Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Intellectual History Review

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rihr20

Republicanism versus liberalism: towards a pre-history

David Craig

To cite this article: David Craig (2023) Republicanism versus liberalism: towards a pre-history, Intellectual History Review, 33:1, 101-130, DOI: 10.1080/17496977.2022.2148324

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2022.2148324

Published online: 19 Jan 2023.

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY REVIEW
2023, VOL. 33, NO. 1, 101–130
https://doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2022.2148324

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Republicanism versus liberalism: towards a pre-history

David Craig

Durham University, Durham, UK

ABSTRACT

This essay argues that the "republicanism versus liberalism" debate that came to prominence in the 1980s was largely an artificial construction made possible by the recent genealogies of its constituent terms. The first section suggests that the idea of "early modern liberalism" took shape from the 1930s, and identifies three broad schools of thought: Marxist, democratic and classical. Despite their differences, they pioneered a stereotype of "liberalism" that was well established – especially in the United States – by the 1950s. The second section examines the so-called "republican tradition," arguing it did not acquire that identity until the early 1970s, and that earlier work excavating the "commonwealth tradition" did not intend it as an alternative to liberalism. That only came into focus as a result of Wood's work. The third section looks at elements of the debate in the 1970s, stressing the attempt to displace Locke and exploring the contribution of Pocock. He increasingly argued for the complex and interwoven nature of both "republicanism" and "liberalism," partly as a response to revisionist work on the natural law origins of liberalism. By contrast, Appleby restated the older "liberalism" and pitted it against "republicanism," thereby reinforcing the binary.

KEYWORDS

liberalism; republicanism; Pocock

1. Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s, debate raged among intellectual historians and political philosophers about the relative merits of "republicanism" versus "liberalism."[1] Among historians, the debate was fiercest on the subject of America. The traditional story, so it was argued, was that America was founded on the ideals of "Lockean liberalism" – natural law, individual rights, contractual government – an individualism that chimed easily with evolving capitalism. With the writings of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood in the 1960s, an alternative "republican" ancestry to the Revolution was revealed, in which classical concepts such as virtue and corruption initially drove the thought of revolutionary leaders but were largely superseded by the time of the Constitution, which marked the "end of classical politics."[2] It was, however, J.G.A. Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment* which elaborated a "republican" tradition stretching from Renaissance Florence

CONTACT David M. Craig d.m.craig@durham.ac.uk Durham University

through seventeenth-century England to revolutionary America and – contra Wood – beyond.[3] Pocock dwelt not just on the political need to preserve constitutional balance from corruption by reliance on propertied virtue, but also on the economic implications of this ideology; supporters of classical virtue tended to fear the early expressions of capitalism because its instability threatened the political institutions and moral personality essential to civic life.

The influence of the "republican" paradigm was extensive and spread well beyond initial interest in the revolutionary period.[4] It provoked a counter-reaction by those who wished to restate the importance of "liberalism" for understanding eighteenth-century America. This argument was elaborated vigorously by Joyce Appleby from the late 1970s.[5] The question to be considered here, however, concerns not the trajectory but the genealogy of this debate and whether the form it took in the 1980s was relatively recent and potentially misleading. Wood, looking back in 1998, was forthright: "the boxlike categories of 'republicanism' and 'liberalism' are essentially the inventions of us historians, and as such they are dangerous if heuristically necessary distortions of a very complicated past reality."[6] Such traditions are artificial: continuities within them are constructed diachronically and barriers between them erected synchronically. It may be useful, therefore, to see how such "boxes" have been created in the historiography and the uses to which historians have put them. Stefan Collini, for instance, has suggested we need histories of the history of political thought to show how the field was a hybrid construction that borrowed from philosophy, law, history and politics.[7] Arguably, we need similar histories of concepts such as "liberalism" and "republicanism" – the history of how particular thinkers and certain themes were subsequently glued together as a "tradition" – while remaining neutral as to whether they are apt characterisations of their subjects. Indeed, such "traditions" may tell us less about the period they are purportedly about – say, the eighteenth-century colonies – and more about the time in which they were invented, say, the mid-twentieth century United States.[8]

This is especially important since the terms "republicanism" and "liberalism" are notoriously slippery. As John Adams famously said in 1807, "there is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than republicanism."[9] Still, even in 1807, it was at least a word! The term "liberalism" is conventionally dated to the 1820s, and to use it to describe intellectual trends before then ought – at the very least – to create some unease.[10] Yet, for some generations, historians of political thought have happily referred to "liberalism" in the early modern period. The aim of this essay, then, is to explore the origins of this debate primarily through the lens of the language of "liberalism." It is important to know what the "republican" historiography was reacting against; was there, in fact, a monolithic "liberalism" that needed to be supplanted, or was "liberalism" something of a mirage: the closer you get to it, the more it recedes into the distance? It has recently been argued that many of the definitional stereotypes of liberalism – including the idea of Locke as its founding father – solidified in the 1930s and that there is a "fable of liberalism … the story liberalism recounts to itself about its origins and purposes."[11] This essay focuses on the period between the 1930s and 1980s. The first part explores some of the broad stories told about early modern "liberalism," while the second considers the development of the "republican" paradigm, and how it related to "liberalism." The final section turns to the 1970s, arguing that the explicit idea of "republicanism versus liberalism" was only formulated in this period, and that Pocock – usually seen as one of the most vocal

advocates of this binary – held a more nuanced position than the historical polemics of the 1980s would suggest.

2. Histories of "liberalism"

Until the 1930s, it was comparatively rare to use the term "liberalism" to refer to the early modern period. To be sure, "liberalism" had its historians, but, in works like Leonard Hobhouse's *Liberalism* or Guido De Ruggiero's *History of European Liberalism*, the bulk of attention focused on the nineteenth century, with thinkers like Smith and Bentham paving the way to political economy, utility and democracy. The typical view, then, was that liberalism was a product of the age of revolutions and, if anything, marked a *rejection* of the ideas of Locke.[12] That was changing by the 1930s, and "liberalism" was being retroactively applied to the earlier period. The stories attached to it were not exactly new: narratives about the rise of individualism and the emergence of the democratic intellect were well-established accounts of the transition from the medieval to the modern.[13] Variants of these stories were brought together under the heading of "liberalism" in the 1930s and, within two decades, it was understood that "liberalism" was born in the early modern period and Locke was its chief exponent. This was a complex process but all we need to do here is briefly sketch some of the main ways "liberalism" was depicted, taking as the primary focus those texts which offered influential surveys of its development.[14] Crudely speaking, there were three main approaches to the problem – left, centre and right – although many elements of the historical story were shared across these divisions.

First, and perhaps most influentially, was the Marxist account offered by Harold Laski in his *Rise of European Liberalism* in 1936, which was itself an extension of a lengthy article from 1930.[15] Despite its explicitly Marxist approach, it remained an important textbook for some decades and had particular appeal in the United States, where it acquired the subtitle *The Philosophy of a Business Civilization*.[16] Laski's central theme was that liberalism was the ideology of emergent capitalism and not the universal ideology it claimed itself to be: "New material conditions … gave birth to new social relationships … a new philosophy was evolved to afford a rational justification for the new world which had come into being. This new philosophy was liberalism." He presented the Renaissance and Reformation as milestones towards a secular worldview and, in particular – drawing on Figgis – towards a secular state which replaced the church as "the guardian of social well-being" and developed its own utilitarian rationality. His account of the seventeenth century drew on Tawney and concluded that, by the end of the century, "the foundations of a liberal philosophy" had fully emerged: a secular state, rationalism and toleration. It was a philosophy "attuned to the religion of success" and which found its ablest propagandist in Locke, who argued the sovereign could not take the property of any man without his consent.[17] "His state is nothing so much as a contract between a group of business men who formed a limited liability company."[18] Locke became the "representative prophet" of property owners and the "successful missionary" of the new faith: "his theories defined the essential outlines of Liberal doctrine for nearly two centuries."[19] Indeed, eighteenth-century thought was merely the working out of this philosophy and Smith and Burke, it was argued, both drew heavily on Locke.[20] The system of liberty offered by the former – and in a similar form by physiocracy – trusted in the

natural harmony of interests, meaning that all the state needed to do was ensure peace, enforce contracts and be frugal. In any case, added Burke, there was nothing government could do for the poor anyway.

A more sophisticated version of this story can be found in C.B. Macpherson, who had studied under Laski at the L.S.E. in the mid-1930s.[21] Although published in 1962, some of the core arguments of *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* had appeared a decade earlier. Locke, it was argued, provided an ideology for the rising bourgeoisie by defending the unlimited accumulation of property, making it a purely private right shorn of any charitable obligation, and arguing that the ignorant poor were best kept in check by religion. It was – as Dunn later put it – "a moral charter for capitalism every bit as brutal as any that Marx alleged."[22] Macpherson was reacting to those who wanted to defend liberal democracy against communism by going back to "the beginning of the liberal tradition"; they reaffirmed natural rights, government by consent, moral supremacy of the individual and sanctity of private property. Locke, for them, was at the heart of the "liberal-individualist tradition," whereas, for Macpherson, they were importing modern liberal-democratic assumptions into the past and ignoring the class content of "seventeenth century liberal theory."[23] Some – such as Laski and Tawney – offered a more "realistic" account by putting Locke back into his social context and understanding that his state was no more than a joint-stock company that served class interests.[24]

The second major way the history of "liberalism" became important in the 1930s was through defining it as democracy and defending it against dictatorial – and, increasingly, "totalitarian" – government. This association was especially apparent in America, where the language of liberalism had been largely absent in political science, but now quickly came to mean democracy and pluralism.[25] Gunnell identifies George Sabine as one proponent of this view, and, although the original 1937 edition of *History of Political Theory* did not much use the term "liberalism" in relation to the early modern period, the original single chapter on the subject in the nineteenth century was expanded to two by the second edition in 1950.[26] Frederick Watkins's *Political Tradition of the West* of 1948 was an attempt to defend liberalism from totalitarianism – liberalism was not simply "laissez-faire capitalism" but "the modern embodiment of all the characteristic traditions of Western politics. If liberalism fails to survive, it will mean the end of the Western political tradition."[27] It meant primarily freedom under the law and he worried that the current crisis of confidence in liberalism would pave the way for totalitarian reaction. As Sabine noted, for Watkins, "liberalism would be practically identical in meaning with what, in popular usage, is more likely now-a-days to be called 'democracy'."[28] William Orton also offered a defence of *The Liberal Tradition* against totalitarianism in 1945, denying that it was simply atomism and individualism and preferring instead the idea of "liberty-within-community."[29] Both he and Watkins stretched their histories back to antiquity. Orton eulogised Aristotle's ideal citizen and claimed it could be linked to Jefferson's independent farmer; a suggestion that hints that this conception of liberalism could be aligned with later "republicanism."[30] Watkins saw in antiquity an evolving conception of legality which would later be revived in the medieval church. Both stressed the importance of the Renaissance and Reformation, with Watkins focusing on how a modern legal order was established with the modernisation of natural law by Grotius and Pufendorf.[31] Orton identified the *politiques* as the "true precursors of modern

liberalism" because they saw that there could be only one source of coercion in a community, that it must be subject to moral principles and that power must be exercised minimally for the purposes of peace and freedom. In saying this, they laid the ground "on which Mirabeau, Paine, Madison, and Jefferson took their historic stand."[32] The state was a means to liberty but also the enabler of community. Interestingly, Orton opposed Laski's account of Locke on property, and argued that there were links back to the natural law doctrines of Aquinas, and similarities to the distributive ideas articulated by Pius XII in 1944. He also offered a balanced account of Smith.[33] Watkins, meanwhile, focused on the politicisation of the middle classes in the eighteenth century and their growing realisation that their reforms required greater democracy.

