

# The Politics of Race and the Future of British Political History

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## Abstract

This article addresses the field of British political history's blind spot when it comes to race. Where modern British political historians are comfortable approaching politics in 'high' and 'popular' forms as well as in terms of ideas, institutions and policy, they often struggle even to see a politics of race in operation. Using examples drawn from research on the post-1945 history of the white supremacist movement in Britain, this article maintains that the means to render race visible in the political history of modern Britain lies in the incorporation of previously overlooked perspectives. In search of these perspectives, it looks to black British history and critical studies of race. In particular, it highlights analyses and critiques of British racism by black political activists, from those who organised in response to the 1959 murder of Kelso Cochrane, to the Black Power groups of the 1970s.

**Keywords:** Black Power, fascism, white supremacism, white supremacy

PUBLISHED IN 2018, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History* was conceived with the 'future' of the study of 'Britain's political past' in mind. It contains thirty-two chapters (plus an introduction) on everything from high politics to popular politics and from political ideas to institutions and policy. However, it is silent on the subject of race.<sup>1</sup> Its discussion of related historical issues is not much better; empire features in one chapter on imperial policy and in a few mentions of tariff reform. *The Oxford Handbook* presents a version of British political history in which people of colour played little part and in which racism was the pastime of 'fringe parties' which did not trouble Britain's robust parliamentary democracy.<sup>2</sup> These omissions are all the more galling when one considers that it was published in the same year as the Royal Historical Society's *Race, Ethnicity & Equality in UK History* report, which identified several deep deficiencies within the discipline of

history, including the lack of diversity in curricula, academic staff and students.<sup>3</sup> *The Oxford Handbook* provides a contemporary illustration of these deficiencies in the field of British political history.

I do not identify as a political historian of Britain, but rather as a historian interested in political ideas or—at a push—as a historian of political culture. This is because I am suspicious of the field. As in *The Oxford Handbook*, I so rarely see practitioners working within the field of 'political history' pay much attention to race in the course of their work. In this article, I argue that the future of British political history lies in confronting and working through its blind spot concerning the politics of race. Using examples drawn from my own research on the post-1945 white supremacist movement in Britain, this article renders race visible in the political history of modern Britain by incorporating previously overlooked perspectives—in this case, black British history and critical studies of race.

<sup>1</sup>D. Brown, G. Pentland and R. Crowcroft, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History*, 1800–2000, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>S. C. Smith, 'Imperial policy'; and K. Morgan, "'Third' and fringe parties', in Brown, et al., *Oxford Handbook*, pp. 349, 352–353, 354, 508–24.

<sup>3</sup>H. Atkinson, S. Bardgett, A. Budd, M. Finn, C. Kissane, S. Qureshi, J. Saha, J. Siblon and S. Sivasundaram, *Race, Ethnicity & Equality in UK History: A Report and Resource for Change*, London, Royal Historical Society, 2018.

## Political history and 'methodological whiteness'

The field of British political history is, to borrow a concept from the sociologist Gurinder K. Bhambra, 'methodologically white'; that is, its practitioners largely reflect on the world in a way 'that fails to acknowledge the role played by race in the very structuring of that world, and the ways in which knowledge is constructed and legitimated within it.' Moreover, '[i]t fails to recognise the dominance of "whiteness" as anything other than the standard state of affairs and treats a limited perspective—that deriving from white experience—as universal.'<sup>4</sup> All too often it struggles even to *see* a politics of race in operation.

Black history and critical studies of race, inspired by the work of black scholars from W. E. B. Du Bois onwards, offer an antidote to 'methodological whiteness' and the means to render the politics of race visible. The perspectives of black thinkers, activists and 'ordinary' black people are important because they did not have the privilege of *not* seeing the politics of race; they experienced British citizenship and society differently because of the ways in which they were racialised by the state, other institutions and wider society.

