Chapter 9, The Global Strong Arms Versus Global Civil Society

The following chapter is the conclusion to Brian Castellani's book, The Defiance of Global Commitment: A Complex Social Psychology. For more, go to the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Defiance-of-Global-Commitment-A-Complex-Social-Psychology/Castellani/p/book/9780815353171

ABSTRACT
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This chapter begins with a summary of chapters 1 through 8 in order to act as a standalone overview of the main arguments of the book. With this summary complete, its addresses the final three concerns of our study. The first is the rise of the Global Strongarms, those political and cultural leaders who seek to turn people away from their global commitments and to embrace the complex triad of global fear, nostalgia retreatism and global aggression. The second is a prognosis about the near and also future outcome of global life, vis-à-vis the numerous global social problems we presently face. The third explores what can be done, which brings us to our study's conclusion: the besieged triangular conflict, the world-over, between global civil society versus nostalgic retreat and global aggression, which are driven hard by global fear, is a societal manifestation of an evolving psychological drama. In other words, globalization, in all of its complexity, including its global social problems, is a grand-scale window into the interior machinations of the human psyche and its conflicted relationship with others and itself. And so it seems that if we are looking outward to solve the problems of the world and, more specifically, the tripartite problem of retreat-aggression-civility, we are looking the wrong way. The real enemy (and solution) resides within, each of us.

PRÉCIS DE NOS RECHERCHES

While we have arrived finally at the end of our journey, we need to begin with a synopsis of the complex social psychology we have so far assembled. Hence the purpose of this somewhat extended précis:

Our study began with a basic concern, motivated by recent global events, which seemed to suggest that, when viewed together, the latest advances in global civil society were under threat or even siege. A quick list of these countervailing events – by no means representative – included the unexpected Brexit vote; the impossible election of Donald Trump; the upsurge of nationalism throughout Europe; the devolution of the Arab Spring into the Arab Winter; the ascent of Chinese economic imperialism; global warming and disruptive climate change; and the riotous instabilities of the world capitalist system.

More important for us, however, was the realization that all these events, despite their differences, seemed to share a common denominator: they all appeared to be less a failure of policy or politics and more a complex social psychological reaction (and mostly negative) to globalization or, alternatively, global civil society – the results of which presently threaten not only our happiness and wellbeing as a species but also our survival. Globalization, as a reminder, refers to the complex ways in which the world has become more doggedly interconnected; while global civil society refers to the social commitments and

moral responsibilities that the management of this unrelenting interdependence requires, including the global social problems thus created.

We therefore had the impetus for our study: we would seek to assemble a complex social psychology of the defiance of global commitment; and to do so, we would engage in a critical reading of Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). Freud's book, while nearly 90 years old, remains a powerful treatise on the multifaceted ways in which the demands of society and its social problems are an evolutionary constraint upon and yet, simultaneously, a macroscopic manifestation of the darker and more untamed reaches of the human psyche and its mammalian past.

Freud, however, would not be our only source of theoretical inspiration and scientific support. We would also draw upon the latest research in such key fields as paleoanthropology, affective neuroscience, sociological psychology, globalization studies, cognitive science, feminism, poststructuralism and the complexity sciences, as well as such key scholars as Manuel Castells, Patricia Hill Collins, Michel Foucault, Sylvia Walby, and Immanuel Wallerstein. With our focus and framework established, we outlined our study's five main research questions:

- What are the major social psychological tensions that stand in the way of our global commitments?
- How has globalization in all of its complexity fostered or emboldened these tensions?
- How have these tensions led to the defiance of global commitment, and by whom and to what extent?
- How have these tensions and their related defiances helped to create the global social psychological problems we currently face?
- And, finally, how do these tensions, global social psychological problems and defiances challenge the advance of global civil society?

Section I

To answer these questions we began, as one always does, at the beginning, with Freud's first chapter and his preoccupation with the twin topics of oceanic feeling and religion. Disagreeing with Freud's negative assessment of religion, we embraced oceanic feeling as a legitimate psychological experience – redefining it as a type of deeply-felt awareness of the global web of life and one's place within it; what sociologists call a *sociological imagination*; and what complexity scientists call a *complex systems* view of the world. The challenge with this view, however, is that the world seems, at present, to be in open combat over it, as people profoundly disagree with one another over the extent to which we (as a global society) should embrace our shared 'systemic' struggles and our common 'complex' social problems. And there are some very legitimate social psychological reasons for this conflict, including our doomed pursuit of happiness. All of which took us to Chapter 2.

For a whole host of reasons, such as death, the inevitable decay of the body, the harshness of living, and the cruelty of social life, Freud sees happiness as a fated pursuit. And yet humans, it seems, are condemned to do so. We saw that current research supports his claim, suggesting that desires such as happiness and seeking are hardwired into our paleomammalian brain and our affective consciousness, part of our complex instinctual pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Unlike the rest of the animal

kingdom, however, humans also desire to drive expensive cars, own large homes, and consume half the planet to be happy. And, equally important, they do not like global civil society (or anyone for that matter) telling them they cannot – hence the doomed nature of this pursuit: the irony of life is that the greater good of the planet comes from our collective embrace of the psychic restraints and moral demands of society; and yet, because of the broken nature of this embrace, due to the evolutionary limitations of the human psyche, society will always fail us; and yet it still remains our best hope.

Section II:

The same irony is true of global civil society and the impossible promise of globalization. One of the most provocative claims Freud makes in *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (1930) is that the unfolding of society is part of our species' developmental process, given the powerful evolutionary role that social life has served us. Once started, however, the conflicted project of 'society' seems to take on a life of its own – driven ever onward (like some out-of-control cybernetic system) toward greater levels of interconnectivity. One such example is globalization and its commensurate global civil society; with the former driving the world toward near-uninhibited global interdependence, no matter the inequality, instability, destruction or harm; and with the latter desperately seeking to manage it or tame it, at least somewhat; and with everyone else, the world-over, figuring out how to 'game' the global system to their advantage, be it through nostalgic-retreat, an embrace of global civil society, or one form of global aggression or another.

Hence our focus in Chapter 3, which was less a sociological assessment of globalization as-it-is; and instead a social psychological exploration of globalization as it is differently *understood*. This 'explore' as it were, led us to review such globalizing forces as post-industrialism, world systems theory, global network society, and the world capitalist system. It also led us to debate what globalization is, the ways it has succeeded or failed, and for whom and in what ways – and with the varying opinions falling into three major social psychological camps, which people, the world-over, must address within themselves: the *globalist viewpoint*, the *retreating nostalgic viewpoint* and the *global civil society viewpoint*.

And, it is with these insights that we began to construct our catalogue of the different ways people, the world-over, have responded to the forces of globalization and global civil society; what we variously called the complex social psychologies of the world. Examples, which we spent the rest of the book exploring, included fear of the global, eco-primitivism, neoliberalism, nostalgic patriarchy and the globalists.