Finally, there were challenges to liberalism – sometimes, problematically, identified with the political right – which advocated a renewed engagement with the classical or Christian tradition. The most well-known were *émigrés* figures such as Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt, whose experiences of Weimar tended to colour their thinking.[34] However, it is important also to recognise the Catholic contribution to anti-modernism: recent scholarship has established how thinkers such as Waldemar Gurian and Jacques Maritain pioneered the idea of "totalitarianism" in critical reaction to Schmitt and argued that the "total state" was the culmination of liberalism. Arendt followed their work closely, commenting to Gurian in 1942 that "Nazism is the spawn of that hell known as liberalism, and into whose abyss both Christianity and Enlightenment came to ruin."[35] Similar arguments were also developed in America: John H. Hallowell's *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology* of 1943 was his opening salvo in a war against liberalism, while Thomas P. Neill's *Rise and Decline of Liberalism* was an accessible – and admittedly derivative – repackaging of the argument a decade later. While sometimes dismissed as "Catholic propagandists," Hallowell, at least, has been credited with giving a "unified voice" to the critique of liberalism that would soon be more famously associated with Strauss and Voegelin.[36] His debt to Catholic critics of totalitarianism is apparent in his attraction to the social thought of Maritain and his opposition to Schmitt's command state for its rejection of eternal and universal standards: while it paid "lip-service" to liberalism, it was emptied of all substantive content and was therefore "more congenial to despotism than to freedom."[37]

What, then, was Hallowell's account of liberalism? In its current form it was not the solution to the "crisis of our times"; "the sickness of the modern world is the sickness of moral confusion" and the error of liberalism was its denial of the reality of evil.[38] He argued that the Renaissance and Reformation gave birth to the autonomous individual, and that, for the aspirant burgher, "Liberalism was the embodiment of the demand for freedom in every sphere of life – intellectual, social, religious, political, and economic."[39] It was also a challenge to political absolutism since the liberal would accept no restraint but law, and law – in order not to be arbitrary – had to be eternal, universal and immutable. Here there was a crucial tension which developed over time. In the early modern period, law was the pursuit of right reason and had its source *outside* individuals, but, by the nineteenth century, liberalism had become "decadent" and paved the way for its own demise by insisting now that law emerged from *within* individuals who were endowed with interests.[40] As a political philosophy, liberalism found "classic expression" in Grotius and Locke, with the *Two Treatises* being its most "detailed and lucid" expression: "According to liberalism there exists a sphere of rights belonging to individuals by virtue

of their humanity for the preservation of which the state exists and beyond which the state may not penetrate."[41] In eighteenth-century political economy enlightened self-interest led "by some mysterious process" to economic prosperity.[42] To liberals, the "atomistic conception of society" was key: they could not conceive of a state which enabled the good, but only as something that resulted from a contract that reflected and satisfied the wills of individuals. None of this appeared dangerous to the "early liberal," who still believed that there was a transcendental order of truth which natural reason could apprehend. Once that withered away, however, the liberal was logically driven either to make the sovereign absolute – which meant tyranny – or the individual absolute, which meant anarchy.[43] Neill offered a comparable – if cruder – account that made the same point: liberalism was a myth based on a false understanding of man and society and leads "logically" to "some form of totalitarian tyranny."[44]

There are some striking similarities between these arguments and those of the more well-known *émigrés*. In 1944, Voegelin had recommended *The Decline of Liberalism* for its insight that totalitarianism was not a successor to liberalism, "but the logical outcome of the initial inconsistencies of the liberal position." He was pleased that theologians such as Niebuhr and Tillich were being taken seriously and with the insistence that the decline of liberalism had its roots "in the faultiness of its religious and metaphysical basis."[45] Hallowell followed Voegelin's work closely, editing an unpublished history of political ideas in 1975, and judging *Order and History* to be a "landmark" of scholarship.[46] He also had some sympathy with Strauss. His review of *Natural Right and History* argued it was a "significant contribution" to diagnosing the current crisis. He dwelt on Strauss's contrast between classical and modern ideas of natural right and the role of Hobbes in trying to put the concept on a supposedly scientific footing.[47] Indeed, in virtually the only use of the term in the book, Strauss argued that

> If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or the safeguarding of those rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism was Hobbes.[48]

Locke – despite talk of God and natural law – took this thinking further, and so, in reality, marked a break rather than a continuity with earlier natural law thinkers like Hooker and Aquinas.[49] Hallowell's problem, however, was that Strauss interpreted this modern turn as a revolt against the classical rather than the Christian tradition, and he argued that a more compelling interpretation of medieval natural law was to be found in Voegelin's *New Science of Politics*. Ultimately, while much could be learnt from Aristotle, the "more profound understanding of man's predicament" was to be found in Paul.[50]

All three of these "schools" tended to understand the founding of the United States in terms of the prevailing orthodoxy associated with Charles Beard and Carl Becker; these progressive historians stressed the role of class divisions in the Revolution and the way that the Constitution was designed to claw power back from radicals towards conservatives.[51] They also agreed with Becker's 1922 study of *The Declaration of Independence* that Locke was the central intellectual inspiration for the founding fathers. Laski cited this work when arguing that Jefferson had drunk deeply from the "Lockian fountain" and that Locke had laid down "the essential thesis of liberalism that no government can ever be justified unless it draws strength from the free consent of the governed."[52]

Hallowell, similarly, saw the Declaration as a virtual "transcript" of Locke's *Second Treatise*, and argued that while "liberalism in America" was typically associated with Paine and Jefferson, it had its roots in seventeenth-century puritans such as Thomas Hooker, Roger Williams and John Wise.[53] Straussians, in particular, became increasingly interested in these questions. Walter Berns, in 1957, stated that the origins of liberalism could be found in the seventeenth century and that there was a clear line running from Hobbes and Locke through to the Declaration, while, in 1959, Martin Diamond argued that *The Federalist* showed that "liberalism and republicanism are not the means by which to ascend to a nobler life" but were rather "instrumentalities" which solved "Hobbesian problems" with the softer tools of Locke.[54]

But it is Louis Hartz's *Liberal Tradition* of 1955 which is now the most famous exponent of the idea of "Lockean liberalism" in America, although, interestingly, he never used that exact phrase and other writers in the same year might better be credited with coining it.[55] The phrase "Lockean" had been defined in his first book, unproblematically, as natural law, the state of nature, the contractual basis of government and the right to remove rulers who broke the contract.[56] Still, it has been suggested that Hartz – along with Hallowell – was "one of the first individuals to characterize Locke as a liberal."[57] That said, there is no real discussion of "Lockean" ideas – perhaps suggesting how well-understood that phrase had become by the 1950s – and, indeed, there is little sustained treatment of any thinker or text and the cast of characters largely act as placemarkers for clusters of doctrine. Like other commentators on liberalism, his concerns were contemporary: he worried that cold war liberalism was becoming "antidemocratic, frightened, defensive, narrow, emaciated" and that an account of its forms would better reveal how to manage its defects.[58]

Hartz's arguments have been explored extensively. His core claim might be captured by reworking Locke: "In the beginning, all America was liberal." In the chapters concerning the eighteenth century, he argued that there was a radical divergence between liberalism in Europe and liberalism in America. In the former, its need to define itself against feudalism affected its attitudes to history, religion, power and class. It became a more rigorously secular, optimistic and abstract doctrine, pioneering atomism and hedonism in doctrines such as physiocracy and utilitarianism to defend business values against feudal traditions. Since feudalism had no place in America, "liberalism" – a term which he recognised as vague – could evolve in a more moderate fashion. It had a "matter of fact" quality; it lacked a strong and distinct middle-class consciousness.[59] There was no clash between religious and secular perspectives; an alliance between "Christian pessimism" and "liberal thought" meant, Hartz believed, that the Revolution was relatively sober.[60] Americans were also not disdainful of the past: they saw their own history in providential terms and could happily look back to the seventeenth century for legal precedents.[61] The progressive historians – who saw class conflict at work in the eighteenth century – had misunderstood the Revolution because they assumed the social conflicts in Europe, which were the result of feudalism, also played out in America. There was, Hartz argued, no social revolution because "the fundamental liberal decisions had been made long before"; colonial society was already a "liberal society."[62] This meant that the supposed class conflict between radicals and conservatives were in fact positions *within* liberalism. The radicals of Massachusetts who supported Shays's Rebellion were "inside, rather than outside, the liberal process of American

politics," and the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were both part of a broad liberal tradition which supplied the underlying solidarity to the "shadow world" of seeming social conflict.[63] Yet this was hidden in plain sight: there had never been "a 'liberal movement' or a real 'liberal party' in America" and, hence, "ironically, 'liberalism' is a stranger in the land of its greatest realization." The core assumption of American thought was "the reality of atomistic social freedom … It is instinctive to the American mind."[64]

Of course, Hartz was not primarily concerned with a precise identification of eighteenth-century ideology. Nevertheless, there is a notable lack of embarrassment in speaking about "liberalism" both in Europe and America. He did not need to define "Lockean" since it was already widely understood: individualist, capitalist, sceptical of the state and, broadly, democratic. By the mid-1950s, then, numerous histories of liberalism had been produced. Indeed, the "fable of liberalism" was largely a creation of its opponents, yet it was an account that its supporters also embraced.[65] Jacob Schapiro, for example, drew on many of the authors we have been considering – Laski, Watkins, Hallowell, Neill and Hartz – to argue that liberalism was the "Way of Freedom" against "communist totalitarianism" and that it was "the accepted pattern of life for the peoples of the western world."[66] Not everyone, however, was impressed. Sheldon Wolin – in many respects a critic of liberalism – confessed he had abandoned many of these preconceptions. Modern accounts had lost touch with "the original temper and outlook of liberalism" and instead peddled a "vulgar caricature": that it was a naive doctrine of progress with "arrogant" convictions about the power of reason to reshape society.[67] These misleading claims, he said, arose from confusing democratic radicalism with liberalism; the former was mainly the creation of eighteenth-century rationalism while the latter had its roots in the period *before* the French Enlightenment. It leaned heavily on Locke, but "most important" was the way it was exposed to Hume and Smith, "two thinkers distinguished by a profound respect for the limits of reason and the pervasiveness of irrational factors in man and society." Wolin's aim was to disentangle that tradition from the first and to show that "liberalism was a philosophy of sobriety, born in fear, nourished by disenchantment, and prone to believe that the human condition was and was likely to remain one of pain and anxiety."[68] This, then, was a very different approach to the subject, albeit one that continued to apply the word "liberalism" to the early modern period.