I became interested in these perspectives in my earlier research on the relationship between British fascism and imperialism. There is a tendency to approach expressions or manifestations of racism in British political history as a series of 'flashpoints'; as marginal or incidental intrusions into British politics, rather than as a feature of British political culture. As Alana Lentin recently outlined, part of the problem with contemporary understandings of 'racism' is that racism is commonly understood separately from historical and sociological analyses of 'race'. Drawing on the work of Stuart Hall and other scholars, Lentin defines 'race' as a discursive system for the classification and management of human difference, for 'the production, reproduction, and maintenance of white supremacy on both a local and planetary

scale'. Lentin locates the roots of 'race' in the history of early-modern Europe, in particular, the moment of the European colonial encounter with non-European peoples. Racism, then, is usefully defined as 'beliefs, attitudes, ideas and morals' that build on these racial classifications and constructions of human difference.<sup>5</sup> To call a particular expression or manifestation of politics or political violence 'racist' is to argue that it is motivated or conditioned by such understandings.

Historians of postwar Britain tend either to overlook British fascism entirely or to assign it a mere bit-part in discussions of ethnicity and immigration. To cite a few examples: Jeremy Black's *Britain since the Seventies* barely mentions the National Front or the British National Party and features scant and superficial discussions of racism and immigration. Brian Harrison's two volumes on postwar British history, *Seeking a Role* and *Finding a Role?*, are not much better. Harrison briefly discusses the National Front's failure to convert anti-immigrant sentiment into votes and the Front's decline from the late 1970s, after Thatcher denied them political space by appropriating their racism. In both volumes, he is quick to defend opponents of immigration from charges of racism and fascism, for instance, asserting that Enoch Powell's 'outlook could hardly have been further away' from that of Britain's fascists. Pat Thane's *A Divided Kingdom* is marginally better, featuring a brief discussion of the National Front and of the campaigns of Oswald Mosley's Union Movement around the 1958 Notting Hill racist riots. But again, Thane measures their impact by electoral results, concluding that the lost deposits of white supremacist candidates 'suggests that extreme racists were a minority'.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup>A. Lentin, *Why Race Still Matters*, Cambridge, Polity, 2020, pp. 11, 13; S. Hall, 'Race—the sliding signifier', in K. Mercer, ed., *The Fateful Triangle: Race, Ethnicity, Nation*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017, pp. 32–33, 53–55.

<sup>6</sup>J. Black, *Britain since the Seventies: Politics and Society in the Consumer Age*, London, Reaktion Books, 2004, p. 180; B. Harrison, *Finding a Role? The United Kingdom 1970–1990*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 201–204; B. Harrison, *Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom 1951–1970*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 218–219, 221–222; P. Thane, *Divided Kingdom: A History of Britain, 1900 to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 236–237, 289, 340, 341.

<sup>4</sup>G. K. Bhambra, 'Why are the white working classes still being held responsible for Brexit and Trump?', LSE Blogs, 10 November 2017; <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/10/why-are-the-white-working-classes-still-being-held-responsible-for-brexit-and-trump/>.

Black thinkers have consistently rejected the idea that fascism was a minor political phenomenon, disconnected from 'mainstream' political thought. Cedric Robinson, for example, has examined 'a Black construction of fascism concealed by the general inattention to critical Black political thought in academic circles'. Focussing primarily on inter-war African American history, Robinson maintained that the black 'masses' formulated a 'theory' of fascism out of their own 'common discourse' and historical experience. What distinguished the 'black' theory of fascism was its marked refusal to treat fascism—with its 'militarism, imperialism, racist authoritarianism, choreographed mob violence, millenarian crypto-Christian mysticism and a nostalgic nationalism'—as any more of 'an historical aberration than colonialism, the slave trade, and slavery'.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, fascism was to be understood primarily as a form of white supremacy, intimately connected to other forms, systems and ideologies of racist domination. This stands in contrast to what Robinson called the conceited and 'euphonious recital of fascism' in both public and academic history, in which fascism appears as 'the "damned" historical identity which the West almost assumed but ultimately rejected.'

