 53 (2): 235–284.
- Geiger, M. 2016. "Policy Outsourcing and Remote Management." In *Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the Spread of 'Remote Control' Practices*, edited by R. Zaiotti, 261–279. London: Routledge.
- Geiger, M. 2018. "Ideal Partnership or Marriage of Convenience? Canada's Ambivalent Relationship with the International Organization for Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (10): 1639–1655. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354033.
- Geiger, M., and A. Pécoud. 2010. "The Politics of International Migration Management." In *Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People*, edited by M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 1–20. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ghana Web. 2012. "18 People Arrested for Human Trafficking." Ghana Web. 24 May. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/18-people-arrested-for-human-trafficking/>
- Hainsworth, J. 2010. "Canadian Navy Boards Sri Lankan Migrants' Ship." NBC News, 12 August. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38684487>
- Hastie, B. 2010. "To Protect and Control: Anti-Trafficking and the Duality of Disciplining Mobility." In *Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People*, edited by M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 126–144. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Humphreys, A. 2012. "CSIS Tip Led to Bust of Alleged Human Smuggling Ring." National Post. 25 May. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/csis-tip-led-to-bust-of-alleged-human-smuggling-ring>
- Huysmans, J., and A. Buonfino. 2008. "Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK." *Political Studies* 56 (4): 766–788. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x.
- Hyndman, J. 2000. *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hyndman, J., and A. Mountz. "Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refolement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe." *Government and Opposition* 43, no. 2 (2008): 249–269. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00251.x.
- IOM. 2015. *Building Better Futures: Canada and IOM Partnerships in Action*. Geneva: IOM. Accessed January 19, 2022. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/canada_iom_partnership_profile.pdf
- IOM. 2018. *Migrant Smuggling to Canada: An Enquiry into Vulnerability and Irregularity through Migrant Stories*. Geneva: IOM. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migrant-smuggling-to-canada-2018-final.pdf>
- IOM Ghana. 2013. *Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants (GAIM - Phase IV): Info Sheet*. Accra: IOM Ghana.
- IRCC. 2015. "Evaluation of the Global Assistance for Irregular Migrants Program." Ottawa. Accessed January 19, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/e2-gaim_eng.pdf
- Koch, A. 2014. "The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (6): 905–923. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2013.855073.
- Little, A., and N. Vaughan-Williams. 2017. "Stopping Boats, Saving Lives, Securing Subjects: Humanitarian Borders in Europe and Australia." *European Journal of International Relations* 23 (3): 533–556. doi:10.1177/1354066116661227.
- Nieuwenhuys, C., and A. Pécoud. 2007. "Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns, and Strategies of Migration Control." *American Behavioral Scientist* 50 (12): 1674–1695. doi:10.1177/0002764207302474.
- Nyers, P. 2006. *Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency*. London: Routledge.
- Nyers, P. 2018. *Irregular Citizenship, Immigration, and Deportation*. London: Routledge.
- Pallister-Wilkins, P. 2017. "Humanitarian Rescue/Sovereign Capture and the Policing of Possible Responses of Violent Borders." *Global Policy* 8 (1): 19–24. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12401.
- Perkowski, N. 2018. "Frontex and the Convergence of Humanitarianism, Human Rights and Security." *Security Dialogue* 49 (6): 457–475. doi:10.1177/0967010618796670.
- Quan, D. 2020. "He Was Accused of Owning the MV Sun Sea Migrant Ship That Reached Canada. Ten Years Later, He's Speaking Publicly for the First Time." Toronto Star. 13 August. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2020/08/13/he-was-accused-of-owning-the-mv-sun-sea-migrant-ship-that-reached-canada-ten-years-later-hes-speaking-publicly-for-the-first-time.html>
- Raj, A. 2011. "Tamil Boat Potentially Bound for Canada Held in Indonesia." National Post. 12 July. Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/tamil-boat-headed-to-canada-held-in-indonesia>
- Rehaag, S. 2010. "2010 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Grant Rates." Accessed January 19, 2022. <https://ccrweb.ca/en/2010-refugee-claim-data>
- Robinson, C. 2017. "Tracing and Explaining Securitization: Social Mechanisms, Process Tracing and the Securitization of Irregular Migration." *Security Dialogue* 48 (6): 505–523. doi:10.1177/0967010617721872.
- Robinson, C. 2018. "Making Migration Knowable and Governable: Benchmarking Practices as Technologies of Global Migration Governance." *International Political Sociology* 12 (4): 418–437. doi:10.1093/ips/oly020.
- Robinson, C. 2020. "Measuring 'Well-Governed Migration': The International Organization for Migration's Migration Governance Indicators." In *The International Organization for Migration: The*

- New 'UN Migration Agency' in a Critical Perspective*, edited by M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 123–143. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNHCR. 2021. *UNHCR Note on the 'Externalization' of International Protection*. New York: UNHCR.
- UNODC. 2013. *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*. New York: UNODC.
- Vaughan-Williams, N. 2015. *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and beyond*. Oxford University Press.
- Walby, K., and M. Larsen. 2011. "Getting at the Live Archive: On Access to Information Research in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* 26 (3): 623–633. doi:10.3138/cjls.26.3.623.
- Walters, W. 2008. "Anti-Policy and Anti-Politics: Critical Reflections on Certain Schemes to Govern Bad Things." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 11 (3): 267–288. doi:10.1177/1367549408091844.
- Walters, W. 2010. "Imagined Migration World: The European Union's anti-Illegal Immigration Discourse." In *Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People*, edited by M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 73–95. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Walters, W. 2011. "Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border." In *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, edited by U. Brockling, S. Krasmann, and T. Lemke, 138–164. New York: Routledge.
- Watson, S. D. 2011. "The 'Human' as Referent Object? Humanitarianism as Securitization." *Security Dialogue* 42 (1): 3–20. doi:10.1177/0967010610393549.
- Webber, F. 2011. "How Voluntary Are Voluntary Returns?" *Race & Class* 52 (4): 98–107. doi:10.1177/0306396810396606.
- Weiss, G. 2012. *The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers*. New York: Bellevue Literary Press.

Interviews cited

- Interview #6, Senior Canadian government official. 5 February 2016.
- Interview #13, Senior Canadian government official. 1 April 2016.
- Interview #18, Senior Canadian government official. 21 April 2016.

Appendix. Access to information requests

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)

1. IRCC A201532096 (24 pages, paper)
2. IRCC A201521196 (26 pages)
3. IRCC A201535452 (21 pages)

Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

4. CBSA A201102325 (699 pages)
5. CBSA A201313161 (199 pages)

Global Affairs Canada (GAC)

6. GAC A201101931 (315 pages)
7. GAC A201302709 (24 pages)

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

8. RCMP A201501244 (159 pages)