3. The emergence of "republicanism"

This dominance of the "fable of liberalism" was ironic since historians were starting to question whether Locke was quite the central voice political theorists imagined.[69] Perry Miller, in 1953, challenged those who discerned the presence of Locke in Wise's writings by showing that the "Lockean" passages were actually from Pufendorf. There was a "curious supposition peculiar to Anglo-Saxon scholarship" that Wise "would have been more original had he drawn upon the English Locke rather than the German Pufendorf," whereas, in fact, in both writers one could find "the conceptions of social compact, natural rights, and right of revolution."[70] This was one way of displacing Locke: stressing other thinkers in the natural law tradition. Clinton Rossiter offered another way in the same year. Having worked extensively through colonial newspapers, he noted that, while there were appeals to Locke, many other eighteenth-century

authorities were routinely invoked, especially "the estimable team of Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard." Colonists sometimes appealed to continental thinkers, but they preferred

> English writers in the Whig tradition … No one can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realizing that *Cato's Letters* rather than Locke's *Civil Government* was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period.[71]

This theme would soon be played more loudly, but there is little sense that Rossiter was trying to erect an alternative tradition to "liberalism"; a term which he rarely used in any case.

The emergence of "republicanism" as an alternative tradition took time. Even in 1970, that term was not yet finally fixed as the name for a pattern of ideas that has been called commonwealth, opposition, country, libertarian, as well as Whig, both Real and Radical. The concern here, though, is how this strand of thought was positioned in relation to "liberalism." Prior to the 1950s, there was little awareness of the importance of a "republican" tradition, though there was some appreciation of the influence of Harrington on colonial minds. Douglass Adair's 1943 doctoral thesis had stressed that many of the ideas of Jefferson and Madison were "ideological commonplaces" of the eighteenth century and drew on Aristotle, Xenophon, Polybius, Cicero and Plutarch, as well as the seventeenth-century republicans, "notably Harrington."[72] Adair reviewed Zera Fink's study of *The Classical Republicans*, and argued that, since they were widely read in colonial America, the book would be of "especial profit" to anyone interested in the intellectual background of the Revolution. There needed to be many more studies to understand the development of "our modern democracy"; this was not a plea for an alternative paradigm, but simply for better intellectual history.[73] Adair nurtured this ambition as managing editor of the *William and Mary Quarterly* between 1946 and 1955, where he encouraged a series of essays exploring "the relation between English political 'classics' and the eighteenth-century English radicals and the revolutionary principles of the American patriots of 1776."[74] His most important connection was with Caroline Robbins – whom he met in 1946 – and he encouraged and promoted her work over the next decade and a half. In her early essays she demonstrated an interest – which went back to early doctoral plans – in the transatlantic exchange of ideas, and stressed that "English and American intellectual history from 1640 to 1840 needs rewriting between the covers of one book."[75] When it appeared in 1959, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* was not exactly that book, since it was restricted to English, Irish and Scottish history, but many reviewers were fully alive to the significant implications it had for colonial and revolutionary history.[76]

The early essays explored some transatlantic aspects of what she then called "libertarian ideas."[77] They might not have been influential in their own day, but they were transmitted from seventeenth-century England to eighteenth-century America by figures such as Hollis. Adams was much influenced by Sidney; indeed, Sidney, she suggested, was a comparable presence in the colonies to Locke, and the "passionate and partisan" *Discourses* may have inspired radicals more than the "temperate" *Treatises*.[78] In her book, she generally avoided describing her subjects as "republicans" and "radicals," and now preferred the term "commonwealthmen."[79] She did not, however, see this as a

counter-tradition to liberalism, as the subtitle of her book indicates: *Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies*. The word "liberal" was used over 75 times and the many writers she discussed were often assessed in relation to "liberal ideas." Molesworth, Shaftesbury and Molyneux were described as "liberal" and even Swift inspired "liberal" rather than Tory politics among his readers. Her section on Ireland was called a "chapter on Irish liberalism" and she saw Thomas and William Drennan as part of a long "liberal tradition."[80] Hutcheson blended the "liberal ideas" of Ireland and Scotland: "Liberalism at Glasgow, at Aberdeen and wherever his disciples may be found, was a vital and growing force." Turnbull, Fordyce, Erskine and Ferguson all in their various ways contributed to "liberal thought."[81] Unsurprisingly, Robbins's discussion of nonconformity was replete with liberal language. Watts and Doddridge were central to "the dissenting contribution to liberal thought" but even Akenside and Dyson, who both became Tories, helped "popularize liberalism." The Dissenting Academies extended the political and theological "liberalism" of the Commonwealth tradition and, in the first half of the century, it was primarily clerics – rather than lawyers – who inclined to "liberal political theories." Later, Blackburne, Lindsey, Watson and Jebb were all noted for various degrees of "liberal views" and, within high politics, "the less liberal Rockinghams" were compared with "the more liberal Chatham-Shelburne groups."[82]

In Robbins's eyes, then, the commonwealth tradition *was* a liberal tradition. She was writing against the assumption that "progressive" political thought dried up between the 1690s and 1760s; in fact there was lots of it, but it was a diverse tradition and any study of "eighteenth-century liberalism" had to appreciate that. "Separation of those liberal thinkers who may be properly thought to derive from seventeenth-century origins, from those whose inspiration was otherwise, cannot be precise. The attempt is justified by the composite nature of eighteenth-century liberalism."[83] She primarily meant religious and political rather than economic ideas: "The liberals or Real Whigs could always be relied on to agitate for shorter parliaments, fewer placemen, a national militia, and greater religious liberty." They were fervent supporters of mixed government who disliked the development of cabinet, party and parliamentary sovereignty and who saw in America the achievement of their ideals.[84] She suggested that Price and Priestley, Jebb and Brand Hollis had an important place in "the history of liberal ideas."[85]

Although she called all this "liberal," she also noted an important shift at the start of the nineteenth century: the "radicals and liberals" of that century might pay some lip service to their predecessors but their utilitarianism meant they had little interest in "old natural rights doctrines" or ideas of mixed government.

> Where both Commonwealthmen and liberal shared a distrust of too powerful a government, the one relied upon a due balance between its different component parts, the other sought a release of individuals from statutory restrictions and controls as preservatives against the Leviathan state.[86]

In other words, the commonwealth tradition placed faith in constitutional machinery, which was not typical of later liberals. Here, then, we can see the germs of the later "republicanism versus liberalism" distinction, but it is striking that Robbins saw no reason to disavow the "liberalism" of her eighteenth-century commonwealthmen.

Her reviewers agreed: a "brilliant contribution to the history of English liberalism," a survey of the idea of "the English liberals from who the Anglo-American liberals learned so much" and, hence, "a contribution to the history of American liberalism." It was a careful study of "liberal" ideas and showed how much influence "liberal writers" in Britain had on America, that federal and state constitutions owed more to "left-wing political traditions" in Britain than anyone had hitherto known.[87] Some also noted the caesura at the turn of the nineteenth century: that the American Revolution was the true fulfilment of this line of thought and that "later English liberalism and radicalism" had only a tenuous connection with it.[88] Interestingly, though, Robbins herself expressed some doubts about the growing use of the language of "liberalism." In a review of George Cherry's *Early English Liberalism* – which drew heavily on Laski, Hallowell, Orton, Watkins and Neill – she cast doubt on its "sweeping claims" about the origins of "modern liberal society" in the seventeenth century. The political story between king, parliament and people would remain unsettled until the nineteenth century, and the limited freeing of trade could not be credited to "a new and firm economic liberalism." The account merely "adds confusion to already confused concepts of liberalism" and, while more work was needed on seventeenth-century thought, "perhaps we might leave aside the word 'liberalism' till we agree on a precise definition."[89]

Given his influence over subsequent debate, it is striking that Bailyn's *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* rarely used the language either of republicanism or liberalism. As most reviewers noted, and he himself acknowledged, he trod in the path walked by Robbins, whose influence is apparent in an early article in 1962.[90] There he opposed those who stressed the "brute pragmatism" of American public life and agreed with Robbins on the importance of transatlantic intellectual exchange. Yes, thinkers such as Locke, Beccaria, Montesquieu and Voltaire were known in the colonies, but perhaps more important was their transmission through Watts, Neal, Burgh, Priestley and Price. Following Rossiter, Bailyn also noted that it was *Cato's Letters* – "a series of radically libertarian essays" – rather than Locke or Montesquieu that was most frequently cited in mid-century colonial politics.[91] These writers – here dubbed exponents of "Enlightenment liberalism" – enabled the revolutionary leaders to formalise ideas and practices which were already largely in place.[92]

By 1967, Bailyn had clarified the political traditions he thought operative in colonial America, yet he did not write of "republicanism" against "liberalism." Indeed, there was no consensus on what the new "commonwealth" tradition should be called: reviewers adopted a wide variety of names. Very few used the word "republican," the exception being Fink, who argued Bailyn needed to look more closely at the *direct* influence of seventeenth-century republicanism.[93] Bailyn himself – despite the influence of Robbins – used neither "republican" nor "commonwealthmen," and instead preferred "opposition," sometimes "country" or "radical" and often also "libertarian," which drew attention to the need to preserve liberty from corruption. Furthermore, it was not conceived as antagonistic to the "liberal" tradition: its core concepts were "natural rights, the contractual basis of society and government, the uniqueness of England's liberty-preserving 'mixed' constitution" all of which were "commonplaces of liberal thought of the time."[94]

In general, though, Bailyn made little use of "liberal" language. Instead, he speaks of four distinct traditions of thought which "opposition" ideology harmonized into "one

distinctive tradition."[95] There were arguments drawn from the usual classical authors about how to preserve a republic, but these rarely inspired direct analysis. Bailyn attached importance to the "European Enlightenment" and argued that the "rationalism of liberal reform" could be found in Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Voltaire, Rousseau, Beccaria and Locke: they were "quoted everywhere in the colonies." Also of great importance was the English common law: Coke was widely cited and Blackstone was a standard authority.[96] Finally, the social and political thought of New England puritanism was increasingly influential as it lost its earlier narrowness. This was a more domestic tradition, but it carried authority because it offered a cosmic interpretation for everyday events.[97]

These four traditions were often inconsistent with each other: the common law obsession with the past conflicted with Enlightenment optimism about the future while covenanters disagreed with both since improvement required that politics be understood within a divine context. Bailyn argued it was the fifth tradition – the "opposition" tradition – which was able to bring coherence to these different stances and yet retain its own "essential characteristics" and "determinative power." The ideas of Milton, Harrington and especially Sidney were reworked by "opposition" politicians in the early eighteenth century, kept alive in Baron and Hollis and renewed by Price, Priestley, Cartwright and Burgh. *Cato's Letters* – again described as "libertarian tracts" – were quoted "everywhere" and "ranked with the treatises of Locke as the most authoritative statement of nature of political liberty and above Locke as an exposition of the social sources of the threats it faced."[98] The themes typically expressed – concern for the individual, hostility to government, the danger of luxury and corruption – resonated unusually strongly in colonial America.