### 'Keep Britain white': white supremacist organisations in postwar Britain

Especially in Britain, the construction of fascism as the vanquished foe is tied to the popular memory of the Second World War and thus carries a lot of political and emotional resonance. Black radical analyses of fascism dispel these national myths and render fascism familiar. Though it is rarely approached in these terms, British fascism *was* Britain's resident white supremacist movement. Drawing on insights from critical studies of race and empire, I have argued elsewhere that inter-war British fascism should not be seen simply as a movement of politically irrelevant Hitler-

worshippers, but as a manifestation of a very particular British political tradition.<sup>8</sup> British fascists represented the most ignominious inheritors of this tradition which held that British imperialism—as an ethos as well as a political system—was the antidote to the problems of the British metropole.

As we have seen, discussion of white supremacist organisations in studies of British political history after 1945 focus largely on their derisory performance in elections. However, electioneering was never the only form of political activity in which the white supremacist movement engaged. Treating electoral success as the only or most important measure of impact fundamentally misunderstands the part that white supremacist organisations have played in the politics of race in Britain. The quest to win votes was no more important—and was, in some cases, less important—than the execution and promotion of racist violence. To ignore this form of political activity and expression is to ignore its victims as well as its broader implications for British politics, society and culture.

Founded in 1948, Oswald Mosley's Union Movement (UM) was the postwar successor to his inter-war British Union of Fascists. The UM promoted plans for an intensification of European colonialism in Africa and was one of the first political organisations in Britain to campaign against non-white Commonwealth migration following the Second World War. Other small groups mounted similar campaigns over the course of the 1950s, including the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL), the White Defence League (WDL) and the National Labour Party (NLP).<sup>9</sup> The UM differed from these in its much more frequent attempts to contest elections. Like the LEL,

<sup>8</sup>L. J. Liburd, 'Beyond the pale: whiteness, masculinity and empire in the British Union of Fascists, 1932–1940', *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2018, pp. 275–296; L. J. Liburd, 'Thinking imperially: the British Fascists and the politics of empire, 1923–35', *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 32, no. 1, 2021, pp. 46–67.

<sup>9</sup>L. J. Liburd, 'White against empire: immigration, decolonisation and Britain's radical right, 1954–1967', in J. Doble, L. J. Liburd and E. Parker, *British Culture After Empire: Race, Decolonisation and Migration since 1945*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2023, pp. 127–146.

<sup>7</sup>C. J. Robinson, 'Fascism and the responses of black radical theorists' [1990], in H. L. T. Quan, ed., *Cedric J. Robinson: On Racial Capitalism, Black Internationalism and Cultures of Resistance*, London, Pluto Press, 2018, pp. 149, 152.

WDL and NLP, the UM was on the ground in Notting Hill shortly before, during and after the racist riots in 1958.

UM activists were directly involved in stirring up racial antagonism and Mosley attempted to make political capital by standing as a candidate in North Kensington for the 1959 election. In the event, he lost badly and failed to secure his deposit. But emphasising lost deposits and the UM's relatively small membership fails to capture the threat it posed to black Britons. In the accounts left by black residents of Notting Hill, what resonates is not the UM's electoral record, but the threat of violence it posed. UM activists feature in several contemporary accounts of the 1958 riots, including in local press reports covering some of the worst of the rioting outside the Latimer Road underground station on the evening of 1 September. There, Jeffrey Hamm, the UM's secretary, addressed a crowd of 700 people.<sup>10</sup> As a local paper recounted:

In the middle of a mob of screaming, jeering youths and adults, a speaker from the Union Movement was urging his excited audience to "get rid of them (the coloured people)." ... Suddenly hundreds of leaflets were thrown over the crowd, a fierce cry rent the air and the mob rushed off in the direction of Latimer Road shouting, "Kill the niggers!"<sup>11</sup>

Like the other white supremacist organisations active in Notting Hill, Mosley's UM did not disappear in the aftermath of the riots. In 1959, an Antiguan carpenter named Kelso Cochrane was fatally stabbed in the middle of a street in North Kensington by a group of white youths. The case was never definitively solved, but rumours circulated that the killer had been a UM member.<sup>12</sup>

The field of British political history has historically not acknowledged the scale, impact or prevalence of racist violence in Britain. Keeping this in mind, we might ask: how would a political historian approach the Notting Hill riots or the murder of Cochrane?