Before we did, however, we reviewed our Section II Note on Method, which provided several key caveats. First, we pointed out that our catalogue is comprised of a variety of different complex social psychological viewpoints. Some, such as fear of the global, are embraced by almost everyone, while others, such as eco-primitivism, by only a minority of people. Also, most people hold a combination of views. For example, one might support neoliberalism and nostalgic patriarchy, but advocate for global civil society to address racism, poverty and sustainable growth – which goes to another point: people often hold contradictory views. For example, people can be raving nationalists and globalists at the same time. Such are the riddles of the human psyche. As such, we decided that the complex social psychologies we uncovered during our study were best treated as fluid and intersecting, with people

moving in and out of different viewpoints and their associated groups. Finally, we made it clear that our catalogue is neither exhaustive nor all-inclusive; also, given the complexity of the world, it should not be taken too literally or seriously, as it is only a working guide, a scientific trace.

With our catalogue ready, we turned to the issue of global fear and the social psychology of group conflict. Within the dark interiors of the human psyche, individual and group-based *fear of the global* seems the biggest threat to global civil society. At the individual level, the psyche becomes more selfish or defensive or even outright aggressive or hostile, as it seeks to protect or preserve itself and its interests (a.k.a. happiness) against globalization or global civil society's intrusion. Individuals also become highly wary of making sacrifices in a global world that would be to the benefit of others, particularly anyone outside of kin and kind. At the collectivist level, *in-groups* (which can range from kin networks to nations) turn toward themselves, while simultaneously turning away from any *out-group*, which they associate with the forces of globalization or global civil society. Equally important, prompted by a global threat, these in-groups also often shore themselves against the outside world by more severely defining, limiting or identifying with each other. In turn, this 'shoring up' can also lead to aggressive, hostile or violent behavior toward members of the opposing out-group. Examples range from ISIS and Syria to China and North Korea to the increased racial tensions in the States and Africa. It also includes the clash between the easternization and westernization of global society.

With our review of these issues clear, we also spent chapters 3 and 4 exploring those social psychologies that support global civil society. The reader will recall that we also briefly discussed the *globalist* (e.g., pro-global capitalism) view in these chapters, even though it was a primary focus in Chapter 8.

Those who endorse global civil society come in a variety of forms, including many of the international organizations we examined: United Nations, European Union, World Health Organization. Other groups include social democrats, eco-feminists and most of the scholars in the globalization literature. While all of these groups and individuals vary considerably in their arguments and agendas – for example, some are very supportive of globalization and the world capitalist system – they are similar insomuch as they seek to solve the global fear problem. And they all support, in one way or another, the advance of global civil society, ecological and biodiversity responsibility, and global civil rights for everyone. Those in the global civil society camp, however, seem to be, at least in terms of power and position, in the global minority, with the *globalist* viewpoint presently having the upper hand, given the number of politically and economically powerful individuals, groups, organizations and governments that support it. Betwixt and between these two is the *retreating nostalgic* view, which has a particularly strong voice in many globally western and northern societies.

Retreating nostalgia and its related issue of resentment come in a variety of forms. As outlined in Chapter 4, however, not all forms of resentment are nostalgic. For example, there is *resentful affluence*, which embraces globalization but is opposed to any form of global civil society that seeks to restrain or limit the materialist gain of the affluent. And, as readers will recall from Chapter 8, resentful affluents also embrace a continuum of global aggression, ranging from revolving elites and neoliberals to the richest and most powerful global aggressors throughout the world.

In terms of our three main forms of nostalgia, the first was *resentful nostalgia*. The main difference here is that those who endorse this complex social psychology are neither privileged nor affluent. As such, their resentment has to do with the sense of being left behind by globalization. Residing within and across this view are *racial-ethnic nationalism* and *patriarchal nostalgia*. Racial-ethnic nationalism and its populist corollary both support, in one way or another, the rights of local culture, community or society over all else. We saw this resentment, for example, in our exploration of the anti-immigration issue in France, Norway, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. In turn, there is patriarchal nostalgia, which seeks to return (or perpetuate) some type of heterosexist patriarchal past, be it domestic or public.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is *eco-primitivism*. Again, while differences within this complex social psychology exist, the common goal is to return/forward the world to an ecologically sustainable form of existence; therefore, while they are in open revolt against global aggression, they tend to support global civil society. As such, many eco-primitivists also endorse global civil society.

Finally, there is *puritanical nostalgia*, which embraces the traditions of the old-world and its patriarchal, religious and heterosexual dominance, or some traditional variant thereof. These individuals therefore oppose any aspect of globalization or global civil society that counters their worldview, as in the case of secularism or women's rights; however, if some aspect of global society is to their benefit, they may embrace it, as in the case of cyberinfrastructure or global trade. Such a selective embrace of globalization and global civil society by puritanical nostalgics is not necessarily, as we learned from Foucault, a social psychological contradiction, as the truth régimes of every global group seem incongruous to those outside looking in. All of which led us to explore Foucault theory on the relationship between knowledge and power. Put succinctly, people embrace the truths that empower them to achieve the happiness and control they want, no matter how dark or cruel that happiness or control happens to be for others.

This equality of embrace, however, does not make all such approaches equally healthy or therapeutic. But that is a point for later, because, as readers will recall, we needed to turn elsewhere at this point, to follow Freud into the deeper and more ancient and primitive layers of the human psyche.

Section III:
One of the most important claims Freud makes in *The Uneasiness Inherent in Culture* is that if civilization is to secure for people the widest possible happiness for the greatest number of people, it is necessary for global civil society to find effective ways to therapeutically manage and, in turn, effectively police many of the idstincts, drives and dysfunctions of humans. And of these, two sets are absolutely crucial to address, given their central role in our global defiance: sex, sexuality and gender; and aggression, otherness and death. Freud therefore devotes the remainder of his study (Chapters 4 to 8) to examining the extent to which such an effective management is possible or alternatively the extent of its limits. And to do so he famously draws upon his catalogue of psychoanalytic theories and clinically derived insights.

The challenge for us, however, was that while Freud's overall argument remains useful, much of his work is regularly misunderstood, misrepresented and dismissed or, alternatively, requires a significant degree of scholarly advance or, in many instances, deletion or removal. And so we had our focus for chapters 5

and 6. Before proceeding, however, we once again made clear the purpose of our work. Following Foucault, we never sought to assemble a comprehensive social psychology of globalization, as it seemed, given the complexities of life, ridiculous. Instead, our aim was always more modest: we sought to create a theoretical toolkit to make sense of the struggles in which we find ourselves, which others can use as they wish, including modifying it or discarding it altogether, given the different struggles in which they find themselves.