It was, however, Gordon Wood's *Creation of the American Republic* – based on a doctoral thesis supervised by Bailyn – which did more to shape subsequent understandings of "republicanism" and, indeed, the whole historiography of this period.[99] Bailyn had touched on the erosion of the older language in the 1770s and 1780s, but this became Wood's major theme: the emergence of "an entirely new conception of politics, a conception that took them out of an essentially classical and medieval world … into one that was recognizably modern."[100] Wood echoed Bailyn on the traditions operating in colonial America, and on the importance of the "Opposition view of English politics." His preferred term was "radical Whig," but once again it was not explicitly contrasted with liberal language: it was "grounded in the political and social ideals of the liberal writings of the previous century, especially those of the classical republicans." It expressed a "heightened language of intense liberalism and paranoic mistrust of power" that appealed to a prickly colonial mind.[101] Once separation was agreed upon, it quickly informed the elaboration of "republicanism." Wood stressed that the public good was seen in corporate rather than individual terms: "the people" was a homogeneous body distinct from the interests of groups and individuals and "liberty" meant placing the public above the private and even accepting curbs on freedom. While some believed "virtue" required greater social equality, most were content with removing the artificial inequalities created by unearned privilege. There was enthusiasm that this version of "republicanism" could prevent the corruption that social and economic transformation might bring, and that it could be sustained in the New World even if it had been disastrous in the Old.[102]

Wood might have described the subsequent story in the 1780s as one of "liberalism" supplanting "republicanism," but, although he stressed that interest and atomism replaced virtue and corporatism, he rarely used the term "liberalism."[103] He wrote instead of how the Americans created a new type of polity – a democratic republic or a representative democracy – which marked the "the end of classical politics."[104] The new polity rested on a more realistic conception of human behaviour, which stressed the centrality of conflicting interests. *Now* an explicitly Lockean idea was embraced: "a social contract formed by isolated and hostile individuals was now the only contractual metaphor that comprehended American social reality"; "hostile individuals coming together for their mutual benefit to construct a society."[105] No longer was politics about the struggle between ruler and ruled, but about transcending and reconciling competing social interests through a complicated machinery that parcelled power out across different institutions. The idea of liberty changed: since the people now had a role in *all* parts of government, it now took the form of private rights to be defended against government encroachment. The public good became a question of the liberty, property and security of individuals.[106] Similarly, the stress on public virtue fell away: there was no point forcing human nature against the grain of self-interest. In effect, by formulating a theory of politics assumed to be based on reality, "the Americans of 1787 shattered the classical Whig world of 1776."[107] In contrast to Hartz, however, Wood saw real social differences at stake, but argued that, by adopting the language of "democratic radicalism," the Federalists concealed their preference for elitist government and so helped create "that encompassing liberal tradition which has mitigated and often obscured the real social antagonisms of American politics."[108]

Interestingly, Wood's reviewers did not identify a clash between "liberalism" and "republicanism." They were more interested in the comfort he provided to neo-Beardians when he adhered to the old-fashioned idea that Anti-Federalists were the democrats and Federalists the aristocrats.[109] Similarly, while they wrote of "republicanism" in the context of the 1770s and 1780s, they tended to use "commonwealth," "dissenting," "Whig" and related epithets to refer to the broader tradition we have been exploring. "American Whigs, Professor Wood argues, accepted without question the general Whig ideology as it had evolved in England, though they drew more heavily upon the radical Whig tradition than on the more respectable conservative Whigs."[110] So, even at the turn of the 1970s, there seemed to be little sense either that "liberalism" was a challenger to "republicanism" or even that "republicanism" was the accepted name for the tradition that Robbins had excavated in 1959. The latter problem was to be largely settled (at least in North America) in 1972 when Robert Shalhope – a young historian specialising in the Antebellum South – surveyed the history of the "republican synthesis." He stressed the invaluable contribution of Robbins – though he referred to her tradition as "libertarian" and "Whig" rather than republican – but argued that it was in Wood's "brilliant portrait of republicanism" that the themes became clear. It was a concept around which Americans could mobilise because it could be defined in so many different ways; though, in an important (and, as it turned out, futile) warning, Shalhope advised against allowing it to become a slogan which could be superimposed onto everything and anyone.[111] What was notable, however, was that by "republicanism," he meant the ideology of the early republic rather than the larger "commonwealth" tradition, which he called

"libertarian." Furthermore, he had nothing to say about "liberalism"; neither this word nor "liberal" makes any appearance in the article at all.

4. Republicanism and liberalism

How, then, did "liberalism" get swept up in a debate about "republicanism"? Shalhope may not have mentioned that word, but he had a lot to say about Locke. The "republican synthesis" was an alternative to the idea that eighteenth-century thought was *Locke et praeterea nihil*. That phrase was taken from an earlier essay by Pocock, which had commended Robbins for showing that Augustan thought was so much more than that.[112] Pocock was also drawing on a wider contextualist literature that was developing in the 1960s. Peter Laslett had shown that the bulk of the *Two Treatises* was written during the Exclusion Crisis rather than the Glorious Revolution and so could hardly serve as the classic account of that revolution, or any that followed its wake.[113] Meanwhile, as we have seen, some historians were questioning whether Locke was as influential in the colonies as had been presumed. In the early 1960s, Dunn was working on precisely this problem, and J.R. Pole – in a review of Bailyn's *Pamphlets of the American Revolution* – criticised Hartz and suggested "it might now be advisable to reserve judgment about the extent of Locke's effective influence in colonial political ideas until we have heard from Mr John Dunn."[114] The conclusion of Dunn's exhaustive research was that there was little evidence that the *Two Treatises* were much read before 1750 – Grotius and Pufendorf were more important – and that by the time it started to appear in colonial debates in the 1760s it had become "an uncontentious and somewhat unexciting work" and, by the 1770s, it was merely a "historical curiosity."[115]

Displacing Locke from a dominant place in histories of the revolutions of 1689 and 1776 mattered because, in political philosophy, he was *the* philosopher of liberalism. The late 1960s also saw the coincidence of a plethora of scholarly writing on Locke, with several polemical works lambasting contemporary liberalism.[116] Among the former was the pioneering contextual study of Dunn, which argued that, in fact, the religious complexion of Locke's politics made him virtually irrelevant to contemporary political theory.[117] Dunn attacked two leading schools of thought. Of the first, the mainstream "liberal interpretation," he was dismissive. While the *Two Treatises* was seen as the classic document in the "ideological self-realization of constitutionalist politics," this had largely come about because of the "mildly fortuitous" relationship of the work to the American Revolution. These arguments were disengaged and narrow; indeed, the traditional liberal account found it hard to present Locke as much more than "the pedlar of a few tired and jejune political nostrums" – political liberty, religious toleration, the right to the fruit of one's labour, liberty of the press and so on – which it did not really explain. "It is difficult to see … that the liberal reading offers much more than taxonomic facilities; it merely tells you what chapter in your history of political thought to put the man in."[118]

The second line of interpretation was more impressive and arose from scholars such as Strauss and Macpherson, who, as critics of liberalism and capitalism, saw Locke as incarnating the "authentic" spirit of both.[119] Dunn applied the scalpel to the latter's claim that Locke was the "dedicated apologist of the rising bourgeoisie." He accepted that Macpherson's arguments were often penetrating and that his discussion of property was a

"brilliant piece of analysis." Nevertheless, Locke did not disavow the obligations of charity and did not ascribe "greater moral rationality" to a life of unlimited capitalist appropriation than to a life of devout poverty.[120] Locke needed to be understood through the puritan idea of "the calling," whereas scholars like Macpherson and Strauss tended to see religion as a sort of polythene coating that could easily be cast aside. Locke would have been incapable of imagining a modern acquisitive society; indeed, there was a tension running through him which placed him firmly in his own time. He was sanguine about the oppressive features of his society and tolerated various forms of unfreedom at the same time as offering "strenuous championship of many different forms of liberty, most particularly liberty of conscience," where he could appear as a "doughty protagonist of 'liberalism'." Too often the former point was ignored so that Locke became "as good a liberal as the seventeenth century could turn out."[121] Dunn's point was tellingly proven in a review by Maurice Cranston entitled "Liberal, Yes; Calvinist, No." Most of the space was given over to Seliger's *Liberal Politics of Locke* and argued that Locke was "one of the first, as well as one of the greatest, philosophers of liberalism." Dunn, meanwhile, was dispatched in a paragraph that simply denied the core claim that Calvinism provided the clue to Locke's politics.[122]

Pocock was enormously influential in giving shape to the idea of "republicanism versus liberalism" even though his own position was much more intricate than generally recognised.[123] *The Machiavellian Moment* was published in 1975, but its core themes were outlined in an essay a decade earlier, which focused on what he then called "opposition" or "country" ideology but which was sometimes later called "republican" or "commonwealth."[124] From the early 1970s, this theme was explicitly linked to broader traditions of "classical republicanism" and "civic humanism"; he tended to prefer the latter term "in spite of the numerous objections made to it" and notwithstanding the American preference for "republicanism."[125] When it came to "liberalism," he explained in 1981 how the *Machiavellian Moment* "consistently displays republicanism as being at odds with liberalism."[126] That may well have been the intention – though it is arguable a more impelling concern was criticising Marxist historiography – but it is striking that the *language* of liberalism was markedly absent from his earlier works: there is nothing in the articles from the 1960s. Instead, it starts to appear from the turn of the 1970s in the context of thinking about ideology in America, and, even in the *Machiavellian Moment*, references to "liberalism" are sparing, appearing only five times and then only in the final chapter on "The Americanization of Virtue."[127] It was only *after* that book was published that Pocock became fixated on how "republicanism" related to "liberalism."[128] In a series of essays drafted between c. 1976 and c. 1980, he, in fact, offered two subtly different perspectives on the problem, which are revealing of some wider trends shaping the historiography of political thought. In the first phase, he wanted to show that the literature on early modern "liberalism" was riddled with errors and that placing "republicanism" – and the response to it – centre-stage was a more revealing way of understanding the development of modernity. In the second phase, however, he appeared to concede to recent revisionist work – much of it originating in Cambridge – that there was a distinct alternative early modern paradigm which *might* be described as "liberalism," but that there remained value in charting its interactions with "republicanism."