How would they assess the UM's impact in relation to them? Perhaps they would look for signs of the involvement of paid-up UM members, but we do not know how many paid-up UM members participated in the Notting Hill riots, nor do we know for certain whether Cochrane's murderer was a Mosleyite. Nor, in any case, do we possess credible membership lists.

The response of Britain's black community to Cochrane's murder offers some suggestions for how historians should approach and understand racist political violence. In response to Cochrane's murder, a defence campaign was mounted by Claudia Jones, editor of *The West Indian Gazette*; the veteran anti-racist and anti-colonial campaigner, Amy Ashwood Garvey; the aspiring Black politician, Dr David Pitt; and several other activists and organisations. The campaign focussed on the acceleratory impact that small white supremacist organisations had on the larger issue of racism and racist violence. Their campaigns in support of the victims of the riot, in response to Cochrane's murder and, a short time later, against the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, offer historians a more joined-up and complex understanding of how race operated in British politics. These activists did not conceive of white supremacist street racism as separate from 'spontaneous' acts of racism by politically unaffiliated white Britons or from the British state's attempts to disenfranchise Commonwealth citizens of colour for the very reason that they themselves did not experience these phenomena separately.

The decade or so that followed Notting Hill was a period of increasing racist political violence involving state institutions, wider society and Britain's white supremacist movement, which, by the early 1970s, was dominated by the National Front (NF). A more militant black politics arose in response. The British manifestation of 'Black Power' articulated, in even more strident terms, the ways in which the racist violence of white supremacist organisations was not detached from the wider experience of structural and institutional racism in Britain, or from the country's colonial history. From the mid-to-late 1960s, the growth of this movement was accelerated by visits to Britain by African American activists and political thinkers like Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and James Baldwin. Black Power in Britain developed into

<sup>10</sup>E. Pilkington, *Beyond the Mother Country: West Indians and the Notting Hill Riots*, London, I. B. Tauris, 1988, p. 118.

<sup>11</sup>C. Eales, 'Witness to violence', *The Kensington News and West London Times*, 5 September 1958, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>M. Olden, *Murder in Notting Hill*, Winchester & Washington, Zero Books, 2011, pp. 71–73.



a 'protean', 'varied' and nationwide movement, comprising a range of organisations (the best archived of which existed mostly in London) and a vibrant black political press.<sup>13</sup>

The black political press of the 1970s contains important insights for the political historian. Its contents speak to a very different, racialised experience of British politics and society than that experienced by white citizens. Organisations like the Black Panther Movement (BPM), the Black Liberation Front (BLF), the Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP) and other bodies conveyed the scale and unrelenting frequency with which black Britons faced racist violence, something rarely covered by the popular press. Black periodicals carried regular reports of fire-bomb attacks, police harassment and violent racist assaults.

However, they understood all these individual incidents as part of a broader politics of race. As the BPM's *Black People's News Service* outlined: 'institutional and individual forms of racism always work together. One cannot exist without the other.' It was in these terms that they understood the spate of petrol bombings of black homes and community spaces in the 1970s. Articles in the BUFP's *Black Voice* alleged that the dual assault of individual and institutional racism amounted to a genocidal plot against black people.<sup>14</sup> They contextualised this alleged plot alongside Cochrane's murder in 1959, the violence of settler colonialism in Australia and America, and even the Holocaust. In another *Black Voice* article from the late 1970s, the despairing author struggled to distinguish between the NF and their professed opponents in the world of democratic, parliamentary politics:

Our children in E.S.N. [Educational Special Needs] schools; our youth in prisons; many of our people in mental institutions; steralization [sic] without consent of many black women; constant harassment and racist oppression every hour of the day, all this being carried

out by those in power who want us to believe that they are different from the N.F.<sup>15</sup>

Unable to distinguish between fascism and democracy *in practice*, Black Power organisations and periodicals regularly applied the terms 'fascist' and 'fascism' to everything from Britain's self-described fascist movement to the racism of the police and the judiciary. In their expansive use of the term, they were not merely brandishing fascism as a rhetorical epithet, but advancing a more joined-up political analysis of, and argument about, the nature of racism in Britain. Inspired by the anti-'fascism' of African American activists like George Jackson and Angela Davis, they expressed a similar black theory of fascism to that of Cedric Robinson.<sup>16</sup> Their point was that, regardless of whether racist violence was carried out by uniformed agents of the state, NF activists, or unaffiliated members of the public, its meaning and effect was essentially the same. These acts collectively (re-)asserted a conception of Britain as a 'white' space.