In terms of Chapter 6, our goal was to explore, clarify and advance Freud's twin concepts of drives and idstincts; particularly in relation to evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, which seem overall headed in the wrong direction. And to do so, as readers will recall, we had to get rid of or rethink a number of things. First, we got rid of Freud's empirically indefensible libidinal drive theory, his psychosexual stages of development, and all such pejorative terms as castration anxiety and penis envy. We also had to make clear the difference between idstincts and drives. The former are the domain of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology (i.e., hardwired predispositions which require no learning), while the latter are the domain of psychoanalysis (i.e., psychosomatic urges, like thirst, which require constant management). Both approaches, if taken too literally, are scientifically wrongheaded. However, it they are used as therapeutic devices, they are powerful. Here, as a reminder, are three examples of how such ideas, when taken too seriously, can go wrong.

To begin, what often makes these approaches mistaken is the paleofantasies they create. These fantasies are what paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists call 'just so' retrospective arguments that look to our prehistoric past to explain, in incorrect reductionist fashion, social psychological behaviors in which we engage today.

The other problem is the tendency of these paleofantasies to ignore the important evolutionary role of social life and to therefore treat society as a consequence of our psychic existence rather than part of its cause. From Chomsky to Fodor, critics have cleaned the rot of these arguments, and still they keep coming back. For example, are Americans economically aggressive because of their prehistoric past or because they were recently socialized to succeed in a highly competitive capitalistic society? Seems the answer is mostly the latter, as well as a complex combination of other psychic and socializing forces, such as globalization, nostalgic retreat, the psychic defiance of global civil society, the economic pressures of the world capitalist system, fear of the global, and in-group/out-group conflict.

The third problem with these paleofantasies – for which Freud can be somewhat excused, but contemporary researchers cannot – is the extent to which they limit their literature review to human evolution alone, thereby ignoring the phylogenetic lineages most likely to have actually formed our primitive psychic functioning, namely our paleomammalian past. For example, are humans hardwired to be aggressive because of our prehistoric campfire life, or because our ancestors were omnivorous mammals? And so, to correct these problems, we turned to several fields of study, including paleoanthropology, feminist psychology, cognitive behavioral science, sociological psychology and the complexity sciences.

Of these, however, the two most important were affective neuroscience and the embodied mind literature. Drawing on the former (e.g., Panksepp & Biven 2012), we were able to widen Freud's concept of

idstincts beyond just sex and aggression to include SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. Making such a move also allowed us, readers will recall, to embrace the pro-social aspects of our phylogenetic past, going all the way back to our ancient mammalian emotional past. However, as readers recall, we embraced all of this in a highly critical way, avoiding such errors as the triune brain a (See Herculano-Houzel 2016).

Drawing on the latter (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1993), we were able to ground Freud's tripartite theory of id-ego-superego in an embodied mind perspective, which helped us demonstrate that the human psyche is a complex emergent phenomenon intensely shaped by the socio-ecological environments in which it is situated. This move also allowed us to embrace the evolutionary role of society and to ground the concepts of idstincts and drives in the sociology of emotions and the cognitive behavioral sciences. Most important, however, when put together, this move allowed us to think of the problems of sex, aggression and death as complex social psychologies – situated in a variety of multifaceted socio-ecological systems, including societal drives – and not just simple idstincts or drives.

All of which took us to Chapter 6 and the heart of our study's problem: resistance and defiance. As all therapists are taught: people do not like to change until the pain of changing is worse than the pain of remaining the same; and even then, they do not want to change; and as soon as they try to change, there are others, for the purposes of their own power or dysfunction, who seek to implicitly or explicitly sabotage or destroy this change. In other words, we change in and through our relationships with others, including the groups, communities and societies in which we live, as our change almost always affects someone else. And supposing we do manage to change, it is usually not for long, or only in part – as long-term sustained change is difficult. Plus, all such change requires a reasonable degree of awareness and understanding of the problems we face, which means we (and those in our lives) have to address our cognitive and emotional and societal distortions, as well as the social roles and identities we embrace, and the nuanced ways we each have been socialized to understand ourselves and the world(s) in which we live. And, ultimately, it requires us to address our own well-built psychic and societal resistances to change. And that does not even begin to address changing ourselves for the sake of others, particularly others we do not like or are in conflict with, or even despise and hate; which amounts to restricting, inhibiting and controlling our own pursuit of pleasure or power or happiness for the benefit of these 'others,' who most likely will not reciprocate, and at our own perceived sacrifice and expense. And that is the process for just one of us, let alone an entire group or community or society or the world, where billions of people are involved.

Still, change does take place. In fact, it is a constant of life. Hence another great riddle of our existence: despite all of our resistance and defiance, life never stops changing. The challenge, then, to come back to Freud's mantra, is how to effectively manage all of this complex and conflicted and contradictory change so that the greatest good can be obtained for the greatest number of people; knowing full well that the majority of all such efforts will be in vain or even, potentially, counterproductive; or worse, they might ironically push people – as we see today, the world-over – to actually defy or rebel against their commitments, resulting in the world (or large segments of it) moving in the wrong direction.

And so, to make sense of all of this, at the end of Chapter 6 we needed to engage in an in-depth review of Freud's provocative concepts of repression and resistance. All of which involved us retro-fitting

repression to connect with the current literature on emotional and cognitive distortions, both at the individual and societal level, so that we could, as previously stated, treat the current global social problems we face as complex social psychologies. Still, for all of the hubbub involved in deconstructing and reconstructing these concepts, Freud's basic point remains true, regardless of the social scientific vocabulary in which it is dressed: if you want people to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people, one has to use the tools of therapeutic power to help people engage in healthy repression and resistance. And that is no easy job.

All of which, readers will recall, brought us to our global model of resistance; which helped to move us along in our research in several important ways. First, pace Foucault's theory of power relations and Strauss' concept of negotiated ordering, it allowed us to conceptualize resistance in complex relational terms, with the forces of nontherapeutic power and unhealthy resistance on one side; and on the other, the forces of therapeutic power and healthy resistance. As a quick reminder, *therapeutic power* involves either enforcing or promoting some global civic commitment or, alternatively, unveiling or revealing to individuals and their in-groups some social psychological insight vis-à-vis some global social problem of concern. In both instances, the purpose is beneficial, constructive, curative, or corrective. In turn, *healthy resistance* involves protecting one's self or one's in-group against the non-therapeutic aspects of power, either by refusing to go against one's global social commitments (e.g., *"You cannot make me/us do that!"*) or by resisting unhealthy societal drives that seek to repress, restrict, manage or ruin one's positive pursuit of happiness (e.g., "*Don't force me/us to repress our selves!"*). In their more volatile form, both types of healthy resistance can turn into defiance, civil disobedience or even violence. In contrast, *non-therapeutic* power seeks to oppose, undermine, ruin or rescind the commitments of global civil society; or, alternatively, it seeks to persuade or force people to engage in unhealthy forms of resistance. In either case, the goal is harmful, damaging, or detrimental. In turn, *unhealthy resistance* desires to avoid, ignore, defy or run away from the therapeutic efforts of global civil society (e.g., *"Don't reveal that to me/us!"*); or, alternatively, it reacts negatively to the demands of global civil society (e.g., *"Don't tell me/us what to do!"*) – all of which leads to and involves all sorts of unhealthy coping and defense mechanisms or even violence and aggression.