Pocock identified a problem with the "conventional wisdom" about liberalism. The story was that political theory became "liberal" at the time of Hobbes and Locke, that

it "obtained paradigmatic dominance" in the period between Locke and Smith and commanded the historical landscape until at least the arrival of Marx.[129] Pocock argued that "anti-liberals" were crucial in developing this story. In one camp was the "classical" school – generally "neoconservative and neo-Hellenic" – among whom he included Strauss, Voegelin, Arendt and Oakeshott, and in the other camp was the "socialist" school which was best represented by Macpherson, but also comprised Wolin, McWilliams and Lowi.[130] Pocock had little to say about the first group since he accused them of a "lofty indifference to history," while in the second group his main target was Macpherson.[131] What united both groups was the belief that liberalism was predicated on "indifference to virtue"; that an individual's "social being" was central and his "political being" largely irrelevant.[132] The "classical" school believed liberalism was about the primacy and protection of the private individual; government became impersonal and "paradoxically authoritarian in those areas from which it does not altogether abstain." The "socialist" school argued liberals turned man into an acquisitive or possessive individual and the state into a mere protector of rights.[133] Whether on the left or the right, the story of liberalism was of the "separation of the individual from the political, a triumph of the commercial, cultural, and social over the political," "the rise of the social to pre-eminence over the political … one of the cant usages of the term 'liberalism'."[134] Kariel's *Beyond Liberalism* was cited as a good instance of this simplistic worldview: it lumped Hobbes, Locke, Smith and Madison together as exponents of a liberalism in which justice and politics was about nothing more than the coordination of rational self-interest among individuals.[135] Pocock was especially struck by the similarities between the two groups: the ideal man of socialist theory, who was "engaged in historical praxis and theory," was a historicized version of classical man, "engaged in political action and contemplation."[136]

This account, Pocock believed, had become widely accepted by the 1970s. The critics of liberalism exaggerated its "paradigmatic control" by simplifying its arguments and antedating its emergence all the better to bolster their own case: that it peddled a "myth" of human personality stripped of its political bearings.[137] Yet, in doing so, they offered a historical "myth": many were trapped in a "clumsy" feudal-to-bourgeois scheme which meant they insisted there was already a rigid separation between the political and the social in the eighteenth century.[138] Pocock's aim was to expose and replace this "myth." First, he repeatedly assaulted the lodestone that was Locke: the *Two Treatises* was far too radical ever to serve as the official ideology of the Glorious Revolution,[139] but, more important, it was not an apologia for the bourgeoisie. Although he was involved in the re-coinage of 1696 and invested in the Bank of England, Locke did not feel any great need to defend the Financial Revolution from its critics. The terms of that debate turned on the language of virtue which simply did not interest him.[140] A better defender of the new world of "specialisation, speculation and exchange" was Defoe, the "first great ideologist" of the new Whig system. He was "was on the brink of depicting a people engrossed in their commercial and personal concerns, who maintained a constitutional system of government with a view to keeping their rulers in leading-strings by retaining the power of the purse." It was *this* which today would be called "liberalism."[141]

A second major theme was Pocock's explanation for the development of political economy.[142] The exponents of civic values were not concerned with the market as such, but with the way that the growth in public credit seemed to subject government

to the mercy of "passions, fantasy, and appetite." Defenders of the Financial Revolution accepted it needed to be placed on a more stable footing; they explored various ways in which "opinion" might regulate "credit" and how "passion" could be turned into "reason" to make egoism beneficial. The notion of "politeness" was contrasted with the figure of "virtue," who lived in an austere world without culture and commerce, but also with the slave of the "passions." The speculative man needed to moderate his passions so that they might be converted into "opinion, experience and interest."[143] The central point for Pocock was that "Whig modernism," as expressed in political economy, was in fact "an effective response to, and outgrowth of, neo-Harringtonian civic humanism."[144] This was a shift from the civic to the civil, from the political to the social: the specialisation of government was not a loss of liberty since individuals could strengthen their economic and cultural interests through the division of labour and exchange of goods. A stadial theory was developed to explain this development, and to show that the classical citizen was primitive compared with the modern. So, although Pocock recognised the anachronistic use of the word, he did see in this defence of modernity the lineaments of modern "liberalism."

The third element focused on America. Pocock was scathing about Hartz: the idea that America had to be Lockean because it had never been feudal was "laughable from the first."[145] More specifically, he wanted to challenge the idea that America was founded on an "encompassing liberal tradition": "a politics of liberal and capitalist individualism, a constitutionalist pluralism based on the legitimate interests of individuals and groups, a moral philosophy which substitutes interest and passion for reason and virtue."[146] Hartz had argued this paradigm dominated from the very beginning, whereas Wood argued for "a partial shift from republicanism to liberalism." Some interpreted Wood simply to be postponing the emergence of Lockean liberalism to the framing of the Constitution and to *The Federalist* Number 10. Pocock questioned all this. Whereas in Britain the civic paradigm never secured ascendancy, and court and country were held in creative tension with each other, in America there was no court tradition and hence country language endured beyond the putative "end of classical politics."[147] Indeed, republican concerns died hard: the reaction to Hamilton in the 1790s repeated earlier debates in England, and, in the minds of Jefferson and Madison, one could find "tensions between liberal and republican, Court and Country" which endured in public life.[148] There was, then, no consensual "liberal tradition" in America.

Critics of Pocock were uncertain whether he was "republican" or "liberal,"[149] whereas his real point was that our understanding of the latter would be enriched if, first, we ditched the misleading accounts of it proffered by Strauss and Macpherson, and second, if we saw it developing in reaction to the former. Ironically, at the same time, revisionist historiography was challenging the republican paradigm and reframing early modern liberalism, albeit rarely using that word. Pocock needed to face new histories no longer dependent on the shaky accounts of Strauss and Macpherson. The argument was stated most obviously in Duncan Forbes's review of *Machiavellian Moment*, which questioned whether the "republican tradition" might be a "meaningless free-for-all." More to the point, he noted that Andrew Jackson's famous outburst – "Damn Grotius! damn Pufendorf! damn Vattel!" – "appears to be the only reference in the book to the whole vast and complex and pervasive tradition of natural jurisprudence" which he judged of greater significance than civic humanism.[150] Over the next few

years, Skinner, Tuck and Tully developed further the claims of this tradition. Pocock was aware of the challenge this presented: discussing political economy and stadial history in 1978, he commented that natural jurisprudence now entered the story, "though there are scholars who would say that I ought to have been telling it in these terms all along."[151] He increasingly accepted that Tully and Forbes had shown that this tradition informed the theories of property in Locke and Hume, respectively, and he dwelt on Skinner's account of the emergence of subjective right in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. Concluding his review of that work, he anticipated that the forthcoming work of Tuck and Tully intimated "a massive revival of an interpretation of the seventeenth century from a viewpoint stressing jurisprudence and the resurgence of *ius gentium*, which Forbes has pitted against civic humanism as a key to the Scottish Enlightenment."[152]

Pocock's position on "liberalism" now became more ambivalent. There was value in restoring the juristic paradigm, but an obsessive focus on it tended to distort permutations which did not fit into it and to amplify "a tormented yet oddly triumphant entity by the name of liberalism."[153] Its focus on *ius* meant it was interested in the "possession, distribution and administration" of things; its concern with "mine and thine" and "to each his due" presented us "with possessive individualism in a form long predating early modern capitalism."[154] Here, its concept of liberty was negative since the citizen pursued his affairs under the law, while the civic version was positive since it expressed the Greek ideal of *vivere civile* where one ruled and was ruled. The juristic paradigm posited that the social came first and the political followed: individuals were defined as possessors, which gave them right and property in things, and then, in Locke, right and property in themselves.[155] Tuck was able to recount

> the classical history of what we have come to term liberalism: the story of how rights became the precondition, the occasion, and the effective cause of sovereignty, so that sovereignty appeared to be the creature of the rights it existed to protect. It is impossible to deny that this is the principal theme of the history of early modern political thought.[156]

Or, similarly,

> The child of jurisprudence is liberalism, in which the distinction between individual and sovereign remains, no matter how close the two are brought to one another; whereas republican virtue pertains immediately to the individual, not as proprietor or rights-bearer but as citizen, sharing self-rule among a number of equals.[157]

In passages such as these, Pocock seems to have conceded a good deal of ground to the "liberalism," which only a few years earlier he was keen to dismantle.

Still, he wanted to ensure that the juristic did not displace the civic, especially since the drift of recent work seemed to be doing exactly that. Writing the history of political thought as law was "largely equivalent to writing it as the history of liberalism," but in the early modern period the languages of virtue and right were largely incommensurate.[158] By the eighteenth century, however, things had changed. Whereas Forbes thought the civic of little consequence because Scottish social thought was "an evolution *within* a tradition of civil jurisprudence," Pocock wanted to see the civil and the civic in fruitful tension with each other. He claimed that "manners" helped redefine "virtue": a modern commercial society compensated the loss of ancient virtue with an enriched personality – albeit in social rather than political form – and modern natural law pioneered the stadial account of how "manners" developed.[159] Hence he could still argue that

"the liberal paradigm thus made its appearance in answer to the civic." Significantly, he also argued that different versions of humanism were supplying *not just* the restatement of classical virtue, *but also* the defence of commercial society. The latter was a humanist jurisprudence which was used against classical republicans and "to construct a liberalism which made the state's authority guarantee the liberty of the individual's social behaviour," but which also "had no intention whatever of impoverishing that behaviour by confining it to the rigorous assertion of ego-centred individual rights." Here, in the first of these claims, we now see acceptance of the early modern account of "liberalism" as explored in the jurisprudential paradigm, but, in the second, the continued rejection – at least before 1789 – of the reductive account of personality ascribed to liberalism by its critics. Indeed, the modernity of the eighteenth century – "the social and sentimental, the commercial and cultural" – in fact could proliferate with alternatives to ancient virtue *because* of the jurisprudential obsession with a universe of things.[160] The "liberalism" which to the mid-twentieth-century mind offered a pinched account of "rigorous individualism" and "self-interest" was, in the eighteenth century, a rich story of "sentiment, sympathy and passion … equipped to account for politeness, taste and transaction."[161]

Pocock, then, did *not* offer a simple choice between "republicanism" and "liberalism." Unfortunately, this was rarely appreciated: many of these articles appeared in specialist collections and were not brought together until 1985, and, in any case, historians enthused by "republicanism" rarely read his work thoroughly.[162] Indeed, just as Pocock was trying to complicate the relationship of the civil to the civic, Appleby was influentially strengthening the idea of a sharp polarity between "liberalism" and "republicanism."[163] As she later explained, her work was prompted in the late-1960s by a textbook which she was required to use for teaching. *The People Shall Judge* was published in 1949 and presented a "canon of liberal texts" to strengthen the education of democratic citizens. Nearly all the extracts were from American writers, but Hobbes, and especially Locke's *Second Treatise* – from which the title of the volume derived – formed a large part of the first section, while 40 pages from Smith's *Wealth of Nations* followed the heading "Problems of Economic Liberalism" in the fourth section.[164] Appleby's conceptions of liberalism were therefore derived from the textbook assumptions of the 1940s and 1950s. In her published work, she restated the importance of Lockeanism – indeed, has been credited with belonging to "a neo-Lockean counter-revisionist school of American history" – but Hartz was not a significant influence because of her opposition to his "consensus" approach.[165] Macpherson was much more important. She also drew on Karl Polanyi, who argued that, by the nineteenth century, economic laws were viewed as "natural forces" which could override "positive law, moral injunctions and personal choice"; the laws of commerce were the laws of nature and therefore the laws of God.[166] She wanted to explain how this idea – which she identified with Smith – had become normalised, and this took her back to the late seventeenth century, where, among merchant writers, she discovered ideas of a natural economic order that were "impervious to social engineering and political interference." She described these writers as "liberal" and judged Locke to be "a major milestone on the road to nineteenth-century liberalism."[167] There was little here that Laski would have objected to.