In most cases, contributors to the black press would not have known whether the individuals they referred to were members of fascist organisations. In any case, the boundary between card-carrying and non-card-carrying white supremacists was very porous. In their refusal to treat white supremacist organisations as an isolated problem, Black Power activists were also attentive to the actual connections between white supremacist organisations and wider society. Their papers carried warnings about known members of the NF working in schools, accusations of collusion between British police officers and the NF, and the extensive infiltration of the prison service by NF members and sympathisers.<sup>17</sup> This suggests a literal as well as figurative continuum of racist repression in which the extra-parliamentary racism of the NF

<sup>13</sup>R. Waters, *Thinking Black: Britain, 1964–1985*, Oakland CA, University of California Press, 2019, pp. 34, 35, 61.

<sup>14</sup>'The meaning of racism', *Black People's News Service*, February 1971, p. 2; 'The bombing', *Black Voice*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1971, p. 5; 'Genocide—the plot—the crimes', *Black Voice*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1971.

<sup>15</sup>'Is there any difference?', *Black Voice*, vol. 9, no. 1, n.d., p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>A. Toscano, 'Incipient fascism: black radical perspectives', *CLCLWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture*, vol. 23, no. 1, 2021; <https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss1/6/>.

<sup>17</sup>'NF teacher', *Grassroots*, vol. 3, no. 5, n.d., c.1970s, p. 10; 'The terrorists of Wandsworth prison', *Grassroots*, October/November 1977, p. 1.

merged with the institutional racism of the British state and the prejudices of wider society. Contained within the black periodical press, then, is a very different political history of Britain.

## White victimhood: white supremacist organisations in recent political history

Where political scientists and historians have dealt with British fascism in contemporary history, they have again been blind to the deeper issues of race and racism. The treatment of the British National Party (BNP) serves as an example. This organisation emerged in 1982 out of splits within the NF following its poor performance in the 1979 general election. From the early 1990s, the BNP attempted to build a 'respectable' reputation around locally-rooted campaigns centred on white victimhood—the notion that white Britons were the real victims of an increasingly multi-ethnic Britain. BNP activists in a branch within Tower Hamlets spearheaded the first of what they called 'Rights for Whites' campaigns. Those campaigns involved the BNP inserting itself into local outrages, such as the stabbing of a white schoolboy by a group of Asian children at a school in Bethnal Green.<sup>18</sup>

From here, the BNP made concerted efforts—with some limited and ultimately unsustainable electoral successes—to present itself as 'a legitimate defender of the white community' in east London against non-white migrants and an out-of-touch disloyal political 'elite'. In the years that followed, votes for BNP candidates in local elections in the area began to increase. In 1993, the BNP candidate, Derek Beackon, was elected as a local councillor in a by-election in Millwall. An ineffective councillor, Beackon only served an eight-month term and the BNP's base of support in the area began to collapse as activists within the group increasingly turned away from