Second, pace Walby's theory of global inequality, it allowed us to situate our model of resistance within and across the ten intersecting *domains* of which our *global web of life* is comprised. These range from the cultural and ecological to the economic and political (See figures 6.3, and 6.4 in Chapter 6).

Finally, it allowed us to formally conceptualize the major global social problems we currently face – from racism and global inequality to political aggression and disruptive climate change – as complex social psychological problems, which emerge both from the ground up and the top down. And so we came to the end of Section 3 with a working model of our complex social psychology of globalization intact.

Section IV:

Still, as readers will recall, we had a bit more work to do, as we ultimately assembled our model to delve in-depth into two of the most important sets of social psychological tensions that Freud (and we) see as crucial to the success of society, global or otherwise. Both have been mentioned. The first set, which Chapter 7 addressed, is sex, sexuality and gender, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and

intersex issues – which we will refer from here on out as LGBTQI. The second set, which Chapter 8 addressed, is aggression, otherness and the death instinct. As concerns these two sets of tensions, however, our initial five questions required a slight rewrite. In their slightly revised form, they were as follows:

- How have the social psychological tensions of sex, aggression and death stood in the way of our global commitments?
- How has globalization in all of its complexity fostered or emboldened these tensions?
- How have these tensions led to the nontherapeutic and unhealthy defiance of global commitment, and by whom and to what extent?
- How have these tensions and their defiance, across the ten domains of the global web of life, helped to create the global social psychological problems we currently face?
- And, finally, how have these tensions, defiances and global social psychological problems challenged the therapeutic power and healthy resistance of global civil society?

Of the various criticisms leveled against Freud, the most damaging are the centrality of his libidinal theory, his patriarchy and his heterosexism. As a reminder, here are the critiques quickly summarized. First, while sex is psychologically important, it is not humanity's psychological *raison d'être* (Foucault 1990a). Second, Freud's theory is patriarchal insomuch as it is unapologetically phallocentric, treating society as the domain of men, and with gender being a basic dualism. Third, despite all of his rebellion against Bourgeoisie values – including his progressive belief that lesbian and gay and bisexual individuals should not be asked to change who they are – Freud nonetheless privileged heterosexuality and male sexual desire above all else, and in so doing saw female hetero-sexuality and LGBTQI individuals as marginal, deviant or simply not important.

And so, we were faced a challenge: we could continue to discard Freud's libidinal theory as patriarchal folly and move along (as we did earlier); or we could analyze it head-on and for what it is, in the hopes of using our analysis to illustrate what global civil society is up against vis-à-vis sexuality and gender. We chose the latter – which provided, I believe, reasonable results.

As a form of update, Chapter 7 began with a review of a rather long list of terms related to sex, sexuality and gender, including such concepts as sexual identity, homo-oppression, and feminism. From there we proceeded to review Freud's patriarchal heterosexism and his 'just so' paleofantasy; which tries to explain how, moving from our prehistorical past to the present, civilization slowly emerged out of the effective repression of male sexuality and out of the confinement of sex to the marital bed of the conjugal family. And it is here, through Freud's paleofantasy, that one catches a glimpse of how the nuclear family mythos and its gendered-division-of-labor was born; and how this Foucaultian truth régime chafes at the anthropological realities of the pre-modern, modern, and postmodern family life of global society, in all of its incredible and contradictory diversity. Here also, in this paleofantasy and its corresponding mythos, emerges the unhealthy 'straight' jacket of heterosexism, as it constrains, forces, demands or, at minimum, seeks to non-therapeutically regulate or reduce the rainbow of human sexual diversity into a singular set of sexual practices and ways of caring for self and others. And, it is through the non-therapeutic implementation of these practices that the sexual wants, dreams or desires of heterosexual women and the LGBTQI communities (despite their healthy resistance) are made irrelevant, deviant or pathological. Or,

worse, they are rigidly and forcefully oppressed, erased, punished or destroyed, as in the case of severe forms of homo-oppression and patriarchy.

So, we asked in the second third of Chapter 7, what are the global consequences of the hegemony of heterosexist patriarchy and the reactive views of nostalgic and puritanical patriarchy? The statistics are grim: from rape and sexual assault to prostitution and human trafficking to the inequalities of domestic and public patriarchy to homo-oppression and physical violence, women and the LGBTQI communities continue, the world-over, to be exploited, dominated and oppressed by patriarchal heterosexist civilization. As such, patriarchal heterosexism (including patriarchal and puritanical nostalgia) remains one of the most dominant forms of unhealthy resistance and non-therapeutic power standing in the way of the global civil rights of women and the LGBTQ communities – and with heterosexual men continuing to resist or defy their global accountability or any such therapeutic pressure to share the power, be it at home, public life or the workplace.

So, what can be done? As we discussed throughout our study, ours has never been an investigation into solving things; instead, we have focused on helping others better understand some of our collective global struggles, primarily by uncovering what most globalization scholars have ignored, namely the complex social psychological roots of these problems. Still, there is significant value is examining how global civil society is trying to address such truculent social psychological issues like patriarchal heterosexism, particularly as they have emerged across the ten domains of our global web of life. As such, for the final third of Chapter 7 we generated a sociological report card of the world today; with the scorecard being hopelessly general and, in large measure, limited; but, sufficient enough, we hoped, that others could make better use of it.

While we cannot summarize our report card here, I think readers will agree that most of the conflicted advances we reviewed were manifestations, in one form or another, of Foucault's take on biopower – that is, the proliferation of therapeutic body-based techniques and strategies bent on securing for people the 'right' to use their bodies to defy suffering, oppression, domination or exploitation and to achieve happiness, health, freedom, and power. And all of it grounded in Foucault's inversion of Freud's idea that sexuality and reproductive success drive the *cultural domain*. For Foucault, the better research question, at least for today, is: what creative practices of culture are emerging out of the new forms of gender and sexuality people are *choosing* to express, including how these new forms are redefining heterosexism, patriarchy and traditional notions of family, domestic life, economy, work, politics and, ultimately, the distributions of gender-based power relations?

With our exploration of Foucault's research question complete, we moved along to Chapter 8 and our second set of tensions: aggression, otherness, and death. Perhaps one of the greatest motifs of human existence is the battle between good and evil. On the one side are the protagonists and those who fight for life and what it right; and on the 'other' side are the antagonists and those who seek, through their cruelty and their aggressions, to dominate the world or ruin it.

The power and also danger of this motif – vis-à-vis the issue of in-group/out-group conflict – is its simplicity, as it tends to divide the world into the cardboard categories of 'us' and 'them.' And with the

obvious social psychological implication being that we (you and me) are always the 'us,' the protagonists; and they, the 'other,' will never be us, as we will never be them.