She then extended these ideas to America: if the colonies were obsessed with virtue, corruption and balance, where did "the aggressive individualism, the optimistic materialism, and the pragmatic interest-group politics" of the new nation come from? Where "are the roots of that liberalism which flowered so quickly after independence?" The answer was

that the economic ideas she had explored – which could be "characterized as liberal" – crossed the Atlantic just as republican ones did. Thus, one needed to understand "the extent to which liberal and classical republican thought presented ideological options to the Americans." The latter was anti-modern and anti-market and appealed to a gentry steeped in classical learning. By contrast, the former offered "simple – simplistic" ideas about human nature that appealed to the middle classes. "Deliverance from the strictures of classical republicanism came from the ideology of liberalism, from a belief in a natural harmony of benignly striving individuals saved from chaos by the stability worked into nature's own design."[168] By applying her work on the "economic liberals" of seventeenth-century England to eighteenth-century America, and by accepting – up to a point – the findings of Bailyn and Wood, Appleby was able to instantiate a stark binary choice between the republican and liberal worldviews. But more, she was also able to challenge consensus historians by interpreting that choice in class terms; hence, the ideological *and* social conflict of America was one of "republicanism versus liberalism."

5. Conclusion

The idea that republicanism and liberalism were mutually inconsistent binaries was a major theme in the 1980s. Thereafter, there was some pushback: scholars challenged the characterisations of each element of the binary and others argued there were significant overlaps between them.[169] This essay has argued that the binary was, in fact, a relatively recent construction, cobbled together in Anglo-American historiography because of the very specific trajectories taken by each of the core terms. In the first case, the content of early modern "liberalism" only fully took shape from the 1930s, and its most vocal articulators tended to be its "classical" or "socialist" critics. This negative account of "liberalism" increasingly tended to dominate by the 1960s and 1970s; some embraced it all the better to highlight its failings, while others took to "republicanism" as a corrective to it. An alternative strategy, however, was to rethink the dominant histories of liberalism; this can be seen in revisionist work on the natural law tradition, and also in reassessments of later liberalism.[170] In the second case, "republicanism" was not the monolith it sometimes appeared: it only acquired that name relatively late, and earlier work had recognised its complexity, had seen it as comparatively "liberal" and, in any case, thought its significance – at least in Britain – ought not to be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it proved useful in the American context from the late 1960s as part of the assault on "liberalism": although it only postponed the arrival of "Lockeanism," it still offered an alternative founding myth. Pocock – especially from the late 1970s – was trying to think more carefully about the relationships between different languages.[171] He also issued an important warning – similar to that of Wood on "boxlike categories" – when he noted that historians tended to think in terms of "one reigning paradigm at a time," whereas they needed instead to understand the complex tensions between them.[172] As this essay suggests, a further way of avoiding the trap of binaries is to probe the histories of their conjunctions, all the better to lift the historiographical fog.

Notes

1. See especially the works cited in Kalyvas and Katznelson, *Liberal Beginnings*, 1–2.
2. Wood, *Creation*, 606.

3. It should be stressed that Pocock's concern – and much of the debate explored here – is with what he called the "Atlantic Republic Tradition". Judith Shklar famously criticised him for a "little England" emphasis, which lost sight of republicanism as "a European ideology … a continuing trend in European radicalism", which culminated in the French Revolution. Shklar, "Review", 560–1.
4. See Rodgers, "Republicanism".
5. See especially Appleby, *Economic Thought*; Appleby, *Capitalism*; Appleby, "Republicanism"; Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism*.
6. Wood, *Creation*, xi.
7. Collini, "Postscript", 295.
8. See Bell, "What is Liberalism?", 70; Skinner, "Place of History".
9. Cited in Wootton, "Introduction", 1.
10. This is not to deny the growing salience of "liberal" language in the eighteenth century. See Craig, "The Language of Liberality".
11. Stanton, "John Locke", 597. See also Bell, "What is Liberalism?"; Gunnell, "Archaeology"; Collins, "Lost Historiography of Liberalism".
12. Bell, "What is Liberalism?", 73–81.
13. See Stanton, "John Locke", 601–6.
14. See, for example, the short bibliography of such surveys in Schapiro, *Liberalism*, 187–8.
15. Laski, "Rise of Liberalism", 103–24.
16. The word "European" was also dropped from the U.S. title.
17. Laski, *Rise of Liberalism*, 12, 58, 154, 156.
18. Ibid., 116. This image of Locke's state was also used in Laski, *Political Thought*, 50; Tawney, *Religion*, 192.
19. Laski, *Rise of Liberalism*, 115, 104–5.
20. Ibid., 161, 183, 196, 198.
21. See Lamb and Morrice, "Ideological Reconciliation", 795–810.
22. Dunn, *Political Thought of Locke*, 215. See also Tully, "After the Macpherson Thesis".
23. Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, 194, 196; Macpherson, "Social Bearing", 1.
24. Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, 195; Macpherson, "Social Bearing", 2.
25. See Gunnell, "Archaeology"; Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, chap. 5.
26. Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, 194, although Gunnell confuses the expansions of the second edition with the original first.
27. Watkins, *Political Tradition*, ix.
28. Sabine, *History*, 741.
29. Orton, *Liberal Tradition*, 3.
30. Ibid., 30, 35.
31. Watkins, *Political Tradition*, 91.
32. Orton, *Liberal Tradition*, 94, 96.
33. Ibid., 110–14, 116–18.
34. See Katznelson, *Desolation and Enlightenment*. On the difficulty of placing Arendt, see Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, 226.
35. Cited in James Chappel, "Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism", 590
36. Rosenblatt, *Lost History of Liberalism*, 270; Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, 213.
37. Hallowell, *Main Currents*, 358. For Schmitt, see also Hallowell, *Decline of Liberalism*, xi, 102–6, and for Maritain (and also Christopher Dawson), see Hallowell, *Main Currents*, 684–7, 748 n. 90.
38. Hallowell, *Main Currents*, 618, 622. See also Hallowell, "Modern Liberalism"; Hallowell, "Liberalism".
39. Hallowell, *Main Currents*, 89.
40. Ibid., 92.
41. Ibid., 110, 101–2, 107.
42. Ibid., 138.
43. Ibid., 113, 111, 114–15.

44. Neill, *Rise and Decline*, 51. Neill's debt to Hallowell is apparent in 24, 37, 236–9, 302. The historical sections on the period before 1800 are also heavily indebted to Laski, to the extent of lifting numerous quotation and passages, e.g. 7, 9, 16–18, 42, 44, 49, 56, 61–8, 72–3.
45. Voegelin, "Review", 108, 109.
46. Hallowell, "Editor's Preface", viii.
47. Hallowell, "Review", 538.
48. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 181–2.
49. Ibid., 165. For Strauss's relation to liberal democracy, see Zuckert and Zuckert, *The Truth about Leo Strauss*; Galston, "Leo Strauss's Qualified Embrace of Liberal Democracy".
50. Hallowell, "Review", 540–1.
51. See, for example, Laski, *Rise of Liberalism*, 163, 274 n. 2; Watkins, *Political Tradition*, 155–62; Neill, *Rise and Decline*, 67–8.
52. Laski, "Rise of Liberalism", 114.
53. Hallowell, *Main Currents*, 155, 150.
54. Berns, *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment*, 245–6; Diamond, "Democracy and *The Federalist*", 62. By 1988, Gordon Wood was remarking on the extent to which scholarship was shaped by students and followers of Strauss, but also arguing that "they are not in fact historians … They have no conception of the process of history". Wood, "The Fundamentalists and the Constitution".
55. Hartz does use the term "Lockian" – his preferred spelling – frequently. For actual uses of "Lockean liberalism" in 1955, see Grimes, *American Political Thought*, 260, 261, 444–5; Viereck, "The Rootless 'Roots'", 219, 221.
56. Hartz, *Economic Policy*, 24–5, 247, 251, 281.
57. Gunnell, "Archaeology", 131. Various influential texts in the 1940s argued that eighteenth-century America was "saturated" with Locke. See Miller, *Origins*, 492; Northrop, *East and West*, chap. 3.
58. Hulliung, "Louis Hartz", 17. For critical perspectives, see Kloppenberg, "Requiescat in Pacem", 90–124; Gunnell, "Louis Hartz", 196–205.
59. Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, 7.
60. Ibid., 42.
61. Ibid., 47–8.
62. Ibid., 71.
63. Ibid., 78, 81.
64. Ibid., 11, 62.
65. Stanton, "John Locke", 609; Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, 217.
66. Schapiro, *Liberalism*, 9, 3, 26.
67. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 293. He included Hallowell among the "Marxists, romantic conservatives, 'realists', and neo-orthodox theologians" that he blamed.
68. Ibid., 293–4.
69. It should also be noted historians were more sceptical of Hartz's arguments than political scientists: Kloppenberg, "Requiescat in Pacem", 94–6.
70. Miller, *New England Mind*, 296.
71. Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic*, 141.
72. Adair, "Intellectual Origins", i, ii.
73. Adair, "Review", 610, 612.
74. Editor's Note in Robbins, "Sidney's Discourses", 296n.
75. Ibid., 273. For Robbins relations with Adair, see Robbins, "Douglass Adair", xvii–xxiii.
76. See especially Adair, "To the Editor", 1048–52, which defended Robbins against what he saw as a dismissive review by Sabine.
77. Robbins, "The Strenuous Whig", 415; Robbins, "Brand Hollis", 241, 247. Bailyn also frequently used this term, and, in 1965, David L. Jacobson edited a selection of the writings of Gordon and Trenchard under the title *The English Libertarian Tradition*. This usage simply meant a concern with liberty, but it is striking that it was being criticised by the

early 1970s. Stourzh, *Alexander Hamilton*, 229 n. 99, argued that the word was an inappropriate way of indicating that Trenchard and Gordon were "to the left of Whig political thought".