electioneering into terrorism with the formation of Combat-18.<sup>19</sup>

Historians and political scientists have largely refrained from engaging with critical studies of race, and especially of whiteness, in their discussions of the BNP's Rights for Whites campaign. They instead identify the growing prominence of white victimhood in the BNP's campaigning as either an opportunistic appropriation of the local Liberal Democrats' adoption of racist rhetoric in campaigns over housing shortages in east London or as the result of influences external to Britain from the 'Euro-nationalist' French *Front National* and the Austrian Freedom Party. Nigel Copsey also attributes it to the BNP's aping of a 'quasi-liberal' discourse of multiculturalism and ethnic minority rights in vogue at the time.<sup>20</sup> Far from being 'new', the BNP's Rights for Whites campaign constituted a reworking of older themes in white supremacist ideology. As with the UM's defensive calls to 'Keep Britain White' in the 1950s, Rights for Whites reacted against the increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of British society in the 1990s. These themes found a newly receptive audience in the context of a 'white backlash' against perceptions that 'multiculturalism' had gone 'too far' in early 1990s Britain. This recurrent receptiveness to white victimhood narratives reflects the way that such narratives have historically been a consistent and fundamental feature of whiteness beyond white supremacist organisations. The very development of whiteness out of settler-colonial anxieties during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 'was born in the apprehension of imminent loss'.<sup>21</sup> The belief in white supremacy was always tinged with the fear that white people would lose their superior position. Without an

<sup>18</sup>N. Copsey, 'Contemporary fascism in the local arena: the British National Party and "Rights for Whites"', in M. Cronin, ed., *The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996, p. 129.

<sup>19</sup>Copsey, 'Contemporary fascism in the local arena', pp. 125–26; N. Copsey, *Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and the Quest for Legitimacy*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 63–64; M. J. Goodwin, *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*, London & New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 47.

<sup>20</sup>Copsey, *Contemporary British Fascism*, pp. 60, 69; Goodwin, *New British Fascism*, pp. 48–50; Copsey, 'Contemporary fascism in the local arena', p. 131.

<sup>21</sup>M. Lake and H. Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 2.

awareness of critical histories of race, our understanding of the politics of race remains narrowly 'presentist' and trapped in overly complacent discussions of electoral failure.

In the absence of their own electoral success, why have white supremacist organisations remained such a resilient feature of British politics? It is worth noting here that the BNP revived and expanded its Rights for Whites campaigning in the mid-to-late 1990s. By the early 2000s, and in the context of events like the 2001 Oldham riots, it began winning its first local elections since Beakon's 1993 victory. These moderate successes culminated in 2009 with the election of two BNP politicians as Members of the European Parliament for Yorkshire and the Humber. But, again, following a poor performance in the 2010 general election and subsequent 2012 local elections, the party went into decline and has since been eclipsed by other organisations like the English Defence League, Britain First and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Though (with the noted exception of UKIP), these were all similarly uninterested or unsuccessful in electoral politics, the white supremacist movement remains a feature of British politics, if in increasingly fragmented online networks of 'lone wolves'.

The survival of the British white supremacist movement in the absence of electoral success reflects the perpetual allure of its favourite themes: on the one hand, a desire to (re-)establish or intensify white supremacy and, on the other, a lament of white victimhood. White supremacists do not need to win power entirely on their own terms in order to disfigure the political scene, from the influence of white supremacist agitation against the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act to New

Labour's talk of 'British jobs for British workers' (an old NF slogan) in the 2000s.<sup>22</sup> The present-day preoccupation with the plight of the so-called 'white working class' is little more than a mutation of older narratives of white victimhood—narratives that white supremacist organisations have played a key role in articulating. Nor did white supremacist organisations need to win power to endanger the lives of people of colour. They can be found close to the scene of the crime, from Kelso Cochrane's murder in the midst of Mosley's 1959 general election campaign, to the 1993 murder of Stephen Lawrence, committed in an area of south-east London that was also a centre of BNP activity.

This article has sought to show what the field of British political history stands to gain from the incorporation of insights from black history and critical studies of race. It has used these perspectives to re-evaluate the place of white supremacist organisations in British politics across the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century. By returning to these overlooked perspectives, it has argued that British political historians need to focus on racism as an ordinary, rather than aberrant, feature of British politics. Additionally, it has highlighted the limits of analysing election results and called for a focus on other forms of political action, especially when it comes to the relationship between racism and political violence. In doing so, it has shown that British white supremacist movements were merely the most energetic and enthusiastic articulators and enforcers of white supremacy within a broader politics of race in Britain.

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<sup>22</sup>Goodwin, *New British Fascism*, p. 57.