Add some global fear and nostalgic retreat to this motif, along with the cognitive and emotional distortions of the human psyche and group life, and you have a potentially dangerous situation on your hands. Which we presently do: war, genocide, terrorism, racism, ethnic conflict, cultural and religious intolerance, ecological destruction, famine, the refugee crisis, resistance to global civil rights, patriarchy, predatory capitalism, inequality, poverty, discrimination, the list just keeps going; and all of it, in one form or another, is an act of aggression.

As readers will recall, for Freud there is no single greater threat to the goals of global civil society than aggression and its associated distortions. In fact, he considered the threat so incessantly damaging to any collective chance at happiness that, in the later years of his life, he reworked his theory of personality, expanding it to become a battle between the forces of Eros (libido and life) and Thanatos (aggression and death).

For Freud, the problem with aggression is that, similar to sexual craving, we deal with it by externalizing it; that is, by releasing it on 'others' and by treating these 'others' as the objects of our angers, hostilities, resentments, cruelties and aggressive desires, fears and abuse. In other words, as a core component of our psychic and social existence, aggression is fundamentally relational, be it reactive or proactive. In short, find someone engaging in an aggression, and you will also find the victim of its release, the 'other.'

As readers will recall, we reviewed several forms of otherness, most notably, the otherness of the powerful and that of the oppressed. In both instances, there is this sense, in the face of global pressures, that one is the victim of or, alternatively, the protagonist against some enemy. In the case of the oppressed, however, the perception is generally real; while in the case of the powerful, it seems more a frame of mind – which we will discuss again momentarily. Either way, the result is conflict.

Hence our global model of resistance: daily we live our lives in a conflicted battle of aggressive attack and resistance against each other and ourselves, with fear a major motivator. As readers will recall, some of these aggressions, which we reviewed across the ten domains of our global web of life, are base and crude, as in the case of mental abuse and sexual assault. Others are more systemic, as in the case of institutional racism and political oppression. Others, still, are even more subtle and sophisticated: complex healthcare legislation aimed at hurting the chronically ill and the elderly; marketplace policies that perpetuate white-collar crime; and politicians and social media outlines that foster a cultural climate of aggressiveness, bullying, ignorance, intolerance and hate.

And then there is violence and death. Broken criminal justice systems, police brutality, illegal arms trafficking, sectarian violence, petro-dictatorships, terrorism, mass shootings, genocide, domestic and racial violence, unbridled consumption of the planet's resources, disruptive global climate change, ecological destruction, the ruin of the planet's biodiversity. Humans, Freud makes clear, can be very wicked creatures. And we almost always engage in our aggressions while assuming that we are the justified protagonists in the story, and with those 'others' being the evil ones.

Which took us to another point: aggression is not always for the 'perceived' bad, as it can also be for the 'perceived' good. Also, aggression can be entirely instrumental and without much emotion, as in the case of the criminal justice system or the 'justified' punishment of wrongdoers. In short, aggression is a complex social psychology.

It is also, more recently, a social psychological reaction to globalization and global civil society, as we saw, for example in the case of *revolting elitism* and *global aggressors* – which takes us back to the 'otherness' of the powerful. Revolting elitism is found within the ranks of any country's meritocracy and the professionals that make up global network society; overlapping with this mindset is affluent resentment. These are the individuals against whom the working and lower classes have been recently in open revolve – the liberal elite (be they in academia, government, the EU, the United Nations, global corporations, the stock market, etc) whom working folks and the poor see as making sure they get everything while leaving nothing behind, and also passing policies that benefit only the affluent at the expense of the rest. Revolting elite also tend to be a herd of cats, as they lack a sense of social solidarity, given how competitively driven they are to guarantee for only themselves and their kin (and little else) the best schooling, neighborhoods, homes, jobs, healthcare, and so on and so forth.

And then there are the global aggressors, which take revolting elitism to the next level in terms of privilege, wealth and power, constituting the top most privileged one percent of global society. The key here, however, is the full arsenal of aggression available to these individuals to make the world as they desire it to be. The result of which amounts to a type of game of thrones, with the powerful pitted against one another and with the rest of the world paying the price for their anti-social hostilities, be it through war or ecological ruin or the instabilities of the world capitalist system.

All of which took us to Freud's concept of Thanatos. As we mentioned earlier, Freud saw the development of society as part of our species' evolutionary process; what he called Eros, the life instinct. In other words, social life is internal to and necessary for the healthy and mature psychic evolution of the human mind. Still, there is always that part of our creature consciousness that rebels against and seeks to defy our sociality, wanting instead to pursue its uninhibited id-based desires. In other words, there is a side of the human psyche that constantly seeks to tear things apart in order to be free of the constraints of global civil society and its moral compass; particularly if those constraints are 'perceived' as onerous or oppressive. And it is the individual's desire to raze society (or one's self) to the ground that Freud called our *death instinct*.

Interestingly enough, social groups and societies can likewise enact their own death instinct, tearing themselves apart for a whole host of reasons. For example, moving through Chapter 8, we saw such self-attacking behavior in Brexit, the Arab Spring, the election of Trump, the sectarian violence in Africa, and the wanton ecological devastation China is causing itself through its uninhibited pursuit of global expansion and material wealth. And, as these different cases demonstrated, some of these aggressions can be for the greater good, while others are not; and with most of them being somewhere in the moral middle.

So what are we to do? Readers will remember Freud's answer. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves, including our enemies! This is the commandment, in all of its absurd ironic simplicity, which

Freud presents to us. Even though our neighbors and our enemies most likely deserve our wrath, and we theirs, some type of negotiated sacrifice and compromise ultimately needs to be made; otherwise, we will all go down fighting, and with very few winners in the end, if any.

It is for this reason, Freud argues, that society promotes the developmental manifestation, as we move into adulthood, of the *superego* – a counteracting psychic force equal to our aggressions, which causes us to internalize the damage we seek to do to others, and to turn this aggression back at ourselves in the reversed form of guilt and shame. As readers will recall, for some, as in the case of psychopaths, the superego's psychic development never takes place; and for others of us, it is, at best, dulled; and still, for others, it can take on a neurotic form, as in the case of far-too-much-anxiety-ridden religious guilt.

Whatever the level, the superego is one of society's greatest gifts. So is its corresponding cultural superego; which, for the Dali Lama, emerges in the philosophy of kindness; and for sociologists, in the form of pro-moral socialization and in the development and embrace of societal rules, laws, mores, norms, sanctions, beliefs, legal procedures, codes, religious writings, courts of law, criminal procedures, lawyers, judges, police, soldiers, systems of surveillance, and so forth; and for us, in the form of global civil society and our corresponding global commitments. All of which took us to our central theme.

THE TRIPARTITE PROBLEM

I think it safe to say that, over the past handful of decades, globalization and, in turn, fear of the global have driven hard on people, the world-over. In response, the human psyche has seemed conflicted and torn.