78. Robbins, "Sidney's Discourses", 282, 295.
79. On radicalism, see Robbins, *Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, 4–7, and for some figures (Baron, Hollis, Pownall, Sawbridge and Macaulay) who were described as "republican", 260, 262, 311, 357–8, 360–1.
80. Ibid., 164, 91, 128, 129, 138, 153, 175, 151.
81. Ibid., 176, 196, 212, 218, 220, 199, 202.
82. Ibid., 249, 256, 257, 259, 238, 230, 294, 295, 330, 334, 332, 323.
83. Ibid., 378, 379.
84. Ibid., 382, 383–4.
85. Robbins, "Brand Hollis", 247.
86. Robbins, *Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, 20.
87. Savelle, "Review", 212; Seed, "Review", 106, 107.
88. Morgan, "Review", 158.
89. Robbins, "Review", 112, 113. A good instance of the diverse ways "liberalism" could be used is Alan Heimert's *Religion and the American Mind* of 1966, which was organised around an antithesis between Liberal and Calvinist positions in the eighteenth century. The former were the Arminian rationalists of the Old Light who were critical of the enthusiasm of the Great Awakening. However, against the received view, Heimert argued that the Liberals were elitist conservatives who used Locke to justify the status quo; they were at best very reluctant revolutionaries. However, it seems that these arguments had little impact on the emerging debate between "republicanism" and "liberalism" and would have to await renewed interest in religion in the 1990s. See, for example, Clark, *Language of Liberty*, who nevertheless thought the "category of 'Liberals', embracing Latitudinarians, rationalists, Arminians, and unitarians, is too inclusive and obscures the theological dynamics which induced many men in that category to countenance resistance" (36, n. 41).
90. See, for example, Colbourn, "Review", 610: Bailyn "makes no claims as a pathfinder".
91. Bailyn, "Political Experience", 343, 344.
92. Ibid., 351.
93. Fink, "Review", 590.
94. Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 45. See Gibson, "Louis Hartz", 156–7
95. Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 23.
96. Ibid., 26, 27, 30–1.
97. Ibid., 33.
98. Ibid., 34, 36.
99. Howe, "Gordon S. Wood", 569.
100. Wood, *Creation*, xvi.
101. Ibid., 14, 16, 17.
102. Ibid., chaps. 2–3.
103. The word "liberalism" only appears twice in the book. By the time he wrote his 1998 preface, he was arguing that he had overdrawn the contrast between it and republicanism, and preferred now to think of "republicanism transformed rather than supplanted by liberalism". Wood, *Creation*, x. See also Bailyn's later comments along the same lines in Ekirch, "Conversation with Bailyn", 649–50.
104. Wood, *Creation*, 595, 606.
105. Ibid., 601–2, 607.
106. Ibid., 609.
107. Ibid., 606.
108. Ibid., 562. Hartz is mentioned neither in the text nor bibliography.
109. See, for example, Smith, "Review", 126–8. More generally, Diggins, "Between Bailyn and Beard".
110. Woods, "Review", 103.

111. Shalhope, "Republican Synthesis", 60, 70, 73.
112. Ibid., 49; Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington", 551.
113. Laslett, "The English Revolution", 40–55.
114. Pole, "Anatomy", 232. See also Dunn, "Review", 478, which noted some "incautiously" expressed points about the influence of certain thinkers, "notably Locke", in Bailyn's *Ideological Origins*.
115. Dunn, "Politics of Locke", 73, 76. The extensive research base is discussed on 70 n.
116. Yolton, *John Locke*; Seliger, *Liberal Politics*; Wolff, *Poverty of Liberalism*; Lowi, *End of Liberalism*.
117. Dunn, *Political Thought of Locke*, x.
118. Ibid., 204, 205, 211.
119. Dunn, "Justice", 68.
120. Dunn, *Political Thought of Locke*, 5, 215n, 216, 217.
121. Ibid., 222, 238.
122. Cranston, "Liberal, Yes", 150.
123. For useful overviews of Pocock's contribution, see Shapiro, "Pocock's Republicanism"; Gunn, "Republic Virtue Reconsidered"; and, for a personal assessment from the vantage of 2003, see the Afterword in Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 553–84.
124. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington", 564–5; Pocock, "Virtue and Commerce", 120; Pocock, "1776", 75, 79.
125. Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 38; Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 252.
126. Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 55.
127. This chapter was a reworked and version of the 1972 review essay Pocock, "Virtue and Commerce". See Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog" and the Afterword in Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, for later comments.
128. Some of these essays were republished in *Virtue, Commerce and History* in 1985, but had their origins in the earlier period.
129. Pocock, "The Mobility of Property", 111. See also Pocock, "Authority and Property", 61; Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 47.
130. Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 70. See also Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 436n; Pocock, "Authority and Property", 60; Pocock, "Myth of Locke", 18–19; Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 243–4. The Afterword in Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 573, indicates that Arendt was an important influence, a theme pursued in Sonenscher, "Republican Historiography", 167–72.
131. Pocock, "The Myth of Locke", 19.
132. Ibid., 18.
133. Pocock, "Authority and Property", 60.
134. Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 70; Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 243–4.
135. Pocock, "The Myth of Locke", 19; Kariel, *Beyond Liberalism*, 5, 8. Kariel was an important critic of American pluralism: Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity*, 239–40.
136. Pocock, "The Myth of Locke", 21.
137. Pocock, "Mobility of Property", 111.
138. Pocock, "The Myth of Locke", 21.
139. See Pocock "Authority and Property", 64–6.
140. Pocock, "The Myth of Locke", 4–7, 9, 12–13, 17, 20–1. See also Pocock, "Authority and Property", 64–6; Pocock, "Mobility of Property", 108; Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 65, and the Afterword in Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 577–80.
141. Pocock, "Authority and Property", 67; Pocock, "Mobility of Property", 111.
142. See Walter, "Pocock's Political Economy".
143. Pocock, "Mobility of Property", 112, 113, 115
144. Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 66, 67.
145. Pocock, "Review", 827.
146. Pocock, "Virtue and Commerce", 127; Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 71.
147. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 523, 527, 508–9, 513.

148. Pocock, "*Machiavellian Moment* Revisited", 71. Pocock was undecided *which* decade the American debates of the 1790s repeated referring at various points to the 1670s, 1690s, 1720s and 1730s. See Pocock, "Virtue and Commerce", 130; Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 529; Pocock, "Authority and Property"; Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 239.
149. See Gunn, "Republican Virtue Reconsidered", 114–21.
150. Forbes, "Review", 554, 555.
151. Pocock, "Mobility of Property", 115. The original version of this essay makes it clear that he meant Forbes.
152. Ibid., 105; Pocock, "Reconstructing the Traditions", 112.
153. Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 38.
154. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 248–9; Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 44. This latter point was also stressed in Tully's review of Tuck's *Natural Rights Theories*: "anyone for fourteenth-century capitalism?"; Tully, "Current Thinking", 477.
155. Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 40–1, 45.
156. Ibid., 45.
157. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 249.
158. Pocock, "Virtue, Rights and Manners", 46, where Kelley, Tuck and Forbes were singled out, but Skinner explicitly excluded. See also Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 247, and also – as late as 2003 – the Afterword to Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 558–62.
159. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 246 (emphasis added), 250; Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 49.
160. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 241; Pocock, "Virtues, Rights and Manners", 50.
161. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 552; Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 244.
162. See Rodgers, "Republicanism", 16.
163. Pocock argued that her obsession with liberalism undermined her ability to locate works in the appropriate historical context, and that she seemed "unwilling or unable" to move out of the paradigm of liberal Lockeanism. Pocock, "To Market", 307. See also Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog", 344–6.
164. Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism*, 2.
165. Winch, "Economic Liberalism", 294; Hulliung, "What's Living", 268, 273 n. 2.
166. See Appleby, "Locke, Liberalism and Money", 43 (where she seems unaware the latter reference was actually from Burke). For other references to these writers, see Appleby, "Ideology and Theory", 512; Appleby, *Economic Thought*, 14–16, 132, 246, 256, 276.
167. Appleby, *Economic Thought*, 242, 251; Appleby, "Locke, Liberalism and Money", 44.
168. Appleby, "Social Origins", 937, 955, 956.
169. See, for example, Kalyvas and Katznelson, *Liberal Beginnings*.
170. In the latter case see, for example, Collini, *Liberalism and Sociology*; Freeden, *New Liberalism*.
171. A theme that would become more prominent in later writings, e.g. Pocock, "Varieties of Whiggism"; Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog",
172. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms", 244.

Notes on contributor

David Craig is Associate Professor of Modern British History at Durham University. He is the author of *Robert Southey and Romantic Apostasy* (2007) and editor, with James Thompson, of *Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (2013). He is currently working on a study of the language of "liberality" and "liberalism" in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Bibliography

Adair, Douglass. "The Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republicanism, the Class Struggle, and the Virtuous Farmer." *PhD diss.*, Yale University (1943).

Adair, Douglass. "Review of *The Classical Republicans* by Zera Fink." *William and Mary Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (1946): 610–612. doi:10.2307/1921912
Adair, Douglass. "To the Editor of the *American Historical Review*." *American Historical Review* 65, no. 4 (1960): 1048–1051.
Appleby, Joyce. "Ideology and Theory: The Tension Between Political and Economic Liberalism in Seventeenth-Century England." *The American Historical Review* 81, no. 3 (1976): 499–515. doi:10.2307/1852421
Appleby, Joyce. "Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money." *Past & Present* 71 (1976): 43–69. doi:10.1093/past/71.1.43
Appleby, Joyce. *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Appleby, Joyce. "The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology." *The Journal of American History* 64, no. 4 (1978): 935–958. doi:10.2307/1890731
Appleby, Joyce. *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s*. New York: New York University Press, 1984.
Appleby, Joyce. "Republicanism and Ideology." *American Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (1985): 461–473. doi:10.2307/2712577
Appleby, Joyce. *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Bailyn, Bernard. "Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America." *The American Historical Review* 67, no. 2 (1962): 339–351. doi:10.2307/1843427
Bailyn, Bernard. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Bell, Duncan. "What is Liberalism?" In *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire*, edited by D. Bell, Chap. 3, 62–90. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Berns, Walter. *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.
Chappel, James. "The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe." *Modern Intellectual History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 561–590. doi:10.1017/S1479244311000357
Clark, J. C. D. *The Language of Liberty: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Colbourn, H. "Trevor. Review of *American Independence* by Thomas Adams and *Pamphlets of the American Revolution* Edited by Bernard Bailyn." *Journal of American History* 52, no. 3 (1965): 609–611. doi:10.2307/1890853
Collini, Stefan. *Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England, 1880–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Collini, Stefan. "Postscript. Disciplines, Canons and Publics: The History of 'The History of Political Thought' in Comparative Perspective." In *The History of Political Thought in National Context*, edited by Dario Castiglione, and Iain Hampsher-Monk, 280–302. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Collins, Jeffrey R. "The Lost Historiography of Liberalism." *Review of Politics* 81, no. 4 (2019): 673–688. doi:10.1017/S0034670519000354
Craig, David. "The Language of Liberality in Britain, c. 1760-c.1815." *Modern Intellectual History* 16, no. 3 (2019): 771–801. doi:10.1017/S1479244317000610
Cranston, Maurice. "Liberal,: Yes; Calvinist, No." *Times Literary Supplement* 3494 (13 Feb 1969): 150.
Diamond, Martin. "Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent." *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 52–68. doi:10.2307/1951730
Diggins, John Patrick. "Between Bailyn and Beard: The Perspectives of Gordon S. Wood." *William and Mary Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (1987): 563–568. doi:10.2307/1939773
Dunn, John. "Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Political Theory." *Political Studies* 16, no. 1 (1968): 68–87. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1968.tb01444.x
Dunn, John. "Review of *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* by Bernard Bailyn." *History* 53, no. 179 (1968): 477–478.