On one hand there is the desire for primitive retreat, to pull away from globalization to some former and more desirable past. We currently see this in the case of such complex social psychologies as resentful nostalgia, racial-ethnic nationalism, puritanical nostalgia, eco-primitivism, and patriarchal nostalgia. And we saw it, to an even wider extent, in the non-therapeutic perpetuation of heterosexist patriarchy, in both its domestic and public forms, as well as the perpetuation of homo-oppression and unhealthy resistance to the advance of LGBTQI and women's rights.

On the other hand there is the desire for aggression, both on the part of individuals and the larger groups to which they belong. This aggression also exists, currently, in a variety of social psychological forms, manifesting itself across all ten domains of global web of life: from economic and political aggression to institutional racism and violence to nationalism and terrorism to war and ecological destruction. It also includes the global aggressors and such related mindsets as neoliberalism, affluent resentment, revolting elitism, and the otherness of power. It also includes everyday people, the world-over, anxiously competing with one another to secure their niche in the sociocybernetic infrastructure of global network society and the world capitalist system. And, finally, in terms of the death instinct, it includes the desire, through any number of means, to tear globalization apart, to raze global civil society to the ground, and to defy our global commitments.

Standing in the psychic way, however, is global civil society, the evolving manifestation of the intersection of our individual and cultural superegos. Equal in its aggression, it too makes its demands

known, requiring each of us to *"Love our neighbors, including our enemies, as ourselves"* and to deal with our retreating fears, our resentments and our aggressions, and to embrace such related healthy and pro-societal psychologies as kindness, forgiveness, sacrifice, tolerance, negotiation, compromise, maturity and growth. And all of it done to procure for the greatest number of people the best and perhaps only chance at the slightest bit of happiness, knowing full well that such a promise, given the frailties of the humanity, can never ultimately be kept, as globalization and global civil society are, ultimately, an ill-fated project to which we presently seem nonetheless condemned to pursue.

And so we come to our theme: the besieged triangular conflict, the world-over, between nostalgic retreat, global aggression, and global civil society, all deeply embroiled in global fear, is actually a societal expression of an evolving psychological drama played out between our idstinctual drives and our complex social psychologies on the one hand, and our superegos on the other; and with our egos in the middle, driven by the reality principle, seeking to manage it all. And it is a drama occurring amongst all 7.5 billion of us as we collide into other another to produce the global world in which we live. And with all of it socio-historically situated within and influenced by the wider social mediums in which we are situated, from our social groups and communities to our cities and countries to our regions and global networks. In other words, globalization, in all of its complexity, including the global social problems it has created – from economic instabilities to ecological ruin – is both the cause and consequence of the interior machinations of the human psyche and its globally-conflicted relationship with others and itself.

And so it seems that, in many ways, if we are looking outward to solve the problems of the world and, more specifically, the tripartite problem of retreat-aggression-civility, we are missing half the picture. The enemy also resides within … each of us.

The challenge, however, is that unhealthy resistance to this insight seems all around us, championed by the non-therapeutic social power of those who would have us do otherwise. All of which takes us to the rise of the *Global Strongarms*.

THE GLOBAL STRONGARMS

Since the dawn of civilization, humanity, it seems, has always been under threat of what scholars and historians have variously called the *Strongarms* of the world. When hearing the name, one thinks almost immediately, for example, of the great empires of history: Egyptian, Greek, Mayan, Aztec, Inca, Roman, Persian, Chinese, Spanish, British, Russian, and, most recently, American – along with the massive national and regional-global dominance they variously obtained. One also thinks, on second reflection, of some of history's most notorious and ruthless Kings and Queens, Emperors and Dictators, Fascists and Despots, Popes and Crusades, Tyrants and Bullies. And, becoming even more specific, one thinks of the 20th century and the rise of fascism and the imperialist pursuit of regional-world dominance in places like Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan and the worldwide horror, cruelty, destruction and death they caused. On a more academic level, one thinks of the field of political psychology, as in the case of such classics as Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* and Adorno and colleagues' *The Authoritarian Personality*, which sought to make sense of the authoritarian and fascist mindset that arose during World War II and the holocaust – both in terms of the Strongarms of the period (Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, etc) and in terms of those that

supported them (e.g., Martin 2001). More specifically, they wanted to know if such a mindset constituted a particular personality type, or, alternatively, a particular social psychological makeup?

The answer, after some fifty years of subsequent research, seems to be most likely no (e.g., Martin 2001). Instead, as most historians rigorously emphasize, the better explanation is that the rise of a Strongarm is contextually and historically sensitive and therefore shifts over time and place, based on the particular set of social psychological and political and socioeconomic conditions in which the Strongarm is situated. Such 'sensitivity to initial conditions' also helps to define who or what the Strongarm is, as well as those who do and do not support them.

All of which brings us to the present. Today, circa 2018, the Strongarms of the world seem, once again on the rise: from president Vladimir Putin of Russia and president Xi Jinping of China, to Marine le Pen of France and president Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, to president Donald Trump of the United States and president Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, to the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban.[i]

These individuals, whom we will call *Global Strongarms,* differ from the previous, however, in two key ways. First, the majority of them are heads of states or leaders of political or social movements in countries where some form of democratic governance exists, be it parliamentary, presidential, etc. For example, the rise and reign of a Strongarm like Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, differs considerably from the rise of a Global Strongarm, like Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary. Related, given these differences in political structure, one cannot as easily make the link between the social psychology of a non-democratic country and the corresponding rise of its Global Strongarm. In other words, given the significant difference in the political arrangements of other countries, the rise of Global Strongarms in democratic countries differs considerably from the Strongarms of the rest of the world. Dictatorships, totalitarian regimes, etc – these are not the chosen forms of government within which most people seek to live or pursue happiness, be it a globalized world or not. Second, their positions of power are, in large measure, a function of their views on globalization and global civil society, which resonate with those who support them. And so we have our current focus, which seeks to address two questions:
- What set of unhealthy or nontherapeutic social psychological conditions gave rise to these Global Strongarms?
- How does these Global Strongarms, in turn, use non-therapeutic power to impact the social psychology of the countries in which they hold power, particularly to get those who support them to defy their respective global commitments?

What Gives Rise to the Global Strongarms?
Of our two questions, our first is the one we have devoted almost the full of our study to examining. Looking back at the insights we have achieved, I think it safe to say that, while variations across countries exists, the initial conditions that give rise to the Global Strongarms seems to be three things:

The first are institutional, socioeconomic and political, with a strong emphasis on inequality and a restriction or even collapse in opportunities for the lower and middle-segments of society. It also includes entrenched governmental ineffectiveness; the rise of meritocracy and revolting elitism; the upsurge of

within-country global aggressors (stock markets, financial investors, corporations, etc); the increasing competitiveness of racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants; the 'supposed' spread of secular liberalism; growing multiculturalism; and the rising tide of various global threats (i.e., terrorism, world markets, foreign competitors, etc), which are seen as due, in large measure, to the ineffective ways the respective country is dealing with the forces of globalization and the restrictions and demands of global civil society.