Dunn, John. *The Political Thought of Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the Two Treatises of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Dunn, John. "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century." In *Political Obligation in its Historical Context*, edited by J. Dunn, Chap. 4, 53–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Ekirch, A. Roger. "Sometimes an Art: Never a Science, Always a Craft: A Conversation with Bernard Bailyn." *William and Mary Quarterly* 51, no. 4 (1994): 625–658. doi:10.2307/2946922
Fink, Z. S. "Review of *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* by Bernard Bailyn." *Historical Journal* 11, no. 3 (1968): 588–590. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00001746
Forbes, Duncan. "Review of *The Machiavellian Moment* by J. G. A. Pocock." *Historical Journal* 19, no. 2 (1976): 553–555. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00010347
Freeden, Michael. *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Galston, William A. "Leo Strauss's Qualified Embrace of Liberal Democracy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss*, edited by Stephen B. Smith, 193–214. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Gibson, Alan. "Louis Hartz and the Study of the American Founding: The Search for New Fundamental Categories." In *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*, edited by Mark Hulliung, 149–183. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
Grimes, Alan. *American Political Thought*. New York: Holt, 1955.
Gunn, J. A. W. "Republican Virtue Reconsidered, or a Sop to Cerebus." In *The Political Imagination in History: Essays Concerning J. G. A. Pocock*, edited by D. N. DeLuna, 101–128. Baltimore: Owlworks, 2006.
Gunnell, John G. "The Archaeology of American Liberalism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 125–145. doi:10.1080/13569310120053821
Gunnell, John G. *Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004.
Gunnell, John G. "Louis Hartz and the Liberal Metaphor: A Half-Century Later." *Studies in American Political Development* 19, no. 2 (2005): 196–205. doi:10.1017/S0898588X0500012X
Hallowell, John H. *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943.
Hallowell, John H. "Modern Liberalism: An Invitation to Suicide." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (1947): 453–466.
Hallowell, John H. *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*. New York: Holt, 1950.
Hallowell, John H. "Review of *Natural Right and History* by Leo Strauss." *American Political Science Review* 48, no. 2 (1954): 538–541. doi:10.2307/1951211
Hallowell, John H. "Liberalism." In *New Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. VIII*, edited by William J. McDonald, 701–706. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1967.
Hallowell, John H. "Editor's Preface." In, *from Enlightenment to Revolution*, edited by Eric Voegelin, and John H. Hallowell, vii–vix. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975.
Hartz, Louis. *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania 1776–1860*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948.
Hartz, Louis. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955.
Howe, John. "Gordon S. Wood and the Analysis of Political Culture in the American Revolutionary Era." *William and Mary Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (1987): 569–575. doi:10.2307/1939774
Hulliung, Mark. "Afterword: What's Living, What's Dead, in the Work of Louis Hartz." In *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*, edited by Mark Hulliung, 267–274. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
Hulliung, Mark. "Louis Hartz, His Day and Ours." In *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*, edited by Mark Hulliung, 11–54. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.

Kalyvas, Andreas, and Ira Katznelson. *Liberal Beginnings: Making A Republic for the Moderns*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Kariel, Henry S. *Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow*. San Francisco: Chandler and Sharp, 1977.
Katznelson, Ira. *Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge After Total War, Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Kloppenberg, James T. "*Requiescat in Pacem*: The Liberal Tradition of Louis Hartz." In *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*, edited by Mark Hulliung, 90–124. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
Lamb, Peter, and David Morrice. "Ideological Reconciliation in the Thought of Harold Laski and C. B. Macpherson." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (2002): 795–810. doi:10.1017/S000842390277844X
Laski, Harold J. "The Rise of Liberalism." In *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol 1*, edited by E. R. A. Seligman, 103–124. London: Macmillan, 1930.
Laski, Harold J. *Political Thought in England: From Locke to Bentham*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.
Laski, Harold J. *The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936.
Laslett, Peter. "The English Revolution and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government'." *Cambridge Historical Journal* 12, no. 1 (1956): 40–55. doi:10.1017/S1474691300000329
Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority*. New York: Norton, 1969.
Macpherson, C. B. "The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory." *Western Political Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1954): 1–22. doi:10.1177/106591295400700101
Macpherson, C. B. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
Miller, John C. *Origins of the American Revolution*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943.
Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.
Morgan, Edmund S. "Review of *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* by Caroline Robbins." *Journal of Modern History* 32, no. 2 (1960): 158. doi:10.1086/238478
Neill, Thomas P. *The Rise and Decline of Liberalism*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1953.
Northrop, F. S. C. *The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding*. New York: Macmillan, 1947.
Orton, William Aylott. *The Liberal Tradition: A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945.
Pocock, J. G. A. "Machiavelli: Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century." *William and Mary Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (1965): 549–583. doi:10.2307/1922910
Pocock, J. G. A. "Review of *Myth and Reality in Late Eighteenth Century British Politics* by Ian R. Christie." *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 826–827. doi:10.2307/1955558
Pocock, J. G. A. "Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 3, no. 1 (1972): 119–134. doi:10.2307/202465
Pocock, J. G. A. "Reconstructing the Traditions: Quentin Skinner's Historians' History of Political Thought." *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 3, no. 3 (1979): 95–113.
Pocock, J. G. A. "To Market: To Market: Economic Thought in Early Modern England." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 10, no. 2 (1979): 303–309. doi:10.2307/203340
Pocock, J. G. A. "The Myth of John Locke and the Obsession with Liberalism." In *John Locke: Papers Read at a Clark Library Seminar 10 December 1977*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, and Richard Ashcraft, 3–24. Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1980.
Pocock, J. G. A. "The *Machiavellian Moment* Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology." *Journal of Modern History* 53, no. 1 (1981): 49–72. doi:10.1086/242241
Pocock, J. G. A. "Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations Between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century Social Thought." In *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the*

Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Istvan Hont, and Michael Ignatieff, 235–252. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Pocock, J. G. A. "Authority and Property: The Question of Liberal Origins." In *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Chap. 3, 51–71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pocock, J. G. A. "The Mobility of Property and the Rise of Eighteenth-Century Sociology." In *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Chap. 6, 103–123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pocock, J. G. A. "1776: The Revolution Against Parliament." In *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Chap. 4, 73–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pocock, J. G. A. "The Varieties of Whiggism from Exclusion to Reform: A History of Ideology and Discourse." In *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Chap. 11, 215–310. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pocock, J. G. A. "Virtues, Rights, and Manners." In *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Chap. 2, 37–50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pocock, J. G. A. "Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the *Ideologia Americana*." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, no. 2 (1987): 325–346. doi:10.2307/2709561
Pocock, J. G. A. *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Pole, J. R. "An Anatomy of the American Whig." *Historical Journal* 9, no. 2 (1966): 229–236. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00026546
Robbins, Caroline. "Algernon Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government*: Textbook of Revolution." *William and Mary Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (1947): 267–296. doi:10.2307/1917334
Robbins, Caroline. "The Strenuous Whig: Thomas Hollis of Lincoln's Inn." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1950): 406–453. doi:10.2307/1917230
Robbins, Caroline. "Thomas Brand Hollis (1719–1804): English Admirer of Franklin and Intimate of John Adams." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 97, no. 3 (1953): 239–247.
Robbins, Caroline. *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II Until the War with the Thirteen Colonies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959.
Robbins, Caroline. "Review of *Early English Liberalism* by George L. Cherry." *The American Historical Review* 69, no. 1 (1963): 112–113. doi:10.2307/1904439
Robbins, Caroline. "Douglass Adair: A Personal Memoir." In *Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair*, edited by Trevor Colbourn, xvii–xxiii. New York: Norton, 1974.
Rodgers, Daniel T. "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept." *The Journal of American History* 79, no. 1 (1992): 11–38. doi:10.2307/2078466
Rosenblatt, Helena. *The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Rossiter, Clinton. *Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953.
Sabine, George H. *A History of Political Theory*. 2nd ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950.
Savelle, Max. "Review of *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* by Caroline Robbins." *The Historian* 22, no. 2 (1960): 212–213.
Schapiro, J. Salwyn. *Liberalism: Its Meaning and History*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958.
Seed, Geoffrey. "Review of *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* by Caroline Robbins." *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 84, no. 1 (1960): 106–108.
Seliger, Martin. *The Liberal Politics of John Locke*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968.

Shalhope, Robert E. "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (1972): 49–80. doi:10.2307/1921327
Shapiro, Ian. "J. G. A. Pocock's Republicanism and Political Theory: A Critique and Reinterpretation." *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society* 4, no. 3 (1990): 433–471.
Shklar, Judith N. "Review of *The Political Works of James Harrington*, Edited by J.G.A. Pocock." *Political Theory* 6, no. 4 (1978): 558–561. doi:10.1177/009059177800600409
Skinner, Quentin. "The Place of History in Public Life." *History & Policy* Papers, no. 35, Dec 2005: www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-35.html.
Smith, Page. "Review of *The Creation of the American Republic* by Gordon S. Wood." *The Journal of American History* 57, no. 1 (1970): 126–128. doi:10.2307/1900564
Sonenscher, Michael. "Liberty, Autonomy and Republican Historiography: Civic Humanism in Context." In *Markets, Morals, Politics: Jealousy of Trade and the History of Political Thought*, edited by Béla Kapossy, Isaac Nakhimovsky, Sophus A. Reinert, and Richard Whatmore, 161–210. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.
Stanton, Timothy. "John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism." *The Historical Journal* 61, no. 3 (2018): 597–622. doi:10.1017/S0018246X17000450
Stourzh, Gerald. *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.
Strauss, Leo. *Natural Right and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Tawney, R. H. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study*. London: Penguin Books, 1984.
Tully, James. "Current Thinking About Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Political Theory." *The Historical Journal* 24, no. 2 (1981): 475–484. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00005586
Tully, James. "After the Macpherson Thesis." In *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts*, edited by J. Tully, Chap. 2, 71–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Viereck, Peter. "The Rootless 'Roots': Defects in the New Conservatism." *The Antioch Review* 15, no. 2 (1955): 217–229. doi:10.2307/4609791
Voegelin, Eric. "Review of *The Decline of Liberalism* by John H. Hallowell." *The Journal of Politics* 6, no. 1 (1944): 107–109. doi:10.2307/2125360
Walter, Ryan. "The Economy and Pocock's Political Economy." *History of European Ideas* 34, no. 3 (2008): 334–344. doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2007.12.010
Watkins, Frederick. *The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948.
Winch, Donald. "Economic Liberalism as Ideology: The Appleby Version." *The Economic History Review* 38, no. 2 (1985): 287–297. doi:10.2307/2597149
Wolff, Robert Paul. *The Poverty of Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
Wolin, Sheldon S. *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.
Wood, Gordon S. *The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787*. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Wood, Gordon S. "The Fundamentalists and the Constitution." *New York Review of Books* 35 (1988): 33–40.
Woods, John A. "Review of *The Creation of the American Republic* by Gordon S. Wood." *Journal of American Studies* 5, no. 1 (1971): 103–107. doi:10.1017/S0021875800000645
Wootton, David. "Introduction: The Republican Tradition – from Commonwealth to Common Sense." In *Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649–1776*, edited by David Wootton, 1–41. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Yolton, John William. In *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Zuckert, Catherine H., and Michael P. Zuckert. *The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.