Related to these conditions is the upswing in the legitimacy and reach of the *agents of defiance* and their arguments. Again, while variations exist, including their motives for doing so, the agents of defiance share a common theme insomuch as they blame global civil society (and, more specifically, liberal and secular elites and the governments, academic institutions, scientific organizations, media outlets, and other public institutions they run) for the problems of globalization. Some of which these agents of defiance argue may be 'trumped up,' as in the case of racism or ethnic conflict or ecological issues and disruptive climate change. And, while our name for these agents is new, our review of their various social movements is not. Readers will recall, for example, we discussed these movements in Chapter 3 during our review of social media and global network society and while assembling our global report cards in chapters 7 and 8. Having made this point, we also need to make clear that the agents of defiance vary greatly in their degree of dissent; as well as the level of civil unrest they seek to pursue; the degree to which they embrace various forms of global aggression or nostalgic retreat; and, also, the legitimacy of their concerns about the failed promises of global civil society, some of which are actually accurate and empirically valid. For example, revolting elitism is a major social problem.

Still, accurate or not, the combination of these conditions 'stokes the flames' of global fear and resentment; which, in turn, leads to a significant rise in the complex social psychologies (and their nuanced intersection) we have sought to address in this study, most notably the tripartite problem that exists between nostalgic retreat, global aggression and global civil society. And so it seems, in summary, that in those countries where a critical mass regarding all of the above conditions has been reached, a tipping point takes place, out of which emerges the Global Strongarms.

The Defiance of the Global Strongarms

The real question for us, however, is the second issue: how Global Strongarms use their non-therapeutic power to influence the unhealthy social psychology of those who support them, mostly in an effort to persuade them to resist or defy their respective global commitments. As with our first question, we have been exploring this issue throughout our study, albeit indirectly. But first we require a caveat. Given our sensitivity to differences based on initial conditions, what follows is only a *minimal definition*; that is, it is a review of the smallest amount of information necessary to characterize someone as a Global Strongarm.

Global Strongarms Defined:

As concerns global civil society and the defiance of global commitments, Global Strongarms are distinct in several key ways. To begin, they acknowledge the very real complaints that large (and mostly conservative) segments of the upper to lower socioeconomic ranks have about the institutional, socio-economic and political conditions that threaten their respective happiness, including a strong emphasis on inequality and the collapse of opportunities for these segments of society. Even more important: they embrace these arguments in a way that their opponents on the Left seem unable to accomplish. We saw

this, for example, in the pro-Brexit movement; the nationalist movement in the Netherlands; Marine Le Pen's ability to co-opt the pro-labor economic arguments of the French Left; and in the anti-immigration movements in Germany; as well as with Putin in Russia.

And here is the other key difference: unlike the political and cultural Left (however defined in a particular country), the Global Strongarms actively support the complex social psychologies of nostalgic retreat and global aggression, from revolting elitism and nostalgic heterosexist patriarchy to affluent resentment and ecological aggression. And that is why such large (mostly conservative) segments of the upper to lower ranks of society tend to support them. For example, looking at exit poll statistics from the 2016 United States presidential race, those who voted for Trump were older, mostly male, less educated, Christian, religious, married, Republican, middle to upper level incomes, and predominantly white.[ii] Exit polls also suggested that these individuals saw the country as 'off track' and immigration and terrorism as the top issues; they also felt they were 'worse off' today than previous; and they overwhelming supported deporting illegal immigrants and building a wall between the States and Mexico; were also angry that government was not working; and one of the reasons they voted for Trump was their desire to see things change.[iii] But here, also, is another key statistic: Trump won amongst those voters who waited until the last two months or even the last few days of the election.[iv]

Even more important, the Global Strongarms seem to believe that retreating nostalgics and global aggressors (as well as the agents of defiance) see the world correctly – unlike the biased cultural or political Left or the prejudiced stewards of global civil society (again, however these groups or mindsets are defined in a particular country). Even more, the Global Strongarms believe that the retreating nostalgic and globally aggressive way of viewing the world, along with the fear and resentments and cognitive and emotional distortions upon which it is based, will make things better again. And, it is here, through this point and the previous, that it becomes clear why the Global Strongarms resonate so well with the complex nostalgic and aggressive social psychological and socioeconomic and political conditions out of which they emerge.

Ironically enough, however, the Global Strongarms only seem to indirectly accuse globalization itself for the problems of their society, given the important role that global markets, the world capitalist system, and their country's respective global aggressions plays in their society's wealth and power. Instead, they blame the problems of globalization on global civil society, or certain key aspects of it – again, some of which is legitimate critique, which is what gives these arguments their air of believability. One example would be the Brexit critique of EU trade regulations that economically stifle the UK; despite all of the relative benefits gained.

Which goes to our next point: to make these arguments, Global Strongarms (and the agents of defiance) often ignore the facts on an issue; seeking instead to ground their arguments in the global fears, resentments, anger, anxieties, inequalities, conflicts, and 'otherness' of people. This approach has led some to say Western society has become a *post-fact society*. Post-fact society is defined as: (a) the postmodern state of being able to say things because they feel right and without worry about their factual basis; (b) feigning balance when, in fact, the arguments being set forth are highly biased or lacking factual evidence; or (c) delegitimizing real news, facts and science as fake or biased because these sources counter one's views or opinions of beliefs.[v]

We note here, also, how a post-fact approach links with the cognitive and emotional distortions and self-defeating beliefs we explored in Chapter 6. Also, a post-fact view is not confined to the political right or Global Strongarms. It also emerges on the cultural and political left; mainly through the extremes of postmodern identity politics, where one's intersectionality can become more important than the facts of what is said. For example, there are those who assert that the dominant heterosexual ethnicity of a country can never speak to the inequalities of minorities or the LGBTQI communities because they are part of the patriarchal heterosexist, racist majority. It can also lead some with such views to also endorse a Global Strongarm, as in the case of Labor in Germany or France supporting nostalgic nationalism because the leftist elite of the EU does not understand their struggles. In turn, revolting elites often embrace a self-affirming, fact-less view of the working and middle classes as somehow ignorant or unaware of the global world(s) in which they live. Again, it keeps going… And all of its preyed upon by the Global Strongarms.

Which takes us to the next point: Global Strongarms defy global civil society in a way that pits people against one another (both within their own country and the world-over), primarily by exploiting their opposing sense of 'otherness' – be it perceived or real. In other words, they persuade people (including those who are opposed to them, as in the case of the cultural and political left) to give up on agreement and such healthy defense mechanisms as tolerance, negotiation and compromise; and to instead embrace their individual and group-based cognitive and emotional distortions, as well as their unhealthy or pathological defense mechanisms and self-defeating beliefs.

Global Strongarms also seek to convince a sufficient number of people that, in the interests of their pursuit of happiness, it is best to turn away from, resist or even outright defy their larger global commitments. The reason being that sacrifice and kindness are a 'zero-sum game,' which will benefit their out-groups and enemies while simultaneously bringing about their own ruin. And, as support, they tend to identify a scapegoat or some combination of enemies (e.g., elites, immigrants, scientists, etc), whom they implicitly or explicitly blame for the current ills of society. And, as we have hopefully made clear throughout our study, they do so whether such individuals or groups are correctly to blame or not.

And, finally, they promise their supporters that, if they follow the Global Strongarm and do all of the above their society will once again become safe and secure. And, equally important, it will become, once again, great!

THE ADJACENT POSSIBLE

So, given all that we have learned in our study, what are those of us who support global civil society to do? I believe there are several things that can be done, all of which have as their aim the complex social psychology of globalized life today. And with the knowledge, of course, that these solutions go hand-in-hand with changes at the policy level, which seek to address the institutional, socioeconomic, political, and ecological challenges people, the world-over, presently face.

First, we need to start with the facts. The conditions and forces of globalization constitute the current form of societal organization through which we, as a global society, are evolving. And this is true for those societies with our without Global Strongarms and with or without democratic process.

Second, along with these conditions, one also needs to acknowledge, in very real ways, that there are those (e.g., individuals, groups, companies, governments) that will always, in various ways, actively resist or defy their global commitments, be it implicitly or explicitly, or consciously or unconsciously. Or worse, they will actively seek to hurt, harm and destroy or, alternatively, exploit, dominate and oppress others – all for their own joy and happiness. Examples include the unbridled consumption behaviors of many western societies; the active embrace of heterosexist patriarchy throughout most of the world; the perpetuation of homophobia and racism and ethnic conflict; humanity's continued usage of violence, war and terrorism to solve problems; and our nearly uninhibited decimation of the environment.
Third, one must be willing to acknowledge that, given the current battle over global civil society taking place the world-over (from the aggressions of China and India to the internecine conflicts of Africa and the Middle East to the retreatism of Europe and the United States), things may be going backwards or, at best, improving in highly contradictory ways – at least in terms of global civil rights, reduced inequality, and increased wellbeing for the lives of the oppressed.

Related, global civil society, at least for the foreseeable future, will most likely, at best, stumble along, with a very limited degree of impact or power. And we will most likely ecologically ruin our world, resulting in a diminished way of life for most people the world-over (particularly the most vulnerable), and with the economic divide amongst the affluent and the rest of the world becoming worse rather than better; and with the global aggressors coming out on top, as they almost always do. In other words, I currently see no happy ending for most of the world, whether globalization continues (as the globalists desire) or comes to a screeching halt (as the nostalgics want), as the global social problems we have created for ourselves will continue to exist either way. As such, our adjacent possible will have to continue lingering in the shadows, waiting.

Still, no matter how bleak our portrait, it seems to me that, only by acknowledging these complex social psychological realities, as Freud suggests we do, that we can truly sustain the long-haul of nonetheless trying to make the world a better place.

Fourth, one needs to acknowledge, embrace, and ultimately address the conditions and concerns of those who oppose global civil society; otherwise they will continue to fall prey to the nontherapeutic power and unhealthy resistance of the Global Strongarms of the world; or any such related social movements. An excellent example of this point in the States is Joan Williams's 27 May 2017 New York Times article, *The Dumb Politics of Elite Condescension*. As both a highly regarded feminist legal scholar and Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California, Williams makes it clear that unless the conditions and concerns of those who voted for Trump are embraced, their related fears and resentments will continue to "morph in ugly ways." Alternatively, however, by embracing and working with these fears and resentments, there is a chance to change minds and improve life, as Williams explains, "not just for some groups, but for all groups." For example, as we saw earlier, many of those who voted for Trump only chose him as a candidate in the final hours.

One can read our fourth point, as well, in part, as a complex social psychological reaction to the aggressiveness of the cultural superego of global civil society. As readers will recall, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud was very much concerned not only with how people restricted their desires and pursuits for the betterment of society; but also, how global civil society would reimburse, offset or reward this deprivation – see the end of Chapter 4 of our study. The reason being that, otherwise neurosis (both individually and socially) will emerge (1930, p. 75). As such, Freud wanted to know the various ways civilization would provide people other and more pro-social pursuits and outlets so as to keep people participating in society, rather than defying or rebelling against it.

A similar concern can be made in terms of those who oppose global civil society today – be they living under the influence of a Global Strongarm of not. We need to find more therapeutic ways to mange the 'perceived' or 'real' aggressions of the cultural superego of global civil society. An example is the 'punishing' tone that tends to go with discussions about ecological issues and disruptive global climate change. Some have argued, for example, that to help people actually change their behaviors, you have to engage in positive messages and what is now called, for example, *nudging behavior* – the behavioral science technique of helping people make small but key incremental changes that have a large, emergent, macroscopic effect, as in the case of health and environmental behaviors or more efficient financial and workplace decisions or working better in highly diverse groups.

But, that is not the end to it. While addressing the concerns of those who rebel against global civil society, one also needs to continue to support the healthy social psychological resistance of those struggling against the non-therapeutic powers of heterosexist patriarchy, homo-oppression, racism, xenophobia, ecological destruction, health inequalities, human trafficking, physical violence, and all other forms of global aggression.

Finally, and by way of summary, the most important thing one can do is use the tools of therapeutic power to help ourselves, as individuals, more effectively struggle with the global tripartite problem of retreat-aggression-civility, as manifested within the interiors of our own psyches, so that we can embrace our oceanic existence and find a more mature and healthier happiness.

I had the good fortunate several years ago to have a small group of Tibetan Buddhists visit our campus of Kent State University, mostly to discuss the challenges of living in a global society. After some rather extensive discussion, one of the students asked, "Given the level of suffering in the world, what is one person to do?" To which one of the monks immediately replied, "Are your parents still living? Do you have family or friends? Do you live in a community of which you are a part? If so, just focus on taking care of them." I spent years reflecting on the monk's comment, as it seemed all too simple. Certainly so much more could be done. But, the more I thought about it, the more it seemed correct: rearranging the interior of our psyches is not only difficult work, it requires, as my Dad pointed out, healthy relationships – be it on any given Sunday or any other day of the week – all in our broken effort, as humans, to embrace the simplest and most difficult of all the commandments, "*To love our neighbors as ourselves, including our enemies.*"

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[i] See www.thetimes.co.uk/article/hungarian-leader-hails-fall-of-west-s-liberal-elite-02qxg0lqh

[ii] . For more on the statistics on the Presidential Election, see The New York Times Election 2016: Exit Polls: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html?

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] For more, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-truth_politics; or www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/opinion/campaign-stops/the-age-of-post-truth-politics.html